Shaw v. Garcia

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-05826
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURENCE JAY SHAW, Case No. 24-cv-05826-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 9 v. ISSUANCE OF LETTERS ROGATORY, DENYING MOTION 10 EDWIN DARIO MANZANO GARCIA, et FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND al., DENYING MOTIONS FOR 11 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Defendants. 12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 52, 56, 58, 68

13 14 In August 2024, pro se Plaintiff Laurence Jay Shaw filed an application for a temporary 15 restraining order (“TRO”). See Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Edwin Dario 16 Manzano Garcia and Veronica Rosibel Manzano Garcia were previously employees of Plaintiff’s 17 company in Guatemala. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that in October 2023, 18 they “seized” online and physical assets from Plaintiff’s company, and began operating their own 19 “counterfeit” company, Defendant Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions LLC. Id. According to the 20 complaint, Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia reside in Guatemala, and Knightsbridge is a New Mexico 21 limited liability company. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 45. 22 The Court directed Plaintiff to serve the individual Defendants consistent with the Inter- 23 American Service Convention and Additional Protocol (“IACAP”). Dkt. No. 19. In the 24 meantime, the Court explained that it would hold the application for a TRO, Dkt. No. 4, in 25 abeyance until Defendants all had been properly served. Id. In the intervening months, Plaintiff 26 filed serial applications for TROs, one of which remains pending. See Dkt. No. 52. Plaintiff also 27 filed a second motion for issuance of letters rogatory, Dkt. No. 56, and a motion for default 1 filed a motion for a TRO. See Dkt. No. 68. 2 I. MOTION FOR LETTERS ROGATORY (DKT. NO. 56) 3 As an initial matter, and as the Court has already explained, Defendants must be properly 4 served. “Service of process is the mechanism by which the court actually acquires the power to 5 enforce a judgment against the defendant’s person or property.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 6 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). “In other words, service of process is the 7 means by which a court asserts its jurisdiction over the person.” Id. Without proper service, the 8 Court “has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s person or property unless the 9 defendant has . . . waived the lack of process.” Id. at 1138–39. 10 The Court directed Plaintiff to serve the individual Defendants consistent with the IACAP, 11 and granted Plaintiff’s prior motions for issuance of letters rogatory. See Dkt. No. 47. Since then, 12 and despite his prior arguments about improper service, see Dkt. No. 67, Mr. Garcia has filed a 13 motion for a TRO, an amended answer, and counterclaims with this Court, see Dkt. Nos. 68, 69.1 14 He did not preserve his challenge to personal jurisdiction in these recent filings. To the contrary, 15 Mr. Garcia is actively requesting the Court’s intervention in this case and in his dispute with 16 Plaintiff. In doing so, Mr. Garcia has waived any arguments about improper service or the Court’s 17 lack of jurisdiction over him. See, e.g., Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1318 18 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 15, 1998) (“Most 19 defenses, including the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, may be waived as a result of the 20 course of conduct pursued by a party during litigation.”). Mr. Garcia may not use jurisdiction as 21 both a sword and a shield, accepting the Court’s jurisdiction when it is beneficial to him but 22 denying it as to Plaintiff’s claims against him. Plaintiff is therefore relieved of his obligation to 23 serve Mr. Garcia under the IACAP. The Court therefore only considers the motion for letters 24 rogatory as to Ms. Garcia. 25 1 In October 2024, Mr. Garcia filed an initial answer in which he raised various affirmative 26 defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, including that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. See Dkt. No. 22-4. In August 2025, Mr. Garcia filed another answer, which appears to supersede his 27 prior answer. See Dkt. No. 69. In the latest filing Mr. Garcia does not challenge personal 1 Plaintiff has filed a motion to reissue the letters rogatory, stating that the USM-272 forms 2 that Plaintiff had initially filled out were not properly formatted for the Guatemalan authorities.2 3 See Dkt. No. 56. The updated forms remain substantively the same. Id. The Court therefore 4 GRANTS the motion as it pertains to Ms. Garcia, but DENIES the motion as it pertains to Mr. 5 Garcia who no longer requires service under the IACAP. Dkt. No. 56. The Court directs the 6 Clerk to affix the Court’s signature and seal to the form for Ms. Garcia at Dkt. No. 56-2. The 7 Court reminds Plaintiff of his obligation to obtain certified Spanish language translations of the 8 case materials. 9 The Court further extends Plaintiff’s deadline to serve Ms. Garcia to December 5, 2025. 10 By December 5, 2025, Plaintiff must file a declaration and any supporting proof confirming that 11 Ms. Garcia has been served under the IACAP, or alternatively, a status report (1) detailing where 12 his efforts to serve Ms. Garcia stand and (2) how much additional time he needs to serve her. 13 II. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 58) 14 Plaintiff requested that the Clerk enter default as to Defendant Knightsbridge since it did 15 not answer the complaint, and Plaintiff now seeks default judgment against the company.3 Dkt. 16 No. 58. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Garcia formed Defendant Knightsbridge as a New Mexico 17 limited liability corporation in December 2023, and that it operates as the “primary legal entity” 18 through which Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia promote and sell their counterfeit products. See Compl. 19 at ¶¶ 45, 46. 