Valley Media, Inc. v. Borders, Inc. (In Re Valley Media, Inc.)

288 B.R. 189, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 40 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 188, 2003 WL 42264
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJanuary 7, 2003
Docket17-12695
StatusPublished
Cited by48 cases

This text of 288 B.R. 189 (Valley Media, Inc. v. Borders, Inc. (In Re Valley Media, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valley Media, Inc. v. Borders, Inc. (In Re Valley Media, Inc.), 288 B.R. 189, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 40 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 188, 2003 WL 42264 (Del. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PETER J. WALSH, Bankruptcy Judge.

This opinion relates to the “Motion of Defendant Borders, Inc. to Dismiss in Part Complaint for Turnover Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) and to Avoid Preferential Transfers and to Recover Property Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550” (Doc. # 5) and “Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint” (Doc. # 11). Borders, Inc. (“Defendant”) requests that the Court dismiss Counts VI and VII of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which is made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012. Valley Media, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) seeks leave to amend its complaint as “justice so requires” in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which is made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7015. 1 For the reasons set forth below, I will conditionally grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss and will *191 grant Plaintiffs motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

On November 20, 2001, Plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding on March 19, 2002. In Counts VI and VII of the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that during the ninety day preference period Defendant received preferential payments totaling “not less than $624,627.18.” See Doc. # 1 at ¶ 38. Plaintiff asserts that these payments are avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and recoverable under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) because the payments were used to satisfy antecedent debt.

Defendant filed its answer responding to Counts I through V of the complaint and setting forth certain affirmative defenses. Defendant also filed the present motion seeking dismissal of Counts VI and VII, based on Bankruptcy Rule 7012 and Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that the complaint lacks sufficient factual information to provide Defendant with fair notice and fails to meet Civil Procedure Rule 8’s pleading requirement. 2 See Doc. # 5 at ¶ 2.

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint and an objection to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint provided Defendant with the factual information that was lacking in the original complaint. Plaintiff claims that Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) permits amendment in the instant proceeding because the original complaint placed Defendant on notice and no undue delay, bad faith, futility or undue prejudice exists. See Doc. # 11 at 2. Defendant argues that any amendment to the complaint would be futile and should be disallowed under Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). See Doc. # 18 at 4-5. In support of this contention, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not supplied sufficient factual information to show that Defendant is a creditor with an interest in the property that was transferred, that the transfer satisfied an antecedent debt and how these transfers enabled the Defendant to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See id. at 3.

DISCUSSION

Under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), “[ejvery defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). In Posman v. Bankers Trust Company, Adv. Pro. No. 97-245, Walsh, C.J. (Bankr.D.Del. July 28, 1999), this Court was asked to address an issue identical to the present situation. In Posman, I detailed the necessary elements for pleading a preferential transfer avoidance action. Due to the similarity between the two cases, I will apply the pleading standard enunciated in Posman to Defendant’s present motion to dismiss.

In Posman, Bankers Trust sought dismissal of an avoidance action because Posman’s complaint alleged that “[wjithin the ninety (90) day period pre *192 ceding the Commencement Date, the Debtors made certain payments to [Bankers Trust] totaling $91,763,464.” See id. at 2. In Posman, no further description was offered regarding the alleged preferential transfers. Posman’s response provided additional documentation regarding the transfers and requested that the court deny Bankers Trust’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that Civil Procedure Rule 8 only required “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See id. at 4. Although significant factual detail is not required, the claim must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court also noted that other courts have held that merely quoting statutory language is insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Kubick v. FDIC (In re Kubick), 171 B.R. 658, 660 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) (holding that entry of a default judgment was inappropriate where complaint merely recited statutory language and contained no facts). In Posman, I found that the following information must be included in a complaint to avoid preferential transfers in order to survive a motion to dismiss: (a) an identification of the nature and amount of each antecedent debt and (b) an identification of each alleged preference transfer by (i) date, (ii) name of debtor/transferor, (iii) name of transferee and (iv) the amount of the transfer. See Posman, Adv. Pro. No. 97-245, at 6.

Plaintiff argues that the Posman opinion is inapplicable for two reasons.

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Bluebook (online)
288 B.R. 189, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 40 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 188, 2003 WL 42264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valley-media-inc-v-borders-inc-in-re-valley-media-inc-deb-2003.