Shim-Larkin v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 27, 2022
Docket1:16-cv-06099
StatusUnknown

This text of Shim-Larkin v. City of New York (Shim-Larkin v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shim-Larkin v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCH SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED: 4/27/22___

Shim-Larkin, Plaintiff, 16-cv-6099 (AJN) —V— ORDER City of New York, Defendant.

ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation: In this employment discrimination action, Defendant objects to an order of the Magistrate Judge granting Plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Plaintiff objects to an order of the Magistrate Judge denying her request to compel Defendant to fully answer certain interrogatories. For the reasons below, both objections are overruled.

I. Background

Plaintiff Heena Shim-Larkin, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit against the City of New York in August 2016 alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law. See Complaint, Dkt. No. 2; Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 30. On November 23, 2016, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox for general pretrial services, including scheduling, discovery, non- dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement. Dkt. No. 22. In February of 2022, the referral was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis. Before the Court are two objections to discovery orders issued by Magistrate Judge Fox.

II. Legal Standard Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the Court “may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court.” The Court may reconsider the magistrate judge’s order “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. “A magistrate judge’s decision is ‘clearly erroneous’ only if the district court is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 08-cv-9361 (JPO), 2016 WL 236248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2016) (citation omitted). “A decision is contrary to law if it ‘fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.’” Id. (citation omitted). III. The Court overrules Defendant’s objection regarding Magistrate Judge Fox’s imposition of sanctions.

Plaintiff submitted her first set of interrogatories on April 25, 2017, Dkt. No. 94-1, and Defendant failed to timely serve its responses. Magistrate Judge Fox ordered that Defendant waived objections pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(4) and was required to provide responses. Dkt. No. 119. Defendant responded to the first set of interrogatories, Dkt. No. 165-2, and Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions because she argued that Defendant failed to fully respond to several of those interrogatories. Dkt. Nos. 602-604. The parties briefed the motion, Dkt. Nos. 611-612, 617-618, and Judge Fox granted Plaintiff’s motion and imposed sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, Dkt. No. 657. After receiving a Rule 11 motion from Plaintiff, Defendant filed an Amended Rule 72(a) objection. Dkt. Nos. 689-690. The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Fox’s order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law and denies Defendant’s objections. 1. Interrogatory No. 1 Interrogatory No. 1, as relevant here, requested contact information for “the female employee of New York City Department of Education [(DOE]) who visited Tompkins Square Park on or about August 18, 2015.” Dkt. No. 165-1. Jacqueline Mills was identified in documents referenced in response to this interrogatory. The Magistrate Judge imposed sanctions

based on four issues with Defendant’s response. Defendant points to one portion of the Magistrate Judge’s decision that is allegedly contrary to law: that a party’s attempt to advance an argument for the first time in a reply must be “rejected as untimely.’” E.g., Dkt. No. 742 at 6 (citing In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, 235 F. Supp. 3d 472, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Defendant is correct that Plaintiff improperly raised for the first time on reply the argument Defendant did not speak to Mills before responding to the interrogatory. However, that was not the only ground on which Judge Fox imposed a sanction. Dkt. No. 657 at 34. Thus, Judge Fox could have and likely would have reached the same conclusion without that argument. 2. Interrogatory No. 2

Magistrate Judge Fox held that a sanction was warranted as to Interrogatory No. 2 because Defendant failed to determine whether Javier Rodriguez had additional contact information, such as a phone number, that Defendant ultimately failed to provide to Plaintiff in response to the interrogatory. Dkt. No. 657 at 35-36. Defendant argues that it interpreted Magistrate Judge Fox’s previous order requiring a supplemental response to only pertain to email addresses, and once it confirmed that DPR did not issue Mr. Rodriguez an email address, it had satisfied that order. Dkt. No. 689 at 13-14. Regardless of the misinterpretation, Plaintiff’s interrogatory requested “[t]he full name, title, address, phone number, and email address” for Mr. Rodriguez. Dkt. No. 165-1 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court finds it neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law for Magistrate Judge Fox to have sanctioned Defendant for not providing a phone number for Mr. Rodriguez, especially when Defendant had a second opportunity to disclose such information in its supplemental response. 3. Interrogatory No. 3

Interrogatory No. 3 requested “all policies and/or practices concerning assigning and/or transferring a lifeguard to a pool during the summer of 2015.” Dkt. No. 165-1. Defendant pointed Plaintiff to various DPR human resources documents but did not direct Plaintiff to a specific policy or even page. Dkt. No. 165-2. Plaintiff argued that the documents were not responsive to her request. Dkt. No. 152. Magistrate Judge Fox concluded that Defendant could not rely on Local Civil Rule 33.3 as an objection to respond more fully because the Magistrate Judge had already ordered Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatories without objections. Dkt. No. 319 at 21. What’s more, Magistrate Judge Fox concluded that Defendant failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d) because it failed to “specify[] the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable [Plaintiff] to locate and identify them as readily

as [Defendant] could.” Id. at 20-21 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1)). The Court affirmed that order on March 27, 2019, and held that it was improper for Defendant to rely on Local Rule 33.3 to limit the scope of the interrogatory, but the Court’s order did not specify whether it was upholding Judge Fox’s determination that Defendant failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d). Dkt. No. 492. Magistrate Judge Fox interpreted the Court’s order to be “tantamount to a rejection” of Defendant’s argument and therefore found that Defendant’s response to Interrogatory No. 3 warranted a sanction. Dkt. No. 657 at 38 (cleaned up) (quoting Fielding v. Tollaksen, 50 F.3d 175, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas
235 F. Supp. 3d 472 (S.D. New York, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Shim-Larkin v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shim-larkin-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2022.