People v. Johnson
This text of 61 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 1 (People v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion
Defendants1 allegedly violated Los Angeles Municipal Code section 28.16, subdivision (a),2 by not clearly and visibly posting the price of gasoline. Defendant’s demurrer was sustained and the complaint dismissed on the ground that state law and regulations preempted the ordinance.
The court in In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128 [41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809], held that chartered cities have full power to legislate in regard to municipal affairs unless: “1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the [Supp. 4]*Supp. 4subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.”
As we cannot discover in Business and Professions Code, section 208803 et seq., an intent of the Legislature to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation, we hold that the city is not preempted from passage of Municipal Code section 28.16 subdivision (a). (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62 [81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137].) As the ordinance concerns itself with the elimination of local traffic hazards, it certainly is not exclusively a matter of state concern nor one that will not tolerate local action. The ordinance does not have an adverse effect on transient citizens which outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality. Furthermore, as neither visibility from a distance nor local traffic congestion are subjects with which the statute deals, the city may legislate thereon. (See In re Hubbard (1964) supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 126.)
[Supp. 5]*Supp. 5The purpose of the Los Angeles municipal ordinance, stated in. section 2 thereof, may be summarized as follows: As a result of the energy crisis, long lines of cars waited for gas. Their drivers could not be informed about the price of the gas by the signs required by state law until they arrived at or near the pump. By posting signs as demanded by the ordinance, all drivers could be so informed without waiting until they came to the pump; drivers could therefore avoid the traffic congestion and hazards created by their moving to another station if the price was [Supp. 6]*Supp. 6not to their liking. Such was not the primary purpose of the statute (§ 20880 et seq., Bus. & Prof. Code); the Legislature’s intent was the prevention of misleading advertising. (See Serve Yourself Gas, etc. Assn. v. Brock (1952) 39 Cal.2d 813, 818 [249 P.2d 545].)
Although both statute and ordinance deal with the same subject (sign size), that of itself does not void the ordinance. (Daniel v. Board of Police Commissioners (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 566, 570 [12 Cal.Rptr. 226]; see also Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 370-372 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515]; Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, p. 62.)
“The cases in this state have consistently upheld local regulations in the form of additional reasonable requirements not in conflict with the provisions of the general law.” (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 370 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515].) The ordinance not only does not conflict with the statute, in fact, it specifically provides in section 1, subdivision (c) that signs posted pursuant to its requirements “shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 8 of Chapter 7 of Division 8 (sections 20880 et seq.) of the state of California Business and Professions Code.” This ordinance actually provides for compliance with the statute.
Judgment as to Thurman A. Johnson is reversed.
Cole, J., and Alarcon, J., concurred.
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61 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 645, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-johnson-calappdeptsuper-1976.