Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc. (In Re Insilco Technologies, Inc.)

330 B.R. 512, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1824, 2005 WL 2371982
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 27, 2005
Docket19-10453
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 330 B.R. 512 (Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc. (In Re Insilco Technologies, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc. (In Re Insilco Technologies, Inc.), 330 B.R. 512, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1824, 2005 WL 2371982 (Del. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION 2

KEVIN J. CAREY, Bankruptcy Judge.

On December 15, 2004, Chad J. Shan-dler, the trustee for the creditors’ trust 3 (the “Liquidating Trustee”) of Insilco Technologies, Inc., et al, (“Insilco” or the “Debtor”) commenced this adversary proceeding by filing a complaint against DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc. n/k/a Credit Suisse First Boston (“DLJMB”) and several other defendants, including affiliates of DLJMB, 4 members of the Insilco Board of Directors, 5 and McDonald Investments, *515 Inc. The Liquidating Trustee filed an amended complaint on February 17, 2005 (the “Amended Complaint”). In this action, the Liquidating Trustee seeks to redress the harm that he alleges the defendants inflicted upon the Debtor and its creditors “by wrongfully exercising their control over the company and taking unfair and harmful actions to advance their own interests, while compromising, prejudicing, and adversely affecting the Debtors’ interests.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 1).

On March 18, 2005, the DLJ-related defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. 6 Other individual defendants also filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint, including David Howe, James Ashton, and Randall Cur-ran. 7 On April 27, 2005, the Liquidating Trustee filed a memorandum of law in opposition to all of the motions to dismiss. Each defendant filed a reply to the Liquidating Trustee’s memorandum of law in opposition to motions to dismiss. 8 Oral argument was heard on the pending motions to dismiss on June 29, 2005.

For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Claims for Relief set forth in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, the Liquidating Trustee shall have until December 1, 2005 to amend the Amended Complaint to provide more detail about the alleged preferential and fraudulent transfers set forth in the First and Second Claims for Relief. Finally, the Seventh Claim for Relief will be dismissed, although the Liquidating Trustee may conduct discovery to determine whether to amend the complaint to bring this claim against any other party.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following facts are alleged by the Liquidating Trustee in the Amended Complaint (the “Amend. Compl.”). DLJ acquired control of Insilco through a merger transaction that closed in August of 1998. 9 (Amend. Compl. ¶45.) Since its acquisition in 1998, DLJMB controlled and dominated Insilco’s ownership and management, in part, by installing its designees as a majority of the Insilco Board of Directors. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 51.) By 1999, four of the seven Insilco Directors were DLJ insiders, including William F. Dawson, Jr., Thompson Dean, John F. Fort, III, and Keith Palumbo. Id. Consequently, DLJMB exercised control and domination over Insilco’s affairs to advance DLJ’s own portfolio strategy for its own benefit. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 46.) Specifically, DLJMB caused Insilco to pursue an aggressive acquisition and divestiture strategy with the goal of preparing Insilco for a successful public offering. (Amend. Compl. ¶48.) As part of this strategy, DLJMB caused Insilco to sell off its publishing business and to pursue strategies *516 to increase Insilco’s technology and automotive businesses by acquiring their market competitors. Id.

Throughout its relationship, DLJMB exercised its control to require and cause Insilco to employ DLJ as Insilco’s financial advisor on multiple proposed and actual transactions. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 57.) In all, Insilco paid $15 million in fees to DLJ between 1998 and 2002. Id.

Furthermore, DLJMB induced Insilco to sell its valuable automotive business to DLJ. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 64-73.) On July 5, 2000, the Board adopted a resolution, which appointed James Ashton to the Board, created a special committee to review, evaluate and negotiate the terms of the proposed sale to DLJ and appointed Mr. Ashton as the sole member of the special committee. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 69.) On July 14, 2000, Mr. Ashton approved the terms of Insilco’s agreement to sell the automotive business to a DLJ venture, ThermaSys, at a sale price of $147 million. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 72.) The purportedly “independent” Mr. Ashton was soon installed as the chairman of the ThermaSys board of directors and, later, as CEO of ThermaSys. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 73.)

On July 14, 2000, MacDonald Investments, Inc. (“MacDonald”) presented the special committee its opinion that DLJMB’s $147 million offer to buy the automotive business was fair. However, MacDonald’s analysis was flawed because it relied on the automotive business’ adjusted Last Twelve Month EBITDA 10 without taking into account productivity improvements and reduced costs. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 74.)

DLJMB also required and caused Insil-co to violate its Credit Agreement. 11 (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 77-79.) DLJMB used its insider status to generate additional fees for DLJ and expose Insilco to three major transactions closing on August 25, 2000, which included the sale of the automotive business to ThermaSys, Insilco’s purchase of PCM, and a major refinancing of Insilco’s credit facility. 12 (Amend. Compl. ¶ 77.)

As of June 30, 2001, Insilco was in violation of the loan covenants under the Credit Agreement. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 84.) At least as early as June 30, 2001, Insilco was insolvent. Id. Furthermore, DLJMB knew that Insilco could not survive in its current form and that bankruptcy was a foregone conclusion. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 85.) Despite this knowledge, DLJMB delayed the filing of a petition, deepening the Debtor’s insolvency. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 86.) DLJMB further delayed the necessary filing of the petition by exercising its dominance over Insilco and refusing to allow the Board to take reasonably prudent actions and manipulating Insilco’s asset sale process and the timing of Insilco’s bankruptcy filing to ensure that DLJ, alone among all of Insilco’s other creditors, *517 would benefit from the remaining assets of Insilco. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 102-104.)

Lastly, the Liquidating Trustee alleges that the Insilco Directors breached their duties of care, loyalty, honesty and good faith by approving actions and strategies designed to advance DLJ’s interests while compromising Insilco’s interests, managing the company in an unfair, unjust and inequitable manner not designed to benefit the company, and failing to avoid and prevent corporate waste and unnecessary expense. (Amend.Compl^ 112.)

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2002, Insilco filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11.

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Bluebook (online)
330 B.R. 512, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1824, 2005 WL 2371982, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shandler-v-dlj-merchant-banking-inc-in-re-insilco-technologies-inc-deb-2005.