OPINION
MANSFIELD, Judge.
A Harris County jury convicted appellant, Rick Allan Rhoades, of capital murder.1 At the punishment phase of the trial, the jury unanimously found appellant to be a future danger under Article 37.071 § 2(b),2 and, further, declined to find mitigating circumstances under Article 37.071 § 2(e). The trial court sentenced appellant to death. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant raises eighteen points of error in his brief on appeal. There are no evidentia-ry insufficiency points of error. Hence, we will address his points in chronological order where appropriate.
In point number one, appellant contends the trial court impermissibly restricted his right to intelligent and effective use of peremptory challenges, when it prohibited voir dire discussion of the statutory thirty-five year minimum for individuals sentenced to life imprisonment. The substance of appellant’s argument is that his right to counsel — as guaranteed by Article I, Section 10, of the Texas Constitution — was impinged when the trial court precluded voir dire discussion of the minimum calendar years appellant would have to serve before being eligible to parole were he sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. See Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
We have held that a trial court commits error if it prohibits defense counsel from asking “proper” voir dire questions. Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 990, 112 S.Ct. 1684, 118 L.Ed.2d 399 (1992). A natural corollary to the preceding rule is that a trial court commits no error if it precludes improper voir dire questioning. A “proper” question is one which seeks to discover a veniremember’s views on an issue applicable to the case. Id. When an appellant challenges a trial court’s voir dire limitation, the reviewing court must analyze the claim under an abuse of discretion standard, the focus of [119]*119which is whether the appellant proffered a proper question. Id.
We have held that parole, and the issues surrounding the minimum prison term necessary for parole eligibility, are not matters for jury consideration in a capital murder prosecution. Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995); Broxton v. State 909 S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 521 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Given that juries are not to consider any aspect of parole, a reasonable trial court could find that parole was not an issue applicable to the ease. If parole was not an issue applicable to the case, a reasonable trial court could correctly conclude that parole was not a “proper” area of voir dire inquiry. Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 116 (Tex.Crim. App.1996). Point of error number one is overruled.
In his second point, appellant avers that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was impinged when the trial court precluded him from discussing, with the venire-members, the statutory thirty-five year minimum for individuals convicted of capital minder who are given a life sentence. Appellant simply declares that his right to counsel was violated, and presents no argument or authority for this contention.
It is not sufficient that appellant globally cite the “Sixth Amendment,” and nothing else, in support of his request for reversal. See Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 940 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 997, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). It is incumbent upon counsel to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal argument based upon that authority. Id.; Tex.R.App.Proc. 74(f) and 210(b); Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 515, fn. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). This is especially important where, as in the case at bar, the relevant area of law is not well defined.3 This Court will not make novel legal arguments for appellant. Point of error two is inadequately briefed, and it is, therefore, overruled.
In point three, appellant claims the trial court committed error by providing false and misleading information about parole eligibility, during the jury selection process. We note that, in appellant’s brief, the argument and authority for this point was combined with the argument and authority for points one, two, and four. Hence, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain what information appellant believes the trial court erroneously provided to the veniremembers. Nevertheless, appellant apparently complains of two instances.
First, appellant complains the trial court, in response to a question from a veniremember, informed the veniremember that the decision regarding parole eligibility was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The exchange follows:
THE COURT: Did you have a question?
VENIREMEMBER: Yes. When will they be eligible for parole?
THE COURT: I can’t answer that.
APPELLANT: I ask the court to answer that.
THE COURT: I am not going to answer it. It’s within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the governor of the State of Texas.
PROSECUTOR: Shall I continue?
THE COURT: Please.
