Simmons v. Shobert

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-6046
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6046 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 5, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court GLYNN R. SIMMONS,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-6046 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00097-J) CLAUDE L. SHOBERT, former detective, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant,

and

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY,

Defendant. _________________________________

GLYNN R. SIMMONS,

Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 25-6051 v. (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00097-J) (W.D. Okla.) CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY,

CLAUDE L. SHOBERT, former detective,

Defendant.

_________________________________ Appellate Case: 25-6046 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2026 Page: 2

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Claude Shobert appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for

summary judgment. He argues the district court did not consider his assertion of

qualified immunity and that he is entitled to the defense. The plaintiff, Glynn

Simmons, counters that the district court implicitly denied qualified immunity on

factual grounds which we lack jurisdiction to review. Shobert’s co-defendant,

Oklahoma City, also appeals on the ground that its liability depends on the qualified

immunity question of whether Shobert violated Simmons’s constitutional rights.

We have jurisdiction to address legal issues underpinning the denial of

Shobert’s qualified immunity defense. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985). Because the district court did not conduct a sufficient qualified immunity

analysis, we VACATE and REMAND for the court to fully consider the defense in

the first instance. Since the City’s liability depends on a finding that Shobert

violated Simmons’s rights, the City’s case is intertwined with Shobert’s. To ensure

Simmons’s case against the City does not go forward prematurely, we assert pendent

jurisdiction and VACATE and REMAND it as well.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

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I. Background

An Oklahoma jury convicted Glynn Simmons of first-degree murder in 1975.

Simmons fought his conviction for decades without success. But in 2023, an

Oklahoma district court vacated Simmons’s conviction and declared him actually

innocent. Simmons then sued former Oklahoma City police detective Claude Shobert

and Oklahoma City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional

rights. 1 Simmons claims Shobert infringed his Fourteenth Amendment due process

right to a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence, fabricating inculpatory

evidence that was used against him at trial, and using improperly suggestive

identification techniques. Simmons also argues Shobert deprived him of liberty

without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Shobert and

another detective conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Finally,

Simmons claims Oklahoma City is subject to municipal liability under the Monell

doctrine for Shobert’s violations of his rights.

Shobert moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The

district court denied the motion in a four-page order without addressing Shobert’s

qualified immunity defense. The court denied Oklahoma City’s motion for summary

judgment in a nearly identical order. The crux of both orders was the district court’s

determination that it could not conduct a summary judgment analysis because all the

1 Simmons also sued the City of Edmond, Oklahoma and the estate of former Edmond Police Department detective Anthony Garrett. Edmond and Garrett’s estate settled with Simmons and are no longer parties to the suit. App. 2421 & n.7.

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relevant facts were disputed. The court explained that the nearly fifty-year lapse

since the relevant events caused significant evidentiary challenges. Many of the key

witnesses are now dead or claim no specific memory of the events and important

physical evidence is either missing or of questionable authenticity. App. 2422–23,

2426–27. As a result, the court found “[t]here are simply no undisputed facts, other

than the basic facts of [the] case” and held it could not conduct “the requisite

summary judgment analysis.” App. 2423, 2427. In denying the motions, the court

explained it would be “up to a jury” to decide the facts and determine “who is

entitled to judgment in their favor.” App. 2423, 2427.

Shobert now appeals the district court’s denial of his qualified immunity

defense. The City also appeals the denial of its summary judgment motion and asks

us to exercise pendent jurisdiction over its case.

II. Discussion

A. Shobert’s Qualified Immunity Defense

Shobert’s motion for summary judgment was based on his assertion of

qualified immunity. Though the district court’s order does not mention qualified

immunity, the issue was squarely presented, and the denial of summary judgment

tacitly denied the defense. Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1243 (10th Cir. 2015). The

order is therefore immediately appealable to the extent it turns on “abstract legal

conclusions.” Est. of Valverde by & through Padilla v. Dodge, 967 F.3d 1049, 1058

(10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.

2008)). “We take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied 4 Appellate Case: 25-6046 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 02/05/2026 Page: 5

summary judgment.” Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation

modified). So our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “(1) whether the facts that the

district court ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal

violation, and (2) whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” Est. of Valverde by & through Padilla, 967 F.3d at 1058 (quoting

Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett, 717 F.3d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2013)). When, as here,

the district court does not say which “particular charged conduct it deemed

adequately supported,” we may review the record de novo to determine “what facts

the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely

assumed.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996).

