Dolliver, J.
May lawyers be subject to liability under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), RCW 19.86? Defendant Chris Demopolis appeals the Superior Court order which dismissed his counterclaims under CR 12(b)(6) for CPA violations against the plaintiffs' law firm of Short and Cressman.
In March 1980, Demopolis met with Douglas Hartwich, partner in plaintiffs’ law firm, to discuss representation in two pending lawsuits. The first involved dissolution of a real estate partnership. The complaint alleged damages in excess of $200,000. After 2 days of trial, the action settled for $7,500. Attorney fees totaled $19,958.53. The second case involved a real estate forfeiture action. Defendant prevailed and was entitled to immediate possession of the premises, rental delinquencies, and damages.
A dispute ensued over the rendering of legal services. Defendant contends he hired Hartwich to handle personally his legal matters but that without his consent or knowledge Hartwich had a younger partner (Ferrell) and an associate [54]*54(Mayotte) do the legal work. Plaintiffs maintain Hartwich personally introduced Ferrell and Mayotte to Demopolis, that he told Demopolis they would be handling the cases, and that Demopolis agreed to this arrangement.
The parties also contest the payment of attorney fees. Defendant asserts he rejected plaintiffs' first bill and made a final settlement of $14,000. The second bill for $29,122.80 is considered excessive by defendant as he holds numerous grievances with the quality of representation. Plaintiffs state they attempted to obtain payment from Demopolis but were unsuccessful. Subsequent to filing a notice of intent to withdraw in August 1980, but before the effective date, plaintiffs maintain they entered into an agreement with Demopolis.
In a letter dated September 3, 1980, Hartwich wrote Demopolis confirming (1) plaintiffs' acceptance of $14,000 as full payment for the partnership matter; (2) withdrawal of their notice to withdraw; (3) plaintiffs' intent to bill at their regular hourly rates for time expended on the second case; and (4) noting "You will be working on the [second] case directly with Don Ferrell and Jim Mayotte, as was the case in the partnership action." A handwritten statement, signed by Demopolis, to hold Short and Cressman harmless for the release of trust funds totaling $3,025.35 held by them for Demopolis' former attorney is on the first page of this letter. However, Demopolis' affidavit states he never received the original or a copy of the letter; he only agreed to hold plaintiffs harmless for the release of trust funds, and was not told he was waiving any legal rights to complain about the fees or the handling of the first case.
Plaintiffs sued Demopolis for breach of an express contract to pay for legal services. Demopolis denied liability and asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He alleged 10 causes of action: (1) unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86; (2) breach of contract; (3) violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (excessive fees); (4) violation of CPR DR 6-101 (incompetence); (5) negligence and [55]*55malpractice; (6) fiduciary duty violations; (7) misrepresentation; (8) violation of CPR DR 2-110 (threat to withdraw) causing mental distress; (9) reformation of contract; and (10) attorney fees assessment.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment which was denied, except for defendant's claim for emotional distress damages which was dismissed. Subsequently, and before a second judge, plaintiffs made a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss defendant's 1st, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 10th causes of action. This latter motion was granted and the counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice. Three reasons were cited for dismissing defendant's counterclaims for CPA violations. First, the practice of law did not constitute the conduct of any trade or commerce within the meaning of the CPA or Washington case law. Second, to regulate the legal profession through the CPA was an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the judiciary to regulate the practice of law. Third, other adequate remedies (breach of contract and malpractice) were available.
Defendant was granted direct discretionary review and assigns error to the dismissal of his CPA violation counterclaims pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) ("failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
I
The first issue we consider is whether the practice of law falls within "trade or commerce" as that term is defined by RCW 19.86. RCW 19.86.020 provides:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
"'Trade' and 'commerce' shall include the sale of assets or services, and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington." RCW 19.86.010(2).
