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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 SILVER FERN CHEMICAL, INC., a CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00775-TL Washington corporation, 12 ORDER ON MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 13 v. SANCTIONS AND MOTION TO SEAL 14 SCOTT LYONS, an individual; TROY KINTO, an individual; KING HOLMES, an 15 individual; ROWLAND MORGAN, an individual; and AMBYTH CHEMICAL 16 COMPANY, a Washington corporation, 17 Defendants. 18 SCOTT LYONS, an individual, and KING HOLMES, an individual, 19 Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 20 v.
21 SILVER FERN CHEMICAL, INC., a Washington corporation; SAM KING, an 22 individual; and LISA KING, an individual, 23 Counterclaim Defendants. 24 1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. No. 124 2 (sealed), 125 (redacted)) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Dkt. No. 123). Having reviewed the 3 Parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Sanctions, GRANTS IN 4 PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Seal, and RESERVES decision on Plaintiff’s request to 5 reconsider this Court’s Order on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 The Court assumes general familiarity with the facts of the case. Relevant to the instant 8 motion, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) at the outset of this 9 case. Dkt. Nos. 3, 22 (sealed). In opposition to the motion, Defendants submitted a variety of 10 declarations, including one from Defendant King Holmes. Dkt. Nos. 29 (sealed), 76. In that 11 declaration, Defendant Holmes stated, “Any of the deals I’ve put together after moving to 12 [Defendant] Ambyth are a result of customers reaching out to me to request we continue our 13 relationship.” Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 14. The motion was ultimately denied. Dkt. No. 40. 14 Later, Defendant Holmes was deposed as part of discovery. Dkt. No. 127-1 (transcript of 15 Holmes deposition) (sealed). In the deposition, Defendant Holmes stated that he contacted 16 multiple customers after his departure from Plaintiff and engaged or attempted to engage in 17 business transactions. See Dkt. No. 124 at 5–7. In one exchange, Defendant Holmes addressed 18 the alleged discrepancy between his testimony and his TRO declaration: 19 Q. You wrote: ‘Any of the deals I’ve put together after moving 20 to Ambyth are a result of customers reaching out to me to request we continue our relationship.’ Did I read that 21 correctly? 22 A. You did. 23 Q. Mr. Holmes, didn’t you just tell me that that’s not true? 24 A. I did. I reached out to a number of them. 1 Q. So this document you signed under penalty of perjury was inaccurate? 2 A. Yeah. I should not have phrased it that way. 3 Dkt. No. 127-1 (sealed) at 10 (150:17–151:5). Later, Defendant Holmes filed a supplemental 4 declaration in which he stated that he “intended to convey” that any deals after moving to 5 Defendant Ambyth are a result of customers “electing to continue our relationship.” Dkt. 6 No. 117 ¶ 5. Defendant Holmes further stated that “I notified many business contacts of my 7 departure from [Plaintiff] Silver Fern the same day I resigned and did not mean to imply 8 otherwise in my Declaration.” Id. 9 Plaintiff now brings the instant motion for sanctions, as well as a motion to seal the 10 motion for sanctions. Dkt. Nos. 124 (sealed), 125; Dkt. No. 123. Defendants oppose. Dkt. 11 Nos. 138 (sealed), 137; Dkt. No. 136. In its motion, Plaintiff also asks the Court to reconsider its 12 Order on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO in light of the instant motion. Dkt. No. 124 at 11–14. 13 II. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 A court may impose sanctions on a party or its counsel by three primary means: 16 (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which applies to signed, written filings; (2) 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1927, which penalizes unreasonable and vexatious multiplicity of proceedings; and (3) the 18 inherent power of the court. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 “Federal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, ‘to 20 manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 21 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. 22 Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). Under its inherent powers, a court may “fashion an 23 appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 24 1 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). “A district court may, among other things, dismiss a case in its 2 entirety, bar witnesses, exclude other evidence, award attorneys’ fees, or assess fines.” Am. 3 Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing F.J. Hanshaw Enterps., 4 Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)). These sanctions may be
5 levied for “willful disobedience of a court order . . . or when the losing party has acted in bad 6 faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .” Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting 7 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)); see also In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 8 Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a finding of bad faith is required to 9 impose sanctions under a court’s inherent powers). 10 B. Discussion 11 Plaintiff moves for sanctions in the form of attorney fees, based on the inherent power of 12 the court. Dkt. No. 124 at 10. Plaintiff argues that but for Defendant Holmes’s false statements to 13 the Court, it would not have had to expend fees to bring the instant motion. Id. Defendants 14 respond that Defendant Holmes did not act in bad faith. See Dkt. No. 138 at 9–13.