Appellant contends that the time for parole eligibility is not within the jurisdiction of the parole board at all. Rather, appellant avers, under the current statutory scheme, parole eligibility is within the jurisdiction of the Legislature. See Article 4.2.18. However, whether the trial court’s response constituted error is not an issue before this Court because appellant failed to object to the statement. We have long held that, for an issue to be preserved on appeal, there must be a timely objection which specifically states the legal basis for that objection. Rezac v. State, [120]*120782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Since, appellant is raising this argument for the first time on appeal, any error is waived.4
As his second basis for error, appellant contends the trial court misled venire-member Adams when it told her that a person sentenced to death was not eligible for parole, while also stating that a defendant sentenced to life in prison was eligible for parole. The relevant voir dire exchange follows:
VENIREMEMBER: ... is he eligible for parole?
THE COURT: Well I think it’s obvious if somebody is assessed the death penalty you don’t get paroled on a death penalty.
VENIREMEMBER: That doesn’t seem to be what is happening, though. Or are we not knowing the full story when we hear things?
THE COURT: You probably don’t know the full story, but you aren’t paroled on a death penalty. I think that is obvious. I don’t think anybody is going to object at this point to my telling you that, which leaves you with the other option, a life sentence.
VENIREMEMBER: And that’s the one that you are eligible for parole at some stage, perhaps?
THE COURT: Yes.
APPELLANT: I would request that you overrule the State’s motion [in limine regarding parole questions] and inform her fully as to the full ramifications of it.
THE COURT: No.
At no time during this exchange did appellant lodge an objection claiming the trial court misled Adams. Rather, appellant simply asked the trial court to overrule the State’s motion in limine. In his brief, appellant now seems to argue that the trial court misled Adams by apprising her of the existence of parole without then informing her of the intricacy of its operation.
We do not have to address the merits of this point because the State exercised a peremptory challenge against veniremember Adams. The alleged error could not have influenced the trial in any conceivable manner. Point of error three is overruled.
In his fourth point, appellant claims that Article 37.071 is unconstitutional if it is interpreted to deny a jury information of the thirty-five year minimum before parole eligibility. Appellant specifically claims that his due process rights protected under both the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution, were violated when the trial court refused to provide the jury with information of the minimum sentence before parole eligibility. See Smith; Broxton; Sonnier, supra.
Appellant also contends, under this point, that his Article I, Section 13 rights guaranteed by the Texas Constitution were violated. As to the latter argument, appellant is presumably referring to the Texas right against cruel or unusual punishment. In any event, appellant does not designate in his brief, and we cannot find in the record, where appellant lodged his Article I, Section 13 objection in the trial court. Without such an objection, any error in this regard has been forfeited. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d at 870.
As to appellant’s federal due process claim, this Court has settled the issue unfavorably to appellant. Broxton, supra. With regard to his Texas due course of law contention, appellant presents no argument or authority as to how the protection offered by the Texas Constitution differs from the protection guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. His claim is, therefore, inadequately briefed and presents nothing for our review. Tex.RApp.Proc. 74(f) and 210(b); Smith v. State, supra, at 847; Ex parte Granger, supra, at 615, fn. 6.
Appellant finally claims, under this point, that his right to equal protection, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated. Appellant specifically claims that capital defendants are treated disparately from non-capital defendants. Appellant’s argu[121]*121ment was rejected in Smith v. State, supra. Point of error four is overruled.
In point eleven, appellant contends that two inconsistent versions of Article 37.071, as enacted by the Texas Legislature, were in effect during the time of appellant’s trial. Appellant argues that the existence of these two versions resulted in a conviction which violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, and his rights under Article I, Sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.
Specifically, appellant complains that two legislative amendments — Senate Bill 880 and House Bill 9 — both effective on September 1, 1991, are conflicting. See Tex. H.B. 9, 72nd Leg., R.S. Ch. 652 and Tex. S.B. 880, 72nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 838. To establish this purported conflict, appellant notes that Senate Bill 880 amended Article 37.071 so as to delete the special punishment issues concerning “deliberateness” and “provocation,” while such a deletion was not reflected in House Bill 9. Appellant argues that there is an “irreconcilable conflict” between the two enactments such that the following rights were violated: First, appellant did not have effective assistance of counsel because he could not know which enactment applied. Second, appellant claims he was unable to effectively prepare and conduct voir dire because of improper statutory uncertainty. Although appellant, in this appeal, presents a “laundry list” of alleged constitutional violations, we will address only the two claims specifically argued in his brief.
