Shannon Latimore v. Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office; Kirk Imporati; Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee; Beth Schenella; Prime Care Medical Inc.; Andre-Miller Polanco; John Doe; John Doe #2; Jacqueline Turner-Cenno

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 16, 2026·No. 1:26-cv-04810·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHANNON LATIMORE, Plaintiff, -against- DUTCHESS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; 26-CV-4810 (JGLC) KIRK IMPORATI; DUTCHESS COUNTY JUSTICE AND TRANSITION CENTER; ORDER OF SERVICE THERESA LEE; BETH SCHENELLA; PRIME CARE MEDICAL INC.; ANDRE-MILLER POLANCO; JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE #2; JACQUELINE TURNER-CENNO, Defendants. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that correctional and medical officials at the Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center (“DCJTC”)—that is, the Dutchess County jail—violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office; (2) Kirk Imporati, Dutchess County Sheriff; (3) the DCJTC; (4) Teresa Lee, Superintendent of the DCJTC; (5) Beth Schenella, Deputy Superintendent of the DCJTC; (6) Prime Care Medical Inc., the medical provider at the DCJTC; (6) Andre Miller-Polanco, Health Services Administrator for Prime Care Medical; (7) John Doe, Prime Care Medical CEO; (8) John Doe 2, Prime Care Medical COO; and (9) Jacqueline Turner-Cenno, Director of Nursing at Prime Care Medical. He seeks monetary relief. By order dated June 11, 2026, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) dismisses, for failure to state a claim, all claims against the DCJTC, and construes those claims as being asserted against the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office, which Plaintiff has named as a defendant, and the County of Dutchess, which the Court adds as a defendant under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) dismisses all official-capacity claims against the individual defendants (Imporati, Lee, Schenella, Polanco, Doe # 1, Doe #2, and Turner-Cenno) as redundant of the claims against their respective employers, the County of Dutchess and Prime

Care Medical; (3) dismisses, for failure to state a claim and failure to allege personal involvement, all individual-capacity claims against the individual defendants, with 30 days’ leave to replead; and (4) directs service on the County of Dutchess, the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office, and Prime Care Medical Inc. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION A. Defendant DCJTC Plaintiff sues the DCJTC. Under New York law, however, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency that does not have the capacity to be sued under its municipal charter.” Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 354 (2d Cir. 2024); see Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that in New York, agencies

of a municipality are, generally, not “suable”). The DCJTC does not have a separate legal identity apart from the municipality that created it, and it is thus a non-suable entity. See Rivera v. Dutchess Cnty. Just. & Transition Ctr., No. 25-CV-6312 (PMH), 2026 WL 791902, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026) (holding that DCJTC is a non-suable entity); Gonzalez v. Dutchess Cnty. Just. & Transition Ctr., No. 25-CV-4729 (LLS), 2025 WL 2793705, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2025) (same). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DCJTC for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and his clear intention to sue an administrative arm of the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office and the County of Dutchess, the Court construes his claims against the DCJTC as asserting claims against the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office, which Plaintiff has named as a defendant, and the County of Dutchess. The Clerk of Court is directed to add the County of Dutchess, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as a

defendant. B. Official-capacity claims against the individual defendants Plaintiff sues the individual defendants (Imporati, Lee, Schenella, Polanco, Doe # 1, Doe #2, and Turner-Cenno) in both their official and individual capacities.

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Shannon Latimore v. Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office; Kirk Imporati; Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee; Beth Schenella; Prime Care Medical Inc.; Andre-Miller Polanco; John Doe; John Doe #2; Jacqueline Turner-Cenno, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Shannon Latimore v. Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office; Kirk Imporati; Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee; Beth Schenella; Prime Care Medical Inc.; Andre-Miller Polanco; John Doe; John Doe #2; Jacqueline Turner-Cenno (Shannon Latimore v. Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office; Kirk Imporati; Dutchess County Justice and Transition Center; Theresa Lee; Beth Schenella; Prime Care Medical Inc.; Andre-Miller Polanco; John Doe; John Doe #2; Jacqueline Turner-Cenno) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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