Serrant v. 46th Precinct Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 6, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05964
StatusUnknown

This text of Serrant v. 46th Precinct Police Department (Serrant v. 46th Precinct Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Serrant v. 46th Precinct Police Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CRYSTAL SERRANT, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-5964 (LTS) 46TH PRECINCT POLICE DEPARTMENT; HONORABLE JUDGE EMILY MORALES- ORDER TO AMEND MINERVA; HONORABLE JUDGE TARA COLLINS; HONORABLE JUDGE RUBEN MARTINO, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Crystal Serrant, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her federally protected rights. By order dated July 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a resident of Georgia, filed this complaint, in connection with events occurring between August 8, 2017, and August 10, 2017, against the following Defendants: (1) the “46th Precinct Police Department”; (2) the Honorable Judge Emily Morales-Minerva; (3) the Honorable Judge Tara Collins; and (4) the Honorable Judge Ruben Martino. The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On August 8, 2017, two detectives from the 46th Precinct, in Bronx County, arrested Plaintiff because her then-husband, Enqi Sang Real, falsely reported to the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office that she had “bruis[ed]” him. (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff “cried” and told Judge Martino that she was in a “domestic violence situation” with Real, and that there were ongoing family court proceedings between them, but Martino granted Real temporary custody of three of their seven children. (Id.) Real took the three children to Michigan and did not return for a February 2017 court date, but he showed up at Plaintiff’s mother’s home on July 12, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff made “frantic calls” to 911 that Real had come “to retrieve” their

other children, but the police never came, and Real left with the three children, and “no one help[ed]” her. (Id.) Family Court Judge Emily Morales-Minerva allegedly committed “judicial misconduct” and “railroaded” Plaintiff, and Judge Morales Minerva has a “judicial history of neglect” and should not have been assigned to preside over Plaintiff’s case. (Id.) Judge Tara Collins allegedly “approved [Real’s] false order of protection against [Plaintiff] which did not include all 7 children.” (Id.) Real called the 46th Precinct and demanded that they arrest Plaintiff, even though their 2 year-old twins were not included in the order of protection. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that her and her children “were trafficked.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she “accept[ed] an ADA to avoid further jail time.” (Id.)

There are approximately 100 pages of attachments to the complaint, including court records from Bronx County and in Michigan, legal bills, and photographs. Some of these attachments contain the full names and birthdates of Plaintiff’s children, and Real’s driver’s license and social security number. (Id. at 10-118.) Included in the attachments is an undated Consent Judgment of Divorce from Michigan. (ECF 103-112.) Plaintiff asserts claims of false arrest, “judicial misconduct,” “obstruction,” and violations of her civil rights and “maternal rights,” and she cites generally to New York State laws governing domestic violence and custody, and also to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c). (Id. ¶ I.A.) DISCUSSION A. Statute of limitations The Court construes Plaintiff’s constitutional claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims appear to be untimely. In the State of New York, there is a three-year limitations period for such claims. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-51 (1989). For claims of false arrest brought under section 1983, the applicable limitations period begins to run when the illegal arrest/confinement without legal process ends. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388-90 (claim of false arrest/false imprisonment under section 1983 accrues on the date when the illegal arrest/confinement without legal process begins, and the applicable limitations period beings to run when that arrest/confinement ends). Otherwise, claims under section 1983 generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. See, e.g., Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013); Teichmann v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., No.

21-CV-5082, 2022 WL 4237110, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2022) (discussion in the context of a procedural due process violation).

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Serrant v. 46th Precinct Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/serrant-v-46th-precinct-police-department-nysd-2023.