Shaw v. Alpha Air Heating & Air Conditioning LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: April 10, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-03953
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES D ISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRIC T OF LOUISIANA

MARK SHAW, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 22-3953

ALPHA AIR & HEATING, L.L.C., ET AL. SECTION: “D”(5) ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. (Rec. doc. 45). Defendants filed no opposition to the motion. Having reviewed the motion and the case lIa. w, theB Caocukrgtr rouulensd as follows.

Plaintiffs Mark Shaw and Daniel Oquendo (“Plaintiffs”) filed this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) lawsuit against their former employers, Alpha Air Heating & Air Conditioning, L.L.C. (“Alpha Air”) and Derek Granger (“Granger”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to recover allegedly unpaid wages, including unpaid overtime wages. (Rec. doc. 1). In their Verified Complaint filed on October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs asserted an FLSA claim for failure to pay overtime wages, an FLSA claim for failure to pay minimum wage, and a Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”) claim for failure to pay wIdag. es and commissions within 15 days after an employee’s separation from his employer. ( ). Alpha Air – a residential heating, air conditioning, and ventilation installer and service provider in southeast Louisiana – hired Plaintiffs Shaw and OIqd.uendo in January 2022 as a full time “Service Professional” and “Installer,” respectively. ( at ¶¶ 14, 23-24). Plaintiffs alleged that Granger, Alpha Air’s owner and sole member, controlled all aspects of their employment including which jobIsd .they performed, how they performed their jobs, and where they performed their jobs. ( at ¶ 27). Id. Plaintiffs were paid an hourly wage and never received any overtime payment. (

at ¶¶ 36, 46, 55, 64). Specifically, Shaw alleged that he was paid $20.00 per hour on a weekly basisId a.nd despite working an average of 55 hours per week, was never paid any overtime. ( at ¶¶ 39-40). According to Shaw, Defendants not only failed to pay him overtime wages but they alIsdo. failed to pay him certain regular wages he was owed as well as earned commissions. ( at ¶¶ 43, 45-46). Shaw alleged that Defendants owed him $3,500.00 in unpaid reguIlda.r wages, $2,500.00 in unpaid commissions, and $4,950.00 in unpaid oIvde.rtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 49-50). Shaw resigned from Alpha Air on September 11, 2022. ( at ¶ 42). As for Oquendo, he was paid $25.00 per hour Iodn. a weekly basis by

Defendants, and he too worked an average of 55 hours per week. ( at ¶¶58-59). Like Shaw, Oquendo alleged thIda.t Defendants failed to pay him certain regular wages and failed to pay overtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 62, 64-65). Oquendo estimated that DefIedn.dants failed to pay him $2,000.00 in regular wages and $3,750.I0d0. in overtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 66-67). Oquendo resigned from Alpha Air in June 2022. ( at ¶ 61). After discovery and motion practice – including Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, granted in their favor (rec. doc. 30) – the District Court held a one-day bench trial on January 22, 2024. (Rec. doc. 41). Two days later, the District Court entered

its findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench. (Rec. doc. 43). Ultimately, the District Court awarded $30,212.00 to Shaw, $28,660.00 to Oquendo, plus interest, and awarded each Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees, plus reimbursement of his reasonable litigation costs. (Rec. doc. 44). This fee application follo wed, in which Plaintiffs seek a total oIIf. $36,2T2h5e.0 L0o idne astttaorr nAepypsr’ ofeaecsh and $1,436.22 in costs.

The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have often repeaHteedn stlheya t va. rEecqkuerehsat rtfor attorneys' fees should Anssootc isapteadw Bnu imldaejrosr & aCnocniltlraarcyt olrist iogfa tLiao.n, .I n c. v. Orleans Par. Schoo, l4 6B1d .U.S. 424, 437 (1983); , 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990). A court's discretion in fashi.ieo.ning a reasonable attorney's fee is broad and reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, , it will not be reversed unless there is stronHg eenvsildeeynce that it is excessivHeo powr oinoadd ve. qSutaattee , oof rT tehxe. amount chosen is clearly erroneous. , 461 U.S. at 436-37; , 236 F.3d 256, 277 n.79 (5th Cir. 2000).

