O
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SEYED HOSSEIN MIRI, Case No.: 5:26-cv-00698-MEMF-MAR
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Petitioner, AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. v. NO. 3]
PAMELA BONDI et al.,
Respondents.
Before the Court is the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion Preliminary Injunction filed by Petitioner Seyed Hossein Miri. Dkt . No. 3 (“Motion”). For the reasons stated herein , the Application is GRANTED IN PART: the Court gr ants the Temporary Restraining Order, and issues an Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction should not issue, but does not grant a Preliminary Injunction at this time. / / / / / / / / / / / / I. Background
A. Factual Background1
Petitioner Seyed Hossein Miri is a citizen of Iran, who has applied for asylum based his
conversion to Christianity and is currently in the custody of the DHS at the Adelanto Detention
Facility in Adelanto, California. Petition ¶ 22.
Miri has lived in the United States for nearly ten (10) years, having entered the country on
September 4, 2016 with a visitor’s visa, accompanied by his wife and minor son. Id. ¶ 2. On January
26, 2017, Miri’s wife filed for asylum in the United States, and he was included as a derivative
beneficiary of that application. Id. Miri attended all scheduled interviews and appointments in
connection with his asylum application. Id. ¶ 3. Miri’s wife’s asylum application remained pending
with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) asylum office for over six years,
during which time Miri was issued employment authorization and permitted to remain in the United
States while awaiting adjudication of the application. Id.
Ultimately, the USCIS asylum office referred the matter to the immigration court for further
proceedings on March 25, 2024. Id. ¶ 4.
Miri subsequently filed his own, separate I-589 application for asylum with the immigration
court. Id. ¶ 5. His application is based on his fears of harm in Iran considering his conversion to
Christianity. This application remains pending with the Immigration Court, as does the application
of Miri’s wife. Id.
On September 23, 2025, as Miri was driving home after dropping his minor son off at school,
his car was surrounded by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials and he was taken into
immigration custody without incident. Id. ¶ 6. DHS records confirm that Miri has no criminal history, and that he resides with his wife and son. Id. Miri then filed a motion for a bond hearing documenting, among other things, the validity of his claim for asylum based on his conversion to Christianity, including extensive evidence of persecution of Christian converts in Iran; his intention and ability to reside with his wife and child as 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Miri’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). This Court is not, at this time, making a final determination as to the veracity of the facts he had been prior to his detention; the fact that his wife is employed with valid employment
authorization; evidence of income tax filings; and the fact that his wife suffered a miscarriage after
his detention. Id. ¶ 7.
On November 19, 2026, the Adelanto Immigration Court conducted a hearing on Miri’s
request for bond. Id. ¶ 8. Miri was not present at the hearing but was represented by counsel. Id.
During the hearing, the DHS argued that Miri was both a flight risk and a danger to the community,
characterizing danger to the community as the DHS’ “stronger” argument. Id. ¶ 9. In support of this
argument, the DHS stated that Miri’s mandatory military service in the Iranian military from 1998 to
2000 – service that was disclosed on Miri’s application for a non-immigrant visa which was
approved by the Department of State – made him a danger to the community. Id. DHS cited the
Encyclopedia Britannica, arguing that the Iranian military has committed human rights abuses. Id.
The DHS additionally relied on the fact that Miri obtained a waiver of the USCIS filing fee
for two applications for employment authorization to argue that he should not be granted bond. Id. ¶
10. The fee waiver requires showing Miri received a means-tested benefit. Id. The DHS noted that
Miri obtained these fee waivers while living at homes which, per the Zillow real estate website, had
estimated monthly rents of approximately $7,000 and $4,000, respectively. Id. According to DHS,
this was conclusive evidence that Miri made misrepresentations with respect to his income to obtain
fee waivers. Id. The DHS thus argued that Miri would not be found credible and his application for
asylum and related relief would be denied. Id.
Based on Miri’s mandatory military service and the allegations of misrepresentation, DHS
argued that Miri was both a flight risk and a danger to the community. Id. ¶ 11. Miri argued that he
qualified for the fee waivers that he obtained based on his receipt of Medi-cal, and that, whatever policy concerns the DHS may have regarding eligibility for fee waivers, no misrepresentations were made in connection with his requests. Id. ¶ 12. He additionally argued that his mandatory military service in the Iranian military occurred nineteen years before the Revolutionary Guard was designated as a terrorist organization and could not be used to deny his application for asylum and related relief. Id. Miri additionally highlighted his family ties, hardship to his wife and child resulting from his detention, his lack of criminal history and cooperation with DHS officials when he was detained as well as the strength of his application for asylum, as factors weighing in favor of
bond. Id. ¶ 13.