Appellant has failed to indicate in his brief, and we cannot find in the record, where he lodged an objection to Article 37.071 in which he claimed “irreconcilable conflict.” These objections were not raised with the trial court; they are raised for the first on appeal. As we held, supra, for an issue to be preserved on appeal, there must be a timely objection which specifically states the legal basis for that objection. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d at 870. Appellant has failed to argue, and we decline to hold in this context, that an untimely objection — under the guise of an “absolute right” or a claim of a “waivable-only right” — is applicable in this case. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).5
Appellant seems to argue — for the first time on appeal — that even without a trial objection, this Court can review the jury charge to determine if there was a defect so egregious that it deprived appellant of a fair trial. Appellant is correct. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). However, there was no error in the Article 37.071 charge because it is plain that there were never two versions of Article 37.071 in existence. If there is no charge error, Almanza has no application.
The Texas Constitution contains a provision which governs the amendment of statutes:
Sec. 36. No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revived, or the section or sections amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.
Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 36.
Hence, to amend a statute, the Legislature must indicate changes by interimeating the modifications onto the text of the statute as the text was prior to amendment. The purpose of this requirement is straightforward:
An amendment which sought to insert words or substitute phrases by reference with no publication could well mislead as to its effect. Such was sometimes the intention. Great confusion was introduced into the law, and to eliminate the uncertainty and confusion, the constitution wisely requires amended statutes to be re-enacted and published so that their meaning may be known without the necessity of examining the statute amended.
Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 36 interp. commentary (Vernon 19811).
House Bill 9 made a single substantive change to Article 37.071. That change was the addition of Section One, in which the [122]*122State might elect to decline pursuit of a death sentence in a capital case. Tex. H.B. 9, 72nd Leg., R.S. Ch. 652, § L To indicate this change, the Legislature was compelled to “re-enact” the entire statute as it was before amendment. Article 37.071 did not yet contain the changes made by Senate Bill 880 because these changes were made during the same legislative session and had not yet taken effect. Hence, House Bill 9 does not contain the changes made by Senate Bill 880.
Senate Bill 880 made more extensive amendments. These changes essentially involved the elimination of the “deliberate” and “provocation” prongs of the jury charge, and the addition of the mitigation finding. To signify these changes, the Legislature was required to “re-enact” the entire statute, as it was before amendment. House Bill 9 was not yet part of Article 37.071.
The Legislature, anticipating appellant’s argument, enacted the following provision in the Code Construction Act:
(b) ... [I]f amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same session of the legislature, one amendment without reference to the other, the amendments shall be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given each.
(e) In determining whether amendments are irreconcilable, text that is reenacted because of the requirements of Article III, Section 36, of the Texas Constitution is not considered to be irreconcilable with additions or omissions in the same text made by another amendment. Unless clearly indicated to the contrary, an amendment that reenacts text in compliance with that constitutional requirement does not indicate legislative intent that the reenacted text prevails over changes in the same text made by another amendment, regardless of the relative dates of the enactment. Tex.Gov’t Code § 311.025(b) and (c).
Upon review of House Bill 9, and Senate Bill 880, we find the two enactments are perfectly reconcilable. Each makes substantive changes the other does not; there is no conflict when one comprehends how statutory amendments are achieved. There being no conflict, appellant’s argument that there were two inconsistent versions of Article 37.071 in effect during his trial is without basis. Point of error eleven is overruled.
In point seventeen, appellant claims the trial court erroneously restricted voir dire questioning regarding factors that particular veniremembers considered mitigating. Appellant simply cites page references where he claims such a restriction occurred and provides no argument or analysis in support.
