OPINION BY
OLSON, J.:
Appellants, Gary J. Shamis and Patricia Shamis, appeal from the order entered on September 19, 2012, granting summary judgment to Geppert Brothers, (“Geppert Brothers”) and dismissing Appellants’ claims against both Geppert Brothers and James Moon c/o Geppert Brothers. The September 19, 2012 order finalized the trial court’s prior, September 6, 2012 orders, wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to Tishman Construction and Mack K. Trucks, Inc.1 We vacate and remand.
On February 25, 2010, Appellants filed a complaint against the named Appellees, sounding in negligence. As Appellants [964] averred, on March 4, 2008, Mr. Shamis was employed by M.L. Jones Construction, Inc. (hereinafter “M.L. Jones”) and was working, as a laborer, at the site of the Pennsylvania Convention Center expansion in Philadelphia (hereinafter “the Project”). Appellants’ Complaint, 2/25/10, at ¶¶ 8 and 10. At the time, the Project was in its demolition phase — M.L. Jones was the demolition subcontractor on the Project and Geppert Brothers was the demolition contractor on the Project. Id, at ¶¶ 8-10. According to Appellants, while Mr. Shamis was working on March 4, 2008, Mr. Shamis was run over by a dump truck that was being operated by Geppert Brothers’ employee James Moon. Id, at ¶ 13-14. The accident caused Mr. Shamis severe and permanent injuries. Id, at ¶¶ 18-23.
As is relevant to the case at bar, Appellants claimed that Mr. Moon and Geppert Brothers were negligent in causing Mr. Shamis’ injuries.2,3 Mr. Moon and Geppert Brothers answered the complaint, denied liability, and discovery commenced.
At the close of discovery, Geppert Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment and claimed that — in accordance with the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act4 — it was immune from civil liability, as it was Mr. Shamis’ “borrowing employer” and Mr. Shamis was its “borrowed employee.”5 Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 1-2. Stated another way, Gep-pert Brothers claimed that it was immune from civil liability because M.L. Jones had loaned Mr. Shamis to Geppert Brothers and Mr. Shamis “passed under [Geppert Brothers’] right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.” Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593, 97 A.2d 59, 61 (1953) (emphasis omitted).
In support of its summary judgment motion, Geppert Brothers essentially relied exclusively upon the oral deposition testimony of its own fact witnesses.6 [965] First, Geppert Brothers cited to the oral deposition testimony of Gary Patrick to “establish” that: Mr. Patrick was employed by Geppert Brothers; Mr. Patrick was the foreman on the Project; M.L. Jones did not have a foreman on the Project; the owner of M.L. Jones “was not on the project often and that no one else from her company was on the [Project] site with any regularity;” “Geppert [Brothers’] laborers were swapped over to M.L. Jones for [the] job and the decisions were made by Geppert [Brothers];” “when the [Project] was finished, all of the laborers and operators furnished to M.L. Jones returned to work for Geppert [Brothers];” if Mr. Shamis had a question about his job, Mr. Patrick would direct Mr. Shamis; and, Geppert Brothers “directed what safety clothing [Mr. Shamis was required to] wear” and controlled the hours that Mr. Shamis was required to work. Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 4-7, citing Deposition of Gary Patrick, 4/19/12, at 21 and 28-28.
Geppert Brothers also attempted to support its summary judgment motion with the oral deposition testimony of M.L. Jones’ employees Francis Bostwick and William Hawthorne. Geppert Brothers claimed that, during their respective depositions, Messrs. Bostwick and Hawthorne “confirmed” that M.L. Jones employees “reported to Gary Patrick of Geppert [Brothers] for their work assignments” and that, “[l]ike all other [M.L.] Jones employees, when the [Project] was finished, [Messrs. Bostwick and Hawthorne] returned to work for Geppert [Brothers].” Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 4, citing Deposition of Francis Bostwick, 4/19/12, at 18-19 and Deposition of William R. Hawthorne, 5/31/12, at 15-16; but see Deposition of Francis Bostwick, 4/19/12, at 17-19 (Mr. Bostwick only testified that he reported to Gary Patrick and that, when the Project ended, he returned to work at Geppert Brothers); Deposition of William R. Hawthorne, 5/31/12, at 12-26 (same).