The Immigration Judge denied bond. Id. ¶ 14. The written memorandum states only “the
respondent failed to meet his burden to establish that he is not a flight risk.” Id. The Immigration
Judge’s verbal reasoning during the hearing, in its entirety, is that “the court is going to deny the
request for bond on the basis of flight [risk]. The court is not going to reach a determination on
danger given the flight finding. Too many red flags here, counsel. I'm not making any kind of
judgment as to the strength of relief. Perhaps it gets granted, perhaps not. I really don't know at this
point. But there are a number of factors working against the respondent as it relates to the flight risk.
So, the court has denied the request for bond on that basis.” Id. ¶ 15.
Miri remains in DHS custody. His next hearing is a preliminary hearing set for March 3,
2026. Id. ¶ 16. During his detention, which has now exceeded four months, Miri has experienced a
significant decline of his health. Id. At his initial apprehension in September, he raised his medical
concerns to DHS officials, who noted that “subject does not claim good health.” Id.
After his detention Miri was sent to the hospital for emergency treatment after experiencing
complications due to his fluctuating blood sugar. Id. ¶ 17. More recently, Miri experienced severe
pain and a serious infection which once again necessitated his hospitalization beginning on or about
January 27, 2026. Id. On or about February 11, 2026, Miri underwent surgery for hernia, and will
require an additional surgery to address hemorrhoids. Id. ¶ 18. Miri remains hospitalized as of the
date of filing this Petition. Id. ¶ 19.
Miri’s wife has been unable to consistently communicate with him, with the hospital refusing
to provide any information to her. She has resorted to requesting casework assistance from her local representative to obtain information about her husband. Id. ¶ 20. Miri has told his wife, “If I die, ICE and Adelanto are responsible for my death.” Id. ¶ 21. B. Procedural History On February 13, 2026, Miri filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this matter. Petition. Miri also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on February 9, 2026. Motion. On February 17, 2026, the Court ordered the Respondents to file a response to the
Application by February 20, 2026, at 5pm. Dkt. No. 5. The Court’s Order also ordered Miri to file a
Reply by February 23, 2026, at 5pm. Id. On February 20, 2026, Respondents filed an Opposition.
Dkt. No. 8 (“Opposition”). On February 23, 2026, Miri filed a Reply. Dkt. No. 9 (“Reply”).
On February 26, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the Motion.
II. Applicable Law
A. Preliminary Injunctions
The analysis that courts must perform for temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d
832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of
a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To
qualify for injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
a likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips
in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. This Court cannot grant the
preliminary injunction “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
The Ninth Circuit has held that injunctive relief may issue, even if the moving party cannot
show a likelihood of success on the merits, if “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance
of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction,
so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied if the probability of success on the merits is low. See Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[E]ven if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.”). / / / / / / B. Habeas Petitions in the Immigration Detention Context District Courts are “generally prohibit[ed]” from “entering injunctions that order federal officia ls to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out” certain provisions of the INA, found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 5 43, 550 (2022). But “lower courts retain the authority to ‘enjoin or restrain the operation of’ the rel evant statutory provisions ‘with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual [nonc itizen] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.’ Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252( f)(1)). This Court, therefore, may grant relief in “individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-D iscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court established that courts should treat a six-month period of detention as “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 700–01. It explained:
After this 6–month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Respondents must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every [noncitizen] not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, a [noncitizen] may be held
in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 701. In other words, trial courts considering an immigration detainee’s habeas petition seeking
release must first ascertain if the detainee has demonstrated good reason to believe that, in the
reasonably foreseeable future, there is no significant likelihood of removal. Only then does the
burden shift to the Respondents to rebut that showing.
A different framework applies, however, once an immigrant has been “released under an
order of supervision.” 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(1). To “revoke an [noncitizen]’s release under this section and return the [noncitizen] to custody,” the Service must “determine[] that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 241.13(i)(2). “Upon revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and is entitled to an initial interview after the immigrant’s return to custody to allow the immigrant to respond, submit evidence, or otherwise demonstrate that “there is no III. Discussion
A. Miri’s Application Is Procedurally Proper.
As a threshold matter, Miri’s Application is procedurally proper.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) states that a Court may issue a temporary
restraining order without notice to the adverse party if movant provides “the movant’s attorney
[written certification of] any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be
required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Local Rule 65-1 requires: A party seeking a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) must submit an application, a proposed TRO, a declaration setting forth
the facts and certification required by [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 65(b)(1)(A) and (B), and a proposed order to
show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. C.D. Cal. L.R 65-1.