To determine a reasonable fee, the Court must provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations regarding whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reported bHye ncsoleuynsel were duplicativeA, susnocnieacteesds Baruyi,l doerr su &n rCeolantterda cttoo rsthe purposes of the lawsuit. , 461 U.S. at 437-39; , 919 F.2d at 379. The Fifth Circuit has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court hBaras nutlseeyd v .p Sruorpleesr factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.”

, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986). In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the Court must first determine the "lodestar" by multiplying the reasonable Sneuem Hbeenrs olefy hours expended anGdre tehne vr.e Aadsomn’rasb olef hourly rate for each participating attorney. , 461 U.S. at 433; the Tulane Educ. Fund overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa F, e2 R8a4i lFw.3ayd C6o4. 2v,. W66h1it e(5th Cir. 2002), Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc. La. Pow, 5e4r8 & U L.Sig. 5h3t C(2o0. v0.6 K);e llstrom , 135 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); , 50 F.3d 319, 324

(5th Cir. 1995). The lodestar is presumeJodh rnesaosnonable, butF ae scsloeurr vt . mPaoyrc tehlaenna e Cnohraonncae Doer 1 dMeecxriecaos, eS .Ait. aDfete Cr .Vco. nsidering the twelve factors. Combs v. City of Huntington , 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing , 829 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2016)). “‘[T]Choem mbsost critical factor’ in determHineninsgle ay reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” , 829 F.3d at 394 (quoting , 461 U.S. at 436). The fee applicant bears the burden of proof on the lodeJsothanr soisnsue, but once calculated, thSee ep aFretsys lseereking modificatio nR iolef yt hve. Cloitdye osft aJar cuknsodner the factors bears the burKdeelnls. t rom , 23 F.4thI na tr e4 1S6m;ith , 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996); A. Re,a 5s0o nFa.3bdl ea tH 3o2u4r; ly Rates , 996 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1992).

“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates M‘acrCe ltaoin b ve. cLaulfckuilna tIendd uasc.c, oInrcd.ing to the prevailing market rates in the relevBalnutm c ovm. Smteunnsiotyn.’” , 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence – in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits – that the requested rates are in line with those prevailBinlug min the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill.” , 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “An

attorney’s requested hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when [he] requests that the lodestar be computed at [his] ‘customary billing rateW,’ hthitee vra. Itme pise rwiailt Ahidnju tshtme ernatn Cgoer po.f prevailing market rates and the rate is not contested.” , See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. abrogated on other grounds by 1Blanchard v. Bergeron La. Power No. 99s-e3e8 a0l4s,o 2 L0a0. 5P oWwLe r1 &57 L8i8g1ht0, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing , 50 F.3d at 328); , 50 F.3d at 328 (“Generally, when an attorney's customary billing rate is the rate at which the attorney requests the lodestar to be computed and that

rate is within the range of prevailing market rates, the court should consider this rate when fixing the houDrluyr erantee v .t oB rbinek earll oLwa.e Idn.c . When that rate is not contested, it is prima facie reasonable.”); , No. CV 21-01568, 2022 WL 2828831, at *2 (E.D. La. July 20, 2022) (“In this caJsoeh nthsoe nr avt.e Bs iogf Lthoets b Siltloinregs a, tItnocr.neys are not contested, and they are therefore reasonable.”); , 639 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (E.D. La. 2009) (“When an attorney's requested rate is his customary billing rate and within the range of prevailing market rates, the court should consider the rate prima facie reasonable if not contested.”).

