Boards of Trustees of the Cement Masons & Plasterers Health & Welfare Trust v. Leewens Corporation

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01626
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE CASE NO. 2:23-cv-01626-TL CEMENT MASONS & PLASTERERS 12 HEALTH & WELFARE TRUST et al., ORDER ON MOTION FOR 13 Plaintiffs, VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL v. 14 LEEWENS CORPORATION, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. Dkt. No. 19 14. Having considered Defendant’s Response (Dkt. No. 16), Plaintiffs’ Reply (Dkt. No. 22), and 20 the relevant record, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion. 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a) governs the voluntary dismissal of an action 22 in federal court, and provides that unless a plaintiff files a notice of dismissal before the 23 opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment, or the parties 24 stipulate to the dismissal of the action, “[a]n action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request 1 only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. § 41(a)(2). “In 2 the Ninth Circuit, the decision to grant a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to 3 the sound discretion of the district court,” and such motions should be “liberally granted, as long 4 as no other party is prejudiced.” Mayes v. Fujimoto, 181 F.R.D. 453, 458 (D. Haw. 1998) (first

5 citing Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980), then citing LeCompte v. 6 Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976)). Thus, the Court must consider whether 7 Defendant will suffer “plain legal prejudice” as a result of dismissal, which is shown “where 8 actual legal rights are threatened or where monetary or other burdens appear to be extreme or 9 unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S., 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). 10 Because Defendant asserts that it consents to the dismissal of all causes of action by 11 Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 16 at 1), the Court finds that it would suffer no legal prejudice as a result of 12 dismissal. Grant of Plaintiffs’ request for voluntary dismissal is therefore appropriate. 13 However, the Court agrees with Defendant’s contention that voluntary dismissal pursuant 14 to Rule 41 does not deprive the Court of the ability to adjudicate fees and costs. See Cooter &

15 Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (“It is well established that a federal court 16 may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending . . . . Thus, even ‘years after 17 the entry of a judgment on the merits’ a federal court could consider an award of counsel fees.’” 18 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 19 (1982))). Consequently, the Court expressly retains jurisdiction over any forthcoming motion for 20 fees and costs by Defendant. 21 // 22 // 23

24 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (Dkt. No. 14) 2 and STRIKES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 17) as moot. Defendant is 3 ordered to file any motion for fees and costs by no later than March 7, 2025. 4 Dated this 21st day of January 2025.

5 A 6 Tana Lin United States District Judge 7

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