Miri asserts that counsel emailed Respondents on February 12, 2026, notifying Respondents
that Miri “intended to file” the Motion. Motion at 1; Reply at 2. Respondents contend that Miri’s
Motion is procedurally flawed because Miri failed to comply with Local Rule 65. Opposition at 5-7.
In particular, Respondents claim that Miri did not provide a declaration setting forth specific facts
that clearly show “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result” “before
[Respondents] can be heard in opposition.2 Id. Respondents’ arguments are unavailing as Rule 65(b)
applies where the nonmovant has not received notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Here, Miri gave
notice to Respondents on February 12, 2026, prior to filing the Motion. Motion at 1. Further, the
Motion and Petition set forth Miri’s arguments as well as supporting evidence including the bond
hearing transcript, Dkt. No. 1-2, and correspondence as to Miri’s medical condition, Dkt. No. 3-9.
2 Respondents contend that Amy Lenhert’s Declaration, Dkt. No. 1-9, include statements which Lenhert lacks personal knowledge because she never met with Miri. Opposition at 5-6. The Court disagrees. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Here, Lenhert directly communicated with Miri’s family due to Miri’s hospitalization, Dkt. No. 1-9 ¶¶ 2-3; Reply at 2, and the bond hearing transcript substantiates the circumstances alleged in the Petition and Motion, see Dkt. No. 1-2. Lenhert does not appear to be speculating or guessing as to Miri’s situation. Rather, she is pleading on information received from individuals closely related to Miri’s circumstances. Reply at 2-3 In sum, Lenhert has personal knowledge of Miri’s allegations. Reply at 3-4. And Respondents had the opportunity and did respond to the Motion. See Opposition.
Thus, Miri complied with Rule 65(b).3
Accordingly, the Court finds the Motion is procedurally proper. The Court thus declines to
deny the Motion on this basis.
B. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Matter.
Miri argues that the Court has jurisdiction to review the Immigration Judge’s “determination
that [Miri] poses a flight risk” because it constitutes a mixed question of law and fact. Motion at 8;
Reply at 4. Respondents respond that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Miri’s request because:
(1) the Petition is primarily a challenge to the Immigration Court’s bond determination at the
November 19, 2026 hearing; and (2) Miri must first exhaust administrative remedies by completing
the appeal process with the BIA before seeking habeas relief. Opposition at 7-12.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides: “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
General under this section regarding the detention of any [noncitizen] or the revocation or denial of
bond or parole.” “That provision does not, however, preclude habeas jurisdiction over constitutional
claims or questions of law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Claims that the discretionary bond process itself was constitutionally
flawed are cognizable in federal court on habeas because they fit comfortably within the scope of [28
U.S.C.] § 2241.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, Respondents cite to Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018), arguing that
Section 1226(e) bars the Court from reviewing the Immigration Judge’s bond determination.
Opposition at 7. In Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that Section 1226(e) precludes a
noncitizen “from ‘challeng[ing] a “discretionary judgment” by the Attorney General or a “decision” that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release.’” 583 U.S. at 295. Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit in Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 781-82 (9th Cir. 2024) considered Jennings’ interpretation of Section 1226(e) and clarified that Section 1226(e) “‘restricts
3 Respondents also argue that Miri did not comply with Local Rule 7-5. Opposition at 5. Local Rule 7-5 applies to motions “unless otherwise ordered by . . . the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or the Local Rules.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 7- 2. Local Rule 65-1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provide requirements for motions for temporary restraining jurisdiction only with respect to the executive’s exercise of discretion’ but that discretionary
judgment does not include constitutional claims or questions of law.” The Ninth Circuit held that the
determination of “dangerousness” (i.e., whether a noncitizen “posed a danger to the community”), is
a mixed question of law and fact which is reviewable by the district court as a “question of law.”