However, the Court may reduce the hourly rateR iifc ihta drdet ve.r Smt.i nTeasm tmhaatn tyh Pea rre. qShueersitfef'ds rDaetpe' tis not within the range of prevailing market rates. appeal dismissed sub n, oNmo.. CRVic h1a7r-9d 7v0.3 S, m20it2h2 WL 4534728, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2022), , No. 22-30497, 2023 WL 2845201 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023). Plaintiffs offer the Declaration of Kevin S. Vogeltanz (rec. doc. 45-5) bBuatr ddaol enso tv .p Froovnitdaen aa n&y oFtohnetra neav,i Ld.eLn.Cc.e of prevailing market rates in this community. In , the district court held: While Plaintiffs provided information regarding the qualifications, skill, and experience of Mr. Bragg, they failed to provide any information regarding the prevailing market rate for lawyers of similar skill, experience, and reputation to Mr. Bragg in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Specifically, Plaintiffs did not offer affidavits from other attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of Louisiana and, instead, rely upon Mr. Bragg's own assertions in his Declarationi nt htahti sh icso rmamteus nairtey rfeoar ssoinmaiblaler. s Terhvuicse, sPlaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that Mr. Bragg's requested rate is in line with those prevailing by lawyers of reasonably No. CV 19-340, 2021 WL 2328382, at *3 (E.D. La. June 8, 2021) (Vitter, J.) (emphasis in original). A similar finding would be appropriate here but for the following case law. Although Plaintiffs do not offer affidavits from other attorneys in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit has clarified that the district court “is itself an expert on the question [of reasonable billing rates] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and properC faemesp abnedll vm. aGyr efoenrm an independent judgment either with or without the aid of testimony.” , 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.

1940). Having reviewed the most recent case law from this District, the Court finds that some of the requested hourly rates do not reflect the prevailing rates in this community. Plaintiffs seek fees for two attorneys: Kevin Vogeltanz and Alec Szczechowski, both attorneys at the Law Office of Kevin S. Vogeltanz, L.L.C. (Rec. doc. 45-5 at 3). Vogeltanz – the founding member of the law office of his own name – is an attorney with 13 to 14 years of experience at the timeI do.f this lawsuit, and Szczechowski is an attorney with less than five years of experience. ( ; Rec. doc. 45-1 at 2). Plaintiffs seek $500.00 per hour for Vogeltanz and $200.00 per hour for Szczechowski. Vogeltanz practices mainly in the area

of labor and employment law and is board certified as an employment law specialist by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization. (Rec. doc. 45-5 at 63). Having reviewed the case law, the Court finds that the prevailing market rates in this communeiety D faonro as tvto. rPnaenyesl Swpiethci aelxisptes,r iIenncc.e similar to that of Vogeltanz cover a wide spectrum. S inter alia , Civ. A. No. 22-14, 2023 WL 6167152, at *2 (E.D. La. July 24, 2023) (approving, , aBna hrdoaulrelsy vr.a Fteo notfa $n3a5 &0 .0Fo0n itna nand, FLL.LS.AC .lawsuit for an attorney with 16 years of experience); , Civ. A. Ill. Cent. $R4.R5. 0C.0o.0 v p. Berh dh. oouf rL tooc o$m40ot0i.v0e0 E pnegri nheoeursr &fo Tr raatitnomrneeny with 40 years of experience); , No. CV 20-1717, 2021 WL 65648, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2021) (awarding attorneys’ fees at the requested billing rate of $275.00 per

hour for attorneys with 21 years and 3 yBeaadrosn o fv .e Bxpeerrryie'sn cRee laianbdl e$ 2R0e0s..,0 0L. Lp.Cer. hour for an attorney with 30 years of experience); , No. CV 19- 12317, 2020 WL 9440406, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2020) (reducing the billing rate for an attorneNyo wrriitsh v1. 4C ayuesaerys of experience from the requested $350.00 per hour to $300.00 per hour); , No. CV 14-1598, 2016 WL 1046101, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2016) (finding rates of $250.00, $200.00, and $15J0ef.0fe0r swone rve. rBeaayswonaatberle D forirl laintgto, rLn.Ley.Cs. with 31, 12, and 8 years of experience, respectively); , No. CV 14- 1711, 2015 WL 7281612, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2015) (affirming magistrate judge's report