15 Here, the Court will grant the motion and award Plaintiff the attorney fees associated 16 with bringing this motion. In their response to Plaintiff’s motion for TRO, Defendants made 17 various representations that they abided by their Confidentiality Agreement, and they specifically 18 distinguished the Confidentiality Agreement from a non-solicitation or non-competition 19 agreement. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26 (sealed) at 9–11, 13–17. Indeed, one section of their response is 20 titled in bold lettering, “Lyons, Holmes, and Kinto Did Not Breach Their Confidentiality 21 Agreement,” faulting Plaintiff for citing no evidence in support of its assertion that the men 22 brought confidential customer information to Defendant Ambyth. Id. at 11. In short, Defendants 23 were acutely aware that whether they had violated the Confidentiality Agreement was one of the
24 issues at the heart of the case and the request for TRO. Then, in support of their opposition to 1 Plaintiff’s request, Defendant Holmes provided a declaration in which the concluding statement 2 asserted (and the Court interpreted his statement as meaning) that customers initiated contact 3 with him, not that he reached out to them (as he actually did), which would have implicated him 4 using potentially confidential information he obtained while working at Silver Fern. See Dkt.
5 No. 29 (sealed) ¶ 14.
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 SILVER FERN CHEMICAL, INC., a CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00775-TL Washington corporation, 12 ORDER ON MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 13 v. SANCTIONS AND MOTION TO SEAL 14 SCOTT LYONS, an individual; TROY KINTO, an individual; KING HOLMES, an 15 individual; ROWLAND MORGAN, an individual; and AMBYTH CHEMICAL 16 COMPANY, a Washington corporation, 17 Defendants. 18 SCOTT LYONS, an individual, and KING HOLMES, an individual, 19 Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 20 v.
21 SILVER FERN CHEMICAL, INC., a Washington corporation; SAM KING, an 22 individual; and LISA KING, an individual, 23 Counterclaim Defendants. 24 1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. No. 124 2 (sealed), 125 (redacted)) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Dkt. No. 123). Having reviewed the 3 Parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Sanctions, GRANTS IN 4 PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Seal, and RESERVES decision on Plaintiff’s request to 5 reconsider this Court’s Order on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 The Court assumes general familiarity with the facts of the case. Relevant to the instant 8 motion, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) at the outset of this 9 case. Dkt. Nos. 3, 22 (sealed). In opposition to the motion, Defendants submitted a variety of 10 declarations, including one from Defendant King Holmes. Dkt. Nos. 29 (sealed), 76. In that 11 declaration, Defendant Holmes stated, “Any of the deals I’ve put together after moving to 12 [Defendant] Ambyth are a result of customers reaching out to me to request we continue our 13 relationship.” Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 14. The motion was ultimately denied. Dkt. No. 40. 14 Later, Defendant Holmes was deposed as part of discovery. Dkt. No. 127-1 (transcript of 15 Holmes deposition) (sealed). In the deposition, Defendant Holmes stated that he contacted 16 multiple customers after his departure from Plaintiff and engaged or attempted to engage in 17 business transactions. See Dkt. No. 124 at 5–7. In one exchange, Defendant Holmes addressed 18 the alleged discrepancy between his testimony and his TRO declaration: 19 Q. You wrote: ‘Any of the deals I’ve put together after moving 20 to Ambyth are a result of customers reaching out to me to request we continue our relationship.’ Did I read that 21 correctly? 22 A. You did. 23 Q. Mr. Holmes, didn’t you just tell me that that’s not true? 24 A. I did. I reached out to a number of them. 1 Q. So this document you signed under penalty of perjury was inaccurate? 