Service Employees International Union-United Healthcare Workers West v. HCA Healthcare

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 7, 2021
• Docket: 5:20-cv-02054
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SERVICE EMPLOYEES Case No. 5:20-cv-02054-JWH-KKx INTERNATIONAL UNION— 12 UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS WEST; ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 VANESSA MONDRAGON; AND DENYING IN PART GLADYS REYES; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO 14 RAY VALDIVIA; and REMAND [ECF No. 16] AND VANESSA CAMPOS VILLALOBOS, DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 15 MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF Plaintiffs, Nos. 17 & 18] AS MOOT 16 v. 17 HCA HEALTHCARE; 18 SAMUEL N. HAZEN, CEO of HCA Healthcare; 19 RIVERSIDE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM L.P. d/b/a RIVERSIDE 20 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL; and JACKIE DeSOUZA-VAN 21 BLARICUM, CEO of Riverside Community Hospital, 22 Defendants. 23 24 25 26 27 1 Three motions are presently pending before the Court: (1) the motion of 2 Plaintiffs Service Employees International Union—United Healthcare Workers 3 West (“SEIU-UHW”), Vanessa Mondragon, Gladys Reyes, Ray Valdivia, and 4 Vanessa Campos Villalobos (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to remand this action to 5 California State Court;1 (2) the motion of Defendants HCA Healthcare, Samuel 6 Hazen, and Jackie DeSouza-Van Blaricum to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint 7 pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f);2 and 9 (3) the motion of Defendant Riverside Healthcare System L.P. d/b/a Riverside 10 Community Hospital (“RCH”) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to 11 Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)3 (collectively, the “Motions”). The Court finds 12 these matters appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in support of 14 and in opposition to the Motions, the Court orders that (1) the Motion to 15 Remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and (2) Defendants’ 16 respective Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff SEIU-UHW, on behalf of its members 19 (including Plaintiffs Vanessa Mondragon, Gladys Reyes, and Raymond (Ray) 20 Valdivia), and Plaintiff Vanessa Campos Villalobos filed their Complaint 21 commencing this action in California State Court.4 Plaintiffs assert five claims 22 23 1 Pls.’ Mot. to Remand (the “Motion to Remand”) [ECF No. 16]. The 24 Court considered the following papers in connection with the Motion to Remand: (1) Defs.’ Notice of Removal (including its attachments) (the 25 “NOR”) [ECF No. 1]; (2) Compl. [ECF No. 1-1]; (3) Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Remand (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 24]; and (4) Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. 26 to Remand (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 25]. 2 Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss & Mot. to Strike [ECF No. 17]. 27 3 Def. RCH’s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 18]. 1 for relief against Defendants: (1) Public Nuisance; (2) Unfair and Unlawful 2 Business Practices; (3) Negligence; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional 3 Distress; and (5) Declaratory Judgment.5 The first, second, and fifth claims for 4 relief are asserted on behalf of all Plaintiffs. The third and fourth claims for 5 relief are asserted individually by Plaintiff Campos Villalobos. 6 Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants failed to adopt adequate 7 workplace health and safety measures in response to the ongoing COVID-19 8 pandemic, which placed RCH employees, including Mondragon, Reyes, 9 Valdivia, and Sally Lara (the late mother of Campos Villalobos), at an increased 10 risk of contracting COVID-19. This increased risk, according to Plaintiffs, 11 extended to all employees, patients, and visitors of RCH, as well as the members 12 of the broader community with whom these individuals came into contact, and 13 thus created an actionable public nuisance under California law. Campos 14 Villalobos alleges that her late mother, Sally Lara, who was employed by RCH, 15 was exposed to and contracted COVID-19 while at work, which ultimately 16 caused Lara’s death, due to Defendants’ negligence.6 Campos Villalobos 17 further alleges that Defendants’ negligence and her mother’s death caused 18 Campos Villalobos to suffer severe emotional distress.7 19 Defendants removed the action to this Court on October 1, 2020, 20 invoking federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.8 21 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ first, second, and fifth claims for relief arise 22 from, or require the interpretation of the terms of, the Collective Bargaining 23 Agreement and a 2019 “Side Agreement” (jointly, the “CBA”) between the 24 25

