Shaffer v. Sires

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Shaffer v. Sires

81 Pa. Super. 589, 1923 Pa. Super. LEXIS 140

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 11, 1923

DocketAppeal, 131

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 81 Pa. Super. 589 (Shaffer v. Sires) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shaffer v. Sires, 81 Pa. Super. 589, 1923 Pa. Super. LEXIS 140 (Pa. Ct. App. 1923).

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Opinion

Opinion by

Gawthrop, J.,

This is an appeal from a judgment of the common pleas affirming, upon certiorari, the judgment of an alderman in an action of assumpsit. The cause of action was within the jurisdiction conferred on aldermen and justices of the peace by the Act of 1810, as amended by the Act of 1879, P. L. 194. We have no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the common pleas. The 22d section of the Act of March 20, 1810, 5 Sm. L. 161, expressly provides that “the judgment of the court of common pleas shall be final on all proceedings removed as aforesaid, (by certiorari) by the said court, and no writ of error shall issue thereon”: Crumley v. Crescent Coal Co., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 231; Home Protective Association v. Reese, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 452; Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 464. This is true although the record discloses that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction: Huntingdon & Broadtop Mountain Railroad v. Fluke, 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 126. But, if we were to consider the case as properly before us, the single proposition on which this appeal is grounded is that the alderman who heard the case was ineligible to hold that office and any judgment which he rendered was void, because he had not resided in the ward in which he was acting as such official for one year next preceding his election to such office, as required by article V, section 11, of the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that the alderman was acting under and by virtue of an election by the people and a commission in regular form issued to him by the Governor of the Commonwealth. He was *591 a de facto officer and, as against all parties but the Commonwealth, was an officer de jure. His right to the office cannot be questioned in any other form than by quo warranto at the suit of the Commonwealth. His powers cannot be inquired into collaterally: Clark v. Com., 29 Pa. 129; Coyle v. Com., 104 Pa. 117.

The appeal is quashed at the costs of appellant.

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Opinion by

Gawthrop, J.,

This is an appeal from a judgment of the common pleas affirming, upon certiorari, the judgment of an alderman in an action of assumpsit. The cause of action was within the jurisdiction conferred on aldermen and justices of the peace by the Act of 1810, as amended by the Act of 1879, P. L. 194. We have no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the common pleas. The 22d section of the Act of March 20, 1810, 5 Sm. L. 161, expressly provides that “the judgment of the court of common pleas shall be final on all proceedings removed as aforesaid, (by certiorari) by the said court, and no writ of error shall issue thereon”: Crumley v. Crescent Coal Co., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 231; Home Protective Association v. Reese, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 452; Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 464. This is true although the record discloses that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction: Huntingdon & Broadtop Mountain Railroad v. Fluke, 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 126. But, if we were to consider the case as properly before us, the single proposition on which this appeal is grounded is that the alderman who heard the case was ineligible to hold that office and any judgment which he rendered was void, because he had not resided in the ward in which he was acting as such official for one year next preceding his election to such office, as required by article V, section 11, of the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that the alderman was acting under and by virtue of an election by the people and a commission in regular form issued to him by the Governor of the Commonwealth. He was *591 a de facto officer and, as against all parties but the Commonwealth, was an officer de jure. His right to the office cannot be questioned in any other form than by quo warranto at the suit of the Commonwealth. His powers cannot be inquired into collaterally: Clark v. Com., 29 Pa. 129; Coyle v. Com., 104 Pa. 117.

The appeal is quashed at the costs of appellant.

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81 Pa. Super. 589, 1923 Pa. Super. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaffer-v-sires-pasuperct-1923.

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