Shaw v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept.

Opinion

SHEENA SHAW, No. 2:16-cv-00729-TLN-CKD Plaintiff, v. ORDER DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sacramento County, Scott Jones, M. Pai, Steven Forsyth, Colin Mason, Kenneth Shelton, and Reid Harris’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 71.) Plaintiff Sheena Shaw (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 72.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 74.) Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motions for Sanctions. (ECF Nos. 75, 77.) Defendants opposed both motions. (ECF Nos. 78, 79.) Plaintiff replied. (ECF Nos. 81, 82.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions. /// /// /// /// Plaintiff alleges that on April 5, 2014, officers of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department made a warrantless entry into her home and used excessive force against her while arresting her 18-year-old son. (ECF No. 69 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges she was arrested on April 5, 2014, and then released from the Sacramento County Jail the following day, April 6, 2014. (Id. at 10–11.) Plaintiff was charged with resisting arrest under California Penal Code § 148 (“§ 148”). (Id. at 12.) On August 13, 2014, Plaintiff entered a diversion program pursuant to California Penal Code § 1001. (Id. at ¶ 86.) Plaintiff successfully completed diversion on August 28, 2015, and all criminal charges brought against Plaintiff were dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 93–94.) Plaintiff filed a Complaint on April 6, 2016 (ECF No. 1), and a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on November 30, 2016 (ECF No. 15). In her FAC, Plaintiff alleged eleven 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims for various constitutional violations, including unlawful search, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 15.) Defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds. (ECF No. 32.) The Court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff appealed. (ECF No. 54.) The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed this Court’s order but remanded the case solely for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s “false arrest claim [was] adequately pled or barred by [her] nolo contendere plea.” (ECF No. 59 at 4.) After ordering supplemental briefing on the issue, the Court allowed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint “for the sole purpose of pleading a false arrest claim.” (ECF No. 68 at 7.) Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 29, 2022. (ECF No. 69.) Plaintiff alleges the following: (1) a § 1983 claim for false arrest against Mason and Harris; (2) a § 1983 claim for conspiracy related to the false arrest against Forsyth, Harris, Mason, and Shelton; (3) a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability related to the false arrest against Pai and Jones; and (4) a § 1983 claim for Monell liability related to the false arrest against Sacramento County, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, and Jones. (Id. at 24–26.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 19, 2022. (ECF No. 71.) Plaintiff filed two nearly identical motions for sanctions on June 8 and 9, 2022. (ECF Nos. 75, 77.) A. Standard of Law A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). B. Analysis Defendants move to dismiss the SAC in its entirety because it fails to state a false arrest claim against any Defendant and, alternatively, violates Rule 8. (ECF No. 71-1 at 2.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues the SAC satisfies Rule 8 and Defendants’ representations are false and meritless. (ECF No. 72.) The Court agrees with Defendants that the SAC should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 for several reasons. Rule 8 requires “each averment of a pleading to be ‘simple, concise, and direct.’” See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”). To comply with Rule 8, a complaint should clearly and fully set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” Id. at 1178. Even if the factual elements of a cause of action are present but are scattered throughout the complaint and not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8 is proper. Id. Further, “[t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” Id. at 1179. Indeed, Rule 8(d)’s requirement that each averment of a pleading be “‘simple, concise, and direct,’ applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. The 27-page SAC is disorganized, unclear, and filled with allegations of questionable relevance. Plaintiff includes over 100 paragraphs of “averments,” many of which appear to support claims that have already been dismissed — such as allegations relating to excessive force and the prosecution. (ECF No. 69 at ¶¶ 20–128.) Under each claim, Plaintiff merely incorporates by reference the preceding allegations, repeats a conclusory paragraph for each claim, and refers to Defendants collectively, even though each claim is purportedly brought against different Defendants under different legal theories. (Id. at ¶¶ 129–136.) This lack of clarity permeates the entire SAC and is a sufficient basis for dismissal under Rule 8. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of an entire complaint that made “everyone did everything allegations” without leave to amend because “[t]he district court made clear . . . that plaintiffs must amend their ‘shotgun pleading’ to ‘state[ ] clearly how each and every defendant is alleged to have violated plaintiffs’ legal rights” and plaintiffs failed to do so). This is the second time the Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8. (See ECF No. 68 at 5–6.) If Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint, she should clearly identify which specific facts support a false arrest claim against each Defendant. See Hughey v. Camacho, No. 2:13-CV-2665-TLN-AC, 2014 WL 5473184, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1176 (“[P]laintiffs would be well advised to . . . focus on linking their factual allegations to actual legal claims.”). Plaintiff is further encouraged to remove allegations that are relevant only to claims that have already been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend.1 Plaintiff filed two motions for sanctions, arguing Defendants’ motion to dismiss and reply in support of the motion “are deliberately frivolous documents that have been filed for an improper purpose.” (ECF Nos. 75, 77.) Plaintiff argues Defendants’ filings are baseless, grounded in misrepresentations, and made without reasonable and competent inquiry. (Id.) Plaintiff’s two motions for sanctions are nearly identical, except that one is brought pursuant to Rule 11 and the other is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“§ 1927”). (Id.) In opposition, Defendant argues Plaintiff violated the 21-day “safe harbor” requirement of Rule 11, her motions for sanctions are duplicative of her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s counsel should be sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing “his vexatious, harassing, and meritless motion[s].” (ECF Nos. 78, 79.) Rule 11 states in relevant part: By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper — whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it — an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . [that] (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law . . .; [and] (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). “Rule 11’s requirement of a reasonable inquiry means an inquiry reasonable under all the circumstances of a case.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 1 The Court notes that as of the date of this Order, Duarte v. City of Stockton is still pending before the Ninth Circuit, which may be dispositive in this case on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea bars her false arrest claim. No. 2:19-cv-00007-MCE-CKD, 2021 WL 4942878 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2021) (Appeal No. 21-16929). F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although Rule 11 does not explicitly contain the word “frivolous,” the Ninth Circuit has used that term as shorthand to “denote a filing that is both baseless and made without reasonable and competent inquiry.” Id. at 1362. “Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.” Operating Engineers Pension Tr. v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly, sanctions under § 1927 require a finding of bad faith. New Alaska Develop. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). “Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument ....” Jd. (citation omitted). As explained above, the Court found merit in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court thus declines to sanction Defendants for their filings. Even assuming Defendants’ motion included some misrepresentations or questionable arguments, they were not material to this Court’s ruling and may have resulted in part from the SAC’s overall lack of clarity. Although it is unclear why Plaintiff filed two motions for sanctions rather than simply oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court denies Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions related to responding to Plaintiff's motions for sanctions. Accordingly, the Court DENIES all requests for sanctions. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend (ECF No. 71) and DENIES Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions. (ECF Nos. 75, 77.) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading not later than twenty-one (21) days after Plaintiff files an amended complaint. DATED: February 15, 2023 ry /) “ \/ the —AZNS ZN Troy L. Nunley» } United States District Judge