UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RIFAT SHAFIQUE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 24-3254 (TJK)
UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case “is yet another iteration” of Rifat Shafique’s “wrongful eviction claim arising
from [her] landlord-tenant matter in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia that has been
litigated, more than once, across five different local and federal courts.” Shafique v. United States
Marshals Serv., 24-cv-03041 (UNA), 2024 WL 5401587, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2024), dismissed,
No. 25-5026, 2025 WL 2299443 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2025) (citation modified).1 Here, Shafique
sued the U.S. Marshals Service in Superior Court, claiming that the agency unlawfully evicted her
without a valid writ. The Marshals Service removed the case and now moves to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court agrees it lacks jurisdiction,
and so it will grant the motion and dismiss the case.
1 See, e.g., Shafique v. Equity Residential Mgmt. LLC, 24-cv-1253 (UNA), 2024 WL 3566206, at *1 (D.D.C. July 24, 2024), aff’d sub nom., Shafique v. Equity Residential Real Est. Inv. Tr., No. 24-7129, 2025 WL 2911212 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2025); Shafique v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apts., 24-cv-3107 (UNA), (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2024), dismissed, No. 25-7014 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2025); Shafique v. Equity Residential Real Est. Inv. Tr., 24-cv-00380 (UNA), 2024 WL 1989113, at *1 (D.D.C. May 1, 2024), motion for relief from judgment denied, 24-cv-00380 (UNA), 2024 WL 4534185 (D.D.C. July 29, 2024). I. Background
Shafique alleges that the Marshals Service evicted from her apartment in March 2023. ECF
No. 1-1 at 9–10. She characterizes her suit as a “tort action” for “illegal policing,” “wrongful
detainer,” and “unlawful eviction” because, she alleges, the Marshals Service did not possess a
lawful writ. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 11–12. She asserts that the Marshals Service acted in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, several civil rights statutes, as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil
Procedure. See id. at 15, 22, 26. She seeks millions in damages, a declaration of her right to the
repossessed apartment, and the return of the apartment and all property that was seized. See id. at
13.
In October 2024, Shafique sued, and the next month, the Marshals Service removed the
case. See ECF No. 1. The Marshals Service now moves to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction and that the complaint fails to state a claim. See ECF No. 35.
II. Legal Standard
“Federal [district] courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Under Rule
12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden to establish the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Daim-
lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006). In evaluating such a motion, the Court must
“assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and . . . grant[] [the] plaintiff
the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,
642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “However, those factual allegations receive closer scrutiny
than they do in the Rule 12(b)(6) context,” and the Court “may look to documents outside of the
complaint in order to evaluate whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain a claim.” Doe v.
WMATA, 453 F. Supp. 3d 354, 361 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation modified).
2 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when she pleads “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded
factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Sissel v. HHS, 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not
enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Because Shafique proceeds pro se, the Court construes her filings liberally. See Bowman
v. Iddon, 848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). That means, among other things,
considering factual allegations from all her filings, not just her complaint. Brown v. Whole Foods
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 151–52 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But none of that absolves her of the need
to plead facts that plausibly establish subject-matter jurisdiction and a claim for relief. See Bick-
ford v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011).
III. Analysis
The Court must dismiss Shafique’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because she
has not shown that the Marshals Service has waived sovereign immunity for any of her claims.
A. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over All Claims Clearly Al- leged in the Complaint Because Sovereign Immunity Bars Them
A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
which “bars lawsuits against the United States, its agencies[,] and its employees sued in their offi-
cial capacities, absent an unambiguous waiver by the federal government.” Boling v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, No. 17-5285, 2018 WL 6721354 (D.C. Cir.
3 Dec. 19, 2018). In such suits, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity. Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 123 (D.D.C. 2016). Such
a waiver “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, . . . will not be implied, . . . [and] will
be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,
192 (1996) (citations omitted). “As a component of a federal agency—the United States Depart-
ment of Justice—[the United States Marshals Service] enjoys sovereign immunity.” Williams v.
Washington D.C. Eviction Marshals, 15-cv-1801 (KBJ), 2016 WL 6082019, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct.