Obviously, pursuant to Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932), the “[testimonial affidavits [or depositions] of the moving party or [its] witnesses, not documentary, even if uncon-tradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for the entry of summary judgment, since the credibility of the testimony is still a matter for the factfinder.” Penn Ctr. House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (1989) (internal quotations, citations, and corrections omitted). Yet, in their response to Geppert Brothers’ motion for summary judgment, Appellants did not identify any potential Nanty-Glo issue and, thus, did not call the potential issue to the trial court’s attention.
Instead, Appellants responded to Gep-pert Brothers’ summary judgment motion [966] by: 1) “denying” the truth of almost all oral statements that were given by Messrs. Patrick, Bostwick, and Hawthorne and 2) attaching evidence that, Appellants claimed, demonstrated that Mr. Shamis was not a borrowed employee of Geppert Brothers.
With respect to the attached evidence, Appellants first attached documents that were filed with the Commonwealth’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and that pertained to Mr. Shamis’ Workers’ Compensation Act claim. These documents stated that, on the day of the accident: M.L. Jones was Mr. Shamis’ employer; M.L. Jones paid Mr. Shamis’ wages; Mr. Shamis worked full-time for M.L. Jones; and, Mr. Shamis was not “employed by any employer other than” M.L. Jones. See Mr. Shamis’ Workers’ Compensation Act Claim, attached at Exhibit “I” to Appellants’ Response. Moreover, the workers’ compensation documents declared that M.L. Jones hired Mr. Shamis on September 10, 2007, that Mr. Shamis’ workers’ compensation claim triggered M.L. Jones’ workers’ compensation insurance policy, and that Mr. Shamis was being paid workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to M.L. Jones’ insurance policy. Id.
Further, attached to Appellants’ response was the subcontract between Gep-pert Brothers and M.L. Jones. According to Appellants, the subcontract specifically declared that M.L. Jones had both the right and the obligation to supervise the demolition on the Project. In relevant part, the subcontract declares:
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OPINION BY
OLSON, J.:
Appellants, Gary J. Shamis and Patricia Shamis, appeal from the order entered on September 19, 2012, granting summary judgment to Geppert Brothers, (“Geppert Brothers”) and dismissing Appellants’ claims against both Geppert Brothers and James Moon c/o Geppert Brothers. The September 19, 2012 order finalized the trial court’s prior, September 6, 2012 orders, wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to Tishman Construction and Mack K. Trucks, Inc.1 We vacate and remand.
On February 25, 2010, Appellants filed a complaint against the named Appellees, sounding in negligence. As Appellants [964] averred, on March 4, 2008, Mr. Shamis was employed by M.L. Jones Construction, Inc. (hereinafter “M.L. Jones”) and was working, as a laborer, at the site of the Pennsylvania Convention Center expansion in Philadelphia (hereinafter “the Project”). Appellants’ Complaint, 2/25/10, at ¶¶ 8 and 10. At the time, the Project was in its demolition phase — M.L. Jones was the demolition subcontractor on the Project and Geppert Brothers was the demolition contractor on the Project. Id, at ¶¶ 8-10. According to Appellants, while Mr. Shamis was working on March 4, 2008, Mr. Shamis was run over by a dump truck that was being operated by Geppert Brothers’ employee James Moon. Id, at ¶ 13-14. The accident caused Mr. Shamis severe and permanent injuries. Id, at ¶¶ 18-23.
As is relevant to the case at bar, Appellants claimed that Mr. Moon and Geppert Brothers were negligent in causing Mr. Shamis’ injuries.2,3 Mr. Moon and Geppert Brothers answered the complaint, denied liability, and discovery commenced.
At the close of discovery, Geppert Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment and claimed that — in accordance with the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act4 — it was immune from civil liability, as it was Mr. Shamis’ “borrowing employer” and Mr. Shamis was its “borrowed employee.”5 Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 1-2. Stated another way, Gep-pert Brothers claimed that it was immune from civil liability because M.L. Jones had loaned Mr. Shamis to Geppert Brothers and Mr. Shamis “passed under [Geppert Brothers’] right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.” Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593, 97 A.2d 59, 61 (1953) (emphasis omitted).
In support of its summary judgment motion, Geppert Brothers essentially relied exclusively upon the oral deposition testimony of its own fact witnesses.6 [965] First, Geppert Brothers cited to the oral deposition testimony of Gary Patrick to “establish” that: Mr. Patrick was employed by Geppert Brothers; Mr. Patrick was the foreman on the Project; M.L. Jones did not have a foreman on the Project; the owner of M.L. Jones “was not on the project often and that no one else from her company was on the [Project] site with any regularity;” “Geppert [Brothers’] laborers were swapped over to M.L. Jones for [the] job and the decisions were made by Geppert [Brothers];” “when the [Project] was finished, all of the laborers and operators furnished to M.L. Jones returned to work for Geppert [Brothers];” if Mr. Shamis had a question about his job, Mr. Patrick would direct Mr. Shamis; and, Geppert Brothers “directed what safety clothing [Mr. Shamis was required to] wear” and controlled the hours that Mr. Shamis was required to work. Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 4-7, citing Deposition of Gary Patrick, 4/19/12, at 21 and 28-28.
Geppert Brothers also attempted to support its summary judgment motion with the oral deposition testimony of M.L. Jones’ employees Francis Bostwick and William Hawthorne. Geppert Brothers claimed that, during their respective depositions, Messrs. Bostwick and Hawthorne “confirmed” that M.L. Jones employees “reported to Gary Patrick of Geppert [Brothers] for their work assignments” and that, “[l]ike all other [M.L.] Jones employees, when the [Project] was finished, [Messrs. Bostwick and Hawthorne] returned to work for Geppert [Brothers].” Geppert Brothers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/12, at 4, citing Deposition of Francis Bostwick, 4/19/12, at 18-19 and Deposition of William R. Hawthorne, 5/31/12, at 15-16; but see Deposition of Francis Bostwick, 4/19/12, at 17-19 (Mr. Bostwick only testified that he reported to Gary Patrick and that, when the Project ended, he returned to work at Geppert Brothers); Deposition of William R. Hawthorne, 5/31/12, at 12-26 (same).
Obviously, pursuant to Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932), the “[testimonial affidavits [or depositions] of the moving party or [its] witnesses, not documentary, even if uncon-tradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for the entry of summary judgment, since the credibility of the testimony is still a matter for the factfinder.” Penn Ctr. House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (1989) (internal quotations, citations, and corrections omitted). Yet, in their response to Geppert Brothers’ motion for summary judgment, Appellants did not identify any potential Nanty-Glo issue and, thus, did not call the potential issue to the trial court’s attention.
Instead, Appellants responded to Gep-pert Brothers’ summary judgment motion [966] by: 1) “denying” the truth of almost all oral statements that were given by Messrs. Patrick, Bostwick, and Hawthorne and 2) attaching evidence that, Appellants claimed, demonstrated that Mr. Shamis was not a borrowed employee of Geppert Brothers.
With respect to the attached evidence, Appellants first attached documents that were filed with the Commonwealth’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and that pertained to Mr. Shamis’ Workers’ Compensation Act claim. These documents stated that, on the day of the accident: M.L. Jones was Mr. Shamis’ employer; M.L. Jones paid Mr. Shamis’ wages; Mr. Shamis worked full-time for M.L. Jones; and, Mr. Shamis was not “employed by any employer other than” M.L. Jones. See Mr. Shamis’ Workers’ Compensation Act Claim, attached at Exhibit “I” to Appellants’ Response. Moreover, the workers’ compensation documents declared that M.L. Jones hired Mr. Shamis on September 10, 2007, that Mr. Shamis’ workers’ compensation claim triggered M.L. Jones’ workers’ compensation insurance policy, and that Mr. Shamis was being paid workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to M.L. Jones’ insurance policy. Id.
Further, attached to Appellants’ response was the subcontract between Gep-pert Brothers and M.L. Jones. According to Appellants, the subcontract specifically declared that M.L. Jones had both the right and the obligation to supervise the demolition on the Project. In relevant part, the subcontract declares:
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BETWEEN GEPPERT BROS., INC. AND M.L. JONES CONSTRUCTION, CO. FOR DEMOLITION AND SITE CLEARING FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION CENTER EXPANSION PROJECT
DEMOLITION CONTRACT NO. 1 THIS CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT MADE THIS 18TH DAY OF JULY IN THE YEAR TWO THOUSAND AND SEVEN
BETWEEN THE CONTRACTOR GEPPERT BROS., INC.
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AND THE SUBCONTRACTOR [M.L. JONES]
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ARTICLE 1 THE WORK
1.1 The Subcontractor shall furnish all supervision and labor, supply and install all materials, tools, equipment, scaffolding, hoisting, transportation, unloading, handling, and all safety requirements and safety inspections necessary to perform and complete all work required for demolition, environmental remediation and site clearing for the [Project] ...
