Siganporia v. Shreyas (AKA Shreyas VA)

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-03145
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 SAN JOSE DIVISION 4 5 KARL SIGANPORIA, Case No. 5:25-cv-03145-BLF

6 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 7 v. VISWESWARA SHREYAS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 8 VISWESWARA SHREYAS, et al., [Re: Dkt. No. 12] 9 Defendants.

10 11 Plaintiff Karl Siganporia filed this action on April 8, 2025, naming fourteen Defendants. 12 Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Nine Defendants have since been dismissed for failure to effect service of 13 process within the time provided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Dkt. No. 23. Of 14 the remaining five Defendants, Plaintiff has stipulated with four of them to extend their deadlines 15 to respond to the Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 7, 15, 18. 16 Before the Court is Defendant Visweswara Shreyas’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 17 Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 12 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, and no reply was 18 filed. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and DENIES 19 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the motion for summary judgment. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the following facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint 22 are taken as true. 23 Plaintiff Karl Siganporia is a certified family law specialist. Compl. ¶ 1. In or around 24 December 2024, Plaintiff was representing an individual in divorce proceedings against Defendant 25 Visweswara Shreyas (“Shreyas”). Id. ¶ 4. Shreyas is a former employee of Defendant Google 26 LLC and/or Defendant Alphabet Inc. (collectively, “Google”) who worked on Google’s search 27 engine. Id. Shreyas is now employed at Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. d/b/a Instagram. Id. 1 and used his access to Google’s internal systems to promote the petition so that it appears as the 2 sixth result on the Google search engine when a search is conducted for Plaintiff’s name. Id. ¶¶ 3, 3 11. In particular, Shreyas’s petition asserted that Plaintiff improperly appointed a court expert— 4 Jeffrey Stegner, a CPA—in the divorce proceedings. Id. ¶ 11. However, the expert was jointly 5 selected by both Plaintiff and Shreyas’s attorney via stipulation. Id. Plaintiff asserts that 6 Defendant Shreyas was aware that statements in the Change.org petition were false, and that he 7 posted them in order to cause emotional distress to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff further alleges that 8 Shreyas “conducted at least some of the activities in question on premises and/or equipment 9 belonging to Defendants Alphabet Inc. and Google LLC.” Id. 10 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. In the “Relief [R]equested” 11 section of his Complaint, he appears to assert only a defamation claim against Defendant Shreyas. 12 Id. ¶ 15. Construing the Complaint liberally, however, he may also be attempting to assert claims 13 for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress and for violation of the Computer 14 Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (“CFAA”) against Defendant Shreyas. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. Plaintiff also 15 named as Defendants the following Parties: Meta Platforms Inc., Google LLC, Alphabet Inc., 16 Samira Ghazvini, State Bar of California, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, United States 17 Department of Labor, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States 18 Department of Education, United States Federal Trade Commission, United States Department of 19 Justice, Change.org PBC, and United States Federal Communications Communication [sic]. Nine 20 of those Parties—State Bar of California, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, United States 21 Department of Labor, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States 22 Department of Education, United States Federal Trade Commission, United States Department of 23 Justice, Change.org PBC, and United States Federal Communications Communication [sic]—have 24 been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Dkt. No. 23. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 27 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 1 Congress authorize them to adjudicate: those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal 2 question, or those to which the United States is a party. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 3 513 (2006) (“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained 4 in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Section 1331 provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, 5 § 1332 for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.”); see also Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 6 1094 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction.”). The 7 plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 8 and a defendant may challenge a plaintiff’s assertion of subject matter jurisdiction by motion 9 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has a continuing 10 obligation to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case if jurisdiction 11 is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 12 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 13 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 14 claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” Conservation 15 Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 16 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). When determining whether a claim has been stated, the Court accepts 17 as true all well-pled factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the 18 plaintiff. Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the 19 Court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 20 notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 21 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 22 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed 23 factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 24 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 25 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the 26 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 27 C. Leave to Amend 1 by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), and discussed at length by the 2 Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). A district 3 court ordinarily must grant leave to amend unless one or more of the Foman factors is present: 4 (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 5 amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, or (5) futility of amendment. Eminence 6 Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries 7 the greatest weight.” Id. However, a strong showing with respect to one of the other factors may 8 warrant denial of leave to amend. Id. 9 D. Motion for Summary Judgment 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary 11 judgment is appropriate if the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 12 the nonmoving party “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 13 moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 14 322 (1986). In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court “does not assess 15 credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine factual issue 16 for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring in part) (citing 17 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995)). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of 18 the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is 19 sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. 20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss 23 Defendant Shreyas first argues that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for lack of subject 24 matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Mot. at 8–9. Plaintiff 25 asserted “federal question” jurisdiction based upon the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 26 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 27 Compl. ¶ 8. However, Defendant Shreyas argues that none of those three statutory or 1 The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden to establish that the Court 2 has subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s only attempt to state a claim under the Fifth 3 Amendment to the United States Constitution alleges that various failures by a subset of 4 Defendants to properly regulate Google and certain federal immigration visa programs 5 “constitut[es] a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.” Compl. ¶ 14. The Defendants 6 identified with regard to that claim are: “United States Department of Labor; United States 7 Citizenship and Immigration Services; United States Department of Education and/or its 8 Successor Department; United States Federal Trade Commission; United States Department of 9 Justice; and the United States Federal Communications Communication [sic].” Id. All of those 10 Defendants have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Dkt. No. 23. 11 Accordingly, there cannot be subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Fifth Amendment. 12 The same is true for Plaintiff’s purported assertion of jurisdiction based on the Immigration 13 and Nationality Act. To the extent that Plaintiff attempted to state a claim under that statute, it 14 was asserted only against the same Defendants as was the purported Fifth Amendment claim. See 15 Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18. All of those Defendants have been dismissed, so there cannot be subject matter 16 jurisdiction based upon the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Dkt. No. 23. 17 Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint states that there is subject matter jurisdiction based on the 18 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (“CFAA”). It is true that original “federal question” 19 jurisdiction exists in a civil action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 20 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, “[t]he presence or absence of federal–question jurisdiction 21 is governed by the ‘well–pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 22 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 23 complaint.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 24 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Here, although Plaintiff invokes the 25 CFAA in the “subject matter jurisdiction” portion of the Complaint, there is no apparent claim 26 under the CFAA against any Defendant. 27 Reading his Complaint with the greatest liberality, Plaintiff appears to suggest that 1 “amplify the[] falsehoods” in the Change.org petition. See Compl. ¶¶ 2–3. The CFAA does 2 prohibit “a number of different computer crimes, the majority of which involve accessing 3 computers without authorization or in excess of authorization, and then taking specified forbidden 4 actions, ranging from obtaining information to damaging a computer or computer data.” LVRC 5 Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(7)). 6 It includes a statutory provision creating a right of action “for private persons injured by such 7 crimes”: Section 1030(g) of the Act states that “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason 8 of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain 9 compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 10 However, it is not clear to the Court which, if any, of the relevant provisions of the Act Defendant 11 Shreyas is alleged to have violated. To the extent that Plaintiff did intend to assert such a claim 12 against Shreyas, Plaintiff failed to identify any of the elements of that claim and/or the factual 13 allegations going to each element. The same is true of the other remaining Defendants. In fact, 14 there is no mention of the CFAA anywhere in the Complaint other than in paragraph 8, which 15 states simply: “The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Immigration and 16 Nationality Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the Fifth Amendment to the United 17 States Constitution insofar as I allege a regulatory taking thereunder.” Compl. ¶ 8. 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the Court has 19 subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The Complaint is DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(1). 20 Since it is not yet clear that any attempt to amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim would 21 be futile, and since no other Foman factor weighs against permitting amendment at this early stage 22 of the proceedings, the Court will give leave to amend the CFAA claim. However, if Plaintiff is 23 unable to plead a viable federal claim in any amended complaint that he may file, the case will be 24 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without further leave to amend. 25 B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 26 As an alternative to his Rule 12(b)(1) argument, Defendant Shreyas argues that all of 27 Plaintiff’s claims against him must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 1 failed to support them with factual allegations. Mot. at 10. Shreyas also argues that Plaintiff’s 2 Complaint should be stricken because it is generally non-sensical. Id. at 11. 