2 A. Yeah. I should not have phrased it that way. 3 Dkt. No. 127-1 (sealed) at 10 (150:17–151:5). Later, Defendant Holmes filed a supplemental 4 declaration in which he stated that he “intended to convey” that any deals after moving to 5 Defendant Ambyth are a result of customers “electing to continue our relationship.” Dkt. 6 No. 117 ¶ 5. Defendant Holmes further stated that “I notified many business contacts of my 7 departure from [Plaintiff] Silver Fern the same day I resigned and did not mean to imply 8 otherwise in my Declaration.” Id. 9 Plaintiff now brings the instant motion for sanctions, as well as a motion to seal the 10 motion for sanctions. Dkt. Nos. 124 (sealed), 125; Dkt. No. 123. Defendants oppose. Dkt. 11 Nos. 138 (sealed), 137; Dkt. No. 136. In its motion, Plaintiff also asks the Court to reconsider its 12 Order on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO in light of the instant motion. Dkt. No. 124 at 11–14. 13 II. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 A court may impose sanctions on a party or its counsel by three primary means: 16 (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which applies to signed, written filings; (2) 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1927, which penalizes unreasonable and vexatious multiplicity of proceedings; and (3) the 18 inherent power of the court. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 “Federal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, ‘to 20 manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 21 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. 22 Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). Under its inherent powers, a court may “fashion an 23 appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 24 1 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). “A district court may, among other things, dismiss a case in its 2 entirety, bar witnesses, exclude other evidence, award attorneys’ fees, or assess fines.” Am. 3 Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing F.J. Hanshaw Enterps., 4 Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)). These sanctions may be
5 levied for “willful disobedience of a court order . . . or when the losing party has acted in bad 6 faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .” Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting 7 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)); see also In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 8 Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a finding of bad faith is required to 9 impose sanctions under a court’s inherent powers). 10 B. Discussion 11 Plaintiff moves for sanctions in the form of attorney fees, based on the inherent power of 12 the court. Dkt. No. 124 at 10. Plaintiff argues that but for Defendant Holmes’s false statements to 13 the Court, it would not have had to expend fees to bring the instant motion. Id. Defendants 14 respond that Defendant Holmes did not act in bad faith. See Dkt. No. 138 at 9–13.
15 Here, the Court will grant the motion and award Plaintiff the attorney fees associated 16 with bringing this motion. In their response to Plaintiff’s motion for TRO, Defendants made 17 various representations that they abided by their Confidentiality Agreement, and they specifically 18 distinguished the Confidentiality Agreement from a non-solicitation or non-competition 19 agreement. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26 (sealed) at 9–11, 13–17. Indeed, one section of their response is 20 titled in bold lettering, “Lyons, Holmes, and Kinto Did Not Breach Their Confidentiality 21 Agreement,” faulting Plaintiff for citing no evidence in support of its assertion that the men 22 brought confidential customer information to Defendant Ambyth. Id. at 11. In short, Defendants 23 were acutely aware that whether they had violated the Confidentiality Agreement was one of the
24 issues at the heart of the case and the request for TRO. Then, in support of their opposition to 1 Plaintiff’s request, Defendant Holmes provided a declaration in which the concluding statement 2 asserted (and the Court interpreted his statement as meaning) that customers initiated contact 3 with him, not that he reached out to them (as he actually did), which would have implicated him 4 using potentially confidential information he obtained while working at Silver Fern. See Dkt.