The trial court, relying on Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn.2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976), interpreted the CPA as exempting the practice of law. In Lightfoot, a client allegedly suffered damages as a result of her attorney's nonfea-[56]*56sanee. We disallowed her CPA claim because of her failure to show sufficient public impact. 86 Wn.2d at 338-39.
A breach of a private contract affecting no one but the parties to the contract, whether that breach be negligent or intentional, is not an act or practice affecting the public interest.
86 Wn.2d at 334. In dictum we "implicitly recognized the lack of precedent for the concept that the legal profession is involved in trade and commerce ..." 86 Wn.2d at 338. Subsequent case law does not appear finally to have answered the question. See Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40, 47-48, 614 P.2d 184 (1980) (Rosellini, J., concurring) ("[w]hether the lawyer [MacDonald] who was sued in that action was engaged in 'trade or commerce' was a question which we left unanswered"); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 361, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) ("Light-foot is correct on its facts in that there was a failure to show that the private dispute affected the public interest or was within the sphere of trade or commerce . . ."); Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d 581, 591-92, 675 P.2d 193 (1983) (unauthorized practice of law by employees of an escrow agent is a violation of the CPA).
The CPA contains no language expressly including or excluding attorneys from its purview. The act, however, contains its own guide to statutory construction. RCW 19.86.920 provides:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is to complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition. It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing this act, the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts . . . interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters and that in deciding whether conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or commerce ... To this end this act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served.
(Italics ours.)
[57]*57Some earlier cases from the United States Supreme Court seem by dictum to have recognized a "learned professions" exemption to the antitrust laws. This exemption was based on judicial interpretations of what constituted a trade — " [w] her ever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions ..." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436, 76 L. Ed. 1204, 52 S. Ct. 607 (1932). See Annot., "Learned Profession" Exemption in Federal Antitrust Laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.), 39 A.L.R. Fed. 774 (1978). The question as to whether there could be restraint of "trade or commerce" when the activities restrained were the professional activities of members of a "learned profession" was not reached until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
In Goldfarb, the United States Supreme Court held minimum fee schedules, published by a county bar association and enforced by the state bar, violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The bar association argued immunity under the Sherman Act because the practice of law was a learned profession — not trade or commerce. The association maintained competition was inconsistent with the practice of a profession because enhancing profit was not the goal of professional activities; the goal was to provide community services. 421 U.S. at 786. The Court said neither the nature of an occupation in and of itself nor the claim of public service controlled in determining whether section 1 included performance. The Court went on to state:
The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, contains no exception. . . . And our cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions . . . Indeed, our cases have specifically included the sale of services within § 1. . . . Whatever else it may be, . . . the exchange of such a service for money is "commerce" in the most common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this [58]*58business aspect ... In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.
(Footnote omitted.) 421 U.S. at 787-88. (Cf., however, footnote 17, where the Goldfarb Court acknowledged " [i]t would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities . . 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.) See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) ("the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism . . .").
Federal courts generally have refused to adopt a blanket immunity for the "learned professions".
The issue of whether a profession is a learned one is not seen by the Court as the appropriate approach for resolving the higher question of whether the Sherman Act is applicable to that profession. To engage in such an inquiry would chart the Court on a semantic adventure of questionable value. It would be a dangerous form of elitism, indeed, to dole out exemptions to our antitrust laws merely on the basis of the educational level needed to practice a given profession, or for that matter, the impact which the profession has on society's health and welfare. Clearly, the more appropriate and fairer course is to examine the nature and conduct involved in the profession on a case by case basis together with the context in which it is practiced.
United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (D.D.C. 1974). See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cy. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 73 L. Ed. 2d 48, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (fact that doctors, rather than nonprofessionals, were parties to price fixing agreement did not exempt them from Sherman Act); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 55 L. Ed. 2d 637, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978) (difference between professional and other business services does not create a broad exemption under the Rule of Reason for learned professions); Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 [59]*59(1962) (pharmacists had no defense to price fixing on ground it was done by professionals); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979) (architects subject to antitrust laws); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (practice of dentistry and orthodontia does not fall outside the ambit of trade or commerce); AMA v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676, 71 L. Ed. 2d 546, 102 S. Ct. 1744 (1982) (per curiam) (equally divided Court affirmed 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980)).