When a defendant challenges a trial court’s limitation on voir dire questioning on appeal, the reviewing court must analyze the claim under an abuse of discretion standard, the focus of which is whether appellant proffered a proper question. Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 990, 112 S.Ct. 1684, 118 L.Ed.2d 399 (1992). A proper question is one which seeks to discover a veniremember’s views on an issue applicable to the case. Id. at 794. If a proper question is disallowed, harm to appellant is presumed because he has been denied the ability to intelligently exercise his peremptory strikes. Id. However, the trial court may restrict questions in which counsel attempts to commit a veniremember to a particular resolution based upon facts peculiar to the trial. Coleman v. State, 881 S.W.2d 344, 350-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 763, 130 L.Ed.2d 660 (1995).
In appellant’s first contention, he claims an improper voir dire restriction in the following exchange:
APPELLANT: Drug usage, could that ever be mitigating factor to you in the proper situation?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, again I have to object to trying to commit Mr. Tomlinson to exactly what things he would consider mitigating ...
THE COURT: Okay. Let me reiterate. APPELLANT: Can I ask the court to rule on her motion so I could respond?
THE COURT: I am sustaining it as far as committing....
This questioning occurred just after appellant told the veniremember that the law required him to consider drug use to be mitigating. Appellant was not asking whether [123]*123the veniremember could consider drug usage in the punishment portion of the trial; rather, appellant was asking whether the venire-member believed it to be mitigating. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 736 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Indeed, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that appellant was intoxicated when he committed the murders. In this context, the trial court could reasonably find such a question to be an impermissible effort to commit the veniremember to a particular set of facts. Coleman v. State, supra.
Upon review of appellant’s second claimed voir dire restriction, we find the limitation to be within the trial court’s discretion. Appellant asked veniremember Tom-linson whether he thought good conduct in prison to be an aggravating factor or a mitigating factor. Appellant was attempting to elicit, not whether the veniremember could consider good conduct in prison as mitigation, but whether the veniremember would find good conduct in prison to be mitigating. There was evidence presented at trial that appellant was a good prisoner before the killings. A rational trial court could find that such questioning was an improper attempt to bind the veniremember to a particular finding based upon the facts presented at trial. Id.
Our review of appellant’s third claim fails to uncover a voir dire limitation. The following exchange occurred:
APPELLANT: What would be mitigating at the time of punishment? You kind of ruled out bad childhood in a way.
VENIREMEMBER: Oh, no, I mean, there could be a combination of things.
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, I have to object to trying to commit Ms. Jones as to exactly what she would consider as mitigating. As long as she would consider any mitigating evidence.
THE COURT: I understand. I don’t understand the question to be trying to commit her.... So if you just want to talk about in general terms.
The trial court then permitted appellant to continue questioning the veniremember in general terms. There was no voir dire limitation.
Our review of appellant’s fourth claim again indicates that the trial court reasonably restrained appellant’s questioning. Appellant was attempting to commit the venire-member to drug use as a mitigating factor. As we held, supra, given the nature of this case, such a restriction was reasonable. Finally, upon review of appellant’s final contention, we fail to find a voir dire restriction. Although the State objected to appellant’s mitigation question, the trial court did not rule on the objection. Hence, appellant was permitted to ask the question.
The trial court legitimately exercised its discretion when it prevented appellant from asking questions which committed venire-members to particular factual findings which were peculiar to the case on trial. Point of error seventeen is overruled.
In point nine appellant claims the trial court erred when it permitted the State to exercise a peremptory challenge against veniremember Bernieee Holiday, in that the challenge was racially motivated and a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Under Batson, the procedure to determine an equal protection violation has three prongs in the context of racial discrimination: First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge has to prove a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one). If this burden is met, the burden of production falls to the proponent of the strike to tender a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then determine if the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination (step three). See also Purkett v. Elem, — U.S. -,-, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). This court reviews the trial court’s finding, vel non, of purposeful discrimination under a clearly erroneous standard. Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 742, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). When applying the clearly erroneous standard, this Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Vargas [124]*124v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). In making this determination, this Court will review voir dire, the State’s race-neutral explanations, the composition of the jury panel, and appellant’s rebuttal and impeachment evidence. Id.
