Sheila Webb v. Leon Lott

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2024
• Docket: 23-1941
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1941

SHEILA WEBB,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LEON LOTT, in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Richland County Sheriffs Department,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

CAMERON DUECKER,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (3:19-cv-02031-CMC)

Argued: May 8, 2024 Decided: August 21, 2024

Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and Gina M. GROH, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Groh wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Richardson joined. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1941 Doc: 41 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 2 of 12

ARGUED: Andrew Lindemann, LINDEMANN LAW FIRM, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Christopher Stephen Truluck, TRULUCK LAW FIRM LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert D. Garfield, Steven R. Spreeuwers, CROWE LAFAVE GARFIELD & BAGLEY, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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GROH, District Judge:

The facts of this case are uncontested and unsettling. A former Richland County

Sheriff’s Deputy assaulted Ms. Webb, a 58-year-old woman, who had called 911 on her

brother for unlawfully using their incapacitated mother’s car. Instead of handling the

situation any number of ways that would have been appropriate, then Deputy Duecker

(“Duecker”) entered Ms. Webb’s home without a warrant or probable cause and repeatedly

tased her in her own bed while attempting to place her under arrest.

The entire incident was captured on Duecker’s body-worn camera. The footage is

disturbing. When Duecker’s supervisor arrived at Ms. Webb’s home, he offered a telling

comment about the situation: “that is a seventy-year-old woman, you tased her, what the

fuck, what happened?” Duecker was fired from the Sheriff’s Department later the same

month. A criminal investigation followed, and Duecker was charged with assault and

battery, third degree.

Ms. Webb sued Duecker and the Sheriff, asserting claims under federal and South

Carolina law, respectively. The jury found in Ms. Webb’s favor and awarded her $50,000

in damages from Duecker and $500,000 from Sheriff Lott. The award against the Sheriff

was reduced by the district court to $300,000 in accordance with South Carolina’s Tort

Claims Act. S.C. Code § 15-78-120(a)(1).

Sheriff Lott asks the court to consider four issues in this appeal. Did the district

court err by 1) excluding evidence of Duecker’s termination and criminal prosecution; 2)

denying the Sheriff’s motion to bifurcate; 3) instructing the jury incorrectly on certain state

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law claims; and 4) granting judgment as a matter of law in Ms. Webb’s favor regarding the

Sheriff’s crime of moral turpitude defense instead of submitting an instruction to the jury?

I. The district court did not err when it excluded after-the-fact evidence of

Duecker’s termination and criminal prosecution.

Sheriff Lott argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence of Duecker’s

termination and subsequent criminal prosecution. We review a district court’s decision

concerning admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which we will not find

unless the decision was “arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331,

346 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002)).

We find no abuse of discretion here.

The Sheriff argues “the district court eliminated a key defense for Sheriff Lott and

disallowed key evidence from being presented to the jury, which was highly prejudicial to

Lott’s defense.” Appellant’s Br. at 17–18. Duecker’s termination and prosecution can

hardly be described as “key evidence” in this case. The body camera footage is the key

evidence. What the Sheriff did in the weeks and months that followed is not germane to

Ms. Webb’s claims. Instead, this is a perfect example of after-the-fact evidence that was

irrelevant to the issues before the jury.

The Sheriff avers, without explanation, that evidence of Duecker’s termination,

arrest, and prosecution would have supported his moral turpitude defense. How Duecker’s

employer responded to his conduct is not the relevant inquiry for determining whether that

conduct constituted a crime of moral turpitude: Duecker’s actions are determinative. The

district court and jury were able to view Duecker’s actions firsthand from the body camera

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footage. The Sheriff’s opinion about Duecker’s conduct was neither necessary nor relevant

for the questions before the district court and jury. The district court did not abuse its

discretion by excluding evidence of Duecker’s termination and criminal prosecution.

II. The district court did not err by denying the Sheriff’s motion to bifurcate.

Sheriff Lott moved the district court to bifurcate the trial by splitting the federal and

state claims, which would have resulted in separate trials for each defendant. Rule 42(b)

permits a court to order separate trials “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite

and economize . . . .”

The district court entered a well-reasoned order denying the motion to bifurcate.

After weighing the facts and circumstances of the case against the objectives enumerated

in Rule 42, the court found that Sheriff Lott failed to meet his burden of proving that

bifurcation satisfied the Rule. We agree.

Moreover, this argument necessarily relies upon the premise that the district court

incorrectly excluded after-the-fact evidence of Duecker’s termination and prosecution.

But, as explained above, the district court did not err in this regard. Thus, with the

foundation of Sheriff Lott’s argument removed, the remainder is unable to stand on its own.

Sheriff Lott was not prejudiced by a joint trial and has failed to demonstrate any abuse of

discretion by the district court in denying the motion to bifurcate.

III. The district court’s instructions of state law to the jury were appropriate.

Sheriff Lott next contends the district court instructed the jury contrary to South

Carolina law as to the assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims. Because

“we accord the district court much discretion” in fashioning its charge, Sheriff Lott’s

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burden to successfully challenge any instruction is an onerous one. Teague v. Bakker, 35

F.3d 978, 985 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011).