Martinez, 124 F.4th at 779-80, 783. The Martinez Court further found that “the district court’s
review of the BIA’s ‘dangerousness’ determination is for abuse of discretion.” Id. Given that the IJ is
to consider the same factors when determining flight risk as it is when determining dangerousness, it
is clear to this Court that the determination of flight risk is also a mixed question of law and fact
which is reviewable by the district court as a question of law.
Here, Miri challenges the constitutionality and sufficiency of the process by which his bond
determination was adjudicated. Petition ¶¶ 61-73. Specifically, Miri posits that the immigration
judge “identifie[d] no facts, contain[ed] no analysis], prevent[ed] meaningful review, and render[ed
Miri’s] detention arbitrary and in violation of his rights to due process” when denying Miri bond on
the basis that Miri posed a flight risk. Motion at 9. As discussed above, pursuant to Martinez, the
question of whether a petitioner poses a flight risk is a question of law that is reviewable by the
Court. 124 F.4th at 779-80, 783. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to review the Immigration
Judge’s determination under an abuse of discretion standard.4 Id.
Respondents further assert that because Section 1226(e) commits bond determinations to
agency discretion by statute, the Court lacks jurisdiction under Sections 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9).
Opposition at 7. Miri counters that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Reply at 5-7.
4 The Court notes that Respondents cite to Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) to similarly argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration judge’s bond determination. Opposition at 7. In Rodriguez Diaz, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the petitioner was afforded due process under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) framework. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209-10. The Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner received procedural safeguards as he received a bond hearing where he was able to present evidence and had a right to seek an additional bond hearing if his circumstances changed. Id. at 1209. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the second Mathews factor— the risk of an erroneous deprivation—weighed against the petitioner. Here, the parties do not dispute whether Miri was deprived of procedural safeguards—a bond hearing. Rather, the parties dispute the sufficiency of the Immigration Judge’s bond determination. Petition ¶¶ 61-73. That is, whether the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal framework when denying Miri’s bond. Id. As stated and supported by Rodriguez Diaz, the Court has “jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider any error of law in [Miri’s] agency proceedings, including any claimed due process violation.” 53 F.4th at 1209. Because determining whether the Immigration Judge applied the proper legal framework at Miri’s bond hearing is a legal question concerning due process, Rodriguez Diaz does not support For the reasons below, this Court finds that Section 1252 does not bar the Court’s review of Miri’s
Motion.
As this Court has explained supra, it lacks authority to enjoin the Government or its
subdivisions to “take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out”
certain provisions of the INA, Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. at 550. But it may still enjoin the
operation of statutory provisions as they apply to an individual noncitizen in removal proceedings.
Id. Put another way, the Supreme Court has recognized that this Court’s jurisdiction to enter
individual habeas relief, where appropriate, does not improperly bear on the Government’s ability to
carry out immigration policy decisions.
As a general matter, in arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction, Respondents appear to
inaccurately describe the question posed to this Court. They note, and then justify, that the Court is
stripped of jurisdiction over challenges to the commencement of “removal proceedings” or “execute
removal orders.” Opposition at 7-9. But this case does not challenge the commencement of removal
proceedings or execution of a final order—the Petition merely alleges that, when Respondents
redetained Miri, they did not afford him the process he was due. Petition at 4. That inquiry is entirely
independent of whether the government may commence removal proceedings or execute a removal
order.
With this framework in mind, the three statutes that Respondents argue prevent this Court
from exercising jurisdiction are inapposite.
Section 1252(g) states that no court may hear a nonimmigrant’s case “arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against an [undocumented person].” Since Miri’s claims “stem from his detention during removal proceedings,” Respondents suggest that the Court is deprived of jurisdiction. Opposition at 8. But the Supreme Court has rejected “the unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the universe of deportation claims,” and has instead endorsed a “much narrower” read that is confined to the “three discrete actions” listed above. Reno, 525 U.S. at 482; Reply at 5. With this reading in mind, Section 1252(g) does not apply here. Neither the instant Motion nor the Petition stem from (or challenge) the commencement of proceedings, adjudication of a case, or the execution of a removal order. Instead, they seek that this Court find that the manner in which Miri was denied
bond as in violation of his constitutional and statutory protections. Motion at 7-12. Respondents cite
no authority for their proposed broad reading of Section 1252(g), particularly the idea that it would
prevent any claim that had the effect of delaying the government’s execution of a final removal
order. See generally Opposition. And, even if they did, this Court is not inclined to find that this
argument would be relevant: Nothing in this Court’s ruling today (or Miri’s requested relief)
prevents Miri’s redetention or removal.