“That we have jurisdiction, however, does not mean that we must, or should,

resolve the merits of the appeal.” Harris v. Morales, 231 F. App’x 773, 777 (10th

Cir. 2007). In the past, we “h[ave] declined to exercise jurisdiction where a district

court failed to address qualified immunity, instead opting to remand to the district

court to address qualified immunity in the first instance.” Ferguson v. Brian

Webster, P.A., 493 F. App’x 982, 983 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Lowe v. Town of

Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998)). That practice recognizes the

general rule that an appellate court does not consider issues not passed upon below.

Lowe, 143 F.3d at 1381 (citing Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 337 (10th Cir.

1992)). Indeed, we routinely remand appeals even when the district court makes

significant factual findings but does not address the clearly-established-law prong of

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qualified immunity. E.g., Rife v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 649 (10th

Cir. 2017); Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2025).

Considering these principles, we believe the prudent course here is to remand

for the district court to address Shobert’s qualified immunity defense. Cf. Lowe,

143 F.3d at 1381. This “bears the advantage of allowing the adversarial process to

work through the problem and culminate in a considered district court opinion, a

decision that will minimize the risk of an improvident governing appellate decision

from this court.” Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2011)

(Gorsuch, J.).

We are mindful of the evidentiary difficulties the district court faces in

conducting this analysis. Still, the normal summary judgment standard applies. The

court should identify which facts are material to Shobert’s qualified immunity

defense on each claim and explain their materiality. See Forbes v. Twp. of Lower

Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 146, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.). Any material fact that is

genuinely disputed must be resolved in Simmons’s favor. Cillo v. City of Greenwood

Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013). The court can then decide whether the

facts a jury could reasonably find can sustain a determination that Shobert impinged

Simmons’s clearly established constitutional rights. Explicit statements of which

facts are material, the grounds for any disputes, and the district court’s judgments on

evidentiary sufficiency will allow us to “carry out our review function without

exceeding the limits of our jurisdiction” in the event of a post-remand appeal.

Forbes, 313 F.3d at 146.

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We also emphasize that Shobert’s assertion of qualified immunity places the

burden on Simmons to prove both that Shobert violated his rights and that the rights

were clearly established at the time of the conduct. Hunt v. Montano, 39 F.4th 1270,

1284 (10th Cir. 2022). As a result, Shobert cannot waive the clearly-established-law

issue on any individual claim by not arguing it in his summary judgment motion. Id.

Deciding otherwise would erroneously shift Simmons’s burden onto Shobert. Id.

B. Oklahoma City’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Alongside his claims against Shobert, Simmons sued Oklahoma City for

Shobert’s alleged constitutional violations based on the Monell theory of municipal

liability. Since municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity, we typically lack

jurisdiction over their appeals from denials of summary judgment. Moore v. City of

Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Owen v. City of Indep.,

445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)). But here we have reason to exercise pendent jurisdiction

over the City’s appeal. See id.

Our court may exercise pendent jurisdiction “where the ‘pendent appellate

claim can be regarded as inextricably intertwined with a properly reviewable claim

on collateral appeal.’” Heard v. Dulayev, 29 F.4th 1195, 1207 (10th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Moore, 57 F.3d at 930). Claims are inextricably intertwined when

“resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well.”

Id.

The City’s liability turns on whether Shobert violated Simmons’s

constitutional rights. The district court’s denial of Shobert’s qualified immunity

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defense implies that the court determined there were sufficient facts to establish a

constitutional violation on each of his claims. Cf. Ferguson, 493 F. App’x at 983.

But by vacating the order in Shobert’s case, we have reopened the question for the

district court to consider and explain. If, on remand, the court determines Simmons

cannot prove Shobert violated his rights as to a claim, the City would be entitled to

summary judgment in its favor on municipal liability. Cf. Moore, 57 F.3d at 930–31

(“[O]ur holding that Defendants did not violate Moore’s First Amendment rights

settles Moore’s federal claim against the City . . . .”). On the other hand, the City

cannot get summary judgment if the district court decides, regarding the alleged

underlying violation, that Shobert is either (1) not entitled to qualified immunity, or

(2) is entitled to qualified immunity solely because the law was not clearly

established. See Heard, 29 F.4th at 1207.

Since the district court might decide on remand of Shobert’s case that his

actions did not constitute a constitutional violation on one or more of Simmons’s

claims, we vacate and remand the City’s case as well. Aware of the limits on our

jurisdiction, we express no view on Simmons’s Monell claim beyond our

observations about the relationship between Shobert’s qualified immunity defense

and the City’s municipal liability. We vacate and remand only to the extent

necessary for the district court to consider Shobert’s defense and assess its impact, if

any, on Simmons’s claim against the City.

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s orders denying

summary judgment and remand for additional proceedings.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam