Hanlon v. Ten Hove

209 N.W. 169, 235 Mich. 227, 46 A.L.R. 788, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 681
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 7, 1926
DocketDocket No. 42.
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 209 N.W. 169 (Hanlon v. Ten Hove) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 209 N.W. 169, 235 Mich. 227, 46 A.L.R. 788, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 681 (Mich. 1926).

Opinion

Fellows, J.

Plaintiff holds the record title to the east half of lot 2 of block 367 of the revised plat of the city of Muskegon. Defendant Andrew Ten Hove holds the record title to lot 15 and the westerly 3 feet of lot 14 of the same block.' Defendant Elizabeth Ten Hove is his wife. These lots face on Third street and are business property. We take it they were formerly part, of the west half of the block. This action of ejectment involved the boundary line at the rear of the business lots. Shortly before bringing the action plaintiff employed a surveyor who determined that the block overruns and apportioned the overrun among the owners. He was unable to find any of the original monuments. There was testi *229 mony in the case that for upwards of 40 years a fence had been maintained on the present line. Defendant purchased the property about 12 years before this suit was instituted and during his occupancy he used and improved the property up to the line of the old fence, and there is testimony that his predecessors in title had done the same, and there was testimony that there was no dispute over the line until the recent survey. The case was tried by the court without a jury. He made and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. By proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and by proper exceptions, plaintiff has saved all questions for review and they include substantially all questions which usually arise in such litigation. As boundary line litigation seems to be coming into vogue again, we shall go into the questions involved at some greater length than the value of the property at stake ordinarily would require.

Adverse Possession. Defendant had been in possession for but 12 years. His deeds conveyed to him lot 15 and the westerly 3 feet of lot 14. If his, predecessors in title owned or had any interest in land, west of these lots they did not convey it to him.. Plaintiff’s counsel insist that decisions of this court dealing with the questions of “tacking” are, therefore, applicable. While the members of this court have not always been in accord on the question, a majority of the court has consistently held that where a grantor conveys a specific piece of property, the grantee may not tack on to the period of his holding of an additional piece of property the period of his grantor’s occupancy thereof to make up the statutory period. His grantor has not conveyed such property or his interest therein and there is no privity. Illustrative of such cases, see Sheldon v. Railroad Co., 161 Mich. 503; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Sterling, 189 Mich. 366; Wilhelm v. Herron, 211 Mich. 339; Robertson v. Boylan, 214 Mich. 27; Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634. The rule of *230 these eases is not a harsh rule. If “A” purchases and holds the record title to 40 acres of land and by adverse possession obtains title to an adjoining 40 acres, it would hardly be contended that a conveyance by him of the 40 acquired by deed would carry with it title to the 40 acquired by adverse possession. So if “A” acquires by deed a 40 acres and obtains an adjoining strip 2 rods wide or some interest in it, his conveyance of the 40 acquired by deed does not carry with it his interest in the adjoining strip. If the sole defense here was that of adverse possession, we would be obliged to hold that it had not been made out.

Acquiescence. Acquiescence in a boundary line, standing alone, is not sufficient defense to an action of ejectment. Numerous cases have come to this court where it was claimed that a line had been agreed upon and acquiesced in thereafter. We have quite uniformly held that the agreement made the basis of such acquiescence should be one based on a doubt or dispute between the parties as to where the line is and a resolving of the doubt or the composing of their differences by an agreement upon a line. Illustrative of this class of cases, see Phelps v. Brevoort, 207 Mich. 429; Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149; DeLong v. Baldwin, 111 Mich. 466; Turner v. Angus, 145 Mich. 679. But where neighboring proprietors have composed their differences and in good faith agreed upon a line and have fixed their monuments, erected their fences and maintained them, the acquiescence need not continue for the statutory period in order to establish the line. Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (4 Am. Rep. 398); Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270; Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459 (11 Am. St. Rep. 589). Where coupled with acquiescence is the further fact that it has continued for the statutory period, such acquiescence for such statutory period fixes the line. Call v. O’Harrow, 51 Mich. 98; Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601; Greene v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168; F. A. *231 Wolf Brick Co. v. Lonyo, 132 Mich. 162 (102 Am. St. Rep. 412); Marion v. Balsley, 195 Mich. 51. So in Gildea v. Warren, 173 Mich. 28, the plaintiff had not been in possession of the premises for the statutory period. If the question of tacking was involved, she could not tack on the period of occupancy of her predecessors in title, but the fences had been acquiesced in for more than the statutory period and it was held that they fixed the line, and in Bunde v. Finley, supra, while the court held that defendant could not tack on the period of possession of his predecessor to his own in order to establish adverse possession, we at the same time sustained the following instruction:

“Where a fence has been treated and acquiesced in as the correct boundary line between adjacent owners for fifteen years the boundary line ought not to be disturbed even if there were some variance from the true line, and a long established fence is better evidence of actual boundaries settled by practical location than a survey made after the monuments of the original survey have disappeared. And where a boundary line has been recognized and acquiesced in for fifteen years it would not be disturbed by reason of new surveys.”

The instant case falls within the line of eases last discussed. The testimony clearly establishes that for over 40 years the line claimed by defendant has been acquiesced in. On both sides of the line the respective parties have used to the line and no further; for many years a fence was maintained; in later years the business property has been used up to the line and, as we understand the record, improvements of some cost have been made by defendant. That the respective parties have acquiesced in the line for more than the statutory period is abundantly sustained by the proof. To restate the question of acquiescence, let us say: While acquiescence alone is not a defense, if acquiescence follows the resolving of a doubt as to where the line is or the settlement of a bona fide

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Bluebook (online)
209 N.W. 169, 235 Mich. 227, 46 A.L.R. 788, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanlon-v-ten-hove-mich-1926.