26 5 See generally Compl. 6 See id. at ¶¶ 17–19 & 93–100. 27 7 See id. at ¶¶ 17–19 & 101–05. 1 parties (except for Campos Villalobos, who was not a party to the CBA).9 Thus, 2 according to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ first, second, and fifth claims for relief are 3 preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”), 29 4 U.S.C. § 185.10 5 As a threshold matter, before reaching the merits of Defendants’ 6 respective motions to dismiss, the Court must determine whether it has subject 7 matter jurisdiction over this action. Therefore, the Court will first address 8 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A. Removal Jurisdiction 11 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 12 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 13 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 14 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 15 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 16 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 17 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 18 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of 20 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 21 removal jurisdiction. See id. Unless otherwise expressly provided by Congress, 22 “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 23 United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 24 defendants, to the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 25 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013) (same) (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 27 9 See id. at ¶ 19. 1 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the 2 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 3 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. In other words, the 4 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See 5 Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the 6 “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the 7 removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 8 (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the 9 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” 10 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Any doubts regarding the existence of 11 subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. 12 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 13 removal in the first instance.”). “In determining the existence of removal 14 jurisdiction, based upon a federal question, the court must look to the complaint 15 as of the time the removal petition was filed. Jurisdiction is based on the 16 complaint as originally filed and not as amended.” O’Halloran v. Univ. of 17 Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).11 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 As noted above, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 20 28 U.S.C. § 1441, invoking federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1331, on the ground that Plaintiffs’ claims arise under, or are preempted by, 22 § 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiffs contend that their state law claims are not 23

24 11 Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”) [ECF No. 15] on October 28, 2020, before filing the instant Motion to Remand. However, for the 25 purpose of ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, the Court looks to the complaint as of the time that Defendants removed the action to this Court. 26 Consistent with this requirement, the court in O’Halloran held that the fact that the plaintiff amended his complaint to include a federal claim after the removal 27 of the action was “of no significance with regard to removal jurisdiction.” O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1379. In any event, here, Plaintiffs’ Amended 1 preempted by the LMRA, and, therefore, they seek the remand of this action for 2 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by 4 the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 5 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly 6 pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 7 Under this rule, the plaintiff is the master of her claim, meaning that she “may 8 avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. As a general 9 rule, “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal 10 defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated 11 in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal 12 defense is the only question truly at issue.” Id. (emphasis in original). 13 There is, however, a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule known 14 as the “complete preemption” doctrine. Id. at 393. “On occasion,” the 15 Supreme Court has explained, “the pre-emptive force of a statute is so 16 ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into 17 one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Id. 18 (quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). In 19 such cases, any claim based upon the preempted state law is considered a federal 20 claim that “arises under federal law” at its inception. Id. Section 301 of the 21 LMRA is among those statutes with such preemptive force. 22 Section 301 of the LMRA provides as follows: 23 Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 24 organization representing employees in an industry affecting 25 commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 26 organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 27 States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the 1 amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 2 parties. 3 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 of the LMRA has been held to preempt any 4 state claim “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 5 organization.” Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 6 Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (quotations omitted). 7 To determine whether a claim arises from, or is preempted by, § 301 of 8 the LMRA, courts in the Ninth Circuit employ a two-step test. First, the court 9 must determine “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred 10 upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside v. Kiewit 11 Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). If the answer is “no,” then 12 the claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Id. If the answer is “yes,” then 13 the court must determine whether the claim is “substantially dependent on 14 analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. If the state law claim is 15 substantially dependent upon analysis of a CBA, then the claim is preempted by 16 § 301 of the LMRA; “if not, the claim can proceed under state law.” Id. at 17 1059–60. 