and recommendation finding that rates of $500.00 and $450.00 per hour were reasonable for two attorneys with 40 years of experience in maritime litigation and that $240.00 per hAoduarm ws va.s C rietya soof nNaebwle O frolre aanns attorney with seven years’ experience in maritime litigation); , No. Civ. A. 13-6779, 2015 WL 4606223, at *3 (E.D. La. July 30, 2015) (findinEgn Vreante E noef rg$y3 5V0e.n0t0u rpese,r L .hLo.Cu. rv . rBelaascokn Ealbkl eE nfeorrg ya nO ffasthtoorren eOyp ewraitthio n2s9, Ly.Le.aCr.s of experience); , No. 14-424, 2015 WL 3505099, at *1-3 (E.D. La. June 3, 2015) (approving hourly rate of $325.00 for an attorney with twenty years of experience, $300.00 for an attorney with ten

years of experience, and $275.00 for an attorney with seven years of experience). Based on this case law, the Court finds an hourly rate of $325.00 reasonable for an attorney with 13 to 14 years of experience at the time of this litigation. Vogeltanz raises two arguments to justify his request for $500.00 per hour. He argues: Decisional law suggests a base rate of $350 for Vogeltanz because of his 13 to 14 years of experience during the case and his status as owner and founder of his firm. Plaintiffs suggest, however, that Vogeltanz should also be awarded a premium on top of his base rate. First, Vogeltanz is one of only apparently three plaintiff’s attorneys in Louisiana board certified in employment law by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization. Plaintiffs suggest such a rare accreditation is worth an additional $100 per hour in our market. Second, plaintiffs take the position that FLSA plaintiffs (and employment-law plaintiffs in general) are underserved in the Louisiana legal community, and because the FLSA has long been described as a remedial statute, plaintiffs suggest Vogeltanz (and any plaintiff’s attorney who undertakes an FLSA case) should be awarded a modest premium of $50 per hour to incentivize lawyers to take on that work.

(Rec. doc. 45-1 at 2-3). Plaintiff cites no case law – and this Court has found none – that would support an additional $150.00 per hour based on Plaintiffs’ two arguments. However, and perhaps without realizing it, Plaintiffs appear to raise an argument that the Court shouldJo hennhsoannce the Jaomhnosuonnt awarded based on the relative weight of certain factors set forth in . The factors are: (1) the time and labor required to represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5) the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relatJioohnnsshoinp with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-19. “[O]f the factors, the court should give special heed to the time and labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved Saizan v. aDnedlt at hCeo nrecrseutlet Porbotdai. nCeod., and the experience, reputation and abilMityig oisf vc.o Puenasrelel. ”V ision, Inc. , 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson, 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998)). The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a

factor, however, if the creation of the lodestar amouIdn.t already took that factor into account; to do so would be impermissible double counting. Reframing Plaintiffs’ arguments, the issue then becomes whether this Court should enhance the lodestar amount basedi.e o. n the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel and the undesirability of the case ( , the underservice by the Louisiana legal community of FLSA plaintiffs). After due consideration, the Court finds that these factors warrant no enhancement. Cutting against Plaintiffs’ argument that FLSA plaintiffs are underserviced in this District and attorneys who prosecute such casesm manedriatt oarny enhancement is the simple

fact that reasonable attorney’s fees and costs are under the FLSA (and the Louisiana Wage Payment Act) when a plaintiff prevails. This fee-shifting statute in and of itself already encourages attorneys to represent FLSA plaintiffs in any district. This Court is cognizant of numerous FLSA lawsuits in this Court and of other lawyers and law firms who often represent FLSA plaintiffs in this District. Indeed, that the FLSAS eceo Fnetgailenys va. Hmiagngdinastory fee provision incentivizes lawyers to represent FLSA plaintiffs. , 19 F.3d 1126, 1134 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of the FLSA attorney fees provision is to insure effective access to the judicial prHocaeusssc hbiyld p vr.o Uvniditiendg Sattattoersney fees for