20 A. Legal Standard 21 Following an entry of default, the Court may enter a default judgment upon request. Fed. 22 23 2 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Inter-American Service Convention and Additional Protocol, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal- considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Service-of-Process/Inter-American-Service-Convention- 24 Additional-Protocol.html (last visited September 22, 2025). 3 As the Court previously noted, Mr. Garcia previously filed several documents purportedly on the 25 company’s behalf, but as a pro se party he is not permitted to represent or file documents on behalf of anyone else. See Dkt. No. 47. “[A] litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to 26 represent anyone other than himself.” Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). Moreover, Defendant Knightsbridge, as a limited liability company, can only appear in court 27 through an attorney. See D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973 (9th 1 R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). However, the Court’s decision to enter a default judgment is “discretionary.” 2 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that 3 “default judgments are generally disfavored,” and that “[w]henever it is reasonably possible, cases 4 should be decided upon their merits.” Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th 5 Cir. 1985). When considering a motion for default judgment, a court must take “the well-pleaded 6 factual allegations in the complaint as true.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 7 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). However, the “defendant is not held to admit facts that are 8 not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id. 9 The Court also has an “affirmative duty” to examine its jurisdiction over “both the subject 10 matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). And it must determine 11 whether service of process on the defendant was proper. See Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 12 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2010); cf. Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 13 851 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding default judgment invalid due to improper service, even where 14 defendant had actual notice of the action). 15 B. Discussion 16 i. Service 17 A plaintiff may serve a corporation, partnership, or association by delivering a copy of the 18 summons and complaint to an agent “authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 19 process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, service may be made “by . . . following state 20 law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where 21 the district court is located or where service is made.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 4(h)(1)(A). In other words, service may also be made here by following either California or New 23 Mexico law. 24 25 • Under California law, service upon an LLC may be made by delivering a copy of the 26 summons and the complaint “to the person designated as agent for service of process in 27 a statement filed with the Secretary of State or to the president or other head of the 1 treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the association to receive 2 service of process.” Cal. Civ. Code § 416.40(b). 3 4 • Under New Mexico law, service upon an LLC may be made by delivering a copy of 5 the summons and complaint “to an officer, a managing or a general agent or to any 6 other agent authorized by appointment, by law or by this rule to receive service of 7 process,” or if none of them are available, “service may be made by delivering a copy 8 of the process or other papers to be served at the principal office or place of business 9 during regular business hours to the person in charge.” See NMRA, Rule 1- 10 004(G)(1)(a), (G)(2). 11 12 Here, Plaintiff has filed multiple certificates of service purporting to indicate that 13 Defendant Knightsbridge has been served. See Dkt. Nos. 25, 42, 45, 65. Defendant 14 Knightsbridge has not appeared in this case, although as noted above, Mr. Garcia has previously 15 and improperly tried to respond on the company’s behalf. Most recently, Plaintiff filed a proof of 16 service indicating that a process server delivered various court documents, including the summons 17 and the complaint, to a receptionist for Defendant Knightsbridge named “Noah Hinojos.” See 18 Dkt. No. 42-1, Ex. 1. The proof of service listed the address as 4801 Lang Avenue Northeast 19 #110, Albuquerque, New Mexico. See id. The process server indicated in an affidavit that he 20 spoke with Mr. Hinojos and that “he accepted the paperwork.” Id. On the website for the New 21 Mexico Secretary of State, Mr. Garcia is listed as the registered agent for Defendant 22 Knightsbridge, and the address listed is the 4801 Lang Avenue Northeast address.4 However, 23 although the address appears to be correct, the process server did not serve Mr. Garcia—the 24 registered agent—directly. There is also no indication in the record that Noah Hinojos, the 25 receptionist, was in charge in any way such that he could have accepted service on Mr. Garcia’s 26 behalf. Therefore, Plaintiff has not yet properly served Defendant Knightsbridge. 27 1 The Court acknowledges the apparent challenges that Plaintiff has faced in trying to serve 2 Defendants in this case and the steps he has taken to try to serve everyone properly. Mr. Garcia, 3 although apparently living in Guatemala, is listed as the registered agent for Defendant 4 Knightsbridge, a New Mexico entity, with a New Mexico address. And as noted in Section I 5 above, Mr. Garcia has now appeared in this case, answered the complaint, and filed his own 6 counterclaims. Defendants appear to be engaging in some level of gamesmanship here. Still, the 7 Court cannot properly exercise jurisdiction or grant default judgment if service was improper. The 8 Court therefore extends Plaintiff’s deadline to serve Defendant Knightsbridge to December 5, 9 2025. 