17, 2016) (Jackson, J.). Shafique purports to sue under the Fourth Amendment, the Civil Rights
Act of 1871—codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–86—the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. But she has not shown a waiver of the Marshals Service’s sovereign
immunity with respect to any claim brought on those grounds.
With respect to Shafique’s constitutional tort claim, the United States “has not rendered
itself liable” for such claims for damages, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994), including
those brought under the Fourth Amendment, see Jones v. NIH Police Dep’t, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2005). Nor has it waived sovereign immunity for claims under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1983, 1985–1986. See Jarvis v. Kijakazi, No. 22-5279, 2023 WL
2815967, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023). And in any case, those statutes “do not apply to actions
against the United States” or federal agencies, see Jarvis v. DeJoy, 23-cv-01970 (UNA), 2023 WL
4824736, at *1 (D.D.C. July 27, 2023) (citation omitted), aff’d, No. 23-5182, 2023 WL 8177118
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2023). Of course, Shafique’s passing references to several Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Evidence fare no better. None waive the Marshals Service’s sovereign im-
munity or even provide a cause of action. Cf. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 370 (1978) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or with-
draw federal jurisdiction.”); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 76–77 (2011) (“The Federal
4 Rules of Evidence do not create an enforceable right for money damages against the United
States.”).2
Indeed, Shafique all but concedes that sovereign immunity operates as described above,
see ECF No. 39 at 2 (“Plaintiff does not dispute whether the United States waives [s]overeign
immunity.”), but insists these claims can still proceed because she “has complied with the com-
mon-law requirement to move forward with litigation” and “has a private cause of action against
individual culpable entities.” Id. Not so. While “there is no sovereign immunity bar” to “dam-
ages” claims against a “defendant [sued] in his personal, individual capacity,” Clark v. Libr. of
Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984), Shafique sues only the Marshals Service—a federal
agency—not any individual in a personal capacity.
Sovereign immunity also bars any claim for relief other than money damages that Shafique
alleges. True, sovereign immunity generally does not bar prospective injunctive or other equitable
relief in suits against federal officers. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 104 (1984) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)). But to repeat, Shafique does
not sue any federal officer, but a federal agency. Nor, for that matter, does Shafique seek equitable
relief. Rather, apart from damages, she seeks a declaration of her right to the repossessed apart-
ment, as well as return of the apartment and all her belongings seized. See ECF No. 1-1 at 13, 16.
The latter two claims are those for ejectment (the assertion of a right to real property) and replevin
(the assertion of a right to personal property)—and both are actions at law redressable by legal
2 Shafique also purports to sue under the District of Columbia Housing Code. See ECF No. 1-1 at 13 (citing D.C. Code § 36-403(b)); ECF No. 10-1 at 5 (citing D.C. Code § 41-3404.02). But, as those statutes “w[ere] enacted by the D.C. City Council, and not the United States Con- gress,” they “cannot waive federal sovereign immunity.” Jarvis v. Kijakazi, 21-cv-1523 (DLF), 2022 WL 4464985, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2022) (quoting Jordan v. Evans, 404 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2005)).
5 remedies. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 280 (1884) (“[A]n action of replevin” is “[t]he
only legal remedy . . . adequate for the purpose of protecting and preserving [a] right to the pos-
session of . . . property”) (emphasis added); Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. 481, 483 (1858) (“[A]n action
of ejectment” is “an attempt to assert at law, and by a legal remedy, a right to real property” and
“possession of land”) (emphasis added).3
For these reasons, Shafique has not shown that the Marshals Service has waived sovereign
immunity for any of the claims she asserts in her complaint. So the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over them, and they must be dismissed.
B. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Any Claim Under the Fed- eral Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) “is the sole avenue by which [a plaintiff] may seek
money damages from ‘the United States . . . for injury or loss of property or personal injury . . .