1.1.1 ... The Subcontractor shall cause the responsible parties to use reasonable efforts to permit a minimum amount of noise and construction hazards that would cause discomfort or danger to occupants of adjoining properties and pedestrians and others in the area surrounding the site. Nothing contained in this agreement shall be deemed to give any third party any claim or right of action against Geppert [Brothers] ... that does not otherwise exist without regard to this agreement, except for any rights granted to Geppert [Brothers] that are expressly set forth in this agreement. The Subcontractor shall be responsible for injury or damage caused to all persons or property. The Subcontractor shall comply with and cause the responsible parties to comply with the requirements of companies providing property insurance with respect to the site.
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[967] ARTICLE 4 THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
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4.2 The Subcontractor agrees to perform the work under the general direction of Geppert [Brothers] and subject to the final approval of Geppert [Brothers], the Archited/Engineer or other specified representative of the Owner, in accordance with the contract documents.
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ARTICLE 9 SUBCONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITIES
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9.14 The Subcontractor agrees to employ competent administrative, supervisory and field personnel to accomplish the work, including layout and engineering and preparation and checking of shop drawings ...
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ARTICLE 11 MISCELLANEOUS
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11.2 It is understood and agreed that the Subcontractor is a third party contractor and is not a servant, agent or employee of Geppert [Brothers] ...
Construction Contract Between Geppert Brothers and M.L. Jones, 7/18/07, at 1-9 (bolding and some internal capitalization omitted).
As Appellants noted, in Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593, 97 A.2d 59 (1953), our Supreme Court held that, under the borrowed servant doctrine:
The crucial test in determining whether a servant furnished by one person to another becomes the employe of the person to whom he is loaned is whether he passes under the latter’s right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.
A servant is the employe of the person who has the right of controlling the manner of his performance of the work, irrespective of whether he exercises that control or not.
Mature, 97 A.2d at 60 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also Wilkinson v. K-Mart, 412 Pa.Super. 434, 603 A.2d 659 (1992) (same); Appellants’ Memorandum in Support of its Response, 8/1/12, at 8.
In following, Appellants claimed that— since the subcontract provided M.L. Jones with the right to supervise the Project— there was a factual issue as to whether M.L. Jones also possessed the right to control Mr. Shamis’ work. Appellants’ Response, 8/1/12, at ¶¶ 27-29.
Finally, Appellants cited to deposition testimony, which, Appellants claimed, demonstrated that Mr. Shamis “was an experienced laborer who had worked on many demolition projects prior to his work at the Project. [Mr. Shamis] was, for this reason and for the most part, left to his own devices and experience in performing, his work on the Project on a daily basis.” Appellants’ Memorandum in Support of Response, 8/1/12, at 10. In support of this declaration, Appellants cited to the deposition testimony of Gary Patrick, wherein Mr. Patrick specifically testified that Mr. Shamis did not need to have “somebody ... direct him every day.” See Deposition of Gary Patrick, 4/19/12, at 26.
As such, and even though Appellants admitted that Mr. Shamis’ actual supervisor was from Geppert Brothers, Appellants claimed that the trial court must deny Geppert Brothers’ motion for summary judgment. See Appellants’ Response, 8/1/12, at ¶ 29 (“[i]t is admitted that [Mr.] Shamis’ supervisor was from Geppert [Brothers]; however, [Mr.] Shamis’ supervisor did not control the [968] manner in which [Mr.] Shamis performed his work”) (emphasis added).
On September 6, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting Geppert Brothers’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Appellants’ claims against the company.7 Trial Court Order, 9/6/12, at 1. Upon entry of this order, the only remaining defendant in the case was James Moon — and Mr. Moon had not filed a motion for summary judgment. As Appellants explain, they, Geppert Brothers, and Mr. Moon then approached the trial court and requested the trial court to enter a “substitute” order, wherein the trial court would simply dismiss Appellants’ claims against Mr. Moon. Appellants’ Brief at 6. The trial court acceded and, on September 19, 2012, the trial court entered an order declaring:
AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2012, upon consideration of Geppert Brothers, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and any response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Motion is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED and DECREED that [Appellants’] Complaint is dismissed with prejudice against Gep-pert Brothers, Inc. as well as against James Moon by operation of law.