To make his prima facie case at trial, appellant made several observations to the trial court. First, appellant confirmed that veniremember Holiday was black. Second, appellant noted that Holiday was the first black veniremember to be interviewed from the fourth jury panel. Appellant also noted that Holiday’s answers seemed very State-oriented. Finally, appellant contended that the State used a peremptory strike against Holiday only two minutes into appellant’s voir dire questioning. Appellant claims that the State, by interrupting his voir dire examination to lodge a peremptory strike, changed its pattern of asserting peremptory strikes. These were the only arguments appellant advanced in his effort to demonstrate a pri-ma facie case.
The State contested the legitimacy of appellant’s prima facie case. The trial court, nevertheless, ordered the State to provide its race-neutral reasons for the strike. The State provided several race-neutral reasons: (a) Holiday “dozed off’ during the State’s group voir dire examination; (b) Holiday’s answers were very succinct, in a way which demonstrated a lack of candor; (c) Holiday only answered three of seventeen questions on a particular page of her juror questionnaire; (d) Holiday’s facial expressions led the prosecutor to believe that she was saying what she believed the prosecutor wanted to hear; (e) Holiday was an elementary school teacher and might identify too closely with evidence of appellant’s difficult childhood; (f) Holiday indicated, with a tone of pride, that, while previously serving on a jury, she “set free” the defendant; (g) Holiday had a first cousin who was in prison. In addition, the State noted that over 64 veniremembers had been questioned to that point, and of those 64 this was the first black veniremember the State peremptorily challenged.
The trial court, noting that it too had observed Holiday napping during voir dire, declared the State’s rationale for striking Holiday to be racially neutral. The trial court then overruled appellant’s Batson motion.
The record does not manifest whether the trial court ever determined that appellant met his prima facie burden. In Texas, however, once a party articulates the reasons for a peremptory challenge, and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d at 835.
Upon review of the record, this Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that error was committed. Appellant’s showing of purposeful discrimination was minimal. The State’s race-neutral explanations were not whimsical, Purkett, supra, and the record does not reflect that the State demonstrated a disparate pattern of strikes against any suspect class. Point of error nine is overruled.
In point ten, appellant claims Batson error as to veniremember Gregory Randle. To support his prima facie claim, appellant stated into the record that: (a) Randle was black; (b) the Hams County District Attorney’s Office has had a history of trying to exclude blacks from juries; (c) Randle was observant and intelligent, and considerate of the prosecution; (d) Randle was “protective as to society.” The trial court ordered the State to provide its race-neutral reasons without ruling upon whether appellant properly made a prima facie case.
The State’s explanations were: (a) Randle had a brother in prison, and although Randle had visited him recently, Randle professed that he did not know what crime his brother committed. The prosecutor professed that she was concerned Randle was being disingenuous, and down-playing the effect his relationship with his brother would have on him; (b) Randle vacillated on the kind of evidence he would require to find future danger. Although this vacillation was not legally sufficient to subject Randle to a challenge for cause, he nevertheless occasionally articulated that he would prefer evidence of past violent behavior to find future danger (the [125]*125State had no evidence of past violent behavior); (c) Randle indicated during voir dire that he thought the death penalty was wrong, although he conceded that it might be necessary for some crimes.
Appellant then disputed the State’s interpretation of Randle’s voir dire answers. The judge found the State’s reasons to be race-neutral and overruled appellant’s objection. Given the utter lack of any real evidence that the State purposefully discriminated against Randle in the record, and the relative strength of the State’s explanations, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. Point of error ten is overruled.
