Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County

677 F. Supp. 933, 1987 WL 24578
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 16, 1987
Docket69 C 2145
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 677 F. Supp. 933 (Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 677 F. Supp. 933, 1987 WL 24578 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

Opinion

677 F.Supp. 933 (1987)

Michael SHAKMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 69 C 2145.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

December 16, 1987.

*934 D. Maria Majeske, Janice S. Loughlin, Steven R. Gilford, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Judson H. Miner, Acting Corp. Counsel, City of Chicago by Jonathan P. Siner, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant City of Chicago.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County by Randolph T. Kemmer, Asst. State's Atty., Greg A. Kinczewski, Chief Atty., Cook County Forest Preserve Dist., Chicago, Ill., for Cook County defendants.

ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

Before this court is plaintiffs' motion to establish an adjustment factor for attorneys' fees. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTS

This is a class action brought under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, challenging the patronage practices of the regular Democratic and Republican Party organizations in most of the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs are independent candidates, voters and taxpayers. The defendants include various government officers at the state and local levels, local government entities, and local organizations and officials of the two major political parties. Plaintiffs' principal theory is that the use of state and local government patronage power to coerce political support for the regular Party organizations and their candidates by the use of political hiring, firing and promotion practices violates independents' rights to fair and equal participation in the electoral process.

This case has a long history in this court. A 1969 dismissal of this action by Judge Marovitz on the ground of lack of standing was reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.1970) ("Shakman I"). Following that reversal, plaintiffs entered into a consent decree with many of the Democratic and Republican defendants. In 1979, this court found that all defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional and civil rights to a free political and electoral process. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F.Supp. 1315, 1342 (N.D.Ill.1979) ("Shakman II"). Recently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the political hiring portion of Shakman II deciding plaintiffs' asserted injuries lacked sufficient proximity to defendants' conduct to afford standing. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F.Supp. 1315 (N.D.Ill.1979), rev'd in part 829 F.2d 1387, 1396-99 (7th Cir.1987) ("Shakman III"). The Seventh Circuit's most recent pronouncement in Shakman III, however, affected only a small number of defendants as a vast majority declined to appeal the 1979 order.[1]

This court's last order concerning this case dealt with plaintiffs' motions to calculate costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to *935 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Although arriving at a base amount or "lodestar" of $883,504.75 for attorneys' fees, this court specifically reserved ruling on what multiplier, if any, should be applied to compute reasonable attorneys' fees for the hours expended during pendency of this case. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 634 F.Supp. 895, 905 (N.D.Ill.1986) ("Shakman IV"). Plaintiffs now motion this court for determination of the multiplier issue.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs claim that the nature of this case and the results achieved are so extraordinary that an upward adjustment of the lodestar is appropriate and necessary to arrive at a reasonable attorneys' fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the "Awards Act"). According to plaintiffs, a multiplier is necessary to compensate counsel for delay in payment, exceptional efficiency, lost opportunities, successful results, and risk of nonpayment.[2]

Defendants argue, however, that any adjustment to the lodestar for the reasons stated by plaintiffs is impermissible in light of this court's earlier order in Shakman IV and the Supreme Court's rulings in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) ("Delaware Valley I"), and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987) ("Delaware Valley II"). Defendants first argue that this court has already compensated plaintiffs for delay in payment by choosing to compute the lodestar based on the current hourly rate charged by plaintiffs' counsel. See Shakman IV, 634 F.Supp. at 902-03. Defendants also take the position that Delaware Valley I effectively precludes any adjustment for the factors of exceptional efficiency, successful results and lost opportunities, as these factors are presumably addressed when the lodestar is computed by multiplying hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 3098-3099. Finally, defendants assert that the clear import of Delaware Valley II is that adjustments for risk of loss are no longer permissible.[3]Delaware Valley II, 478 U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 3087. Because of the impact which the Supreme Court's rulings in Delaware Valley I and II have on the issue before this court, a detailed review of Delaware Valley I and II will be undertaken before proceeding to the arguments presented by the parties.

A. Delaware Valley I

The Delaware Valley litigation arose in the context of an action asserted by a citizens' council and others against the Commonwealth *936 of Pennsylvania to compel compliance with a vehicle emission inspection and maintenance program mandated by provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. After prevailing on the merits in the district court, the citizens' council petitioned for an award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act which provides that a court "may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d).

Granting the request for fees, the district court first segregated the attorney's work on the case into nine distinct phases and then scrutinized the number of hours claimed by each attorney. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v.

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Bluebook (online)
677 F. Supp. 933, 1987 WL 24578, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shakman-v-democratic-organization-of-cook-county-ilnd-1987.