Nor do Respondents’ other suggested jurisdictional bars operate in this case. Section
1252(a)(5) states that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance
with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal
entered or issued under any provision of this chapter.” And Section 1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial
review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order
under this section.” The Ninth Circuit has clarified that these two provisions only “channel judicial
review over final orders of removal to the courts of appeals.” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026,
1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). And, again, Miri has not requested this Court to review his
removal order itself. See generally Petition; Motion; Reply at 6. Neither the Petition nor the Motion
before this Court contest the basis of the final removal order. Reply at 6-7. Nor does this Court
intend to call into question the merits of the Government’s reasons, or the basis of the Government’s
authority, to remove Miri.
In sum, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition and consider
the granting of injunctive relief as a preliminary matter, if appropriate. C. Applying the Winter factors, Miri Is Entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order. As discussed above, the standard for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are substantively identical. For the foregoing reasons, Miri has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a temporary restraining order. Miri advances two grounds upon which a temporary restraining order should be granted. First, Miri argues that his substantive due process rights were violated because the Immigration Judge’s bond determination was based on “conjecture.” Motion at 9; see also Reply at 9. Second,
Miri asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated because he “has been deprived of
the opportunity to contest his detention before a neutral arbiter.” Motion at 11.
The Court addresses these grounds below.
i. The first Winter factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is not met with respect to both grounds. Notwithstanding the Court’s jurisdiction, the application must be denied because Miri fails to demon strate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. “Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important factor,” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotat ion marks omitted), which “is especially true for constitutional claims,” see Jr. Sports Mags. Inc. v. Bonta, 80 F.4th 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2023). 1. The Immigration Judge’s bond determination constitutes an abuse of discretion.
On his first ground, the parties do not dispute that Miri received post-detention process,
including a bond hearing before an immigration judge on November 19, 2026. Dkt. No. 1-2; see
generally Motion; Opposition; Reply. The question before the Court is whether the Immigration
Judge abused its discretion in denying Miri’s bond at the bond determination hearing. Miri argues
that the Immigration Judge failed to consider the evidence and general criteria for bond when
denying Miri’s bond. Motion at 9-10. Respondents counter, stating that the Immigration Judge’s
ruling was based on a proper analysis of the circumstances and exhibits provided. Opposition at 12.
In Martinez, the immigration judge evaluated the petitioner’s “mitigating evidence, such as
his successful pre-incarceration release on bond, the district court’s statements during sentencing, his
efforts at rehabilitation, his family ties, and his strong community support.” 124 F.4th at 780. The immigration judge, however, denied bond, finding petitioner’s “two convictions for drug trafficking to be dispositive.” Id. at 780-81. In evaluating the immigration judge’s determination, the Ninth Circuit clarified that “‘factual question[s] raised in an application for discretionary relief’ remain unreviewable.” Id. at 782-83 (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024)). As such, factual and credibility determinations, such as the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, the level of financial support a noncitizen provides, and whether a noncitizen lied on an
application form are unreviewable. Id. at 783.
An immigration judge, when assessing whether a noncitizen “is a danger to the community
or a risk of flight,” may consider the following factors:
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the [noncitizen’s] length of residence in the United States; (3) the [noncitizen’s] family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the [noncitizen’s] employment history; (5) the [noncitizen’s] record of appearance in court; (6) the [noncitizen’s] criminal record,
including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the [noncitizen’s] history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the [noncitizen] to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the [noncitizen’s] manner of entry to the United States. Id. An immigration judge has “broad discretion to weigh the listed factors and add any factors not menti oned or discount those that are less probative.” Id. at 784. Thus, under an abuse of discretion standard, the district court cannot reweigh evidence. Id. at 785. R ather, the district court must determine whether the immigration judge “applied the correct legal s tandard.” Id. In finding that the immigration judge relied on a totality of the evidence standa rd, including petitioner’s repeated narcotics convictions, to determine that petitioner was a “dang er to the community,” the Ninth Circuit found that the immigration judge did not abuse its discre tion. Id. As stated, Miri received a bond hearing before an immigration judge where he had the oppor tunity to challenge his detention and the immigration judge subsequently found that the government proved, by clear and convincing evidence that Miri is a flight risk. Miri argues that the Immig ration Judge failed to consider the general Martinez fac tors for bond. However, none of these factors are dispositive and an Immigration Judge is not limited to these factors. In fact, an immigration judge’s bond determination may rely on a totality of the evidence standard, Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785, or “may be based upon any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the [noncitizen] or the Service,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). At the November 19, 2026 bond hearing, Miri was represented by counsel. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1. During the hearing, Miri and Respondents each presented their respective documentary evidence and oral arguments. Miri stated that: (1) his Iranian military services were mandatory; (2) “his family ties
are significant”; (3) “he’s never been a flight risk”; (4) he doesn’t have a criminal record; and (5)
there is a risk of harm if he returns to Iran. Id. at 7-9. In response, Respondents asserted that: (1) Miri
made material misrepresentations to obtain a fee waiver and thus, Miri lacks credibility for matters
related to work authorization; and (2) Miri’s prior Iranian military services support a finding that he
“potentially is a danger.” Id. at 4-5.