We do not review challenged jury instructions in isolation. Instead, they must be reviewed

within the context of the whole charge, practically rather than technically, and for an abuse

of discretion. See Bailey v. Cnty. of Georgetown, 94 F.3d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1996); Spell v.

McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1395 (4th Cir. 1987).

“Instructions will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the

whole record, they adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without

misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the [objecting] party.” Bunn v.

Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co. KG, 723 F.3d 454, 468 (4th Cir. 2013) (quotation

omitted). “We review de novo whether the district court’s instructions to the jury were

correct statements of law.” Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 538

(4th Cir. 2000). “Even if a jury was erroneously instructed, however, we will not set aside

a resulting verdict unless the erroneous instruction seriously prejudiced the challenging

party’s case.” Bunn, 723 F.3d at 468 (quotation omitted).

As to the assault and battery instructions, Sherriff Lott offers only the following

argument to this court: “The district court’s reliance on Roberts v. City of Forest Acres,

902 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.C. 1995), is misplaced in that the court in Roberts never addressed

whether a police officer acts within the scope of his official duties in committing an assault

or battery. The Roberts decision addresses only the officer’s liability and not the agency’s

liability.” Appellant’s Br. at 28–29. This argument challenges the district court’s

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instruction that “when a sheriff’s deputy uses force greater than is reasonably necessary

under the circumstances, the agency may be liable for battery.”

First, we find no legal error in the district court’s instructions. As noted in the

response brief, Sheriff Lott “makes no specific argument with regard to the district court’s

instruction on assault” and as to the battery instruction, “only generally alleges prejudice

and does not identify how the language of the instruction was incorrect.” Appellee’s Br. at

38. The district court’s instruction comes from this court’s decision in Scott v. Vandiver,

476 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1973) (“Assault by a sheriff's deputy in the performance of his

duties is among the specific acts for which a sheriff is liable.” (quoting Rutledge v. Small,

192 S.C. 254, 6 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1939)). The district court changed only the word “is” to

“may be” liable, which was correct and to Sheriff Lott’s benefit.

Turning to the instruction on the false arrest/false imprisonment claim, Sheriff Lott

avers it contains “several errors of law.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. Specifically, the Sheriff

argues that the district court should not have included language about a warrant or exigent

circumstances, and by doing so, the court “in effect, invited a finding of liability where the

deputy arrests without a warrant.” Id. at 30.

The jury in this case was instructed that “[t]he fundamental issue in determining the

lawfulness of restraint in this case is whether there was a warrant, or probable cause

accompanied by an exigent circumstance to arrest Plaintiff without a warrant. In the

absence of either of these, the restraint is unlawful.”

When this instruction is viewed within the whole charge and against the backdrop

of the facts of this case, it clearly stated the law and properly instructed the jury. The false

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imprisonment claim here contained some unusual nuances because the person who was

arrested was in their home. It is undisputed that no warrant was issued for this arrest.

Therefore, Dorn v. Town of Prosperity, 375 F. App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2010), is of no moment.

Because the arrest took place in a private home, the officer was required to have a warrant

or probable cause and exigent circumstances for the arrest. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in charging the jury, and the law within the instructions is correctly stated.

IV. The district court properly granted Ms. Webb’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law on the moral turpitude defense.

Sheriff Lott argues the district court erred by declining to instruct the jury on his

moral turpitude defense. What is a “crime of moral turpitude” according to South Carolina

law? “South Carolina has applied a traditional framework, defining moral turpitude as ‘an

act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to

his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of

right and duty between man and man.’” Baddourah v. McMaster, 433 S.C. 89, 108, 856

S.E.2d 561, 571 (2021) (quoting State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 414, 248 S.E.2d 263, 263

(1978) (cleaned up)).

In Baddourah, the court also noted that “the moral turpitude standard lacks absolute

precision in American law.” 433 S.C. at 107, 856 S.E.2d at 570. Indeed, South Carolina’s

framework for determining whether a crime is one of moral turpitude is reminiscent of

Justice Stewart’s infamous test for obscenity. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197

(1964) (concurring) (explaining, “I know it when I see it”); see also Julia Ann Simon-Kerr,

Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1003 n.15 (2012).

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The Supreme Court of South Carolina has explained, “assault of a high and

aggravated nature, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature are not always

crimes of moral turpitude, [but] they may be depending on the facts as particularized in the

indictment.” In re Lee, 313 S.C. 142, 143–44, 437 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1993). To determine

whether a crime involves moral turpitude sometimes requires a review of the facts. “In

those cases, determining whether an offense qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude

involves consideration of the nature of the crime as defined by law as well as the

particularized facts contained in the indictment.” Baddourah, at 108–09, 571 (citing State

v. Bailey, 275 S.C. 444, 446, 272 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1980)).

“Under South Carolina’s moral turpitude framework, we focus ‘primarily on the

duty to society and fellow man [that] is breached by the commission of the crime.’”

