Self v. Hanson

305 F.2d 699, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 29, 1962
Docket16928_1
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 305 F.2d 699 (Self v. Hanson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Self v. Hanson, 305 F.2d 699, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625 (9th Cir. 1962).

Opinion

305 F.2d 699

Althea G. SELF, formerly Althea G. Williams, Appellant,
v.
C. F. HANSON, Deputy Commissioner, Thirteenth Compensation
District; Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., a corporation; Peter
Kiewit Sons, Inc., a corporation; and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees.

No. 16928.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 29, 1962.

Henry C. Clausen, Richard G. Burns, and Sheldon C. St. Clair, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Harold C. Nystrom, Acting Solicitor of Labor, Herbert P. Miller, Assistant Solicitor of Labor, Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., William H. Orrick, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen., Morton Hollander, Mark R. Joelson, Attorneys, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Cecil F. Poole, U.S. Atty., and Robert N. Ensign, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS, JERTBERG and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge.

There is a shore line highway on the Island of Guam which runs westerly about three miles from Agana to a place called Schroeder Junction, thence on to a finger-like peninsula called Cabras Island, thence the length of Cabras Island (two miles), continuing on top of Crystal Breakwater for its three-mile length, and finally terminating in a turn-around area at the west or seaward end of the break-water.

About 11:00 p.m. March 3, 1949, Althea G. Williams (now Self) and Alexander C. Muzzy were sitting in the cab of a small truck parked in the turnaround area. They had been there some twenty or thirty minutes when an army weapons carrier from nearby Harmon Air Force Base, running out of the control of its driver (one Corporal Seabourn), crashed into the right side of the cab of the truck at a point on the right door against which Mrs. Self was sitting. She suffered considerable spinal injuries, the permanence and seriousness of which remain disputed.

In attempting to fix liability on the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 1346, 2671 et seq., Mrs. Self has twice before placed her case before this court, Williams v. United States, 9 Cir., 215 F.2d 800, reversed 348 U.S. 926, 75 S.Ct. 338, 99 L.Ed. 726; Williams v. United States, 9 Cir., 248 F.2d 492, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 953, 78 S.Ct. 537, 2 L.Ed.2d 529, but we ultimately held the United States insulated from such liability by virtue of Corporal Seabourn's unauthorized use of the weapons carrier.

Now, in the posture of a claim for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,1 we are, for the third time, confronted with questions of authorized use and scope of employment-- but this time with respect to Mrs. Self and her employers Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., and Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., not to Corporal Seabourn and his employer, the United States. We now conclude that Mrs. Self should recover.2

To summarize this conclusion, it is our view that both Muzzy's and Mrs. Self's conduct was, at that time and place and in that vehicle, within the scope of their employers' authorization to such extent that, had they been the cause, not the victims, of the negligent driving, their employers would have been liable to injured third parties for their acts. We think the same rule applies in this compensation case.

Now, some more facts: In November, 1948, Mrs. Self, then 26 years of age and (we take it) unmarried, lived in Palo Alto, California. The Morrison-Knudsen and Peter Kiewit Companies (herein 'MK-PK,' as they were known on the island) had a joint construction contract to be performed in Guam. At Sausalito, about 40 miles from Palo Alto, they were recruiting stateside men and women to go to Guam to work for them. Mrs. Self, an experienced stenographer and clerk, became one of these people, entering into a written employment contract whose terms consumed some 28 pages of ordinary typing or 2 pages of find print. Mrs. Self was employed as a stenographer, and she was obligated to stay in Guam at least a year, although MK-PK were not required to keep her that long. For their part, MK-PK agreed to pay her a starting salary of $48 a week, to provide her room and board at $1.50 per day, and to transport her on the round-trip from Sausalito to Guam, although the 'homeward' leg of the journey was conditioned on her performing the contract.

On arrival in Guam she was given quarters in the women's compound at Edusa along with about 150 or 200 other women. The regular meals were at a nearby mess hall. Also, her work for eight hours a day (and usually overtime on Saturday) was performed at a nearby building in which MK-PK had space. About a week before the accident she had advanced from stenographer to Muzzy's secretary. Her salary, including overtime pay, had increased to about $68 a week. In the testimony Muzzy is described as 'part of the MK-PK 'brass' on the job.' His title was Superintendent of Supply Yards and Docks. Normally he worked eight hours a day, but was on 24-hour call.

The Edusa headquarters seems to have been ten to twelve miles northeast of Agana, and somewhere in between was the Harmon Air Force Base. Some weeks before the accident Mrs. Self had sought and obtained from MK-PK permission to teach evenings in a school for adults located across the road from the air base. Apparently it was sponsored by the 20th Air Force for air force and military personnel, their families, and civil service workers. Mrs. Self taught there four hours a night, four nights a week, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., at a salary of a dollar an hour.

There was no public transportation system available in the Edusa-Harmon area. One had to depend on rides either in government cars of military personnel or MK-PK cars and light trucks. Both seem to have been plentiful. (Apparently the army engineers and MK-PK used the same motor pool area at Edusa for their motor vehicles.) Muzzy had a permanent trip ticket. In writing, he was authorized to use the vehicles for recreational purposes without limit except to the island. (Of course, the agreement provided he was responsible for negligent damage to the vehicle and its loss.) And it seems apparent that MK-PK was maintaining the car and, we assume, furnishing the gasoline.3 Mrs. Self had taken and passed the quartermaster examination for a government 'driving license,' which apparently was required by MK-PK and the Engineers, who supplied the cars to MK-PK. She was authorized to drive passenger cars, station wagons and small trucks. She testified, and it seems uncontradicted, that she was authorized to draw a car, a trip at a time, for the same recreational purposes. However, there is no record of her drawing a car. Women, especially at night, were not encouraged to drive the cars.

The MK-PK vehicles were used regularly by employees to get to and from the Edusa school, all with the approval of MK-PK, and apparently as a fringe benefit to employees. It is apparent if you were an MK-PK employee you didn't take your car to Guam or buy one.

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Bluebook (online)
305 F.2d 699, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/self-v-hanson-ca9-1962.