10 ii. Personal Jurisdiction 11 Because the Court anticipates Plaintiff will attempt to serve Defendant Knightsbridge 12 again, the Court further notes that it is not clear from the current record that the Court has personal 13 jurisdiction over Defendant Knightsbridge. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Garcia is “the sole member 14 of the Counterfeit LLC,” Defendant Knightsbridge, and that he “utilizes the Counterfeit LLC as an 15 alter ego for his operations within the United States.” See Dkt. No. 58 at 9–10. However, Plaintiff 16 offers little support for these assertions. If Plaintiff intends to pursue this case against Defendant 17 Knightsbridge, he will need to offer some factual support for his belief that Defendant 18 Knightsbridge is merely Mr. Garcia’s “alter ego.” See Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073– 19 74 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing requirements for alter ego liability). 20 III. MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (DKT. NOS. 52, 68) 21 Both Plaintiff and Mr. Garcia have filed motions for temporary restraining orders. Dkt. 22 Nos. 52, 68. 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may enjoin 24 conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard 25 for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction are substantially 26 identical. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839, n.7 (9th 27 Cir. 2001). A party seeking preliminary relief must establish: (1) he is likely to succeed on the 1 balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. 2 Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary relief is “an extraordinary remedy that 3 may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. 4 A court must find that “a certain threshold showing” is made on each of the four required 5 elements. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Ninth Circuit’s 6 sliding scale approach, a preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious questions going to 7 the merits” if “a hardship balance [also] tips sharply towards the [movant],” and “so long as the 8 [movant] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 9 public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 A. Plaintiff’s Motion 11 Plaintiff has filed a motion for a TRO against Defendant Knightsbridge, in which he 12 requests that the Court order the company to (1) return control and ownership of Plaintiff’s Google 13 Adwords account; and (2) stop using Plaintiff’s intellectual property, including the business name 14 “Knightsbridge Sleep Solutions” and the trademark for the “dual band.” See Dkt. No. 52. As 15 already explained in Section II above, however, it is not clear that the Court has jurisdiction over 16 Defendant Knightsbridge, a New Mexico entity. The Court DENIES the motion on this basis. To 17 the extent Plaintiff believes Defendant Knightsbridge is just the alter ego of Mr. Garcia, Mr. 18 Garcia has now appeared in this case, and Plaintiff may pursue his claims against him accordingly. 19 B. Mr. Garcia’s Motion 20 Mr. Garcia has filed his own motion for a TRO with this Court. Dkt. No. 68. Mr. Garcia 21 appears to contend that Plaintiff is filing frivolous takedown notices under the Digital Millenium 22 Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Id. As of August 18, 2025, he has also filed an answer and 23 counterclaims to the complaint. Dkt. No. 69. Mr. Garcia contends that he is the rightful copyright 24 owner of the intellectual property at issue in this case, including the “dual band chin strap.” Id. 25 Plaintiff responds that this is false, and accuses Mr. Garcia of providing fraudulent copyright 26 registrations in support of the motion. See Dkt. No. 70. The Court cannot say at this stage, given 27 the meager record before it, that Mr. Garcia is likely to succeed on the merits of his counterclaims. 1 business dispute, with each pointing the finger at the other side. Now that Mr. Garcia has 2 appeared and answered in this case, the parties may proceed to litigate these contested issues. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 As explained above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to 5 reissue the letters rogatory, Dkt. No. 56, and directs the Clerk to affix the Court’s signature and 6 seal to the form for Ms. Garcia at Dkt. No. 56-2. The Court further extends Plaintiff’s deadline to 7 serve Ms. Garcia and Defendant Knightsbridge to December 5, 2025. By December 5, 2025, 8 Plaintiff must file a declaration and any supporting proof confirming that Ms. Garcia has been 9 served under the IACAP and Defendant Knightsbridge has been served properly, or alternatively, 10 a status report (1) detailing where his efforts to serve these Defendants stand and (2) how much 11 additional time he needs to serve them. 12 The Court DENIES the motion for default judgment against Defendant Knightsbridge, 13 Dkt. No. 58, and DENIES the motions for temporary restraining order, Dkt. Nos. 52, 68. 14 The Court further SETS a case management conference on November 4, 2025, at 2:00 15 p.m. for Plaintiff and Mr. Garcia. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All parties, 16 members of the public, and media may access the webinar information at 17 https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. All attorneys and pro se litigants appearing for the case 18 management conference are required to join at least 15 minutes before the hearing to check in with 19 the courtroom deputy and test internet, video, and audio capabilities. The Court further 20 DIRECTS the parties to submit their individual case management statements by October 28, 21 2025. 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 The parties are encouraged to seek assistance at the Legal Help Center, which provides 2 || free information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants. More information about the 3 Legal Help Center is provided at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/legal-help. Appointments may be 4 scheduled either over the phone at (415) 782-8982 or by email at 5 federalprobonoproject @ sfbar.org. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: 9/22/2025

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12

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