In point eighteen, appellant contends the trial court erred when it refused to admit, during punishment, eleven childhood photographs which depicted him as a normal, happy child. Appellant argues that the trial court’s preclusive ruling denied him the opportunity to present relevant, mitigating evidence in his defense. When the trial court asked appellant to demonstrate relevance, he made the following argument:
My point is the State has introduced photographs throughout the dehumanizing stage of their punishment hearing, showing various photographs of him when he was arrested at the time of seventeen, eighteen, throughout, mug shots. To aid the jury to understand the development of the defendant through his various stages of his life, we also have the right to show the human side, of the defendant as much as the State has attempted to dehumanize and turn him into some sort of monster. I think, under Penry and under the mitigation portion stage of the trial, the jury should be entitled to see the defendant grow and what various stages [sic]. Talking about elementary school and how he appeared, et cetera, et cetera. And let them give whatever weight they think is necessary. It’s very material to our lawsuit.
Thus, appellant was trying to “humanize” his client by demonstrating that he was once a normal child.
Within the meaning of Article 37.071, § 2(a), evidence “mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty” if a reasonable juror could conclude that the evidence was a basis for a sentence less than death. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 217 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (plurality opinion). Article 37.071, § 2(f)(4) provides further guidance when it defines mitigating evidence “to be evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness.” As we observed in Alvarado, if a reasonable juror could not conclude that the proffered evidence reduced the defendant’s moral blameworthiness, then a trial court would be within its discretion to exclude the evidence. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d at 217.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never suggested that sentencers be given—in the context of mitigation—“unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses.” Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion). As the Supreme Court observed in Franklin, supra:
We find unavailing petitioner’s reliance on this Court’s statement in Eddings [v. Oklahoma], 455 U.S. [104] at 114 [102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) ], that the sentencing jury may not be precluded from considering “any relevant, mitigating evidence.” This statement leaves unanswered the question: relevant to what? While Lockett [v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) ], supra, answers this question at least in part— making it clear that a State cannot take out of the realm of relevant sentencing considerations the questions of the defendant’s “character,” “record,” or the “circumstances of the offense”—Lockett does not hold that the State has no role in structuring or giving shape to the jury’s consideration of these mitigating factors. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. at 179, 108 S.Ct. at 2330. [citations omitted].
The Franklin plurality recognized a relevance requirement to evidence bearing on the jury’s mitigation determination.
Indeed, Justice O’Connor provides further guidance to the issue of relevancy by [126]*126placing a limit on the categories of evidence which are conceivably mitigating. She provides a prism with which to determine the relevance of proposed mitigating evidence: the culpability of the defendant. As she explained in Franklin, supra, and later in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989):
[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held in society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may he less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. Franklin, supra, 487 U.S. at 184, 108 S.Ct. at 2333. [citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) ] [emphasis added].
To Justice O’Connor, the evidence- is relevant because it relates to the moral culpability of a defendant’s act. By this logic, if evidence has no relation to a defendant’s moral culpability for the charged crime, then it is irrelevant to mitigation.
In our view, photographs of appellant which depict a cheerful early childhood are irrelevant to appellant’s moral blameworthiness for the commission of a violent double-murder because such evidence has no relationship to appellant’s conduct in those murders. That appellant was once a child does not diminish his moral culpability for the act of murder. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to admit these photographs. Point of error eighteen is overruled.
In point five, appellant claims the trial court erred when it admitted evidence, during the punishment phase of the trial, that appellant would be eligible for unaccompanied emergency furlough from prison if he were assessed a life sentence for the offense of capital murder. The State elicited this evidence from Roy Smithy, who was employed by the Huntsville prison:
Q: If an inmate is in prison and behaves himself for a certain period of time, even if he has been convicted of capital murder, and of course, is there on just a life sentence, is there an opportunity for him to get furloughed?
A: If he obtains SAT status, state approved trustee 3 status, then he is eligible for furloughs.
Q: Just exactly what does a furlough mean?
A: You have different types. You have emergency furloughs. You have other — .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, could I have a running objection to all of this?
THE COURT: Just a moment. Approach the bench, please.