5 No. 29 (sealed) ¶ 14. 6 In totality, Defendants intentionally created the wrong impression that customers 7 affirmatively reached out to Defendant Holmes to continue business, not the other way around, 8 thus avoiding any confidentiality issues. Defendant Holmes conceded as much in his deposition 9 when he agreed that his declaration statement was “inaccurate” and acknowledged that he 10 “should not have phrased it that way.” Dkt. No. 127-1 at 10 (151:1–5). Defendant Holmes also 11 admitted that he affirmatively reached out to a number of Plaintiff’s clients. Dkt. No. 127-1 at 6 12 (103:5–104:6), 8 (142:13–23, 143:22–144:1), 9 (146:12–23, 147:9–148:16). In one of the more 13 egregious examples, Defendant Holmes admitted not only reaching out to one of Plaintiff’s 14 clients on his first day working for Defendant Ambyth, but also making a deal with that customer
15 the same day. Id. at 9 (147:9–148:2, 148:9–14). 16 The Court finds that Defendants acted in bad faith in misleading the Court as to 17 Defendant Holmes’s behavior. The Court further finds that the misrepresentation was material 18 because it improperly shaded the Court’s understanding of a core issue at the TRO stage and 19 impacted the final outcome.1 See Guerra v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1281 (W.D. 20 Wash. 2014) (“[A]n attorney’s reckless misstatements of law and fact may be sanctionable when 21 22
23 1 Illustrative of Defendants’ shading of reality is their claim that Plaintiff “fabricate[d]” statements by Defendant Holmes, when Plaintiff plainly described what Defendant Holmes “effectively” argued in his declarations. Compare 24 Dkt. No. 138 at 13, with Dkt. No. 125 at 14. 1 coupled with an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings to gain a tactical advantage.”). 2 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED. 3 III. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 4 A. Legal Standard
5 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h)(1). Such motions must be denied 6 absent a showing of “manifest error in the prior ruling or . . . new facts or legal authority which 7 could not have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Id. 8 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in “highly unusual circumstances.” Marlyn 9 Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 10 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). “A motion for 11 reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when 12 they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. 13 v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Whether or not to grant reconsideration is 14 committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
15 of the Yakima Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 B. Discussion 17 As part of its motion for sanctions, Plaintiff also “asks this Court to reconsider its motion 18 to preliminarily enjoin Defendant Holmes and Ambyth from doing business with those 19 customers from [Plaintiff’s] confidential and trade secret customer list that Defendant Holmes 20 solicited and transacted business with prior to signing his false declaration.” Dkt. No. 124 at 11; 21 see also id. at 11–14 (evaluating TRO factors). Defendants declined to address the motion to 22 reconsider in their response, but they stated that “upon the Court’s request, Defendants are 23 prepared to fully brief this issue.” Dkt. No. 138 at 8.
24 1 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is granted, as the evidence shows 2 that Defendant Holmes used information from Plaintiff’s customer list to solicit customers. See 3 supra § II(B). Moreover, the motion is based on new evidence uncovered in discovery that could 4 not have been presented with the motion for TRO at the outset of this matter. See Dkt. No. 124 at
5 5–10. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider appropriate. However, before 6 ruling on Plaintiff’s request to reconsider, the Court will allow Defendants to file briefing on the 7 issue of whether this Court’s prior Order on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO should be modified to 8 enjoin Defendants Holmes and Ambyth from doing business with customers solicited by 9 Defendant Holmes. Therefore, the Court RESERVES decision on Plaintiff’s request. 10 IV. MOTION TO SEAL 11 A. Legal Standard 12 There is a strong presumption of public access to court-filed documents. Local Civil Rule 13 (“LCR”) 5(g); accord Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 14 2006). A party seeking to seal records related to motions that are dispositive or otherwise “more
15 than tangentially related to the merits of a case” must “meet the high threshold of showing that 16 ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.” See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 17 1092, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. However, if the motion is non- 18 dispositive and only tangentially related to the merits of a case, a party need only make a 19 showing of “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 20 F.3d at 1101. 21 B. Discussion 22 Plaintiff moves to seal its Motion for Sanctions and the six exhibits attached to the 23 motion. Dkt. No. 123 at 1. Plaintiff argues that its redactions to the motion that cover specific
24 customer names, contact information, and transaction details are supported by compelling 1 reasons and are as minimal as possible. Id. at 4. However, Plaintiff believes the exhibits could be 2 redacted. Id. In response, Defendants argue that Exhibit 3 (Dkt. No. 127-2) and Exhibit 6 (Dkt. 3 No. 127-5) should remain under seal because they also contain customer identities and 4 confidential financial information. Dkt. No. 136 at 3–4. As to the remaining exhibits, Defendants
5 simply state that they “do[ ] not object” to leaving them under seal. Id. at 2. 6 As an initial matter, Plaintiff applies the “compelling reasons” standard to its proposed 7 redactions and does not address whether the “good cause” standard applies instead. See Dkt. 8 No. 123 at 2–4. For their part, Defendants discuss both standards but do not identify which 9 standard should be applied. See Dkt. No. 136 at 2–3. Whether a motion for sanctions is more 10 than tangentially related to the merits of a case is dependent on the facts of each case. Compare, 11 e.g., Westerkamp v. Mueller, No. C21-2088, 2023 WL 3060971, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2023) 12 (finding the “compelling reasons” standard applies to a motion for sanctions), with Delvecchia v. 13 Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. C19-1322, 2021 WL 5605176, at *5 (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 2021) 14 (finding the “good cause” standard applies instead).