prevailing plaintiffs with wage and hour grievances.”); , 53 Fed. Cl. 134, 146 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (“the purpose of the FLSA attorneys' fee provision is to provide an adequate economic incentive for private attorneys to take employment discrimination cases and thereby to ensure competent legal representation of legitimate claims”) (internal Tovar v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. citation omitted); , No. 3:20-CV-1455-B, 2022 WL 2306926, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2022) (“Due to the nature of the FLSA attorneys' fee provision, which provides an incentive for attorneys to take up meritorious claims that would ordinarily

result in relatively small awards. . . .”). Granting an hourly enhancement for representing underserviced plaintiffs in an area of law that already rewards counsel for representing underserviced plaintiffs seems far too much to the Court like double-dipping. Moreover, this Court does not dispute that specialization in any type of law is admirable, but the number of FLSA lawsuits in this District in which the plaintiff prevails Sbeeeli eDsa annoys argument that specialization is necessary to adequately represent one’s client. , 2023 WL 6B1a6d7o1n5 v2., Bate r*r1y ’(sn Roetilniagb lteh aRte ps.l,a Lin.Lt.iCff.s prevailed in their FLSA lawsuit through settlement); , Civ. A. No. 19-12317, 2023 WL

395181, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2023) (noting that plaintiffs prevailed in their lawsuit after a 2 jury trial). This Court is unwilling to set the precedent that any specialist (in any area of law) is automatically entitled to an increase in his or her hourly rate. An enhancement of $150.00 per hour is thus not warranted. This Court takes no issue with the hourly rate requested by Szczechowski, an attorney with less than five years of experience at the time of this litigation. “Judges in this district award attorney's fees in the amGouirnotd oLfo $a2n0 C0o .f,o Lr. Lw.Co. rvk. Hpeeirsfloerrmed by an associate with less than five years of experience.” Batiste v. Lewis , No. 19-13150, 2020 WL 3605947, at *8 (E.D. La. July 2, 2020) (citing , No. 17-4435, 2019 WL 1591951, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2019) (awarding $200.00 per hour to attorney with five 2 Given that Plaintiffs’ counsel has informed the Court – and this Court has Dvearniofised – tBhaatd ohne is only one of three attorneys board certified in employment law by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization (rec. doc. years of experience)). Accordingly, the Court finds $200.00 per hour to be a reasonable billing rBa.t e forR Sezaczseocnhaobwles kHi’os ucrosn Etrxibpuetniodne dto this litigation.

The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting and supHpeonrstlienyg the reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. , 461 U.S. at 437. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to excludIde. from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary . . .” at 434. HouIrds. t hat are not properly billed to one’s client are not properly billed to one’s adversary. The Supreme CouIdr.t calls on fee applicants to make a fee request that demonstrates “billing judgment.” The remedy for failing tIod .exercise “Wbiallliknegr j uvd. gCmiteyn ot”f iMs etsoq ueitxeclude hours that were not reasonably expeWndaeldke. r v. H aUtD 434;

, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting , 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“If there is bnuot eav irdeednuccet ioofn boilfl i‘nthge j uhdogumrse anwt, ahrodwede vbeyr ,a t hpeenr ctehnet apgreo pinetre rnedmede dtyo issu bnsottit uat ed efonria tlh oe fe fxeeersc,i se of billing judgment. ’” (emphasSiese a Gdrdeeedn)). Alternatively, thCiasm Ceoruornt cva. Gn rceoantedru Ncte aw l iOnrele-bayn-sl iFneed a. nCraelydsitis U onfi othne time report. , 284 F.3d at 662; , Civ. A. No. 16-8514, 2017 WL 1426970, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017). Attached to Plaintiffs’ motion is the Declaration of Kevin S. Vogeltanz (rec. doc. 45-5)

