Shields v. Collins

Michigan Court of Appeals

Shields v. Collins

268 N.W.2d 371, 83 Mich. App. 268, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2302

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 9, 1978

DocketDocket 77-544

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 268 N.W.2d 371 (Shields v. Collins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shields v. Collins, 268 N.W.2d 371, 83 Mich. App. 268, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinions

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, seeking an injunction restraining defendants from entering onto land the ownership of which is the subject of this litigation. He also sought damages for destruction of property on his land and for construction of a fence along the property line. Defendants counter-claimed, seeking a declaration of the actual property line, title to the strip of disputed property and damages. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court found for defendants, awarding them title to the property and damages. From that judgment, plaintiff appeals as of right.

The trial court filed a written opinion making findings of fact. To the extent that these findings go to the credibility of the witnesses and are consistent with the evidence, we affirm them; the trial judge has had ample opportunity to see the witnesses and to form a judgment as to who is more worthy of belief. Under these circumstances, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge.

He found that, in 1958, there was doubt between plaintiff’s predecessor in title and defendants as to the boundary line between the two parcels of real property, and that they agreed to set the existing fence line as the boundary. The trial judge also found that plaintiff’s predecessor in title, a woman plaintiff had dated, told plaintiff that the property line was the fence. These findings are supported by evidence; we decline to disturb them.

The trial court then found for defendants under [271]*271Hanlon v Ten Hove, 235 Mich 227, 230; 209 NW 169 (1926).

On appeal, plaintiff attacks the credibility of his predecessor in title and also claims that the trial court erred in finding that the doubt or disagreement which existed here rose to the level of or was of the nature requisite to justify application of the legal doctrine of acquiescence.

As indicated, we reject appellant’s insistence that we accept his version of his communications with his predecessor. We do not disturb the trial court’s conclusion regarding credibility. With respect to appellant’s second claim, we are satisfied that the underlying reason for the rule is the promotion of peaceful resolution of boundary disputes. The best interest of a community is served by giving legal effect to friendly resolution of boundary line disputes or doubts.

This rationale is as applicable where there is only a doubt over the location of a boundary line as where the doubt has flared into a dispute. This is not a case where, in 1958, the parties made a mutual mistake as to the boundary; to the contrary, neither plaintiff’s predecessor in title nor defendants knew where the correct boundary was. Thus, in the within case, doubt existed as to the location of the boundary. That doubt was resolved short of dispute by an agreement between defendants and plaintiffs predecessor in title. If there had not been any doubt as to the boundary line, there would not have been any occasion for defendants and plaintiffs predecessor in title to meet and to agree that the fence would be treated as the boundary line. Further indication of the existence of doubt is the fact that plaintiff was told by his predecessor that the fence was the boundary line, and not the line that plaintiff now claims is [272]*272correct after his belated 1972 survey. We hold that these circumstances were sufficient to invoke the doctrine of acquiescence. We do not find the trial court’s decision inconsistent with the cases.¹

Affirmed, with costs.

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Per Curiam.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, seeking an injunction restraining defendants from entering onto land the ownership of which is the subject of this litigation. He also sought damages for destruction of property on his land and for construction of a fence along the property line. Defendants counter-claimed, seeking a declaration of the actual property line, title to the strip of disputed property and damages. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court found for defendants, awarding them title to the property and damages. From that judgment, plaintiff appeals as of right.

The trial court filed a written opinion making findings of fact. To the extent that these findings go to the credibility of the witnesses and are consistent with the evidence, we affirm them; the trial judge has had ample opportunity to see the witnesses and to form a judgment as to who is more worthy of belief. Under these circumstances, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge.

He found that, in 1958, there was doubt between plaintiff’s predecessor in title and defendants as to the boundary line between the two parcels of real property, and that they agreed to set the existing fence line as the boundary. The trial judge also found that plaintiff’s predecessor in title, a woman plaintiff had dated, told plaintiff that the property line was the fence. These findings are supported by evidence; we decline to disturb them.

The trial court then found for defendants under [271]*271Hanlon v Ten Hove, 235 Mich 227, 230; 209 NW 169 (1926).

On appeal, plaintiff attacks the credibility of his predecessor in title and also claims that the trial court erred in finding that the doubt or disagreement which existed here rose to the level of or was of the nature requisite to justify application of the legal doctrine of acquiescence.

As indicated, we reject appellant’s insistence that we accept his version of his communications with his predecessor. We do not disturb the trial court’s conclusion regarding credibility. With respect to appellant’s second claim, we are satisfied that the underlying reason for the rule is the promotion of peaceful resolution of boundary disputes. The best interest of a community is served by giving legal effect to friendly resolution of boundary line disputes or doubts.

This rationale is as applicable where there is only a doubt over the location of a boundary line as where the doubt has flared into a dispute. This is not a case where, in 1958, the parties made a mutual mistake as to the boundary; to the contrary, neither plaintiff’s predecessor in title nor defendants knew where the correct boundary was. Thus, in the within case, doubt existed as to the location of the boundary. That doubt was resolved short of dispute by an agreement between defendants and plaintiffs predecessor in title. If there had not been any doubt as to the boundary line, there would not have been any occasion for defendants and plaintiffs predecessor in title to meet and to agree that the fence would be treated as the boundary line. Further indication of the existence of doubt is the fact that plaintiff was told by his predecessor that the fence was the boundary line, and not the line that plaintiff now claims is [272]*272correct after his belated 1972 survey. We hold that these circumstances were sufficient to invoke the doctrine of acquiescence. We do not find the trial court’s decision inconsistent with the cases.¹

Affirmed, with costs.

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268 N.W.2d 371, 83 Mich. App. 268, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shields-v-collins-michctapp-1978.

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