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
3 The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Shafique’s ejectment and replevin claims for another reason: she lacks standing to bring them. She does not allege that the Marshals Service has control over the disputed apartment or her personal belongings. Nor is there any reason to suspect it does. District of Columbia law provides that “[a]t the time of eviction, the housing provider shall . . . take legal possession of the rental unit,” D.C. Code § 42-3505.01a(c)(1), and that, in general, any property not retrieved by an evicted tenant shall be deemed “abandoned prop- erty,” id. § 42-3505.01a(d)(5)(A), which “the housing provider shall dispose of . . . in any manner not prohibited . . . by law,” id. § 42-3505.01a(d)(5)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, following Shafique’s eviction, possession of her apartment and any property inside reverted by law to her landlord, not the Marshals Service. That matters because Shafique has only sued the Marshals Service here. And if “the government does not possess the property claimed[,] the Court would lack power to order its return or fashion other relief.” Ford-Bey v. United States, 19-cv-2039 (BAH), 2020 WL 32991, at *13 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-5053, 2021 WL 2525374 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2021). In other words, even if Shafique obtained “a favorable decision” in this action against the Marshals Service, the Court would lack the power to order the return of the apartment and her belongings. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citation modified). For that reason, she lacks standing to seek that relief. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021) (“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.”) (emphasis added).
6 acting within the scope of his office or employment.’” Lyles v. Hughes, 83 F. Supp. 3d 315, 322
(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d in part, No. 15-5106, 2015 WL 9007382 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Although Shafique does not explicitly bring a claim under the FTCA,
construing the complaint liberally, any such claim she alleges fails for lack of subject-matter ju-
risdiction as well, for several reasons.
First, “[a]n FTCA claim may only be brought against the United States itself, not against
its components or officers” and “[h]ere, Plaintiff has failed to sue the United States, as required.”
Noha v. Union Station Washington D.C. Female Sec. Guard, 25-cv-01046 (UNA), 2025 WL
2239254, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2025). This alone dooms her complaint.
Second, Shafique has not pleaded an actionable tort under the FTCA, which is also a juris-
dictional problem. See Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 218 n.8 (2021) (“In cases such as this
one where a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an element that is both a merit element of a claim and
a jurisdictional element, the district court may dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule
12(b)(6).”). Rather, she sues the Marshals Service for “intentional denial of [her] rights, . . . willful
and deliberate condoning of an unlawful eviction,” and “intentional[] refus[al] to investigate this
matter or exercise any action necessary to uphold law and order in accordance with its own duties
and responsibilities.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 13–14. As the Marshals Service argues, these claims are
barred under FTCA section 2680(h), which “excludes intentional torts, such as ‘wrongful evic-
tion,’ conversion or interference with contractual rights (such as those of a tenant in a lease),” as
well as section 2680(c), which excludes “claims arising out of detention of goods not subject to
criminal forfeiture proceedings.” ECF No. 35-1 at 15 (citation modified).
To be sure, the FTCA’s intentional tort bar is not as broad as the Marshals Service would
have it. While section 2680(h) generally precludes some intentional torts, it “does not remove
from the FTCA’s waiver all intentional torts,” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 n.1 (2013)
7 (emphasis added), nor does it—at least expressly—bar claims for “conversion,” id., or wrongful
eviction. That said, Shafique does not address the Marshals Service’s argument that, because her
claims are essentially those for “interference with [a tenant’s] contractual rights . . . in a lease” and
“return of detained goods not subject to criminal forfeiture proceedings,” they are barred by FTCA
section 2680(h) and section 2680(c) respectively. ECF No. 35-1 at 15. Thus, the Court treats
those arguments as conceded, and concludes that that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these
claims.4 See Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Because the FTCA excepts
tort claims” falling under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) “from the Government’s sovereign immunity
waiver, [such claims are] barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the District Court will be
required to dismiss [those claims] for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
In addition, to the extent Shafique asserts a claim arising from the Marshals Service’s pur-
ported failure to “provide” or “present” the eviction writ, see ECF No. 1-1 at 11, she has not shown
that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for such a claim.5 As the Marshals Service argues,
Shafique “points to no duty or obligation for [it] to retain a copy of the writ or provide it upon
request.” ECF No. 35-1 at 19. Even if she had, she has not shown that a breach of that duty “is a
4 “[W]hen a plaintiff files a response to a motion to dismiss but fails to address certain arguments made by the defendant, the court may treat those arguments as conceded, even when the result is dismissal of the entire case,” Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2002), and even when, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, see, e.g., Rhodes v. Superior Ct. of D.C., 303 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2018). 5 Shafique requests that the Court “take judicial notice that the United States Marshals Service fails to present any writ authorizing the ejectment of Rifat Shafique from her home.” ECF No. 1-1 at 14. Though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201(b) permits “[a] court [to] . . . take judicial notice of any fact not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Bern- hardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18-cv-2739 (TJK), 2023 WL 2598677, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023) (cleaned up), Shafique’s disputed allegation that the Marshals Service failed to produce the eviction writ is not properly the subject of judicial notice, especially at this stage of the litigation.
