People v. Johnson

61 Cal. App. 3d 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 645
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 15, 1976
Docket14078
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

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Bluebook
People v. Johnson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

61 Cal.App.3d 1 (1976)
132 Cal. Rptr. 645

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
THURMAN A. JOHNSON, Defendant and Respondent.

Docket No. 14078.

Court of Appeals of California, Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles.

July 15, 1976.

*3 COUNSEL

Burt Pines, City Attorney, Ward G. McConnell and Joseph McCarthy, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ritner & Wong and William B. Ritner for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

MARSHALL, P.J.

Defendants[1] allegedly violated Los Angeles Municipal Code section 28.16, subdivision (a),[2] by not clearly and visibly posting the price of gasoline. Defendant's demurrer was sustained and the complaint dismissed on the ground that state law and regulations preempted the ordinance.

(1) The court in In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128 [41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809], held that chartered cities have full power to legislate in regard to municipal affairs unless: "1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the *4 subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality."

(2) As we cannot discover in Business and Professions Code, section 20880[3] et seq., an intent of the Legislature to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation, we hold that the city is not preempted from passage of Municipal Code section 28.16 subdivision (a). (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62 [81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137].) As the ordinance concerns itself with the elimination of local traffic hazards, it certainly is not exclusively a matter of state concern nor one that will not tolerate local action. The ordinance does not have an adverse effect on transient citizens which outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality. Furthermore, as neither visibility from a distance nor local traffic congestion are subjects with which the statute deals, the city may legislate thereon. (See In re Hubbard (1964) supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 126.)

*5 The purpose of the Los Angeles municipal ordinance, stated in section 2 thereof, may be summarized as follows: As a result of the energy crisis, long lines of cars waited for gas. Their drivers could not be informed about the price of the gas by the signs required by state law until they arrived at or near the pump. By posting signs as demanded by the ordinance, all drivers could be so informed without waiting until they came to the pump; drivers could therefore avoid the traffic congestion and hazards created by their moving to another station if the price was *6 not to their liking. Such was not the primary purpose of the statute (§ 20880 et seq., Bus. & Prof. Code); the Legislature's intent was the prevention of misleading advertising. (See Serve Yourself Gas, etc. Assn. v. Brock (1952) 39 Cal.2d 813, 818 [249 P.2d 545].)

Although both statute and ordinance deal with the same subject (sign size), that of itself does not void the ordinance. (Daniel v. Board of Police Commissioners (1961) 190 Cal. App.2d 566, 570 [12 Cal. Rptr. 226]; see also Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 370-372 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515]; Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, p. 62.)

"The cases in this state have consistently upheld local regulations in the form of additional reasonable requirements not in conflict with the provisions of the general law." (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 370 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515].) The ordinance not only does not conflict with the statute, in fact, it specifically provides in section 1, subdivision (c) that signs posted pursuant to its requirements "shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 8 of Chapter 7 of Division 8 (sections 20880 et seq.) of the state of California Business and Professions Code." This ordinance actually provides for compliance with the statute.

Judgment as to Thurman A. Johnson is reversed.

Cole, J., and Alarcon, J., concurred.

NOTES

[1] The People in the instant case are appealing from a demurrer and the dismissal of the complaint against defendants Exxon Company, U.S.A. and Thurman A. Johnson. The docket indicates that on November 7, 1975, on the court's own motion, the complaint was dismissed as to both defendants, Johnson and Exxon Company. Although rule 105(e) of the California Rules of Court requires copies of briefs to be served on each adverse party who appeared separately, the record discloses that the People served only the attorneys for defendant-respondent Thurman A. Johnson; there is virtually no indication that Exxon was made a party to this appeal. Thus, this appeal has been taken only as to defendant Johnson and the dismissal of the complaint as to Exxon stands. Although the notice of appeal lists both defendants Exxon and Johnson in the caption, it states that it is an appeal from an order sustaining defendant's (singular) demurrer and dismissing the case. This could mean either Exxon's demurrer or Johnson's. However, nothing else was done by appellant to bring in Exxon as respondent and the appeal will be treated as one from an order in favor of Johnson.

[2] "(a) Every person, firm, partnership, association, trustee, or corporation which owns, operates, manages, leases or rents a gasoline service station or other facility offered for sale, selling or otherwise dispensing gasoline or other motor vehicle fuel to the public from such a facility abutting or adjacent to a street or highway shall post or cause to be posted or displayed and maintain at said premises at least one sign, banner or other advertising medium which is clearly visible from all traffic lanes in each direction on such street or highway.

"Each said sign, banner or other advertising medium shall be readable from said traffic lanes and shall indicate thereon the actual price per gallon, including all taxes, at which each grade of gasoline or other motor vehicle fuel is currently being offered for sale, sold or otherwise dispensed, if at all, at said facility on said date."

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61 Cal. App. 3d 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-johnson-calctapp-1976.