Shea v. Management and Training Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 18, 2022
Docket1:18-cv-00830
StatusUnknown

This text of Shea v. Management and Training Corporation (Shea v. Management and Training Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shea v. Management and Training Corporation, (W.D. Tex. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

DR. GRAHAM SHEA, DDS, § Plaintiff § § v. § Case No. 1:18-CV-00830-SH § MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING § CORPORATION, § Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Court held a bench trial in this case from August 30 through September 1, 2021. Plaintiff Dr. Graham Shea, DDS, appeared in person and through counsel, and Defendant Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”) appeared through counsel. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 21, 2021. Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs, exhibits, arguments of counsel, stipulations, applicable law, and entire record, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 I. Jurisdiction The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this cause because Shea’s claims arise under the laws of the United States, and he has exhausted all administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. II. Background MTC managed the Gary Job Corps Center (“GJCC”) in San Marcos, Texas, pursuant to a $10.1 million contract with the U.S. Department of Labor. On July 18, 2016, MTC hired Shea as the dental director for the GJCC, which offered dental care to its approximately 1,300 students. Shea’s employment was terminated on January 13, 2017.

1 All findings of fact contained herein that are more appropriately considered conclusions of law are to be so deemed. Likewise, any conclusion of law more appropriately considered a finding of fact shall be so deemed. On May 23, 2017, Shea filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General-Department of Labor (“OIG-DOL”). The Department of Labor issued an “Order Denying Relief” on June 21, 2018. Shea filed this de novo action on October 2, 2018, alleging that MTC retaliated against him for making protected disclosures by terminating his employment, in violation of the Federal Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. He seeks compensatory damages,

including back pay and front pay, as well as his costs, expenses, and attorney fees. Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 19 ¶¶ 26-27. III. Legal Standards Shea’s claim arises under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (“NDAA”), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, which “prohibits any recipient of federal dollars from retaliating against whistleblowers who report an abuse of that money.” Tex. Educ. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 992 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Robertson v. Intratek Comput., Inc., 976 F.3d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that “Section 4712 creates whistleblower rights”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 1, 2021) (No. 20-1229). The statute was enacted as a pilot program in 2013 and made permanent in 2016. Tex. Educ. Agency, 992 F.3d at 354 n.1.

The NDAA “provides a private right of action to employees of federal contractors who are discharged or discriminated against in retaliation for disclosing information about regulatory violations to a federal entity responsible for overseeing the employer’s federal contract.” Wright v. Common Ground Health Clinic, Inc., No. 16-11623, 2016 WL 4720011, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2016). “Generally, federal whistleblower protection statutes aim to uncover serious fraud against the government or critical health and safety violations by encouraging those with firsthand knowledge to come forward.” Kappouta v. Valiant Integrated Servs., LLC, No. 20-CV-1501, 2021 WL 4806437, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021). Title 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1) provides that: An employee of a contractor . . . may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing . . . information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract (including the competition for or negotiation of a contract) or grant. In his Second Amended Complaint, Shea alleges that he was discharged as a reprisal for disclosing violations and mismanagement of MTC’s contract. Dkt. 19 ¶ 26. Accordingly, in order to prevail on the claim he has alleged, Shea must prove that (1) he was an employee of a government contractor, (2) he disclosed information that he reasonably believes “is evidence of gross mismanagement” of MTC’s contract to manage the GJCC “or a violation of law, rule, or regulation” related to that contract, and (3) his disclosure was a contributing factor in his termination. See Sargent v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-cv-00620, 2020 WL 5505361, at *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2020); see also Wondercheck v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 3d 472, 480-81 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (stating elements of prima facie case). A “reasonable belief” “includes ‘both a subjective and an objective component,’ which means ‘an employee must actually believe in the unlawfulness of the employer’s actions and that belief must be objectively reasonable.’” Craine v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 687 F. App’x 682, 691 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121, 1132 (10th Cir. 2013) (construing whistleblower provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)))2; cf. Wallace v. Andeavor Corp., 916 F.3d 423, 426-47 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating, in Sarbanes-Oxley Act case, that belief defendant committed covered violation must be objectively

2 The NDAA “is a relatively newer statute with scant interpretive case law.” Busselman v. Battelle Mem’l Inst., No. 4:18-CV-05109-SMJ, 2019 WL 7763845, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2019). and subjectively reasonable, and that the “objective standard examines whether the belief would be held by a reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience as the aggrieved employee”) (internal quotation omitted). An employee has the burden to demonstrate that the protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the adverse personnel action. See 41 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(6) (incorporating burdens of proof

specified in 5 U.S.C § 1221(e)). The employee may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing factor to his termination through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that “(A) the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or protected activity; and (B) the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.” Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp., Inc., 897 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 5 U.S.C.

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Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Administrative Review Board
717 F.3d 1121 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Craine v. National Science Foundation
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897 F.3d 1283 (Tenth Circuit, 2018)
Kevin Wallace v. Tesoro Corporation
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TX Education Agency v. EDUC
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