Baddourah, at 111, 573 (quoting State v. Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 74, 354 S.E.2d 906, 908

(1987)). Previously, Ball was overruled in part, but the court “retain[ed] the test articulated

in Ball for determining whether a crime qualifies as one of ‘moral turpitude[.]’” State v.

Major, 301 S.C. 181, 184, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990).

It is from within this nebulous framework we must determine whether Duecker’s

third-degree assault and battery of Ms. Webb could qualify as a crime of moral turpitude.

The appellant contends the district court erroneously determined the evidence in this case

was so lacking that the question was not appropriate to be put before the jury and judgment

as a matter of law was warranted. The district court found this immunity defense was

unavailable to Sheriff Lott because the facts in this case did not establish there was “an act

of baseness, vileness, or depravity.” J.A. 1364.

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“A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the third degree if the person

unlawfully injures another person . . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(E)(1). The affidavit

accompanying an arrest warrant for Duecker states, “he did unlawfully injure the victim by

grabbing, pulling, and repeatedly tasing the victim while attempting an unlawful arrest.”

J.A. 39. To be clear though, “the measure of moral turpitude in South Carolina is not based

on the severity of physical injury, as even offenses that do not involve physical harm or

felonies have been designated as crimes of moral turpitude.” Baddourah, at 111, 573.

Indeed, mere possession of cocaine is a crime of moral turpitude in South Carolina,

yet simple possession of marijuana is not. Ball, 292 S.C. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 908 with State

v. Harvey, 275 S.C. 225, 227, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1980). Even criminal conduct that is

likely to produce death or actually results in great bodily injury is not automatically

classified as a crime of moral turpitude. “[T]he crime of assault and battery of a high and

aggravated nature does not necessarily constitute a crime of moral turpitude[.]” Bailey, 275

S.C. at 446, 272 S.E.2d at 440.

In its rulings after the close of evidence and on posttrial motions, the district court

held Sheriff Lott did not produce sufficient evidence that Duecker committed a crime of

moral turpitude, and consequently, it granted Ms. Webb’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law on Lott’s defense. The district court found that an act of baseness, vileness, or

depravity must be present to find Duecker committed a crime of moral turpitude.

Considering the testimony and other evidence admitted during trial, the district court

found there was no evidence Duecker committed an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity.

Accordingly, the district court found Sheriff Lott failed to produce sufficient evidence to

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support the affirmative defense Duecker committed a crime of moral turpitude. The district

court reaffirmed this ruling during posttrial motions when Sheriff Lott moved for a new

trial on the same basis.

Duecker’s conduct—repeatedly tasing an unarmed 58-year-old woman in her house

while unlawfully arresting her—instinctively feels like conduct that could be described

using the words “moral turpitude.” But, as the district court concluded from the evidence

admitted during trial, Duecker used his taser in a misguided and inappropriate effort to gain

Ms. Webb’s compliance rather than through ill will or malicious intent to cause her harm.

The district court’s fact-based inquiry here was appropriate. There can be no doubt

that in a situation like this “the surrounding facts . . . determine whether moral turpitude is

involved.” State v. Hall, 306 S.C. 293, 296, 411 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1991). The video footage

of Duecker’s conduct shows a man who lost control over the situation and lacked the

wherewithal to properly determine what to do next.

He was wrong about his lawful ability to effect an arrest of Ms. Webb in her home

under the circumstances, and he was wrong to force her into compliance with a taser.

However, the video clearly shows this misguided man politely calling Ms. Webb “Ma’am”

and pleading with her to comply with his commands. Nothing about his behavior indicates

that he was motivated by depravity. Instead, he appears to mistakenly believe he is lawfully

arresting Ms. Webb, and according to his testimony, used his taser because he “had been

trained it was the least likely to cause serious injury.” J.A. 593.

Sheriff Lott argues the district court was wrong to conclude there must be an act of

baseness, vileness, or depravity. Instead, he argues “[t]hat is the very issue that the State

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Supreme Court clarified in Baddourah.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. The decision in Baddourah

does not have the reach Sheriff Lott suggests: “Our holding today is limited to the issue

before the Court, a charge of second-degree domestic violence involving an allegation of

physical violence ‘likely to result in moderate bodily injury.’” 856 S.E.2d at 574, n.11.

Thus, Baddourah did not overrule or abandon precedent. Although it clarified there

is a focus on the duty to society and fellow man breached by the commission of a crime, it

did not abandon the required act of baseness, vileness, or depravity.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina has consistently stated the test to determine

a crime of moral turpitude. In a case where an individual used his public office to attempt

to obtain sexual favors, the court found those “facts demonstrate a vileness and baseness

which are sufficient to make them crimes of moral turpitude.” Matter of Lee, 313 S.C. 142,

144, 437 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1993). The inquiry is not limited only to an individual’s duty to

society and fellow man or overly concerned with bodily injury. The inquiry is holistic.

Courts must find an underlying act that is depraved or vile coupled with a duty to

others or society. Here, the district court correctly determined that Sheriff Lott did not

produce sufficient evidence to warrant a crime of moral turpitude affirmative defense

instruction and judgment as a matter of law in Ms. Webb’s favor was appropriate.

* * *

The district court’s decision is thus

AFFIRMED.