SPENCE, J.
Plaintiffs and interveners, owners and operators of self service gasoline stations, appeal from a judgment declaring that sections 20880, 20882, 20883, 20884, 20885 and 20886 of the Business and Professions Code, regulating price advertising on or near gasoline stations, are constitutional and are applicable to plaintiffs’ price signs.
Appellants contend that the sections in question involve an improper exercise of the police power, depriving them of their property without due process of law. It is further contended that these sections violate article IV, section 25, subdivision 33 of the California Constitution in that they constitute a special law that is unnecessary because a general law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) is and can be made applicable. We have concluded that this regulation of price advertising is a proper exercise of the police power and that the judgment must be affirmed.
The sections in question
require price signs, other than price signs on the gasoline dispensing apparatus (Bus. &
Prof. Code §§ 20820-20826), to set forth in detail and in lettering as large as other lettering thereon, the total price of the gasoline, including tax and grade. Signs using the words “save,” “off,” “discount,” “less,” “below,” or words of similar meaning are considered price signs. The signs employed by appellants and others in the business of owning or operating gasoline stations use thereon the words “Save,” “Serve Yourself and Save,” and “Save 5,” followed by small lettered words “cents,” “ways,” “minutes,” or minor variations of the same. Many of said signs do not refer to the name nor state the price of the gasoline offered for sale.
In reviewing legislation for the purpose of testing its propriety as an exercise of the police power, “ [t]he power of the court is limited to determining whether the subject of the legislation is within the state’s power, and if so to determine whether the means adopted to accomplish the result are reasonably designed for that purpose, and have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.”
(Max Factor & Co.
v.
Kunsman,
5 Cal.2d 446, 456 [55 P.2d 177].) Furthermore, it must be presumed at the outset that the Legislature acted within its powers.
(Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills,
11 Cal.2d 343, 348 [79 P.2d 1080].) The burden is upon those attacking the statute to make a showing that the statute is unconstitutional.
With this brief statement of the governing principles, we turn to the legislation at hand. It is apparent upon its face that the primary purpose of this legislation is the prevention of misleading advertising, which purpose has long been deemed a proper subject for the exercise of the police power. (Note, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 900, 89 A.L.R. 1004; 2 Cal.Jur.2d 606; and 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 283, p. 1043. See, also,
Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills, supra,
11 Cal.2d 343, 350;
In re Sidebotham,
12 Cal.2d 434, 436 [85 P.2d 453, 122 A.L.R. 496] ; and
In re McNeal,
32 Cal.App.2d 391, 394 [89 P.2d 1096].)
The next step is the consideration of the means employed by the Legislature to reach this legitimate end. These involve primarily the requirement of full disclosure, a method approved in
In re Sidebotham, supra,
12 Cal.2d 434, 436. To demonstrate the unconstitutionality of these statutes, appellants cite and rely upon a series of cases declaring statutes unconstitutional which prohibit all price advertising on or near gasoline stations except those signs of a limited size permitted on the pumps.
(Regal Oil Co.
v.
State,
123 N.J.L. 456 [10 A.2d 495] ;
State
v.
Miller,
126 Conn. 373 [12 A.2d 192] ; and
Levy
v.
City of Pontiac,
331 Mich. 100 [49 N.W.2d 80]. But
cf. Merit Oil Co.
v.
Director of Division of Neces. of Life,
319 Mass. 301 [65 N.E.2d 529] ;
People
v.
Arlen Service Stations,
284 N.Y. 340 [31 N.E.2d 184] ; and
State
v. Hobson,-Del.- [83 A.2d 846].) However, the legislation under consideration here differs substantially from that involved in the above cases. There the right to maintain signs of a sufficient size to be read by a passing motorist was prohibited. Our statutes do not prohibit effective advertising in this sense. Rather, sections 20882 and 20883 of the Business and Professions Code encourage the same by establishing minimum requirements as to size of lettering on the signs, thereby making more certain that the passing motorist can read them. The difference is of significance. The ultimate right to advertise price is unaffected by our statutes. Although the Legislature may be denied the power to destroy a given right, the authority to regulate its exercise is
recognized. (See
Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills, supra,
11 Cal.2d 343, 350, and cases cited therein.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Williams
v.
Standard Oil Co.,
278 U.S. 235 [49 S.Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 287], is not a barrier to this legislation. There it was held that a state could not fix the price of gasoline for the reason that the business of selling gasoline is not one “affected with a public interest.” But regardless of the standard by which the validity of price-fixing legislation should be tested
(Tyson & Brother-United Ticket Office
v.
Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 430 [47 S.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718]; see
Nebbia
v.
New York,
291 U.S. 502 [54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940] ; and
Olsen
v.
Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 [61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500]), the statutes in question do not deal with price-fixing and the Williams ease is not controlling here.