3 The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint is poorly pleaded and difficult to parse. As 4 guidance in case Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s defamation 5 and emotional distress claims, as currently pled, would fail to clear the bar under Rule 12(b)(6). 6 The elements of a California defamation claim are: “(a) a publication that is (b) false, 7 (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes 8 special damage.” Sanchez v. Bezos, 80 Cal. App. 5th 750, 763 (2022) (quoting Taus v. Loftus, 40 9 Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007)). Here, Plaintiff has identified a publication that has been 10 “communicat[ed] to some third person,” id. (quoting Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 11 645 (1999)): the Change.org petition, see Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, which was made available to the 12 public at large. Plaintiff also appears to suggest that there are two falsehoods implicit in the 13 Change.org petition, including (1) that Plaintiff had a “conflict of interest” in appointing Jeff 14 Stegner, a CPA employed with Bridge Forensic CPAs, as an expert in the divorce proceedings, 15 and (2) that Plaintiff was somehow responsible for various alleged performance issues by Bridge 16 Forensic CPAs during the divorce proceedings. See id. ¶ 12. 17 However, Plaintiff does not specifically identify the false statements at issue. Instead, he 18 speaks in conclusory generalizations—saying that Defendant Shreyas “caused to be published 19 . . . a defamatory petition making entirely false accusations,” id. ¶ 2, that Shreyas posted 20 “defamatory content that he knew to be false,” of which the most crucial assertion was that 21 Plaintiff “appointed the Court’s expert,” id. ¶ 11, and that Shreyas was implying through the 22 petition that “Jeff Stegner and/or Bridge Forensics failed in all of these ways and Karl Siganporia 23 appointed him,” id. ¶ 12. The Court need not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable 24 inferences. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1055. Instead, it is Plaintiff’s obligation to 25 clearly identify the specific statements in the petition that are alleged to be false. Moreover, 26 “[w]here the words or other matters which are the subject of a defamation action are of ambiguous 27 meaning, or innocent on their face and defamatory only in the light of extrinsic circumstances, the 1 which makes them defamatory.” Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 645. 2 That said, there is no indication that the statements in the Change.org petition would be 3 protected by any privilege, and, if Plaintiff can establish that the Change.org petition contains the 4 specific falsehoods indicated, then such statements do appear to be calculated to “expose[] 5 [Plaintiff] to contempt or ridicule or . . . other reputational injuries.” See Jackson v. Mayweather, 6 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1259–60 (2017), as modified (Apr. 19, 2017). 7 Regarding Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims: in California, “negligent causing of 8 emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence.” Eriksson v. Nunnink, 233 9 Cal. App. 4th 708, 729 (2015). Thus, “[t]he traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, 10 causation, and damages apply.” Id. (quoting Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 11 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (1989)). “The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows: 12 (1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all 13 bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to 14 the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or 15 severe emotional distress.” Berry v. Frazier, 90 Cal. App. 5th 1258, 1273 (2023), as modified on 16 denial of reh’g (May 15, 2023), rev. denied (Aug. 9, 2023) (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & 17 Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)); accord Sams v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 17-1848, 18 2018 WL 1474333, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (“The elements of a prima facie case for the 19 tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 20 defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 21 emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 22 and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (citing 23 Melorich Builders, Inc. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 931, 935 (1984))). 24 There are flaws in Plaintiff’s present pleading of both emotional distress claims. For the 25 negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Plaintiff has failed to plead a duty or a breach of 26 that duty on Defendant Shreyas’s part. See Compl. ¶ 15. And for the intentional infliction of 27 emotional distress claim, Plaintiff has failed to identify “conduct so extreme and outrageous as to 1 ina civilized community.” Sams, 2018 WL 1474333, at *10 (quoting Coleman v. Republic Indem. 2 Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 4th 403, 416 (2005)). Under California law, “it is not enough that the 3 defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to 4 || inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice’ or a degree 5 || of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.” Pardi v. 6 Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. 7 || App. 4th 488, 496 (1998)). Plaintiff must be able to show something more to state a claim for 8 || ITED. 9 C. Motion for Summary Judgment 10 Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter 11 || jurisdiction, Defendant Shreyas’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT 12 || PREJUDICE to a further motion for summary judgment should Plaintiff file a viable amended 5 13 complaint. 14 || IV. ORDER 15 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is a 16 || DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before 3 17 August 27, 2025. Failure to meet the deadline to file an amended complaint or failure to cure the 18 deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a final dismissal of Plaintiffs suit. 19 Plaintiff may not add parties or claims without the express approval of the Court or 20 stipulation of all Parties. In addition, any amended complaint should reflect the fact that nine of 21 Plaintiffs original Defendants—and the claims asserted against those Defendants—have been 22 || dismissed and may not be amended. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: August 6, 2025

TH LABSON FREEMAN 27 United States District Judge 28