18 Here, the parties agree that Plaintiffs’ claims do not involve a right 19 conferred upon Plaintiffs by the CBA.12 Therefore, the Court proceeds to the 20 second prong of the Burnside test to determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims are 21 “substantially dependent” upon interpretation and analysis of the CBA. See id. 22 Determining whether a claim is preempted by § 301 is not “a task that 23 always ‘lends itself to analytical precision.’” Id. at 1060 (quoting Cramer v. 24 Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001)). But a few guiding 25 principles have emerged. The first is that, in determining whether a particular 26 right arises by virtue of state law or is grounded in the CBA, the court must 27 1 consider “the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the 2 collective-bargaining agreement [and] not whether a grievance arising from 3 ‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be pursued.” Id. (quoting Livadas v. 4 Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 121–24 (1994)) (citations and quotations omitted) 5 (emphasis in original). In this regard, the Supreme Court has made clear that 6 reliance on the CBA as part of a defense to what is plainly a state law claim is not 7 enough “to transform the action into one arising under federal law.” 8 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399; see also Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. 9 The second guiding principle is that, in determining whether a claim is 10 “substantially dependent” upon interpretation and analysis of a CBA, the court 11 must decide whether resolution of the claim requires a “look to,” as opposed to 12 an interpretation of, the CBA. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125; Burnside, 491 F.3d 13 at 1060. Although this distinction is “not always clear,” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 14 691, the Supreme Court has held that a “look to” the CBA—for example, to 15 decide that none of its terms is in dispute or to determine the wage rates agreed 16 to under the CBA to compute a penalty—is not enough to warrant preemption. 17 See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125. Ultimately, “when the meaning of contract terms 18 is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a [CBA] will be consulted in the 19 course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be 20 extinguished.” Id. at 124. “[A] hypothetical connection between the claim and 21 the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 22 691. A claim under state law is preempted only “if it is so inextricably 23 intertwined with the terms of a labor contract that its resolution will require 24 judicial interpretation of those terms.” Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 25 202, 211 (1985). 26 27 1 Applying those principles here, Plaintiffs’ first claim for public nuisance is 2 the focus of the Court’s inquiry.13 Under California law, a nuisance is 3 “[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, 4 or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the 5 comfortable enjoyment of life or property, . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 3479. A 6 public nuisance “is one which affects at the same time an entire community or 7 neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the 8 annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” Id. § 3480. 9 A claim for public nuisance has seven factual elements: (1) the defendant 10 created a condition or permitted a condition to exist that was, inter alia, harmful 11 to health; (2) the condition affected a substantial number of people; (3) an 12 ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the condition; 13 (4) the seriousness of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s 14 conduct; (5) the plaintiff did not consent to the defendant’s conduct; (6) the 15 plaintiff suffered a special injury, i.e., different from the general public; and 16 (7) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s 17 harm. Cal. Civ. Jury Instr. (CACI) No. 2020 (2021). 18 According to Defendants, because Plaintiffs must prove that Defendants’ 19 conduct was unreasonable and that Plaintiffs did not consent to Defendants’ 20 conduct, Plaintiffs’ claim for public nuisance will necessarily require analysis of 21 what was agreed to under the CBA.14 Based upon Plaintiffs’ allegations that 22 Defendants’ unreasonable conduct includes, for example, instructing employees 23

24 13 Plaintiffs’ UCL claim and claim for declaratory relief are derivative of Plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim, and, therefore, they are preempted to the same 25 extent, if at all, as the public nuisance claim. See Opposition 18:16–24. Similarly, the Court must first determine that it has federal question jurisdiction 26 under § 301 of the LMRA before it can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Campos Villalobos’ claims for negligence and negligent infliction of 27 emotional distress, which are purely state law claims that do not involve the CBA to any extent. 