Shaun Heath Brooks v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 8, 2024
• Docket: 07-23-00110-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00110-CR

SHAUN HEATH BROOKS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 251st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 32005C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding

January 8, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Shaun Heath Brooks, Appellant, was convicted of violating a protective order two

or more times within a twelve-month period.1 The trial court sentenced him to ten years’

incarceration, probated for a period of ten years, and a $500 fine. On appeal, he

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and claims that the sentence imposed

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.072(a). BACKGROUND

Appellant and Ashley Rogers were in a dating relationship for about a year,

beginning in 2019. They broke up but remained friendly. After they broke up, Rogers

moved into a camper situated near Rogers’ grandmother’s house. In late July of 2021,

Appellant and Rogers got into an argument and Appellant kicked Rogers in the stomach.

Appellant was charged with assault causing bodily injury—family violence, and released

on bond on August 3, 2021.2 Under the conditions of the bond, Appellant was to have no

direct or indirect contact with Rogers.

Appellant later made calls to Rogers’ Facebook account on five or six occasions,

but Rogers did not answer the calls. Appellant also made four or five telephone calls to

Rogers’ grandmother, in which he asked if Rogers was there and sought the

grandmother’s permission to marry Rogers. He came to the grandmother’s house four or

five times. One such visit occurred on February 2, 2022, when Appellant arrived at the

grandmother’s house and talked to her for some time. Appellant was still there when

Rogers arrived home from work. Appellant then spoke directly to Rogers, telling her he

wanted her back and wanted her to marry him. Rogers told him that he needed to leave,

which he eventually did.

On another occasion, Rogers came home from work and saw Appellant in the entry

hall of her grandmother’s house. Rogers remained in her vehicle but her boyfriend, who

was with her, went to the house and spoke to Appellant. After Rogers and her boyfriend

2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b).

2 left, Appellant also left the property. Later that day, Appellant attempted to contact Rogers

on Facebook.

On February 4, when Rogers came home from work, she saw Appellant in his truck

outside her home. Rogers walked to her camper next to the house. Appellant was yelling,

“Ashley, I love you” and “Come with me. I want to marry you.” Rogers remained in the

camper until the police arrived.

In March of 2022, a criminal complaint was filed alleging that Appellant had, “from

on or about February 2, 2022 through February 4, 2022, engaged in conduct two or more

times that constituted an offense under Section 25.07 of the Texas Penal Code, to

[Rogers], the protected individual, in violation of a bond set in a family violence case . . . .”

Appellant was subsequently indicted by the grand jury.

The case was tried to the bench in December of 2022. Appellant pleaded “not

guilty.” The trial court found Appellant guilty as charged and later sentenced Appellant

as set forth above.

ANALYSIS

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to sustain his conviction. We apply one standard, legal sufficiency, when

evaluating the evidentiary sufficiency to support a criminal conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under

this standard, we examine all the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to

the verdict to determine whether any reasonable juror could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 3 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,

61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). It is the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

It is not required that each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the

appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is

sufficient to support the conviction.” Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing

the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.

Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

A person commits an offense if, during a period that is twelve months or less in

duration, the person two or more times engages in conduct that constitutes an offense

under section 25.07 of the Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.072(a). Section

25.07, in turn, makes it an offense for a person to violate the terms of certain protective

orders by communicating with a protected individual in a threatening or harassing

manner, communicating a threat through any person to a protected individual,

communicating with a protected person when the order prohibits such communication, or

going to or near various places described in the order. Id. § 25.07(a)(2), (3).

Rogers was a protected person under the conditions of a bond within the scope of

section 25.07. The order prohibited Appellant from having direct or indirect contact with

Rogers. At trial, Rogers testified that Appellant came to her grandmother’s house on

4 February 2 and talked to her grandmother. Rogers arrived in her grandmother’s entry

hall, made eye contact with Appellant, and was spoken to by Appellant, who restated his

desire to marry her. On another occasion, Rogers saw Appellant in her grandmother’s

entry hall again. Appellant attempted to contact Rogers via Facebook later that day. On

February 4, Appellant was parked in a truck outside Rogers’ home when she came home

from work. As Rogers walked from her vehicle to her camper, while within view of

Appellant, Appellant was yelling that he loved her and wanted to marry her. We conclude

that this evidence supports a finding that Appellant violated the conditions of the bond by

communicating with Rogers when such communication was prohibited. Therefore, we

find that legally sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s conviction. We overrule

Appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the ten-year prison sentence constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment given the facts and circumstances of his case. To preserve

error for appellate review, the complaining party must present a timely and specific

objection to the trial court and obtain a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). When a party fails

to specifically object to an alleged disproportionate or cruel and unusual sentence in the

trial court or in a post-trial motion, the party waives any error for purposes of appellate

review. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc);

Williams v. State, 191 S.W.3d 242, 262 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). Appellant

acknowledges that he raised no complaint regarding his sentence at trial or in any post-

trial motion. We therefore hold that Appellant has failed to preserve this complaint for our

review. See Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005,

pet. ref’d). Moreover, we decline Appellant’s invitation to circumvent the rule requiring

5 preservation of error by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We overrule Appellant’s

second issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.