Shaw v. Kellogg

170 U.S. 312, 18 S. Ct. 632, 42 L. Ed. 1050, 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1549
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 2, 1898
Docket154
StatusPublished
Cited by54 cases

This text of 170 U.S. 312 (Shaw v. Kellogg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312, 18 S. Ct. 632, 42 L. Ed. 1050, 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1549 (1898).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brewer,

after stating .the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1860, in settlement of a claim under a Mexican grant to land in the vicinity of Las Yegas, Congress passed an act giving to the claimants an equal amount of land, to be by them selected elsewhere in the Territory of New Mexico, stipulating that the land should be vacant and non-mineral and should be located within three years in square bodies not exceeding five *330 in number. Within the three years they selected and located the tract in question as one fifth of the land to which they were thus entitled. They applied to the proper officers of the United States to take such steps as would perfect their title. More than thirty-four years ago the Land' Department took its final action. Since then it has continuously treated the tract as private land, and refused to recognize it in any way as part of the public domain; within the same year, 1864, in which it took its final action, it reported the fact thereof to Congress, and that body has never in any way questioned the .'rightfulness of th^ action taken.. And now at the end of this lapse of time the title is challenged, and challenged upon propositions which, if sustained, establish that the owners have never had, and do not now have, any certain title to a single foot of the-land, and this although they have been in undisturbed possession1 all these years, and have paid taxes to the state authorities amounting to $66,000 at least and probably more.

The party who challenges the title of the plaintiff to the particular portion of the tract in controversy in this suit entered at first into possession of it as a .tenant, and when at the termination of his lease he was refused a continuance thereof, took steps to maintain ~a possession and assert a right adverse to his former landlord. It is undoubtedly true that settled rules of -law cannot be ignored because in any particular case their application works apparent harshness. At the same time the result to which the contentions of the defendant'.lead may well compel a careful examination of them.

These contentions are that Congress granted only non-mineral lands; that this particular tract is mineral land, and therefore by the terms of-the act is not within the grant; that no patent has ever been issued, .and therefore the legal .title has never passed from the Government; that the Land Department never adjudicated that this was non-mineral land, but on the contrary simply approved the location, subject to the conditions and provisions of the act of Congress, thereby leaving the question of title to rest in perpetual abeyance upon possible future discoveries of minerals within the tract.

In examining these contentions it is well to consider first *331 the act of Congress of June 21, 1860, and the circumstances under which it was passed. For, as said in Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. Barney, 113 U. S. 618, 625, in reference to legislative grants, “ they are to receive such a construction as will carry out the intent of Congress, however difficult it might be to give full effect to the language used if the grants were by instruments of private conveyance. To ascertain that intent we must look to the condition of the country when the acts were passed, as well as to the purpose declared on their face, and read all parts of them together.” This act was a final disposition by Congress of certain claims under Mexican grants for lands situate in the Territory of New Mexico. The circumstances and character of these claims had been reported to Congress by the surveyor general of the Territory. Some of them were confirmed as reported and in toto, and, as stated in Tameling v. U. S. Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U. S. 644, Maxwell Land Grant case, 121 U. S. 325, and other cases, such confirmation operated as a grant de novo, and took effect at once as a relinquishment by Congress of all rights of the United States to the premises. Others were confirmed in part and for only fractions of the areas claimed, and as to them, by section 2, it was made “ the duty of the surveyor general of New Mexico immediately to proceed to make the surveys and locations authorized and required by the terms of this section.” Another claim was not confirmed, but leave was given to the claimant to bring suit,, with a proviso that if the suit should not be instituted within two years the claim should be presumed to have been abandoned; and in respect to the claim before us the right of location was to' continue in force for three years and no longer. Obviously, the thought was that these claims should not only be finally but speedily disposed of. It was not contemplated that the title should remain unsettled, a mere float for an indefinite time in the future.

As the amount of the Las Vegas claim .was large, and as the claimants were required to make.their locations “in square bodies, not exceeding five in number,” each. location would necessarily be of a. tract of 'considerable size; in fact, each one *332 was nearly 100,000 acres. The tract thus located was as a whole to be non-mineral. No provision was made for indemnity lands in case mineral should be found in any section or quarter section. So that when the location was perfected the title passed to all the lands or to none.

•It will also be perceived that Congress did not permit this location to be made anywhere in the public domain, but only within the limits of the Territory of New Mexico. It was not like a military land warrant, subject-to. location upon any public lands, but only a grant which could be made, operative within certain prescribed and comparatively narrow limits — limits not even so broad as those of the territory ceded by Mexico. There were then but few persons living In New Mexico; it contained large areas of arid lands; its surface was broken by a few mountain chains, and crossed by a few streams. It was within the limits' of this territory, whose condition and natural resources were but slightly known,.that Congress authorized this location. The grant was made in lieu of certain specific lands claimed by the Baca heirs in the vicinity of Las Yegas, and it was the purpose to permit the taking of a similar body of land anywhere within the limits of New Mexico. The grantees, the Baca heirs, were áuthorized to select this body of land. They were not at liberty to select lands already occupied by others. The lands, must be vacant. Nor were they at liberty to select lands, which were then known to contain mineral. • Congress .did not intend to grant any mines or mineral lands,, but with these exceptions their right of selection was coextensive with the limits’of New Mexico. We say “ lands then known to contain mineral,” for it cannot be that Congress intended that the grant should be rendered nugatory by any future discoveries of mineral. The selection was to be made within three years.

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Bluebook (online)
170 U.S. 312, 18 S. Ct. 632, 42 L. Ed. 1050, 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaw-v-kellogg-scotus-1898.