1 with COVID-19 symptoms to come to work, Defendants contend that the 2 determination of whether such conduct was reasonable requires analysis of the 3 scope of Defendants’ right to set rules for work schedules under various sections 4 of the CBA.15 Defendants make similar arguments with respect to Plaintiffs’ 5 allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged failure to warn of the risk of possible 6 exposure to COVID-19,16 failure to provide adequate protective equipment,17 7 failure to provide information regarding COVID-19 safety protocols,18 and 8 Defendants’ alleged unreasonable instruction regarding extra sanitization 9 precautions in relation to blood draws.19 10 There appears to be no authority addressing whether a state law public 11 nuisance claim asserted by parties who are subject to a CBA is preempted by 12 § 301 of the LMRA. However, the legal character of a public nuisance claim 13 suggests that it is not. Whether a given interference is unreasonable is judged 14 under an objective standard: “the question is not whether the particular plaintiff 15 found the invasion unreasonable, but ‘whether reasonable persons generally, 16 looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it 17 unreasonable.’” San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 4th 893, 18 938 (1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826, cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 19 1979)). Indeed, as Plaintiffs point out, the legal right implicated by a public 20 nuisance claim is the right of the public to be free from unreasonable 21 interference with health and safety. See Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 22 Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 (1971). That right arises under state law—not 23 from the terms of a CBA. Nor is it substantially dependent upon analysis of the 24

25 15 Id. at 14:10–15:3. 26 16 Id. at 15:4–22. 17 Id. at 15:23–16:8. 27 18 Id. at 16:9–22. 1 CBA in this case. Consistent with this principle, the Ninth Circuit has 2 recognized that “protecting worker safety,” among other worker rights, 3 “remains well within the traditional police power of the states.” Alaska Airlines, 4 Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 919 (9th Cir. 2018). This well-established rule 5 obviates any need for the Court to interpret the scope of the CBA.20 6 Plaintiffs plainly allege that Defendants’ conduct, regardless of the CBA, 7 objectively constitutes an unreasonable interference in public health and safety. 8 Defendants raise the terms of the CBA as a defense to Plaintiffs’ allegations 9 regarding Defendants’ alleged unreasonable conduct. However, “the presence 10 of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive argument does not 11 overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule.” 12 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398. This is true even when “a defense to a state claim 13 is based on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement” and, thus, will 14 require the state court “to interpret that agreement to decide whether the state 15 claim survives.” Id. Ultimately, “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,” 16 and, for federal jurisdiction to be proper, “a federal question must appear on the 17 face of the complaint.” Id. at 398–99. Indeed, “the plaintiff may, by eschewing 18 claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court,” and 19 a defendant cannot “merely by injecting a federal question into an action that 20 asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising 21 under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be 22 litigated.” Id. Otherwise, the Supreme Court has explained, “the plaintiff 23 would be master of nothing.” Id. 24 25 20 The parties each cite § 33.4 of the CBA, and Defendants purport to 26 dispute the scope of this section and whether it applies to Plaintiffs’ claims here. However, the Court need not decide this issue because Plaintiffs do not invoke 27 § 33.4 as the basis for their public nuisance claim. Plaintiffs’ right, and the right of the general public, to be free from unreasonable interference in their health 1 Here, no federal question appears on the face of the Complaint, and the 2 Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ claim for public nuisance is so 3 “inextricably intertwined” with the terms of the CBA that the claim is 4 preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no 5 federal question jurisdiction over this action. 6 A. Plaintiffs’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees 7 Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees because, in their view, Defendants’ 8 removal of the action to this Court was unreasonable. As a general rule, 9 “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under [28 10 U.S.C.] § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively 11 reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 12 U.S. 132, 140–41 (2005). As confident as Plaintiffs may be in their arguments, in 13 view of the relatively novel issues presented in this case, the Court cannot find 14 that Defendants’ removal of the action was unreasonable. There are no 15 authorities on the issue of whether a public nuisance claim is preempted by § 301 16 of the LMRA, and, even though the Court makes no finding regarding the scope 17 of § 33.4 of the CBA, the Court does not consider that section to be so clear as to 18 make Defendants’ decision to remove the action objectively unreasonable. 19 Thus, Defendants had a reasonable basis for removing this case to federal court. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 22 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is GRANTED in part (with respect 23 to remand) and DENIED in part (with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for an 24 award of attorneys’ fees). 25 2. This case is REMANDED to Riverside County Superior Court. 26 27 1 3. Defendants’ respective Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. MU 4|| Dated: June 7, 2021 : 5 SNPTED: or RES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28