Shaffer v. Unknown

District Court, S.D. California·Decided October 7, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-01757·Unknown

Opinion

DANNY RAY SHAFFER, Case No.: 24-cv-01757-AJB-VET

Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION v. FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Respondent. Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a habeas corpus action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging both a resentencing arising from a judgment of conviction from the Riverside County Superior Court and the conditions of his confinement during his incarcerations at Avenal and Pleasant Valley State Prisons. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner has neither paid the filing fee nor filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons discussed below, the instant action is DISMISSED without prejudice. Petitioner cannot proceed with this action until he has either paid the $5.00 filing fee or has qualified to proceed in forma pauperis. See R. 3(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (2019). As such, the instant case is subject to dismissal for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement. /// Petitioner has not invoked this Court’s jurisdiction with respect to either his challenge to his resentencing or his challenge to his conditions of confinement. Further, because Petitioner appears to raise both a habeas challenge and a challenge to his conditions of confinement in the same action, the Court finds transfer inappropriate. A. Challenge to Petitioner’s Resentencing A petition for writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the United States District Court of either the judicial district in which the petitioner is presently confined or the judicial district in which he was convicted and sentenced. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 497 (1973). On the face of the Petition and as part of the sole enumerated claim, Petitioner indicates he is challenging a resentencing which occurred in the Riverside County Superior Court (see Doc. No. 1 at 1, 6-7; see also generally Doc. No. 1-2), which is within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Eastern Division. 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(1). Petitioner is presently confined at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California (see Doc. No. 1 at 16; see also Doc. No. 1-1), located in Fresno County, which is within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 84(b). Because Petitioner is neither housed in San Diego or Imperial Counties and does not challenge a judgment of conviction from either San Diego or Imperial Counties, he has failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to his habeas challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(d) (“The Southern District comprises the counties of Imperial and San Diego.”). Although this Court does not have jurisdiction over the action, “[u]nder a provision of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, if a court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction the court shall transfer the action to any other such court in which the action could have been brought ‘if it is in the interest of justice.’” Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990), citing In re McCauley, 814 F.2d 1350, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1987). Transferring a habeas corpus proceeding to a district with proper jurisdiction is in the interest of justice because dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere is “time consuming and justice-defeating.” Miller, 905 F.2d at 262, quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962). Ordinarily, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the Court would transfer this proceeding to Petitioner’s district of conviction, which is in this instance the Central District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Braden, 410 U.S. at 497, 499 n.15 (noting that the district of conviction is ordinarily a more convenient forum because of the accessibility of evidence, records, and witnesses); Laue v. Nelson, 279 F. Supp. 265, 266 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Here, however, while Petitioner contends the instant Petition challenges his May 2024 resentencing (see Doc. No. 1 at 1), a review of the sole enumerated claim in the Petition reflects that Petitioner also appears to challenge the conditions of his confinements at Avenal and Pleasant Valley State Prisons in that same claim. (See id. at 6-8; see also generally Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2.) Because Petitioner appears to bring two separate challenges in the instant Petition, one of which may not be brought in habeas corpus and proper venue appears to lie in a different District than that for his habeas action, as discussed below, the Court declines to transfer this action and instead finds dismissal appropriate. B. Challenge to Petitioner’s Conditions of Confinement In addition, it appears to the Court that a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to § 2254 is not the proper vehicle for at least a portion of the claim Petitioner presents. Upon review, in addition to the stated challenge to Petitioner’s resentencing, the sole enumerated claim in this Petition appears to also challenge the conditions of Petitioner’s prior confinement at Avenal State Prison in Kings County, California, as well as his present confinement at Pleasant Valley State Prison. (See Doc. No. 1 at 6-8.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges that on several occasions the CDCR has refused to transfer to him to Court for resentencing proceedings and thus denied him access to courts, indicates he currently has stitches in his mouth as a result of being assaulted, asserts several witnesses have heard CDCR staff conspiring to plant contraband on him and offering an inmate a television to stab Petitioner, and alleges the CDCR staffs actions have been done “in retaliation for my filing staff complaints and a 1983 lawsuit.” (Id. at 7-8.) Petitioner seeks removal from CDCR custody and placement into the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department and requests an FBI investigation into the matter. (Id. at 8.) This aspect of Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on habeas because it does not challenge the constitutional validity or duration of his confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1994); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. Meanwhile, “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challe

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Related

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman
369 U.S. 463 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Baugh v. United States
27 F.2d 257 (Ninth Circuit, 1928)
Laue v. Nelson
279 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. California, 1968)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Skinner v. Switzer
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (Supreme Court, 2011)