Although the right to advertise is a property right
(People
v.
St. John,
108 Cal.App.Supp. 779 [288 P. 53], the requirement of full disclosure of price and brand name is a reasonable method of regulating gasoline advertising, and the statutes have a real and substantial relation to legitimate objectives of the police power. The law does not become oppressive or confiscatory by reason of the fact that it may be more costly to conform to its requirements.
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SPENCE, J.
Plaintiffs and interveners, owners and operators of self service gasoline stations, appeal from a judgment declaring that sections 20880, 20882, 20883, 20884, 20885 and 20886 of the Business and Professions Code, regulating price advertising on or near gasoline stations, are constitutional and are applicable to plaintiffs’ price signs.
Appellants contend that the sections in question involve an improper exercise of the police power, depriving them of their property without due process of law. It is further contended that these sections violate article IV, section 25, subdivision 33 of the California Constitution in that they constitute a special law that is unnecessary because a general law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) is and can be made applicable. We have concluded that this regulation of price advertising is a proper exercise of the police power and that the judgment must be affirmed.
The sections in question
require price signs, other than price signs on the gasoline dispensing apparatus (Bus. &
Prof. Code §§ 20820-20826), to set forth in detail and in lettering as large as other lettering thereon, the total price of the gasoline, including tax and grade. Signs using the words “save,” “off,” “discount,” “less,” “below,” or words of similar meaning are considered price signs. The signs employed by appellants and others in the business of owning or operating gasoline stations use thereon the words “Save,” “Serve Yourself and Save,” and “Save 5,” followed by small lettered words “cents,” “ways,” “minutes,” or minor variations of the same. Many of said signs do not refer to the name nor state the price of the gasoline offered for sale.
In reviewing legislation for the purpose of testing its propriety as an exercise of the police power, “ [t]he power of the court is limited to determining whether the subject of the legislation is within the state’s power, and if so to determine whether the means adopted to accomplish the result are reasonably designed for that purpose, and have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.”
(Max Factor & Co.
v.
Kunsman,
5 Cal.2d 446, 456 [55 P.2d 177].) Furthermore, it must be presumed at the outset that the Legislature acted within its powers.
(Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills,
11 Cal.2d 343, 348 [79 P.2d 1080].) The burden is upon those attacking the statute to make a showing that the statute is unconstitutional.
With this brief statement of the governing principles, we turn to the legislation at hand. It is apparent upon its face that the primary purpose of this legislation is the prevention of misleading advertising, which purpose has long been deemed a proper subject for the exercise of the police power. (Note, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 900, 89 A.L.R. 1004; 2 Cal.Jur.2d 606; and 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 283, p. 1043. See, also,
Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills, supra,
11 Cal.2d 343, 350;
In re Sidebotham,
12 Cal.2d 434, 436 [85 P.2d 453, 122 A.L.R. 496] ; and
In re McNeal,
32 Cal.App.2d 391, 394 [89 P.2d 1096].)
The next step is the consideration of the means employed by the Legislature to reach this legitimate end. These involve primarily the requirement of full disclosure, a method approved in
In re Sidebotham, supra,
12 Cal.2d 434, 436. To demonstrate the unconstitutionality of these statutes, appellants cite and rely upon a series of cases declaring statutes unconstitutional which prohibit all price advertising on or near gasoline stations except those signs of a limited size permitted on the pumps.
(Regal Oil Co.
v.
State,
123 N.J.L. 456 [10 A.2d 495] ;
State
v.
Miller,
126 Conn. 373 [12 A.2d 192] ; and
Levy
v.
City of Pontiac,
331 Mich. 100 [49 N.W.2d 80]. But
cf. Merit Oil Co.
v.
Director of Division of Neces. of Life,
319 Mass. 301 [65 N.E.2d 529] ;
People
v.
Arlen Service Stations,
284 N.Y. 340 [31 N.E.2d 184] ; and
State
v. Hobson,-Del.- [83 A.2d 846].) However, the legislation under consideration here differs substantially from that involved in the above cases. There the right to maintain signs of a sufficient size to be read by a passing motorist was prohibited. Our statutes do not prohibit effective advertising in this sense. Rather, sections 20882 and 20883 of the Business and Professions Code encourage the same by establishing minimum requirements as to size of lettering on the signs, thereby making more certain that the passing motorist can read them. The difference is of significance. The ultimate right to advertise price is unaffected by our statutes. Although the Legislature may be denied the power to destroy a given right, the authority to regulate its exercise is
recognized. (See
Hart
v.
City of Beverly Hills, supra,
11 Cal.2d 343, 350, and cases cited therein.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Williams
v.
Standard Oil Co.,
278 U.S. 235 [49 S.Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 287], is not a barrier to this legislation. There it was held that a state could not fix the price of gasoline for the reason that the business of selling gasoline is not one “affected with a public interest.” But regardless of the standard by which the validity of price-fixing legislation should be tested
(Tyson & Brother-United Ticket Office
v.
Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 430 [47 S.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718]; see
Nebbia
v.
New York,
291 U.S. 502 [54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940] ; and
Olsen
v.
Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 [61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500]), the statutes in question do not deal with price-fixing and the Williams ease is not controlling here.
Although the right to advertise is a property right
(People
v.
St. John,
108 Cal.App.Supp. 779 [288 P. 53], the requirement of full disclosure of price and brand name is a reasonable method of regulating gasoline advertising, and the statutes have a real and substantial relation to legitimate objectives of the police power. The law does not become oppressive or confiscatory by reason of the fact that it may be more costly to conform to its requirements.
Nor is there any merit in the contention that this legislation represents an arbitrary attempt to eliminate competition in the retail selling of gasoline. It is not our function to search for motive in testing the constitutionality of a statute.
(Daniel
v.
Family Security & Ins. Co.,
336 U.S. 220, 224 [69 S.Ct. 550, 93 L.Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945].)
There can be no doubt that many gasoline price signs are misleading. When a motorist on the highway sees a sign which states in large letters “Save 5” or “5 Off,” he can reasonably assume that he will save 5 cents per gallon below the price of gasoline sold in conventional service stations. And when these words are followed by the words “minutes,” “ways,” or the like, in small letters, the signs are highly misleading. Appellants do not argue at great length that the regulation of such signs is a violation of due process. Rather, they argue that the statute would be unconstitutionally applied if enforced against the sign “Serve Yourself and Save.”
(Brock
v.
Superior Court,
12 Cal.2d 605, 610 [86 P.2d 805].) Respondents have indicated an intent to so enforce the statute. While it is generally true that the motorist can realize a saving in the self service type station, and that this sign
is therefore literally true, we cannot agree that the application of the requirement of full disclosure of price and brand name will violate due process of law. The convenience to the motoring public in having the price per gallon plainly disclosed where there is a representation that a saving can be made may well have been a real consideration of the Legislature in enacting the statute. The Legislature, in the first instance, is the judge of what is necessary for the public welfare, and, in the absence of a showing of arbitrary interference with property rights or of the lack of substantial relation between means and a legitimate subject for regulation, we can not declare this legislation invalid.
The final contention that this statute violates article IV, section 25, subdivision 33 of the California Constitution is likewise without merit. This section states: “The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable.”
The question whether a general law can be made applicable is one for the Legislature, “to be determined in the light of the evils intended to be avoided, and with its determination upon that question we may not interfere, unless the disregard of the constitutional requirement is clear and palpable.”
(People
v.
Mullender,
132 Cal. 217, 221 [64 P. 299] ; Accord:
Wheeler
v.
Herbert,
152 Cal. 224, 232 [92 P. 353] ;
Matter of Petition of Burke,
160 Cal. 300, 302-303 [116 P. 755] ; and
Ventura County Harbor Dist.
v.
Board of Supervisors,
211 Cal. 271, 276-277 [295 P. 6].) There is no disregard of the constitutional requirement here. To the contrary, it is apparent that section 17500 of the Business and Professions Code, which prohibits false or misleading advertising in general, could not be applied to require a full disclosure of price or brand name of gasoline offered for sale.
The distinction between a general and a special law within the meaning of the Constitution has been stated as follows -. “ [A law] ... is general . . . when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction . . . [It is a special law] ... if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise of a common right, upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.”
(City of Pasadena
v.
Stimson,
91 Cal. 238, 251-252 [27 P. 604].) It is
therefore clear that the constitutional prohibition against special legislation does not preclude legislative classification, but only requires that the classification be reasonable. (See
People
v.
Western Fruit Growers,
22 Cal.2d 494, 506 [140 P.2d 13], and cases cited therein.) Here, the legislation applies equally to all persons engaged in the business of selling gasoline. The classification is a reasonable one. Gasoline is a unique commodity in that few people, if any, can distinguish between grades or brands by the use of the senses. Unlike many other commodities, its sale is final in the sense that there is no practical way for the motorist to return or exchange the purchased commodity, if dissatisfied. Price and brand name are the principal factors in its sale, and therefore, advertising of these elements in a misleading manner is peculiarly subject to abuse. Furthermore, it must be presumed that the Legislature has made a careful investigation in the field, and that it has properly determined that the interests of the public require this regulation.
(Pacific Coast Dairy
v.
Police Court,
214 Cal. 668, 674 [8 P.2d 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217].) No showing to the contrary has been made.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenlc, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J. pro tem., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied November 25, 1952. Edmonds, J., did not participate therein.