After the parties’ arguments, the Immigration Judge concluded that there are “too many red
flags.” Id. at 10. The Immigration Judge further decided that there are “a number of [] factors
working against the [Miri] as it relates to the flight risk. So the court has denied the request for bond
on that basis.” Id. The Immigration Judge did not reach a “determination on danger given the flight
finding.” Id. Importantly, when denying Miri’s bond, the Immigration Judge did not set forth the
which factors or evidence were relied on. Id. Specifically, the Immigration Judge did not discuss
weighing the Martinez factors or whether the flight risk finding was based on Miri’s Iranian military
service. Id. Notably, Miri’s Iranian military service was presented to substantiate a finding that Miri
is a danger to the community, not a flight risk. Id. at 5. And the hearing transcript lacks evidence
presented as to Miri being a flight risk. Thus, unlike Martinez where the immigration judge
“evaluated [petitioner’s] mitigating evidence, such as his successful pre-incarceration release on
bond, the district court's statements during sentencing, his efforts at rehabilitation, his family ties,
and his strong community support,” 124 F.4th at 780, the Immigration Judge here did not provide
the basis for the bond determination aside from the conclusory statements about “red flags” and
“factors working against” Miri, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10.
The Ninth Circuit, when evaluating Board of Immigration Appeals’ decisions under an abuse of discretion standard, have held that a court “abuses its discretion when it fails to ‘consider and address in its entirety the evidence submitted by a petitioner’ and to ‘issue a decision that fully explains the reasons for denying a motion to reopen.’” Franco-Rosendo v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 792–93 (9th Cir.2005)); Carnalla-Munoz v. United States Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 627 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to find an abuse of discretion where the “immigration judge and the Board have considered all of the factors upon which petitioners rely”); Barrera-Leyva v. Immigr. and
Naturalization Serv., 653 F.2d 379, 380 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that the immigration judge abused its
discretion by “failing to consider all of the relevant factors”); Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757,
765-66 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that an abuse of discretion review is limited to ensuring that the
agency relied on the appropriate factors).
As described, the Immigration Judge did not explain the reasons for denying Miri’s bond.
The Immigration Judge did not describe which Martinez factors were considered, if any, or what
evidence was relied on. As such, the Immigration Judge did not explain the reasons for denying
Miri’s bond and the record does not establish that the Immigration Judge relied on the appropriate
factors. Id.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Immigration Judge abused its discretion in denying
Miri’s bond. Miri is thus likely to succeed on the merits
2. Miri has not established that Miri’s bond determination was not before a neutral arbiter. Miri further argues that his procedural due process rights were violated because “the immig ration court system is not an independent adjudicative body.” Motion at 11. Respondents do not di rectly contest this assertion but do generally claim that Miri “does not identify any due process violat ion.” Opposition at 12. Miri cites to: (1) the ongoing mass-scale purge of immigration judges perceived as obstacles to DHS’ enforcement agenda; (2) the parallel purge and reconstitution of the BIA, resulting in a 97% pro-decision rate; (3) the rec ruitment and installation of 2 explicitly enforcement-aligned “deportation judges” with dramatically reduced qualifications; (4) EOIR policy directives establishing expectations that adjudications favor the government over noncitizens; and (5) explicit instructions to defy district court rulings that impede DHS's enforcement goals. Id. at 11-23. The Motion, however, does not allege any details or facts that the Immigration Judge before Miri’s bond determination failed to consider Miri’s bond from a neutral standpoint. The record does not indicate the absence of neutrality, and the Court is not inclined to conclude non- neutrality based on national and general articles discussed by Miri, which do not implicate the Immigration Judge’s conduct in this action. Therefore, Miri’s bond determination was before a
neutral arbiter and Miri has not established a likelihood of success on this basis.5
Taken together, the Court finds that the first Winter factors is met as to Miri’s challenge of
the Immigration Judge’s bond determination.