While federal courts have rejected professional immunity from the antitrust laws, state courts are split on this issue in construing their consumer protection laws. See, e.g., Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 190 Conn. 528, 461 A.2d 1369 (1983) (client's counterclaim that law firm engaged in unfair trade act or practice by attempting to collect debt which it knew was not due and owing lacked "nexus with the public interest" and was properly dismissed); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983) (unfair trade practices act, which regulates "the conduct of any trade or commerce", does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law); Frahm v. Urkovich, 113 Ill. App. 3d 580, 447 N.E.2d 1007 (1983) (legislature's use of "trade or commerce" in defining application of consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act was not meant to include the actual practice of law); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (advertising of legal services is clearly a "trade" or "commerce" under unfair trade practices and consumer protection law); Matthews v. Berryman, 196 Mont. 49, 637 P.2d 822 (1981) (attorney who told clients he would withdraw as counsel, unless they signed security agreement, held not to have committed unfair trade practices); Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence was insufficient to support finding that attorney's conduct in billing client four times the amount he testified to under oath constituted a deceptive trade practice); Barnard v. Mecom, 650 [60]*60S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (attorney's failure to release $5,000 worth of trust funds or pursue lawsuit held to violate deceptive trade practices act); DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (purchase or acquisition of legal services covered by deceptive trade practices act), aff'd, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
Defendant urges a literal interpretation of the express language of the CPA. He contends attorneys sell "assets" and "services". RCW 19.86.010(2). Hence, their conduct falls within the trade or commerce provision of RCW 19.86.020. Defendant states the purposes of the act, i.e., protection of the public from unfair or deceptive acts or practices, are served by its application to lawyers. RCW 19.86.920. He distinguishes Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn.2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976), as it never addressed whether an attorney's conduct was part of trade or commerce. Rather, Lightfoot is deemed the court's first attempt to articulate a theory which excluded from the act purely private disputes.
Plaintiffs, however, assert that, as RCW 19.86 was adopted virtually verbatim from federal antitrust laws, the Legislature is presumed to have intended "trade or commerce" to be interpreted in accordance with then-existing construction of that term under federal law. Since before 1961, federal law did not consider the learned professions to be part of trade or commerce, ergo, the practice of law cannot constitute trade or commerce under the CPA. Plaintiffs distinguish Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975) as dealing with commercial aspects of the legal profession, and not with the practice of law itself.
Guided by the legislative prescription to follow federal law (see discussion in Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic, 190 Conn. at 517-21) and to construe liberally the CPA, RCW 19.86.920, we hold that certain entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law may fall within the "trade or commerce" definition of the CPA. The more recent federal cases stand for the principle that attorneys, as well as other [61]*61professionals, are not exempt from antitrust laws. The CPA, on its face, shows a carefully drafted attempt to bring within its reaches every person who conducts unfair or deceptive acts or practices in any trade or commerce. RCW 19.86.010(1) and (2); RCW 19.86.020. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, supra at 787-88. There is no statutory exemption for lawyers. Cf. RCW 19.86.060; RCW 19.86.070; RCW 19.86.170. Moreover, to limit our interpretations to the inconclusive dictum of pre-1961 federal case law relative to the "learned profession" seems totally contrary to the legislative directive that the CPA be construed liberally. RCW 19.86.920.
Defendant's counterclaims do not principally attack the actual performance of Short and Cressman's legal advice and services. Nor is defendant urging that plaintiff attorneys be reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred. Rather, defendant's counterclaims primarily challenge the entrepreneurial aspects of legal practice — how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and collected and the way a law firm obtains, retains, and dismisses clients. These business aspects of the legal profession are legitimate concerns of the public which are properly subject to the CPA.