(Counsel went to the bench for an off-the-record conference; then the reporter was called to the bench, and the following proceedings were had:)
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, to allow her to go into this stuff and not let me allude to — let the jury know he is going to stay locked up for thirty-five years is a gross miscarriage of justice.
THE COURT: I don’t know where your objection is in there. I understand what your previous objection was. She has been admonished.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to any further questions along this line.
THE COURT: I am going to allow her to complete her line of questioning. That is all I am going to say.
Q: I am not even sure I remember what the last question was.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Talking about furlough.
Q: Thank you. I think I had asked you what is a furlough?
A: A furlough is when an inmate is allowed to leave the prison unit unescorted to attend whatever reason it is that he has requested to leave the unit, things such as funeral, family emergency and things of that sort where he, in essence, signs a piece of paper that says that he is going to be released a certain time and that he will go to wherever this emergency is and that he promises that he will be back and turn himself back into the unit.
Q: Like just for the weekend or something or for a day or so?
[127]*127A: Yes, ma’am. It may not be just a weekend. It could very well be for a three day period in the middle of the week.
Q: Depending on the circumstances?
A: Yes, ma’am.
This discussion encompasses the entire testimony regarding furlough.
We do not have to address the merits of appellant’s contention because he failed to object to the line of questioning with ample specificity to notify the trial court of his contention. See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). This Court has identified the prerequisites to an effective objection respecting the admissibility of evidence. As we held in Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992):
As regards specificity, all a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it. Of course, when it seems from context that a party failed effectively to communicate his desire, then reviewing courts should not hesitate to hold that appellate complaints arising from the event have been lost.
In the instant case, appellant objected only to the trial court's decision to preclude issues of parole eligibility from the trial; appellant did not actually object to the State’s question regarding emergency furlough.
Indeed, the trial court flatly told appellant that it did not comprehend the nature of appellant’s objection. Rather than rephrasing the objection in a way that the trial court could fathom, appellant lodged another nonspecific objection. Appellant failed to effectively communicate his objection. Appellant then declined to rephrase it when the trial court informed him that it did not understand his objection. We therefore hold that appellant’s complaint regarding the State’s questioning is waived for failure to object with specificity. Point of error five is overruled.
In point six, appellant again contends error resulting from the admission of evidence with respect to unescorted emergency furlough. In this point, however, appellant claims the trial court erred when it overruled appellant’s motion for new trial based upon the admission of such evidence. As we held in point five, appellant waived his objection to evidence of unescorted emergency furlough. Appellant, by failing to object correctly, waived his right to complain of the admission of this evidence. Hence, the admission of evidence regarding unescorted emergency furlough could not form the basis of a motion for new trial. Point of error six is overruled.
In point seven, appellant again contends error resulting from the admission of evidence with respect to unescorted emergency furlough. However, in this point, appellant claims the trial court erred when it overruled his requested jury instruction at punishment that the jury not consider the possibility of furlough during deliberations. Appellant is again attempting to avoid the consequence of his procedural default regarding emergency furlough. Appellant failed to object to, or request the court to limit, the jury’s consideration of this evidence. Indeed, appellant also failed to request that the trial court strike the evidence at the time it was offered, waiting until the jury charge was prepared.
The motion to strike is itself subject to a requirement of timeliness. See S. Goode, et al., Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 103.2 at 18 (2nd ed. 1993). For an objection to be “timely”, a party must invoke it as soon as the ground for it becomes manifest. Id. In the case at bar, the basis for a motion to strike became manifest as soon as the State elicited the testimony regarding emergency furlough. Yet, appellant failed to request that the jury be instructed not to consider the evidence when it was elicited. The motion to strike, in the guise of a requested jury instruction, was untimely. The trial court therefore did not err when it overruled appellant’s requested instruction. Point of error seven is overruled.
