Sherman v. Sherman
This text of 678 A.2d 9 (Sherman v. Sherman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from a family support magistrate’s order. The trial court dismissed the appeal because it determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly dismissed his appeal upon determining that the appeal form filed did not [805]*805fulfill the requirements of General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) (2). The defendant’s alternative argument is that § 46b-231 (n) (2) is unconstitutional.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts. On October 27, 1994, at the conclusion of a contested support hearing at which the defendant appeared pro se, a family support magistrate ordered the defendant to pay child support in the amount of $183 per week. The magistrate also found an arrearage of $34,038 as of October 24, 1994. The magistrate ordered the defendant to make a lump sum payment of $1500 on the arrearage.
On November 7, 1994, the defendant filed an appeal form (JD-FM-111). The defendant did not file a separate petition with the appeal form. On December 15, 1994, the attorney general moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 On January 11, 1995, the defendant, then represented by counsel, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss. On January 26, 1995, the attorney general filed its reply brief and the court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss. On February 7,1995, the court issued an order dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We must first address whether this appeal is moot.3 The attorney general claims that because the defendant has paid the $1500 lump sum on the arrearage, this appeal is now moot. “ ‘Mootness applies to situations where events have occurred during the pendency of an appeal that make an appellate court incapable of [806]*806granting practical relief through a disposition on the merits. . . . Because this court has no jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, no appeal can be decided on its merits in the absence of an actual controversy for which judicial relief can be granted.’ ” Cole v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 40 Conn. App. 501, 505-506, 671 A.2d 844 (1996), quoting Bakerville Lumber & Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 38 Conn. App. 212, 213, 659 A.2d 758 (1995). Because the defendant’s appeal could have challenged more than the $1500 lump sum payment,4 namely the total amount of the arrearage, we conclude that the payment of the $1500 does not render this appeal moot.
I
The defendant claims that he complied with § 46b-231 (n) (2) by filing the appeal form within fourteen days of the family magistrate’s order. The right to appeal from a family magistrate order to the Superior Court is created by § 46b-231 (n). Section 46b-231 (n) (2) provides in pertinent part: “Proceedings for such appeal shall be instituted by filing a petition and payment of a fifty-five dollar filing fee in superior court for the judicial district in which the decision of the family magistrate was rendered not later than fourteen days after filing of the final decision . . . .” The defendant argues that the appeal form he filed is the functional equivalent of the petition required by the statute. We are not persuaded.
“A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created. Chestnut Realty, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 201 Conn. 350, 356, 514 A.2d 749 (1986); Norwich Land Co. [807]*807v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975). Such provisions are mandatory, and, if not complied with, the appeal is subject to dismissal. Basilicato v. Department of Public Utility Control, 197 Conn. 320, 322, 497 A.2d 48 (1985); Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission, 177 Conn. 584, 587, 418 A.2d 939 (1979). Vernon Village, Inc. v. Carothers, [217 Conn. 130, 142, 585 A.2d 76 (1991)]. . . . Raines v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 482, 489-90, 604 A.2d 819 (1992). Dismissal is required in such a situation because, if the appellant lacks standing to appeal the case, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 234 Conn. 624, 640, 662 A.2d 1251 (1995).
The defendant concedes that no petition was filed as required by the statute.5 The defendant’s contention that the appeal form is the functional equivalent of the petition and thus satisfies the statutory requirement is unavailing. The function of the petition is to make the court and opposing parties aware of the alleged error or defect from which the aggrieved party seeks redress. See Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978) (plaintiff must allege facts that if proven [808]*808would constitute aggrievement as prerequisite to trial court’s jurisdiction over subject matter of appeal).
There is no place on the appeal form for the appellant to state the reasons for the appeal. In fact, the appeal form states in two places that it should be filed with a petition attached. Because the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, he lacked standing to appeal the order. Because the defendant lacked standing, the court lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the appeal. Basilicato v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 197 Conn. 320; Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 177 Conn. 584.
II
The defendant next claims that § 46b-231 (n) (2) is unconstitutional.6 We decline to address his claims. “[A] party ‘cannot seek the relief provided in an ordinance or statute and later in the same proceeding raise the question of its constitutionality.’ ” D’Addario v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 25 Conn. App.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
678 A.2d 9, 41 Conn. App. 803, 1996 Conn. App. LEXIS 313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sherman-v-sherman-connappct-1996.