ii. The second Winter factor, a demonstrated likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction, is met. To establish the second Winter requirement, Miri must demonstrate a likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without a temporary restraining order. This Court finds that he has done so. As a threshold matter, Miri has “established a likelihood of irreparable harm by virtue of the fact th at [he is] likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.” Herna ndez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). Respondents do not contest Miri’s alleged irrepa rable harm—detention as a result of a legally inadequate bond determination—other than sugge sting that such harm should not excuse Miri from exhausting administrative remedies. Oppos ition at 11-12; see Motion at 22-23; Reply at 9. As stated, Miri did not receive a consti tutionally adequate bond hearing under Section 1226(a), resulting in a deprivation of consti tutional rights. And “it is well established that the deprivation of constitutional due process rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2 012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). As a result, Miri’s ongoing detention inhere ntly risks his irreparable harm, as it is not clear when he will be processed, released, or remov ed. Motion at 22-23; Reply at 9-10; Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir.2001). Thus, as this Court has already found that Miri has a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of his challenge to the Immigration Judge’s bond deter mination—which implicates Miri’s constitutional rights—this Court finds the second Winter factor is met. / / / / / /
5 The Court understands that Miri would have this Court release him without remanding to the IJ for a new bond hearing because the IJ is not neutral. Opposition at 11-12, 24-25. Because the Court does not find that iii. Tpuhbel itch iirndt earneds tf, oaurret hm Weti. n ter factors, balancing the equities and considering the
When, as here, the nonmoving party is a Respondents entity, the last two Winter factors
“merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This Court then considers the third and fourth
factors—whether the “balance of equities” is in Miri’s favor and whether an injunction is in the
public interest—jointly. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.
The balance of equities does appear to tilt strongly in Miri’s favor. The Court notes that the
Government has a strong interest in the enforcement of federal immigration law. However, the
Immigration Judge did not explain the basis for denying Miri’s bond, resulting in the violation of
Miri’s constitutional rights to receive an adequate bond hearing under Section 1226(a). Motion at 23.
“‘[I]t is clear that it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow the [Respondents] . . .
to violate the requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies
available.’” Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013). Given Miri’s
inadequate bond hearing, Miri’s continued detention fails to comply with his constitutional due
process rights. Therefore, the Court finds ample reason to conclude that “the balance of hardships
tips decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). And, for
related reasons, an injunction is in the public interest. “Public interest concerns are implicated when
a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the
Constitution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the third and fourth Winter factors are met here.
D. Miri Was Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Miri and Respondents dispute whether Miri was required to exhaust his administrative
remedies by appealing the denial of his bond request to the Board of Immigration Appeals under Ninth Circuit’s prudential exhaustion factors laid out in Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). The Puga factors include: 1) whether agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; 2) whether relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 3) whether administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and preclude the need for judicial review. Id. As to the first factor, Miri argues that because the Board of Immigration Appeals is not a
“fact-finding authority” and would only be reviewing “legal error,” there is “no further development
of the record needed” to resolve the issues. Reply at 8. Respondents counter, stating that given the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ subject matter expertise, it is the proper forum to generate a “more
complete factual record for review.” Opposition at 11. Because this action involves a legal question,
an “administrative appellate record is not necessary to resolve” Miri’s challenge to the Immigration
Judge’s bond determination. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 989. As such, this factor does not favor
exhaustion.
As to the second factor, Miri asserts that because the dispute concerns a matter of law—
whether the Immigration Judge conducted a proper bond hearing—resolution by this Court can
provide guidance for future detainees. Reply at 8-9. Respondents claim that the dispute is “fact-
intensive” and thus, resolution by this Court would not provide guidance. Opposition at 11. Rather,
Respondents posit that it would result in “district courts will be overrun with appeals that should be
heard by the BIA under the guise of habeas petitions.” Id. As determined, whether Miri is a flight
risk is a mixed question of fact and law. So the Court does not find relaxation of the requirement for
administrative review to be fact-intensive. Reply at 8-9. This factor thus weighs against exhaustion.