[128]*128In point eight, appellant avers that the trial court erred when it overruled his requested jury instruction regarding the minimum time served on a life sentence before parole eligibility. At the outset we note, that this Court has considered this argument in prior cases and ruled unfavorably to appellant. Smith; Broxton, supra. Appellant, however, contends that the parole instruction became necessary when evidence respecting unescorted emergency furlough was introduced to the jury:
The trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider testimony regarding the procedures applicable to discretionary prison release. This is the type of evidence which courts have consistently ruled inadmissible and which the legislature would still keep from jury deliberation.
The essence of appellant’s argument is that he should be permitted to notify the jury regarding procedures surrounding discretionary prison release if the State is permitted to do so. However, the jury was authorized to consider evidence of unescorted emergency furlough because appellant failed to object properly to its admission. That the jury could consider emergency furlough does not necessitate that it be informed of the factors surrounding parole eligibility. This is because the jury’s knowledge of whether appellant was eligible for parole in thirty-five years does not serve to rebut the possibility that appellant could be released on emergency furlough within two days of entering prison. The two issues are unrelated. Hence, the trial court did not err when it refused to give a parole instruction. Point of error eight is overruled.
In point thirteen, appellant contends that Article 37.071 is unconstitutional because it fails to place the burden of proof, with respect to mitigation, upon the State. Appellant’s argument follows:
[Article 37.071] limits and inhibits the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Said infirmity results by the statute’s failure to place the burden of proof on the State for the mitigation special issue as mandated by Art. 37.071(e).
In cases where mitigating evidence is presented, all that is constitutionally required is a vehicle by which the jury may give mitigating effect to appellant’s evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, supra; Walton v. State, 497 U.S. 639, 649-50, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3055, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Barnes v. State 876 S.W.2d 316, 330 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 174, 130 L.Ed.2d 110 (1994). No burden of proof exists for either the State or defendant to prove or disprove the mitigation question. Id; Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Point of error thirteen is overruled.
In point fourteen, appellant claims the trial court erred when it refused to give a punishment instruction which accurately placed the burden of proof as to mitigation on the State. As we held in the prior point of error, no burden of proof exists for either the State or defendant to prove or disprove the mitigating question. Barnes v. State, supra.- Hence, the trial court did not err when it overruled appellant’s erroneous request to instruct the jury that the burden of proof was on the State to prove mitigation. Point of error fourteen is overruled.
In point sixteen, appellant contends the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the punishment charge. In his objection, appellant claimed that the charge failed to identify and define which factors presented by the evidence could be considered mitigating. Indeed, appellant bases this contention upon the notion that there are some factors which are mitigating as a matter of law.
■ There is no evidence that must be viewed by a juror as having a definitive mitigating effect, per se. Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 155, 130 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994). As we have previously held: “[Appellant] is not entitled to jury instructions specifically informing the jury that certain evidence may be considered or how it may be applied.” Id. Hence, appellant’s request for an instruction informing the jury that certain evidence was mitigating, [129]*129per se, was properly denied. Point of error sixteen is overruled.
In point fifteen, appellant claims Article 37.071 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it fails to direct or inform the jury regarding the nature of mitigating or aggravating evidence that would call for or against the application of the death penalty. As we held in Robertson, supra:
Each juror may or may not believe certain evidence is mitigating; however, the constitution only requires that where a juror believes there is relevant mitigating evidence, that juror must have a vehicle to give his or her reasoned moral response to such evidence.
Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 712. (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)). The Federal Constitution does not require trial courts to instruct juries regarding how they should consider, or apply what they may or may not deem mitigating evidence. Point of error fifteen is overruled.
In point twelve, appellant claims the trial court erred when it overruled his contention that Article 37.071 was unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. constitution. Appellant specifically asserts that an untrained jury was incapable of predicting whether a defendant might commit future acts of violence which would constitute a continuing threat to society. Appellant, therefore, argues that Article 37.071 fails “to meet the constitutional requirement that the death penalty not be arbitrarily or capriciously rendered.” This Court addressed and rejected appellant’s argument in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 121 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Point of error twelve is overruled.
Having found no reversible error, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.