and the relevant billing records. (Rec. doc. 45-3). I dIn. total, Plaintiffs’ counsel expended a combined 81.75 total hours litigating this case. ( ). Vogeltanz billed 66.25 hours, and Szczechowski billed 15.5 hours. In calculating the hours, counsel exercised billing judgment by taking affirmative steps to excise all time entries for telephone calls and email 3 correspondence. In the course of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel drafted the complaint, drafted a motion to compel (which this Court granted), drafted their witness and exhibit lists, and drafted a motion for partial summary judgment (which the District Court granted). Plaintiffs’ counsel also drafted two motions for sanctions, one when Defendants failed to appear for their depositions, and one when Defendants still failed to sit for their depositions after this Court ordered them to do so. Plaintiffs drafted the pre-trial order, which the District Court adopted, and participated in the one-day trial, after which they prevailed. Having reviewed the docket sheet and the billing records – which reflect the efforts exerted by Plaintiffs’ counsel – the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel have exercised billing judgment. However, there are two entries that this Court will excise given that it cannot

determine what legal tasks were performed in conjunction with the entries. On July 24, 2023, counsel entered 7.75 hours but listed only the word “counsel” as the task performed. In addition, on December 12, 2023, counsel expended 0.5 hours but listed only the word “record” as the task performed. The Court cannot award these 8.25 hours given that there is no description of the legal services performed. After subtracting these two entries, the CIIoI.u rt fiCnodsst tshat Vogeltanz expended 58 hours, and Szczechowski expended 15.5 hours.

Plaintiffs seek costs in the amount of $1,436.22, which is comprised of $402.00 for

the filing fee, $190.00 to serve Defendants, and $844.22 for court-reporter fees for the two occasions at which Defendants failed to appear for their depositions. Filing fees and fees for service of process (that are cheaper than those charged by the U.S. Marshal) are Gros v. New Orleans City generally recoverable. on reconsideratio, nN oin. Cpiva.r tA. 12-2322, 2014 WL 2506464, at *16 (E.D. La. June 3, 2014), Marsala v. Mayo , No. Civ. A. 12-2322, 2014 WL 3894371 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2014); , No. 06–3846, 2014 WL 1276187, at *4

(E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2014). The Court will award these costs. GenerallyS, otihse vc. oCstrse srceelnatte Dd rtioll itnhge c&a nPcreoldla.,t iIonnc .of a deposition are not taxable under Section 1920. report and, Nreoc.o SmAm-1e9n-dCaVt-io0n1 1a9d4o-pFtBe,d 2s0u2b3 n oWmL. 8So7l0is7 4v.2 C1r, eastc e*n6t (DWri.lDli.n gT e&x .P Orocdt.. , 1I9n,c .2023), ee also E.A.F.,F N. ov.. CUVn iStAed-1 S9t-aCtAe-s1194-FB, 2023 WL 8704782 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2023); s , No. SA-08-CA-124-XR, 2014 WL 2155263, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2014) (holding a fee for a certificate of non-appearance is not allowed because a certificate oShf anwon v-a. pHpaeradrbaenrcgee irs not a deposition transcript and is

not authorized by Section 1920); , No. SA-06-CV-751-XR, 2010 WL 1424726, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010) (“Section 1920 does not authorize costs for certificates of nonappearance.”). However, fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case are taxable under Section 1920(2). Here, Plaintiffs used the transcripts of Defendants’ non-appearance as exhibits to their motions for sanctions for Defendants’ failure to appear at their properly-noticed depositions. (Rec. docs. 29-2, 35-2). The Court finds that these fees were thus necessarily obtained for use in

this case. Accordingly, the Court will tax these costs to Defendants and award Plaintiffs a tIoVt.a l ofC $o1n,4c3lu6s.2io2n in costs.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED GRANTED IN PART that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (rec. doc. 45) is , and Plaintiffs be awarded $21,950.00 in fees and $1,436.22 in costs for a total of $23,386.22. 10th April

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2024. MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE