22-1574 Sierra v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT: EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Maria E. Sierra,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 22-1574
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________
1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Steven L. Barkan, Steven L. Barkan, P.C., Melville, NY.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sophia Ree, Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (McMahon, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the June 28, 2022, judgment of the district court granting summary judgment is
VACATED and the action is REMANDED to the district court for trial proceedings.
Maria E. Sierra was a Coach Cleaner on National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(“Amtrak”) trains until she suffered an accident cleaning a coach bathroom. Sierra filed a single
claim against Amtrak under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60,
claiming that Amtrak acted negligently in violation of the statute by, among other things, “failing
to provide the Plaintiff with a safe place to work.” Joint App’x at 11. She appeals from an order
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.) granting
summary judgment in favor of Amtrak and dismissing her claim under FELA. Because there is a
triable factual issue under FELA as to whether Amtrak was on notice but failed to intervene
regarding the potentially hazardous working conditions that Sierra experienced, we vacate and
remand for trial proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Any Amtrak passenger knows that passenger train bathrooms look quite different at the
beginning of a trip compared to the end. Coach Cleaners are tasked with restoring these bathrooms
to a clean state after each journey, and they are often confronted with “dirty, nasty, and smelly”
conditions. Joint App’x at 352. As Sierra describes it, the only way to remove these stains and
2 the smell is to “[s]crub the floor really good. Really wet. . . . Wet, wet, mop, mop, scrub really
hard.” Id. at 43. The goal? To “leave the premises impeccable.” Id. at 44.
According to Sierra, her usual approach to cleaning—mopping the whole bathroom several
times—often resulted in her standing on a very wet floor, a practice potentially contrary to
Amtrak’s written training materials and which Amtrak describes as a hazard. Sierra nevertheless
testified that she always cleaned this way and that her supervisors witnessed her doing so but never
intervened. On the evening of July 6, 2018, Sierra cleaned seven bathrooms without incident.
When mopping the eighth and final restroom of her shift, however, she slipped and fell on the wet
floor and injured her knee. This suit followed.
DISCUSSION
For more than a century, federal law has applied a relaxed standard of negligence to claims
brought by employees against railroads engaged in interstate commerce. See Federal Employers’
Liability Act, ch. 149, §§ 1–10, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60).
In applying that standard on a motion for summary judgment, this Court has repeatedly affirmed
the “strong federal policy” in favor of letting juries decide cases arising under FELA, Sinclair v.
Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
such that summary judgment is appropriate “[o]nly in instances where reasonable jurors could
reach only one conclusion,” Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
Because we conclude it is possible that a reasonable jury could have reached a conclusion different
than that of the district court, we vacate and remand for trial proceedings under the relaxed
negligence standard required by federal law in this context.
3 I. Standard of Review
It “has been accepted as settled law for several decades,” CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,
564 U.S. 685, 699 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), that the standard to be
applied by the jury in a FELA case “is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury
or death for which damages are sought,” id. at 692 (emphasis added) (quoting Rogers v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d
80, 87 (2d Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[c]ountless judges have instructed
countless juries in [this] language,” CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 699; see also id. at 698 n.5
(collecting cases from every court of appeals applying this standard), which is to be read “as a
comprehensive statement of the FELA causation standard,” id. at 695.
In light of this relaxed standard of negligence in FELA cases, this Court has long held
that “the right of the jury to pass on factual issues ‘must be liberally construed.’” Williams v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85); see
also Tufariello, 458 F.3d at 87; Ulfik v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 & n.1 (2d Cir.
1996); Johannessen v. Gulf Trading & Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1980); Eggert v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, when reviewing
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it is appropriate for the district court to “take the
determination from the jury and decide the question as a matter of law,” Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85,
only when “there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a jury to find for the plaintiff,” Syverson
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 828 (2d Cir.
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22-1574 Sierra v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT: EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Maria E. Sierra,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 22-1574
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________
1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Steven L. Barkan, Steven L. Barkan, P.C., Melville, NY.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sophia Ree, Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (McMahon, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the June 28, 2022, judgment of the district court granting summary judgment is
VACATED and the action is REMANDED to the district court for trial proceedings.
Maria E. Sierra was a Coach Cleaner on National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(“Amtrak”) trains until she suffered an accident cleaning a coach bathroom. Sierra filed a single
claim against Amtrak under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60,
claiming that Amtrak acted negligently in violation of the statute by, among other things, “failing
to provide the Plaintiff with a safe place to work.” Joint App’x at 11. She appeals from an order
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.) granting
summary judgment in favor of Amtrak and dismissing her claim under FELA. Because there is a
triable factual issue under FELA as to whether Amtrak was on notice but failed to intervene
regarding the potentially hazardous working conditions that Sierra experienced, we vacate and
remand for trial proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Any Amtrak passenger knows that passenger train bathrooms look quite different at the
beginning of a trip compared to the end. Coach Cleaners are tasked with restoring these bathrooms
to a clean state after each journey, and they are often confronted with “dirty, nasty, and smelly”
conditions. Joint App’x at 352. As Sierra describes it, the only way to remove these stains and
2 the smell is to “[s]crub the floor really good. Really wet. . . . Wet, wet, mop, mop, scrub really
hard.” Id. at 43. The goal? To “leave the premises impeccable.” Id. at 44.
According to Sierra, her usual approach to cleaning—mopping the whole bathroom several
times—often resulted in her standing on a very wet floor, a practice potentially contrary to
Amtrak’s written training materials and which Amtrak describes as a hazard. Sierra nevertheless
testified that she always cleaned this way and that her supervisors witnessed her doing so but never
intervened. On the evening of July 6, 2018, Sierra cleaned seven bathrooms without incident.
When mopping the eighth and final restroom of her shift, however, she slipped and fell on the wet
floor and injured her knee. This suit followed.
DISCUSSION
For more than a century, federal law has applied a relaxed standard of negligence to claims
brought by employees against railroads engaged in interstate commerce. See Federal Employers’
Liability Act, ch. 149, §§ 1–10, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60).
In applying that standard on a motion for summary judgment, this Court has repeatedly affirmed
the “strong federal policy” in favor of letting juries decide cases arising under FELA, Sinclair v.
Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
such that summary judgment is appropriate “[o]nly in instances where reasonable jurors could
reach only one conclusion,” Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
Because we conclude it is possible that a reasonable jury could have reached a conclusion different
than that of the district court, we vacate and remand for trial proceedings under the relaxed
negligence standard required by federal law in this context.
3 I. Standard of Review
It “has been accepted as settled law for several decades,” CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,
564 U.S. 685, 699 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), that the standard to be
applied by the jury in a FELA case “is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury
or death for which damages are sought,” id. at 692 (emphasis added) (quoting Rogers v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d
80, 87 (2d Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[c]ountless judges have instructed
countless juries in [this] language,” CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 699; see also id. at 698 n.5
(collecting cases from every court of appeals applying this standard), which is to be read “as a
comprehensive statement of the FELA causation standard,” id. at 695.
In light of this relaxed standard of negligence in FELA cases, this Court has long held
that “the right of the jury to pass on factual issues ‘must be liberally construed.’” Williams v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85); see
also Tufariello, 458 F.3d at 87; Ulfik v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 & n.1 (2d Cir.
1996); Johannessen v. Gulf Trading & Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1980); Eggert v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, when reviewing
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it is appropriate for the district court to “take the
determination from the jury and decide the question as a matter of law,” Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85,
only when “there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a jury to find for the plaintiff,” Syverson
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). We review de novo a
district court’s award of summary judgment, “constru[ing] the evidence in the light most
4 favorable to the plaintiff” and “drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all ambiguities in
[plaintiff’s] favor.” Tufariello, 458 F.3d at 85 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
II. Triable Issue on Sierra’s FELA Claim
Given the relaxed negligence standard in summary judgment motions under FELA, there
is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Amtrak had notice that Sierra was cleaning
bathrooms in a potentially hazardous manner but failed to intervene.
The district court incorrectly found “nothing in the record indicating that Amtrak had
actual or constructive notice of the slippery conditions of the train bathrooms or that the methods
required to clean said bathroom creat[ed] unsafe and slippery conditions.” Special App’x at 11
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Sierra testified that “[o]n many occasions,”
Amtrak foremen—the employees “in charge of the work being performed” on the trains—
“would come by while [she] was working and observe [her] work.” Joint App’x at 277–78; see
also id. at 48, 50 (describing her cleaning process on the night of her injury as “routine”); id. at
298–301, 311–12 (recalling that during her cleaning shifts on Acela trains, including on the night
in question, “very particular” and “demanding” foremen would “walk by” to confirm that
employees were complying with company policies, such as requirements to use personal
protective equipment and proper footwear). In particular, Sierra noted that “the foreman
observed [her] cleaning the bathroom and scrubbing with [her] mop while standing on a wet
floor” and that “[t]here were no complaints or instructions not to do work in this manner.” Id. at
278 (emphasis added); see also id. at 344 (“[Sierra] had been observed on many occasions
washing the bathroom floor in this ma[nn]er by the Amtrak Foremen, who were constantly
walking the train and watching her clean and [Sierra] was never told that she was mopping in an
improper manner.”). Amtrak concedes that it “was well aware of the hazards of walking on a
5 wet surface,” Appellee’s Br. at 38, but it disputes that its foremen had knowledge of Sierra’s
practice of cleaning while standing on wet floors, id. at 39; see also Joint App’x at 375 (attacking
Sierra’s statements as “speculative, vague and conclusory”). In light of FELA’s relaxed
negligence standard, this dispute constitutes a triable issue.
The district court also faulted Sierra for “not identify[ing]” the specific foremen whom
she claims had observed her mopping while standing on a wet floor. Special App’x at 12. But
failure to name a foreman does not make Sierra’s statement vague, and we have held that a
plaintiff’s testimony “is a permissible and sufficient means of establishing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists requiring a trial,” even without independent corroboration. R.B. Ventures,
Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 59–60 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 60 (“Under FELA,
the circumstantial evidence . . . was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact . . . .”).
Sierra testified that foremen regularly observed her working and that they saw her standing on a
wet floor “[o]n many occasions.” Joint App’x at 278. Because the “quantum of evidence that
suffices in FELA cases is significantly lower than in ordinary torts cases,” Nelson v. Metro-N.
Commuter R.R., 235 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), what Sierra has put forward is enough to
defeat summary judgment under FELA.
We thus hold that the district court erred by taking the question of FELA liability away
from the jury. 1 We VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for trial
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1 Having found a genuine dispute of material fact as to notice of the potentially hazardous floor condition, we do not reach the parties’ arguments about compliance with local rules or the adequacy of Sierra’s training and cleaning equipment as provided by Amtrak.