Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary

Idaho Supreme Court

Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary

291 P.2d 870, 77 Idaho 292, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 351

CourtIdaho Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 20, 1955

Docket8295

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 291 P.2d 870 (Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 291 P.2d 870, 77 Idaho 292, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 351 (Idaho 1955).

Pincite

Opinions

PORTER, Justice.

On September 24, 1950, appellant was incarcerated in the State Penitentiary under sentence for a felony, the sentence being “for a term of not more than five years at hard labor.” On May 21, 1952, appellant, while working in the license plate factory at the penitentiary, suffered a severe personal injury by accidental means. The accident was caused by a faulty and [293]*293defective embosser press. Appellant duly filed his claim with the Industrial Accident Board for workmen’s compensation. The board entered its order denying compensation and appellant has appealed to this court from such order. The controlling issue in this case is whether or not claimant was an employee within the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

At the time of his injury, appellant was engaged in a prison work project authorized by the State Board of Correction under the provisions of Section 20-245, I.C., which section reads in part as follows :

“The state board of correction shall have the authority to use, under such rules and regulations as they may prescribe, the labor of convicts either within or without the walls of the penitentiary and on all public works done under the direct control of the state; He He ”

In the comparatively recent case of Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 137, 212 P.2d 654, we had before us a situation analogous to the present one. An inmate of the city jail of the City of Boise was performing labor in moving city furniture under the supervision of a city patrolman. He was injured while being transported to a cafe to eat. His claim for workmen’s compensation was allowed by the Industrial Accident Board but was denied by this court on the ground that he was not an employee of the city. In our opinion we said, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 655:

“Furthermore, the above facts conclusively show Miller was not employed by the city of Boise, and, moreover, that he never received any compensation whatever from, nor was he ever paid any compensation by, Boise City. Hence, the relationship of employer and employee never existed between respondent and appellant.”

The conclusion reached in the Miller case that a convicted prisoner in performing labor required by law is not an employee under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is supported by the following cases: Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okl. 167, 21 P.2d 754; Greene’s Case, 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E. 857; Lawson v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 37 Ga.App. 85, 139 S.E. 96.

Appellant cites the case of California Highway Comm. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 200 Cal. 44, 251 P. 808, 49 A.L.R. 1377, in support of his contention. An examination of the opinion in such case discloses that it was decided under a special statute providing that the State Highway Commission might employ convicts and that such convicts should receive stipulated wages for their labor. The opinion concedes that absent such a statute, convicts would not be entitled to workmen’s compensation.

Appellant makes the suggestion that as compensation for his labor appellant received certain privileges as a pris[294]*294oner and that his work record would be considered on his application for parole. These rewards to the prisoner are a matter of grace and are at the discretion of the Board of Correction. They are not wages paid by the state to the prisoner giving rise to the relationship of employer and employee. The opinion in California Highway Comm. v. Industrial Accident Comm., supra, discusses this point and arrives at a conclusion contrary to the contention of appellant.

We are of the opinion that at the time of the accident appellant was not working under any contract of hire either express or implied hut was performing labor required of him by law; and that he was not an employee entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The order of the Industrial Accident Board denying compensation is affirmed.

TAYLOR, C. J., and KEETON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PORTER, Justice.

On September 24, 1950, appellant was incarcerated in the State Penitentiary under sentence for a felony, the sentence being “for a term of not more than five years at hard labor.” On May 21, 1952, appellant, while working in the license plate factory at the penitentiary, suffered a severe personal injury by accidental means. The accident was caused by a faulty and [293]*293defective embosser press. Appellant duly filed his claim with the Industrial Accident Board for workmen’s compensation. The board entered its order denying compensation and appellant has appealed to this court from such order. The controlling issue in this case is whether or not claimant was an employee within the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

At the time of his injury, appellant was engaged in a prison work project authorized by the State Board of Correction under the provisions of Section 20-245, I.C., which section reads in part as follows :

“The state board of correction shall have the authority to use, under such rules and regulations as they may prescribe, the labor of convicts either within or without the walls of the penitentiary and on all public works done under the direct control of the state; He He ”

In the comparatively recent case of Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 137, 212 P.2d 654, we had before us a situation analogous to the present one. An inmate of the city jail of the City of Boise was performing labor in moving city furniture under the supervision of a city patrolman. He was injured while being transported to a cafe to eat. His claim for workmen’s compensation was allowed by the Industrial Accident Board but was denied by this court on the ground that he was not an employee of the city. In our opinion we said, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 655:

“Furthermore, the above facts conclusively show Miller was not employed by the city of Boise, and, moreover, that he never received any compensation whatever from, nor was he ever paid any compensation by, Boise City. Hence, the relationship of employer and employee never existed between respondent and appellant.”

The conclusion reached in the Miller case that a convicted prisoner in performing labor required by law is not an employee under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is supported by the following cases: Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okl. 167, 21 P.2d 754; Greene’s Case, 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E. 857; Lawson v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 37 Ga.App. 85, 139 S.E. 96.

Appellant cites the case of California Highway Comm. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 200 Cal. 44, 251 P. 808, 49 A.L.R. 1377, in support of his contention. An examination of the opinion in such case discloses that it was decided under a special statute providing that the State Highway Commission might employ convicts and that such convicts should receive stipulated wages for their labor. The opinion concedes that absent such a statute, convicts would not be entitled to workmen’s compensation.

Appellant makes the suggestion that as compensation for his labor appellant received certain privileges as a pris[294]*294oner and that his work record would be considered on his application for parole. These rewards to the prisoner are a matter of grace and are at the discretion of the Board of Correction. They are not wages paid by the state to the prisoner giving rise to the relationship of employer and employee. The opinion in California Highway Comm. v. Industrial Accident Comm., supra, discusses this point and arrives at a conclusion contrary to the contention of appellant.

We are of the opinion that at the time of the accident appellant was not working under any contract of hire either express or implied hut was performing labor required of him by law; and that he was not an employee entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The order of the Industrial Accident Board denying compensation is affirmed.

TAYLOR, C. J., and KEETON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

291 P.2d 870, 77 Idaho 292, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shain-v-idaho-state-penitentiary-idaho-1955.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack