1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURENCE JAY SHAW, Case No. 24-cv-05826-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR LETTERS ROGATORY AND 9 v. DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 10 EDWIN DARIO MANZANO GARCIA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 27, 28 11 Defendants. 12 13 In August 2024, pro se Plaintiff Laurence Jay Shaw filed an application for a temporary 14 restraining order (“TRO”). See Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Edwin Dario 15 Manzano Garcia and Veronica Rosibel Manzano Garcia were previously employees of Plaintiff’s 16 company in Guatemala. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that in October 2023, 17 they “seized” online and physical assets from Plaintiff’s company, and began operating their own 18 “counterfeit” company, Defendant Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions LLC. Id. According to the 19 complaint, Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia reside in Guatemala, and Knightsbridge is a New Mexico 20 limited liability company. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 45. There are two overlapping and threshold issues 21 in this case: service and jurisdiction. 22 A. Service 23 First, and as the Court has already explained, Defendants must be properly served. 24 “Service of process is the mechanism by which the court actually acquires the power to enforce a 25 judgment against the defendant’s person or property.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th 26 Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). “In other words, service of process is the means by 27 which a court asserts its jurisdiction over the person.” Id. Without proper service, the Court “has 1 has . . . waived the lack of process.” Id. at 1138–39. 2 The Court directed Plaintiff to serve the individual Defendants consistent with the Inter- 3 American Service Convention and Additional Protocol (“IACAP”). Dkt. No. 19. The Court gave 4 Plaintiff until January 16, 2025, to do so.1 Id. at 2. Plaintiff has filed two motions for issuance of 5 letters rogatory as part of this process. See Dkt. No. 27, 28. The IACAP does not require formal 6 letters rogatory, but does require the USM-272 form that Plaintiff has filled out and attached to his 7 motions.2 See Dkt. No. 27-1; Dkt. No. 28-1. Plaintiff requests that the Court sign and seal the 8 forms, as is required under the IACAP.3 Dkt. Nos. 27, 28. Plaintiff has confirmed that he is aware 9 of the obligation to and will obtain certified Spanish language translations of the case materials 10 and the USM-272 forms. See id. He will then transmit these documents to ABC Legal, the U.S. 11 Central Authority contractor, for transmittal to the Guatemalan Central Authority for service. Id. 12 Having reviewed the materials, the Court GRANTS the motions and directs the Clerk to 13 affix the Court’s signature and seal to the forms. Dkt. No. 27-1 and Dkt. No. 28-1. The Court 14 further extends Plaintiff’s deadline to serve the individual Defendants to March 28, 2025. By 15 March 28, 2025, Plaintiff must file a declaration and any supporting proof confirming that the 16 individuals have been served under the IACAP, or alternatively, a status report (1) detailing where 17 his efforts to serve Defendants stand and (2) how much additional time he needs to serve them. 18 The Court will continue to hold the application for a TRO, Dkt. No. 4, in abeyance until 19 Defendants have been properly served. 20 As for Defendant Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions LLC, Plaintiff has filed multiple 21 certificates of service purporting to indicate that the New Mexico entity has been properly served. 22 See Dkt. Nos. 25, 42, 45. Defendant Knightsbridge has not appeared in this case, although Mr. 23 1 The Court notes that Mr. Garcia, although he has filed documents on the docket, has not waived 24 the lack of process. He has explicitly stated that he has not been served properly. See Dkt. No. 26. 25 2 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Inter-American Service Convention and Additional Protocol, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal- 26 considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Service-of-Process/Inter-American-Service-Convention- Additional-Protocol.html (last visited December 12, 2024). 27 3 Id. (“The clerk of the court in the U.S. where the action is pending must place their seal and 1 Garcia appears to have filed several responses to Plaintiff’s motions for a TRO on the company’s 2 behalf. See Dkt. Nos. 37, 40, 43. The Court has already cautioned Mr. Garcia that as a pro se 3 party, he is not permitted to represent or file documents on behalf of anyone else. Dkt. No. 19. 4 “[A] litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than 5 himself.” Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). Moreover, Defendant 6 Knightsbridge, as a limited liability company, can only appear in court through an attorney. See 7 D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973 (9th Cir. 2004); Civil L.R. 3– 8 9(b) (“A corporation, unincorporated association, partnership or other such entity may appear only 9 through a member of the bar of this Court.”). The Court therefore STRIKES Dkt. Nos. 37, 40, 10 43, and directs the Clerk to remove them from the docket. 11 The Court understands that Plaintiff has requested that the Clerk enter default as to 12 Defendant Knightsbridge since it has not formally answered the complaint, and that Plaintiff 13 intends to seek default judgment against the company. Dkt. No. 46. The Court will evaluate the 14 sufficiency of the service when and if default is entered and Plaintiff files his motion for default 15 judgment. 16 B. Personal Jurisdiction 17 Even if all Defendants were properly served, however, the Court has serious questions 18 about whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over any of them. “Without a proper basis for 19 jurisdiction . . . the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s 20 person or property unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction . . . .” Ross, 504 F.3d at 21 1138–39. Plaintiff cannot obtain default judgment against any Defendants if the Court lacks 22 personal jurisdiction over them. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When a court 23 is considering whether to enter a default judgment, it may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of 24 personal jurisdiction.”). And to date, no Defendant has thus far consented to jurisdiction here. To 25 the contrary, Mr. Garcia has explicitly argued that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 26 Defendants. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 22. As noted above, Mr. Garcia may only represent himself and 27 no other Defendants in this case. So for now, the Court only considers this argument as it relates 1 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the case is properly brought in the Northern District 2 of California because Plaintiff himself is located here. See Compl. at ¶ 4. That, however, is not 3 enough for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. And Plaintiff, not 4 Defendants, bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction over Defendants. 5 See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The complaint alleges that 6 Defendants all reside outside California: Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia reside in Guatemala, and 7 Knightsbridge is a New Mexico limited liability company. See Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 45. The 8 address at which Plaintiff has attempted to serve Knightsbridge is also located in New Mexico. 9 See Dkt. Nos.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURENCE JAY SHAW, Case No. 24-cv-05826-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR LETTERS ROGATORY AND 9 v. DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 10 EDWIN DARIO MANZANO GARCIA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 27, 28 11 Defendants. 12 13 In August 2024, pro se Plaintiff Laurence Jay Shaw filed an application for a temporary 14 restraining order (“TRO”). See Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Edwin Dario 15 Manzano Garcia and Veronica Rosibel Manzano Garcia were previously employees of Plaintiff’s 16 company in Guatemala. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that in October 2023, 17 they “seized” online and physical assets from Plaintiff’s company, and began operating their own 18 “counterfeit” company, Defendant Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions LLC. Id. According to the 19 complaint, Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia reside in Guatemala, and Knightsbridge is a New Mexico 20 limited liability company. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 45. There are two overlapping and threshold issues 21 in this case: service and jurisdiction. 22 A. Service 23 First, and as the Court has already explained, Defendants must be properly served. 24 “Service of process is the mechanism by which the court actually acquires the power to enforce a 25 judgment against the defendant’s person or property.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th 26 Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). “In other words, service of process is the means by 27 which a court asserts its jurisdiction over the person.” Id. Without proper service, the Court “has 1 has . . . waived the lack of process.” Id. at 1138–39. 2 The Court directed Plaintiff to serve the individual Defendants consistent with the Inter- 3 American Service Convention and Additional Protocol (“IACAP”). Dkt. No. 19. The Court gave 4 Plaintiff until January 16, 2025, to do so.1 Id. at 2. Plaintiff has filed two motions for issuance of 5 letters rogatory as part of this process. See Dkt. No. 27, 28. The IACAP does not require formal 6 letters rogatory, but does require the USM-272 form that Plaintiff has filled out and attached to his 7 motions.2 See Dkt. No. 27-1; Dkt. No. 28-1. Plaintiff requests that the Court sign and seal the 8 forms, as is required under the IACAP.3 Dkt. Nos. 27, 28. Plaintiff has confirmed that he is aware 9 of the obligation to and will obtain certified Spanish language translations of the case materials 10 and the USM-272 forms. See id. He will then transmit these documents to ABC Legal, the U.S. 11 Central Authority contractor, for transmittal to the Guatemalan Central Authority for service. Id. 12 Having reviewed the materials, the Court GRANTS the motions and directs the Clerk to 13 affix the Court’s signature and seal to the forms. Dkt. No. 27-1 and Dkt. No. 28-1. The Court 14 further extends Plaintiff’s deadline to serve the individual Defendants to March 28, 2025. By 15 March 28, 2025, Plaintiff must file a declaration and any supporting proof confirming that the 16 individuals have been served under the IACAP, or alternatively, a status report (1) detailing where 17 his efforts to serve Defendants stand and (2) how much additional time he needs to serve them. 18 The Court will continue to hold the application for a TRO, Dkt. No. 4, in abeyance until 19 Defendants have been properly served. 20 As for Defendant Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions LLC, Plaintiff has filed multiple 21 certificates of service purporting to indicate that the New Mexico entity has been properly served. 22 See Dkt. Nos. 25, 42, 45. Defendant Knightsbridge has not appeared in this case, although Mr. 23 1 The Court notes that Mr. Garcia, although he has filed documents on the docket, has not waived 24 the lack of process. He has explicitly stated that he has not been served properly. See Dkt. No. 26. 25 2 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Inter-American Service Convention and Additional Protocol, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal- 26 considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Service-of-Process/Inter-American-Service-Convention- Additional-Protocol.html (last visited December 12, 2024). 27 3 Id. (“The clerk of the court in the U.S. where the action is pending must place their seal and 1 Garcia appears to have filed several responses to Plaintiff’s motions for a TRO on the company’s 2 behalf. See Dkt. Nos. 37, 40, 43. The Court has already cautioned Mr. Garcia that as a pro se 3 party, he is not permitted to represent or file documents on behalf of anyone else. Dkt. No. 19. 4 “[A] litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than 5 himself.” Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). Moreover, Defendant 6 Knightsbridge, as a limited liability company, can only appear in court through an attorney. See 7 D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973 (9th Cir. 2004); Civil L.R. 3– 8 9(b) (“A corporation, unincorporated association, partnership or other such entity may appear only 9 through a member of the bar of this Court.”). The Court therefore STRIKES Dkt. Nos. 37, 40, 10 43, and directs the Clerk to remove them from the docket. 11 The Court understands that Plaintiff has requested that the Clerk enter default as to 12 Defendant Knightsbridge since it has not formally answered the complaint, and that Plaintiff 13 intends to seek default judgment against the company. Dkt. No. 46. The Court will evaluate the 14 sufficiency of the service when and if default is entered and Plaintiff files his motion for default 15 judgment. 16 B. Personal Jurisdiction 17 Even if all Defendants were properly served, however, the Court has serious questions 18 about whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over any of them. “Without a proper basis for 19 jurisdiction . . . the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s 20 person or property unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction . . . .” Ross, 504 F.3d at 21 1138–39. Plaintiff cannot obtain default judgment against any Defendants if the Court lacks 22 personal jurisdiction over them. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When a court 23 is considering whether to enter a default judgment, it may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of 24 personal jurisdiction.”). And to date, no Defendant has thus far consented to jurisdiction here. To 25 the contrary, Mr. Garcia has explicitly argued that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 26 Defendants. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 22. As noted above, Mr. Garcia may only represent himself and 27 no other Defendants in this case. So for now, the Court only considers this argument as it relates 1 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the case is properly brought in the Northern District 2 of California because Plaintiff himself is located here. See Compl. at ¶ 4. That, however, is not 3 enough for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. And Plaintiff, not 4 Defendants, bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction over Defendants. 5 See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The complaint alleges that 6 Defendants all reside outside California: Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia reside in Guatemala, and 7 Knightsbridge is a New Mexico limited liability company. See Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 45. The 8 address at which Plaintiff has attempted to serve Knightsbridge is also located in New Mexico. 9 See Dkt. Nos. 25, 42, 45. 10 In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 11 is proper, the district court must apply the law of the state in which it sits—here, California— 12 when there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. 13 Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). California law allows for the exercise 14 of “jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of th[e] state or of the United 15 States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 16 defendant consistent with due process only if he or she has “certain minimum contacts” with the 17 relevant forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair 18 play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations 19 omitted). A plaintiff may invoke either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Ranza v. Nike, 20 Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015). “The strength of contacts required depends on which of 21 the two categories of personal jurisdiction a litigant invokes.” Id. 22 A court may assert general personal jurisdiction over a defendant “when [his] affiliations 23 with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [him] essentially at home in the 24 forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) 25 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a defendant if 26 (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the 27 forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, or purposely directed conduct at 1 activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in that it comports with fair play and 2 substantial justice. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 3 Plaintiffs complaint contains no allegations about Mr. Garcia’s ties (or the other 4 || Defendants’ ties) to California at all. The Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE 5 why the Court should not dismiss the case as to Mr. Garcia for lack of personal jurisdiction. 6 || Plaintiff shall file a response of no more than ten pages by January 10, 2025.4 7 C. Conclusion 8 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motions for letters rogatory, Dkt. Nos. 27 and 28, 9 || and directs the Clerk to affix the Court’s signature and seal to the forms, Dkt. No. 27-1 and Dkt. 10 || No. 28-1. The Court further extends Plaintiffs deadline to serve the individual Defendants to 11 March 28, 2025. By March 28, 2025, Plaintiff must file a declaration and any supporting proof 12 || confirming that the individuals have been served under the IACAP, or alternatively, a status report 5 13 (1) detailing where his efforts stand to serve Defendants and (2) how much additional time he 14 || needs to serve them. 3 15 The Court STRIKES Dkt. Nos. 37, 40, 43, and directs the Clerk to remove them from the a 16 || docket. 3 17 The Court further ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE why the Court should not 18 dismiss the case as to Mr. Garcia for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff shall file a response of 19 no more than ten pages by January 10, 2025. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: 12/13/2024 22 Alaupred 5 hdl). 73 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge 24 25 26 07 * The Court respectfully suggests that Plaintiff consider whether the Court has a viable legal basis for personal jurisdiction over the other Defendants before he continues incurring expenses in 28 trying to serve them or in seeking default judgment. As discussed, the case cannot proceed here if the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712.