However, a few of defendant's claims as a matter of law are outside the purview of the CPA and were properly dismissed by the trial court. CR 12(b)(6). Defendant alleges plaintiffs' law firm neglected properly to gather essential facts and evaluate the dissolution of his real estate partnership such that settlement was untimely; to pursue claims against defendant's opponents causing him a loss of valuable rights; and failed in a timely manner to file a judgment in the second action. Defendant also claims that the judgment finally entered was defective in failing to hold one of defendant's opponents liable. These claims are not chiefly concerned with the entrepreneurial aspects of legal practice; rather, they concern the actual practice of law. Since these claims are directed to the competence of and strategy employed by plaintiffs' lawyers, they amount to allegations of negligence or malpractice and are exempt [62]*62from the CPA.
In reaching this result, we are cognizant of the important public policy interests at stake. Current remedies available to the victims of professional malpractice or misconduct have shortcomings. Comment, The Washington Consumer Protection Act vs. The Learned Professional, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 435, 436 (1975). Most actions are expensive and difficult to prove. "The injured client can take little comfort from the fact that the wrongdoer has been reprimanded or suspended or stripped of the right to practice his profession." 10 Gonz. L. Rev. at 437. In some actions, only the prospects of attorney fees and potential treble damages provide a complete remedy. RCW 19.86.090. The CPA should be "available as an efficient and effective method of filling the gaps left vacant by the existing common law ..." (footnote omitted), 10 Gonz. L. Rev. at 437, as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.
II
Next, we consider whether the application of the CPA to attorneys would be an unconstitutional legislative invasion of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in its power to regulate the practice of law. Const, art. 4, § 1 provides: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court ..." The Supreme Court has an exclusive, inherent power to admit, enroll, discipline, and disbar attorneys. Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976). We have held the exercise of "'this power is necessary for the protection of the court, the proper administration of justice, the dignity and purity of the profession, and for the public good and the protection of clients'." Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wn.2d 212, 215, 667 P.2d 630 (1983) (quoting In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 475, 172 P. 1152 (1918)). Furthermore,
"'the power to make the necessary rules and regulations governing the bar was intended to be vested exclusively in the supreme court, free from the dangers of encroachment either by the legislative or executive branches.'"
[63]*63Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443, 453, 635 P.2d 730 (1981) (quoting Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 633, 548 P.2d 310 (1976)).
Plaintiffs assert application of the CPA to the practice of law violates the separation of powers doctrine. See Hagan & Van Camp, at 452-53 (RCW 19.62, which permitted nonattorneys to select and prepare documents for real estate transactions, unconstitutionally infringed upon the court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law). Plaintiffs maintain defendant's complaints are regulated by the court (¿.e., disciplinary rules) and cannot be shared with the Legislature. The legal profession is claimed to be the most strictly regulated of all professions and plaintiffs state that to allow regulation of lawyers by a "politically motivated" Legislature is not in the public interest.
Defendant contends application of the CPA to lawyers does not violate the court's power to regulate the practice of law. He analogizes that criminal laws (i.e., criminal fraud) could not be applied to attorneys if plaintiffs' position was adopted. Moreover, defendant criticizes plaintiffs' failure to show that applying the CPA to lawyers would interfere with the court's powers.
Amicus curiae, Washington State Attorney General, relying on In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918), argues the separation of powers doctrine does not create an impenetrable barrier through which the Legislature may not venture. Rather, the exclusive power of the court lies in determining who may practice law and who, once admitted, shall be suspended or disbarred from such practice. The corollary, according to amicus, is that the Legislature may constitutionally act with regard to attorneys so long as its enactments do not affect or purport to take away the court's power to admit, suspend, or disbar.