15 Regardless of which standard applies, the Parties’ sealing requests are permissible insofar 16 as they protect customer identities or confidential financial information, which this Court has 17 previously approved under the “compelling reasons” standard. See Dkt. No. 52 at 4–5. Thus, 18 redactions to Plaintiff’s motion are permissible where they name a specific customer. See, e.g., 19 Dkt. No. 124 at 5:25, 6:9, 6:17, 6:25. So, too, is Defendants’ request to seal the entirety of 20 Exhibits 3 and 6, which are simply lists of Defendant Ambyth’s customers and/or associated 21 financial information. See Dkt. Nos. 127-2, 127-5. 22 However, the Parties’ requests otherwise sweep too broadly and are without any provided 23 justification. For example, the Court will not seal the entirety of Exhibits 1 and 2 (Dkt. Nos. 127,
24 127-1), which are excerpts from deposition transcripts, nor will it permit redactions of quotes 1 from those transcripts in the motion (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 124 at 2:18–19, 6:3–5), as neither Party 2 has offered any reasons for those requests. Similarly, the Court will not seal the entirety of 3 Exhibits 4 and 5 (Dkt. Nos. 127-3, 127-4), which are printouts of email conversations, as neither 4 Party has offered any reasons for those requests. If the Parties believe specific portions of
5 Exhibits 1, 2, 4, or 5, should be sealed (both in the exhibit and as quoted in the motion), they 6 may file new redacted versions of those documents with an accompanying motion to seal that 7 identifies and applies the applicable sealing standard. Otherwise, the documents must be refiled 8 without any redactions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 11 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. Nos. 124 (sealed), 125) is GRANTED. 12 Plaintiff is AWARDED the attorney fees associated with its motion. 13 (a) Plaintiff SHALL file an accounting of the attorney fees requested within 14 fourteen (14) days of this Order.
15 (b) Defendants SHALL have seven (7) days to file any objections to the 16 accounting. 17 (c) If Defendants have no objections to the accounting, they SHALL pay 18 Plaintiff the requested amount within twenty-eight (28) days of this 19 Order and file a certification that the amount has been paid. 20 (2) Decision is RESERVED on Plaintiff’s request contained in its Motion for Sanctions 21 (Dkt. No. 124 at 11–14) that the Court reconsider its prior Order on Plaintiff’s 22 motion for TRO (Dkt. No. 40). 23
24 1 (a) Defendants SHALL file, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, a 2 supplemental brief on Plaintiff’s request to reconsider this Court’s prior Order 3 on Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. The brief SHALL NOT exceed five pages. 4 (b) Should Plaintiff wish to respond, a response brief may be filed within
5 seven (7) days of the filing of Defendants’ brief. The response brief 6 SHALL NOT exceed five pages. 7 (c) Plaintiff’s request SHALL be noted for September 19, 2024. 8 (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Dkt. No. 123) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 9 (a) The Parties SHALL meet and confer, within fourteen (14) days of this 10 Order, to determine whether the documents at issue (Dkt. Nos. 124, 127, 11 127-1, 127-3, 127-4) can be unsealed in their entirety or whether one or 12 both Parties seeks to seal a portion or the entirety of any document. 13 (i) If the Parties agree that no additional sealing is required, the 14 unsealed documents SHALL be filed within three (3) days of the
15 meet and confer. 16 (ii) If one or both Parties seeks additional sealing or redactions, the 17 Party or Parties seeking to further seal or redact the documents 18 SHALL file, within seven (7) days of the meet and confer, the 19 documents with all requested redactions and an accompanying 20 motion to seal. 21 Dated this 29th day of August 2024. 22 A 23 Tana Lin United States District Judge 24