8 tort cognizable under District of Columbia law.” Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d
1151, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Gutrejman v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2021)
(“FTCA waives sovereign immunity . . . where state law would make a private person liable in
tort.”). Thus, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over any such claim because Shafique
has not shown that it “state[s] a cause of action under District of Columbia tort law.” Art Metal-
U.S.A., Inc., 753 F.2d at 1160.
Third, even if Shafique’s complaint stated a viable FTCA claim, it would be time barred
by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Under the FTCA,
[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim ac- crues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of [the] mailing . . . of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency.
Id. Here, Shafique submitted an administrative claim to the Marshals Service in March 2023 re-
lated to the agency’s “unlawful eviction” with an “unverified writ.” Although the Marshals Ser-
vice mailed Shafique a notice denying this claim in June 2023, see ECF No. 35-2 at 88–90,
Shafique did not file suit in D.C. Superior Court until October 2024, see ECF No. 1-1 at 19–23,
well after the six-month window had closed.6
True, the FTCA’s statute of limitations may be equitably tolled. See United States v. Wong,
575 U.S. 402, 420 (2015). But Shafique has not shown any grounds for the Court to do so. To
receive the benefit of equitable tolling, Shafique “must show (1) that [s]he has been pursuing h[er]
6 “Because statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dis- missal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred.” Bregman v. Perles, 747 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). That said, Shafique alleges in the complaint that she “filed complaints and tort claims against the United States Marshals Service, all to no avail.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 5. Thus, the Court may consider, as documents “incorporated by reference” into the complaint, Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 860 F. App’x 1, 2 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2021), the administrative complaints and denial notices attached to the Marshals Service’s motion to dismiss, see, e.g., ECF No. 35-2 at 5–14, 85–86, 88.
9 rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in h[er] way.” Jackson v.
Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020). She has shown neither. She asserts that she never
received the agency’s notice denying her claim and baldly alleges that her purported signature on
the Marshals Service’s certified mail receipt is a forgery. See ECF No. 39 at 10. But those argu-
ments fail to support equitable tolling for two reasons.
For one, the six-month limitations period “unambiguously . . . runs ‘from the date of mail-
ing,’” and Shafique did not have to “receive the denial [notice] in order to commence the six-
month limitations period.” Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
For another, Shafique “was entitled to deem h[er] administrative claim denied six months
after [s]he submitted [the] claim . . . and could have filed an action in federal district court there-
after.” Lonero v. United States, No. 22-10317, 2022 WL 3544401, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). So even assuming the Marshals Service had not responded to her
claim within six months—i.e., by early September 2023—she waited for over a year before filing
in the District of Columbia Superior Court. She offers no explanation for that delay. “Equitable
tolling does not apply where . . . the failure to timely file is attributable to what is at best a garden
variety claim of excusable neglect.” Id. (citation modified).7
7 Shafique submitted another administrative complaint to the Marshals Service around early June 2024, about four months before she filed this suit. See ECF No. 35-2 at 93–94. The Marshals Service asserts that it did not deny or otherwise respond to that complaint because it “s[ought] redress for the same injuries arising out of the March 8, 2023 eviction,” ECF No. 35-1 at 18, and “appeared to raise the same or similar claim that [was] previously denied on June 2, 2023,” ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 8. Even if this later-filed complaint asserted new claims not subject to the same six-month statute of limitations period as her March 2023 complaint, Shafique has not shown that she exhausted her administrative remedies as to those claims. If an agency fails to issue a “final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed,” a claimant may sue “any time thereafter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). But here, Shafique jumped the gun, suing just four months after submitting this administrative claim. Thus, even assuming any claims in this
10 IV. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant the Marshals Service’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 11, 2026
later-filed complaint are not time barred under section 2401(b), the Court nonetheless lacks juris- diction to consider them under section 2675(a).