In Bruen, an attorney challenged a 1917 act which delegated authority to the board of law examiners to determine his fitness to practice law as an unconstitutional encroachment on judicial powers. The court upheld the constitu[64]*64tionality of the act, except for the provision for a final order by the board. Final judgments on disbarment were to come from the court. 102 Wash, at 481. In relating the two powers the court stated:
The cases are fairly uniform upon the proposition that admitting to practice, suspending, and disbarring are judicial functions. The legislative power, in the interest of uniformity of standard and to remedy and prevent mischiefs in the profession, may regulate and restrict this power, but cannot take it away. It may provide machinery for the administration of the regulation provided by the legislature, as in carrying into effect such regulations some agency is necessary.
102 Wash. at 477.
Similarly, in Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the judicial disciplinary system and consumer protection laws have different functions and there is no reason why they cannot coexist.
We should not permit the special relationship of attorneys to the judiciary to blind us to the fundamental importance of the relationship of attorneys to their clients. Although the canons of ethics and the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility purport to govern both the official and the private aspects of the practice of law, the code's emphasis is consistently ethical and regulatory. [CPA], by contrast, is primarily addressed to the pragmatic concerns of the public; it emphasizes prevention of injury to the consumer of legal services and redress to those injured by attorney misconduct. [CPA] in no way relieves attorneys of the ethical duties imposed on them by the code. For the conduct that [CPA] declares illegal, it provides distinctly separate remedies, different both in purpose and in form from the scheme of regulation envisaged by the code. We recognize that [CPA's] distinct form and purpose do not, by themselves, guarantee that the judiciary's disciplinary power will continue to operate in an unhindered fashion. The defendant has not, however, demonstrated the contrary. A priori, there is no reason why the code and [CPA] cannot coexist.
(Footnotes and citations omitted.) 190 Conn. at 525-26. Cf. [65]*65Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975) ("[i]n holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions").
While we should jealously protect our prerogatives, if the legislative power is not limited by the constitution, it should be unrestrained. Moses Lake Sch. Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Comm'ty College, 81 Wn.2d 551, 555, 503 P.2d 86 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 934 (1973). This is in accordance with our presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislative acts. Crane Towing, Inc. v. Gorton, 89 Wn.2d 161, 169, 570 P.2d 428, 97 A.L.R.3d 482 (1977). Accordingly, we hold the CPA does not trench upon the constitutional powers of the court to regulate the practice of law.
Closely connected with the constitutional argument is the ruling of the trial court that defendant's CPA claim must be dismissed because he "has pled and does have other adequate remedies available to him." In support of this view the trial court cited Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn.2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976). Lightfoot, however, does not support this position. Rather, it said that the CPA does not "provide an additional remedy for private wrongs which do not affect the public generally." Lightfoot, at 333. Implicit in this statement and in the thrust of Lightfoot is the view that the CPA was to give an additional remedy to those who have suffered a wrong which does impact the public interest. That this is the correct interpretation of Lightfoot is borne out by cases such as Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 360, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) and Thomas v. French, 30 Wn. App. 811, 813, 638 P.2d 613 (1981).
To conclude, lawyers may be subject to liability under the CPA. We hold entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law, which are principally counterclaimed by defendant, fall within the sphere of "trade or commerce" under RCW 19.86.010(2) and 19.86.020. As to such claims, we reverse [66]*66the trial court's dismissal of defendant's CPA counterclaims. Defendant's claims which purely allege negligence or legal malpractice are exempt from the CPA and were properly dismissed under CR 12(b)(6). While we hold the term "conduct of any trade or commerce" does not exclude all conduct of the profession of law, we do not decide in this case whether the CPA applies to every aspect of the practice of law in this state as to the performance of legal services. Whether Demopolis at trial can satisfy the Anhold public interest test or other requirements of the CPA is beyond our scope of review. Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40, 46, 614 P.2d 184 (1980).
Finally, we hold application of the CPA to entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Dimmick, J., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur.