Sharp v. Bolin

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJanuary 25, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-01549
StatusUnknown

This text of Sharp v. Bolin (Sharp v. Bolin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharp v. Bolin, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 ANTHONY A. SHARP, Case No. 1:21-cv-01549-NONE-SAB

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF TO BE A 13 v. THREE-STRIKE LITIGANT AND REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 14 BOLIN, et al, PAUPERIS STATUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 15 Defendants.

16 17 18 19 20 I. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff Anthony A. Sharp (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding 23 pro se and in forma pauperis (K-41609), initiated this civil rights action in the Northern District of 24 California pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants in their individual and official 25 capacities as employees for the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges 26 he was supposed to receive a Federal Stimulus check of $1,200 but he never received the check, 27 that the check was instead sent to an unknown address with his personal identifying information, 28 and that the IRS Defendants refused to investigate or remedy the situation. (Id.) On October 21, 1 2021, the case was transferred from the Northern District to this Court. (ECF No. 5.) On October 2 22, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 6.) However, for the 3 reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be declared a three-strike litigant 4 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), that Plaintiff’s IFP status be revoked in this matter, and that 5 Plaintiff be required to pay the full filing fee before he is permitted to proceed in this litigation or 6 face dismissal.1 7 II. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 As mentioned, the Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 6.) 10 Nevertheless, IFP status may be revoked at any time, either on motion or sua sponte, if the Court 11 determines that such status should not have been granted. See, e.g., Schwerdtfeger v. Paramo, No. 12 19-cv-2255 JLS (JLB), 2021 WL 1186831, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021) (collecting cases). 13 Indeed, Andrews v. King implicitly allows the Court to sua sponte raise the § 1915(g) problem, so 14 long as the court notifies the prisoner of the earlier dismissals considered to support a revocation 15 of IFP status and provides the prisoner an opportunity to be heard on the matter before dismissing 16 the action. See Andrews v. King (King), 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). This is because IFP 17 status “is not a constitutional right.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999); see 18 also Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Leave to proceed [IFP] is a privilege, 19 not a right[;] courts have the discretion to revoke that privilege when it no longer serves its goals”) 20 (citation omitted). Rather, it may be acquired and lost during the course of litigation. Stehouwer 21 v. Hennessey, 841 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Cal. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds by Olivares 22 v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995). 23 The plain language of the statute, known as the “Three Strikes” provision of the Prison 24 Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), makes clear that a prisoner is precluded from bringing a civil action 25 or an appeal IFP if he has brought three actions or appeals (or any combination thereof totaling 26 three) that were previously dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See

27 1 The Court notes Plaintiff consented to magistrate jurisdiction over this litigation on October 8, 2021. (ECF No. 3.) However, the Court additionally notes that not all parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction because the IRS 28 Defendants have not yet been served or appeared in this matter. 1 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020) (citing § 1915(g)); see also Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 2 at 1178. More specifically, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) states: 3 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 4 incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in the United States that was dismissed on grounds that it was 5 frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 6 physical injury. 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015) (holding a dismissal that 8 is on appeal counts as a strike during the pendency of the appeal); Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1727 (a 9 dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under § 1915(g), regardless of whether the 10 dismissal was with or without prejudice); Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048 11 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing dismissals that count as strikes). 12 To determine whether a dismissal counts as a strike, a reviewing court looks to the 13 dismissing court’s actions and the reasons underlying the dismissal. Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 14 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 15 (the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial). However, a dismissal qualifies 16 as a strike only where the entire action was dismissed for a qualifying reason under the PLRA. 17 Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (in a multi-claim case, all causes of action 18 must be dismissed under the PLRA) (citing Washington, 833 F.3d at 1057); see also Harris v. 19 Harris, 935 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that if one reason supporting a dismissal is not a 20 reason enumerated under § 1915A, then that reason “saves” the dismissal from counting as a strike). 21 If a prisoner has “three strikes” under § 1915(g), he may not proceed without paying the 22 full filing fee unless “the complaint makes a plausible allegation” that the prisoner “faced 23 ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ ” at the time his complaint was filed. Andrews v. 24 Cervantes (Cervantes), 493 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007). In evaluating whether the 25 imminent danger exception applies, the court must construe the prisoner’s “facial allegations” 26 liberally to determine whether the allegations of physical injury are plausible. Williams v. Paramo, 27 775 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2015). However, assertions of imminent danger “may be rejected as 28 overly speculative or fanciful, when they are supported by implausible or untrue allegations.” 1 Cervantes, 493 F.

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Sharp v. Bolin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharp-v-bolin-caed-2022.