As to the third factor, Miri concedes that the Board of Immigration Appeals is capable of
reviewing his bond determination. Reply at 9. But he states that the exhaustion requirements should
be waived due to the prolonged nature of appeals before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id.
Thus, requiring Miri to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would result in unreasonable
and unconstitutional continued detention. Id. In opposition, Respondents emphasize that the Board
of Immigration Appeals has the authority to correct the Immigration Judge’s errors under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii). Opposition at 11-12. The Court agrees that the Board of Immigration Appeals has the ability to review Miri’s bond determination and correct any mistakes. But as stated, the Court finds that requiring Miri to go before the Board of Immigration Appeals would prolong his unconstitutional detention, thereby causing irreparable injury. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 987 (holding a court may waive exhaustion requirements if “pursuit of administrative remedies” would lead to “irreparable injury”). Thus, this factor weighs against exhaustion. Taken together, the Court, in weighing the Puga factors, finds that Miri was not required to
exhaust administrative remedies given the questions of law at issue. This decision is consistent with
Hernandez, where the Ninth Circuit waived the exhaustion requirement given that the question
before the Court involved a legal challenge. 872 F.3d at 988-89.
Accordingly, Miri’s failure to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals will not preclude
him from obtaining a temporary restraining order.
E. A Release Order Is the Appropriate Relief.
Miri requests that the Court order his immediate release from Respondents’ custody and
enjoin Respondents from redetaining him unless Respondents provide Miri with an adequate Section
1226 bond hearing and find Miri is a flight risk or danger to the community. Motion at 25.
Respondents, in their Opposition, do not contest that Miri is entitled to immediate release should the
Court determine the merits in Miri’s favor. See generally Opposition.
First, Miri’s prompt release is the remedy that will best return Miri to the status quo and
restore his position as it was prior to the detention that Miri contends was in violation of his
constitutional and statutory protections. The purpose of a temporary restraining order is “to preserve
the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary
injunction.” 11A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2951 (3d ed.). Though the Ninth
Circuit has not opined on the matter of scope of preliminary relief in this specific context, other
courts in this Circuit have taken a similar approach. See, e.g., F.M.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-
01381, 2025 WL 3083934, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025).
Second, in any event, this Court permits the Government to remedy the procedural deficiency
at issue through its Orders issued infra. This Court’s resolution of this Motion—to order Respondents to release Miri from custody and not redetain him absent compliance with due process and his legal protections—in effect permits the Government to follow the appropriate steps to reattempt Miri’s detention. Accordingly, Miri is entitled to a release order. / / / / / / IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion GRANTED IN PART and ORDERS as follows.
1. The Court finds that the Immigration Judge abused its discretion in denying Miri’s
request for bond at the bond determination hearing.
2. Respondents are ORDERED to release Miri from custody (and return to him his personal
belongings) within forty-eight (48) hours,6 and they may not redetain him without
compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), and 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
3. Respondents are enjoined from relocating Miri outside of the Central District of
California pending final resolution of this matter.
4. Respondents shall not impose any release restrictions on Miri, such as electronic
monitoring, unless deemed necessary at a future pre-deprivation bond hearing.7
5. This Court orders Respondents to show cause, in writing, as to why a preliminary
injunction should not issue.
a. Respondents’ brief is due at 5 PM on Thursday, March 12,
2026. Miri may file a response brief by Tuesday, March 17,
2026.
b. The parties may stipulate to a different briefing schedule via
joint stipulation filed by 5 PM on Monday, March 9, 2026.
Should the parties wish to extend either briefing deadline, the
parties should also stipulate that this temporary restraining
order may remain in effect (without converting to a preliminary
6 This Court understands, based on Respondents’ representations from hearings in similar immigration habeas cases, that Respondents believe that forty-eight hours is a reasonable amount of time to effectuate release.
7 Restraints not shared by members of the public renders an individual in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, California, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (holding that a person is in custody if the person “is subject to restraints ‘not shared by the public generally’” and the person’s “freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1963) (finding that the “chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail. Yet English courts have long recognized the writ as a proper remedy even though the restraint is something less than close physical confinement”). As such, prospective release restrictions, such as electronic injunction) through this Court’s decision on the preliminary injunction. c. The parties’ briefing on the preliminary injunction should address whether the granting of this TRO renders the PI request, and the habeas petition itself, moot. 6. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report regarding the Respondents’ compliance with this Order by Monday, March 9, 2026.
Dated: March 5, 2026 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG United States District Judge