Shawn Powell v. Fidencio Guzman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 27, 2025
• Docket: 22-55787
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHAWN D. POWELL, No. 22-55787

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:21-cv-02052-DOC-PVC v.

FIDENCIO GUZMAN, Warden,* MEMORANDUM**

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 23, 2025*** Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and COLE,**** District Judge.

Petitioner Shawn D. Powell appeals from the district court’s final judgment

* The Clerk’s Office is directed to substitute respondent “Fidencio Guzman, Warden,” for respondent “Heather Shirley, Acting Warden.” ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). **** The Honorable Douglas Russell Cole, United States District Judge Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. and order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He alleges ineffective assistance

of counsel (“IAC”) during his trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

and 2253(a). We review a district court’s decision denying a § 2254 petition de novo

and its underlying factual findings for clear error. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d

943, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2004). We may not grant habeas relief for claims rejected by

a state court unless the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court” or was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

To succeed on his IAC claim, Powell must show that his counsel’s acts or

omissions were so deficient that they “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness” and that there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984).

Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not repeat

them here. We affirm.

1. Powell failed to show that his trial counsel’s concession of guilt on the

vandalism and violation-of-protective-order charges fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Powell argues that the concessions undermined “[t]rial counsel’s

chosen defense strategy [of challenging] the credibility of the witnesses.” But the

2 Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized the reasonableness of

conceding arguments that would be hard to contest in order to shore up counsel’s

credibility. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984); United States v.

Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the evidence strongly supported

the conceded charges. The broken window observed by Deputy Duane Parrish

supported the vandalism charge and suggested the “negative contact” required for

the violation-of-protective-order charge. The violation-of-protective-order charge

was supported by the stipulation establishing the existence of the protective order.

The transcript from the 911 call and the body camera footage from Deputy Jay Yu

both indicate that Powell and the victim had been arguing. Given this and other

evidence, trial counsel’s decision, which preserved her credibility by not disputing

minor charges for which there existed strong evidence in addition to Nicassio’s and

Cobb’s statements, fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Trial counsel’s concession allowed her to

challenge witness credibility with respect to the more serious charges, which were

supported by less independent evidence. The district court correctly concluded that

the state court’s decision satisfies the § 2254(d) standard.

2. Powell failed to show that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and

present documentary evidence that Powell lived in the victim’s house to rebut the

burglary charge either fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or resulted

3 in prejudice to Powell. Powell does not contest the government’s assertion that he

has never provided any of the documentary evidence he claims exists, including in

support of his habeas petition. His only support for the existence of the documentary

evidence is his “own self-serving statement,” which is insufficient to show that the

state court’s application of Strickland was objectively unreasonable. Womack v. Del

Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007).

Even if Powell had presented the documentary evidence, he would still have

had to show how the documentary evidence could have provided a defense to

burglary. Under California law, “[t]o sustain a burglary conviction, the People must

prove that a defendant does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter his

or her family residence.” People v. Davenport, 268 Cal. Rptr. 501, 505 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1990). The record does not indicate that Powell owned the property, paid rent,

had a key, or left personal belongings at the property. The record also establishes

that Powell had been released from prison for domestic violence just days earlier,

and that the victim had a restraining order against him. As a result, the district court

correctly deemed reasonable the state court finding that Powell had no

“unconditional possessory right” to enter the victim’s home.

3. Powell did not show that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and

present evidence of a voluntary intoxication defense fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Under California law, voluntary intoxication can negate specific

4 criminal intent but not general criminal intent. People v. Williams, 29 P.3d 197, 204

(Cal. 2001). While burglary is a specific intent crime, In re T.A.J., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d

331, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), and thus could be negated by the jury’s conclusion

that Powell was voluntarily intoxicated, inflicting corporal injury on an intimate

partner requires only general intent, People v. Burton, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 392, 397

n.8 (2015). If trial counsel had raised a voluntary intoxication defense, she

reasonably might have expected the jury to be more likely to convict Powell of

domestic violence. Powell was ultimately sentenced to eleven years and four months

in prison for inflicting corporal injury on an intimate partner and only sixteen months

for burglary. Given the relative severity of the charges, the district court reasonably

determined that trial counsel was not deficient in deciding not to argue a defense

against the lesser burglary charge that may have increased Powell’s likelihood of

being convicted of the more serious domestic violence charge. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689.

4. Powell failed to show that he suffered any prejudice from his trial counsel’s

failure to investigate and present evidence of mental health issues. He claims that

such evidence “would have provided support for his voluntary intoxication defense

and important context at trial for the circumstances of the alleged conduct.” But

because trial counsel reasonably decided not to pursue the voluntary intoxication

defense, evidence supporting that defense would not have impacted the trial. Powell

5 also fails to explain how providing “important context” for the circumstances

surrounding his conduct would have impacted the trial outcome, so Powell fails to

show prejudice.

The district court’s order is AFFIRMED.