Shim-Larkin v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 26, 2023·No. 1:16-cv-06099·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DO CUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED Heena Shim-Larkin, DOC #: ______ ___________ DATE FILED: 9/26/2023___ Plaintiff,

-against- 16 Civ. 6099 (AT) (JW)

ORDER ADOPTING City of New York, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Defendant. ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

Plaintiff pro se, Heena Shim-Larkin, brings this action against Defendant, the City of New York, alleging discrimination based on her national origin, race, color, age, protected status as a victim of domestic violence, and disabilities in violation of her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Executive Law § 290, et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-101, et seq., including claims of a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, failure to accommodate her disabilities, and unlawful retaliation. R&R at 1, ECF No. 855 (citing Am. Compl., ECF No. 30). On May 10, 2022, the Court referred the matter to the Honorable Jennifer Willis for a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) on the parties’ anticipated cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 786. On November 1, 2022, the parties filed their motions. ECF Nos. 814, 819; see Pl. Mem., ECF No. 822; Def. Mem., ECF No. 817. On August 18, 2023, Judge Willis issued the R&R, in which she recommended that Defendant’s motion be granted in part, and that Plaintiff’s motion be denied. R&R at 3. Before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R, Pl. Obj., ECF No. 865; and (2) Defendant’s objections to the R&R, Def. Obj., ECF No. 866. For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES the parties’ objections and ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety. DISCUSSION1

I. Standard of Review A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party makes specific objections, the court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which objection is made. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, when “a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments,” the court reviews the R&R strictly for clear error. Harris v. TD Ameritrade Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Wallace v. Superintendent of Clinton Corr. Facility, No. 13 Civ. 3989, 2014 WL 2854631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) (citation omitted); see also Bailey v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 13 Civ. 1064, 2014 WL 2855041, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) (“[O]bjections that

are not clearly aimed at particular findings . . . do not trigger de novo review.”). Moreover, “a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.” United States v. Gladden, 394 F. Supp. 3d 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation omitted). The Court may adopt those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made “as long as no clear error is apparent from the face of the record.” Oquendo v. Colvin, No. 12 Civ. 4527, 2014 WL 4160222, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014) (citation omitted). An R&R is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

1 The Court presumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history as detailed in the R&R, see R&R at 3–10, and, therefore, does not summarize them here. been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citation omitted); see also Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 669 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). II. Plaintiff’s Objections Plaintiff argues that Judge Willis incorrectly found that the evidence failed to create

genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation claims. See generally Pl. Obj. As to the hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff contends that Judge Willis erred in her analysis “by separating the [summary judgment] evidence into distinct incidents, rather than considering the evidence in total.” Id. at 2. But Plaintiff previously made this argument to Judge Willis and merely “reiterates [her] original arguments.” Wallace, 2014 WL 2854631, at *1; compare Pl. Obj. at 2–9, with Pl. Opp. at 8–10, ECF No. 837. The Court thus reviews the R&R for clear error and concludes that Judge Willis did not clearly err in her careful analysis of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment evidence. R&R at 13–25. To the contrary, Judge Willis considered the “totality of the circumstances” including the

“frequency and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct [was] physically threatening or humiliating, whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with [P]laintiff’s work performance, and the effect on [P]laintiff’s psychological wellbeing.” Id. at 13 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). After reviewing the totality of Plaintiff’s proffered evidence, Judge Willis concluded that the comments made to Plaintiff were “few in number and sporadic” and that the behavior against Plaintiff was not “discrimination based on her protected characteristics.” Id. at 17, 21–22. These conclusions were not clearly erroneous based on the evidence. Likewise, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that she adduced sufficient evidence to create a question of fact on the issue of causation and discriminatory animus. Here, again, Plaintiff restates her original arguments, see Wallace, 2014 WL 2854631, at *1, but objects to the weight that Judge Willis gave to different pieces of evidence. See Pl. Obj. at 11–12. The Court concludes that Judge Willis did not err in “reject[ing] circumstancial or indirect evidence” and giving less “weight” to certain evidence. See id.

Because the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection as to her hostile work environment claim, the Court also rejects Plaintiff’s objection as to the constructive discharge claim because the standard for constructive discharge is higher than the standard for a hostile work environment claim. See R&R at 31 (citing Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 725 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also Pl. Obj. at 13. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Judge Willis incorrectly found that the evidence failed to create genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation. Here, again, Plaintiff lists a series of objections but entirely “reiterates [her] original arguments.” Wallace, 2014 WL 2854631, at *1; compare Pl. Obj. at 14–17, with Pl. Opp. at 21–23. For example, Plaintiff argues that Judge Willis should have considered other protected activities and failed to account for

Defendant’s inadequate response to retaliation by other employees. Pl. Obj. at 14–17. Plaintiff also reincorporates her analysis as to the hostile work environment claim. Id. at 14, 17.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Shim-Larkin v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Shim-Larkin v. City of New York (Shim-Larkin v. City of New York) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp.
604 F.3d 712 (Second Circuit, 2010)
TRAVEL SENTRY, INC. v. Tropp
669 F. Supp. 2d 279 (E.D. New York, 2009)
Harris v. TD Ameritrade Inc.
338 F. Supp. 3d 170 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)