Segar v. Ashcroft

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 27, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 1977-0081
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HENRY SEGAR, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civ. Action No. 77-0081 (EGS)

MERRICK B. GARLAND, 1 as U.S. Attorney General, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Over four decades ago, the Court held that the Drug

Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) discriminated against African-

American special agents in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Segar v.

Smith, No. 77-81, 1982 WL 214, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1982).

Since then, the parties have engaged in various forms of

litigation to effectuate the Court’s order enjoining the DEA

from engaging in discriminatory practices and requiring the DEA

to implement nondiscriminatory systems. See Segar v. Barr, No.

77-81, 2019 WL 2605591, at *1 (D.D.C. June 25, 2019).

1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the current Attorney General for the United States, Merrick B. Garland, is substituted as Defendant for former Attorney General of the United States, William P. Barr. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs for the period of litigation from June

1, 1996, to June 25, 2019. See Pls.’ Am. Mot. for Award of

Att’ys’ Fees and Costs (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 485 at 1. 2 Upon

careful consideration of the motion, the opposition, the reply

thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the

Court GRANTS in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs in the amount of $14,689,565.23.

I. Background 3

In 1981, the Court found that the DEA discriminated against

African-American agents with respect to promotions, enjoined the

agency from engaging in those discriminatory practices, and

required the agency to implement nondiscriminatory promotion

systems for certain Grade levels of agents. See Segar, 2019 WL

2605591, at *1. The parties created a “Working Group” to develop

and recommend promotion systems that would comply with the

Court’s order. See id. The Court also ordered the creation of

2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document. 3 This Background focuses on the procedural developments in the

case for the time period at issue in the current fee request— June 1, 1996, to June 25, 2019. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 1. More comprehensive descriptions of the case’s full history can be found in previous opinions. See, e.g., Segar, 2019 WL 2605591, at *1-3; R. & R., ECF No. 395 at 1-5 (recounting procedural history from 1977 onward to contextualize “outstanding issues” discussed in Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation).

2 the Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee to monitor

the DEA’s compliance with the Court’s order. See id. at *2.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in several rounds of

litigation over enforcement of and compliance with the Court’s

order. In 1997, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the DEA’s new

promotion system, alleging that it “continue[d] to discriminate

against African-American agents in violation of law and th[e]

Court’s Order.” See Op., ECF No. 35 at 2. The Court held a

hearing on the motion in late 1997 and in 1999 enjoined certain

parts of the DEA’s new promotion system, holding that the DEA

was “obligated to implement a Career Development Program to

reduce the acknowledged disparate impact” of their processes.

See id. at 22-23.

In 2004, Plaintiffs again sought to enjoin the DEA’s

promotion process for a specific branch of the agency,

culminating in briefing, oral argument, and a ten-day bench

trial. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 281 at 1. In March 2006, the Court

denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Injunction but ordered new

restrictions on Defendants’ promotion processes, see id.; and

Defendants appealed, see Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 288 at 1. The

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C.

Circuit”) vacated and remanded. See Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d

16 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for compliance and to

3 show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt based

on their alleged failures to adhere to the Court’s injunctions

regarding the DEA’s discriminatory promotion processes. See

Pls.’ Mot. for Compliance and to Show Cause Why Defs. Should Not

be Held in Contempt, ECF No. 303 at 1. The motion and several

other issues pending in the case were referred to Magistrate

Judge Facciola for resolution. See Minute Order (Aug. 22, 2014).

Magistrate Judge Facciola held an evidentiary hearing to resolve

the issues in late 2014, see Minute Entry (Oct. 27, 2024); and

subsequently prepared a Report and Recommendation regarding the

promotion processes at issue, the status of the Working Group,

the availability of a third-party vendor capable of validating

future promotions procedures, the continued oversight of the

DEA’s compliance with previous court orders, the calculation of

awards for individual relief, and the award for attorney’s fees,

see R. & R., ECF No. 395 at 5-14. In 2019, this Court adopted in

part Magistrate Judge Facciola’s Report and Recommendation and

granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a compliance order. See Order,

ECF No. 423 at 1. Relevant to the current motion, the Court also

ordered Plaintiffs to prepare and provide to Defendants “a

detailed request for attorney’s fees from the period of June

1996 to present.” Id.

4 In January 2020, the parties filed a joint status report

updating the Court on the open issues in the case, including

that the parties were unable to come to a global settlement that

would also resolve the issue of attorney’s fees. See Joint

Status Report, ECF No. 430 at 3. Plaintiffs filed an Amended

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees with attached exhibits on June 19,

2020. See Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File an Am. Mot. for Award of

Att’ys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. 443. In April 2023, the Court

granted Plaintiffs leave to file the amended motion. See Minute

Order (Apr. 26, 2023). 4 Defendants filed their opposition the

following month. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Am. Mot. for Award of

Att’ys’ Fees and Costs (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 487. And

Plaintiffs filed their reply thereafter. See Reply in Supp. of

Pls.’ Am. Mot. for an Award of Att’ys’ Fees and Costs (“Pls.’

Reply”), ECF No. 488. The motion is now ripe and ready for

adjudication. 5

4 The original Amended Motion, filed in 2020, was docketed at ECF No. 443 with attached exhibits. A new motion and copy of the previous memorandum (without the original exhibits) was docketed at ECF No. 485, in 2023 when this Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for leave. For clarity, the Court will only refer to ECF No. 485 when referencing the substance of Plaintiffs’ motion but will refer to the attached exhibits from the original motion when necessary. 5 In May 2023, pursuant to this Court’s directive, Plaintiffs

also submitted briefing on the individual relief owed to class members due to Defendants’ discriminatory actions. See Pls.’ Opening Brief on Individual Relief Owed to Class Members for Defs.’ Race Discrimination, ECF No. 486. In April 2024, Defendants notified the Court that the parties have reached an

5 II. Legal Standard for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Title VII allows a “prevailing party” to recover “a

reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). A

“reasonable fee” is one that is “adequate to attract competent

counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys.” West

v. Potter, 717 F.3d 1030, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Even when attorneys undertake Title

VII representation pro bono, they may recover a reasonable

attorney’s fee. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 900

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (“Nor is it relevant that a law firm

. . . originally undertook representation pro bono publico. We

see nothing inconsistent in prosecuting a case in the public

interest, agreeing not to charge one’s own client a fee and

thereafter seeking fees from the losing defendant.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

“The basic formula for calculating an attorney fee award”

is to multiply “the number of hours reasonably exp[e]nded in

“agreement in principle regarding Plaintiffs’ request for individual relief,” and were waiting on “formal approval” before presenting the agreement to this Court. Third Notice Regarding Pl.’s Notice of Updated Amount of Individual Relief, ECF No. 498. Plaintiffs subsequently updated the Court that this pending agreement did “not encompass the parties’ separate dispute over the payment of fees and costs for the work that plaintiffs’ counsel ha[d] done on this case over the past quarter-century.” Resp. to Notice Regarding Agreement in Principle, ECF No. 499. Accordingly, this Opinion only addresses the parties’ dispute over attorneys’ fees and does not address any arguments about individual relief owed to class members.

6 litigation by a reasonable hourly rate,” the total of which is

known as the “lodestar.” DL v. District of Columbia, 924 F.3d

585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The reasonableness of an hourly rate is determined by three

elements: (1) “attorney[] billing practices,” (2) “attorney[]

skill, experience, and reputation,” and (3) “prevailing market

rates in the relevant community.” Eley v. District of Columbia,

793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted). An attorney’s “usual billing rate is presumptively the

reasonable rate,” if that rate is “in line with those prevailing

in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Kattan ex rel.

Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In establishing the prevailing market rates, a fee

applicant bears the burden of “produc[ing] satisfactory

evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at

100 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[n]o

particular type of evidence can be considered gospel; ‘evidence

of the prevailing market rate can take many forms.’” DL, 924

F.3d at 589 (quoting Eley, 793 F.3d at 104 n.5).

7 To establish that a fee applicant’s reported hours are

reasonable, “[s]upporting documentation must be of sufficient

detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with

a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and

reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353

F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary” should be excluded from the fee submission. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also id. (“Hours

that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory

authority.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A fee applicant “bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award . . . and justifying the reasonableness

of the rates.” DL, 924 F.3d at 588 (internal quotation marks

omitted). If the fee applicant can clear that hurdle, then the

claimed fee is “presumed to be the reasonable fee” and “the

burdens shifts to the defendant to present equally specific

countervailing evidence if it seeks a different (presumably

lower) rate.” Id. at 588-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has warned that “the determination of

fees ‘should not result in a second major litigation.’” Fox v.

Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at

437). And a court’s goal should be to “do rough justice, not

8 . . . achieve auditing perfection.” Id.; see also id. (observing

that “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become

green-eyeshade accountants” and “may take into account their

overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating

and allocating an attorney’s time”).

A prevailing party’s attorney may also recover “reasonable”

costs as part of their attorney’s fee. See Castle v. Bentsen,

872 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (D.D.C. 1995) (“[T]he question is

whether the costs asserted are reasonable.”); see also Holbrook

v. District of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2004)

(“An attorney . . . is entitled to all expenses associated with

the litigation that [she] would normally expect to pass on to

fee paying clients, provided such costs are reasonably incurred

and reasonable in amount.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Costs such as “copying, faxing, and postage, are traditionally

considered part of a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Holbrook, 305

F. Supp. 2d at 46.

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs seek $14,234,016.55 in attorneys’ fees and

$770,750.91 in costs— a total request of $15,004,767.46—for the

23-years of litigation at issue. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at

1. Defendants oppose the motion, challenging the reasonableness

of Plaintiffs’ proposed rates, the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’

documented hours, and the reasonableness of some of Plaintiffs’

9 claimed costs. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 9, 17, 30.

Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fees are

“excessive” and “unsupported by the billing entries, which

reflect non-substantive clerical work, duplicative billing, and

overstaffing on routine projects.” Id. at 7. Plaintiffs respond

that all their claimed hours, rates, and costs are reasonable

and that their “voluntary reductions . . . more than offset any

actual shortcomings there may be with the motion and ample

supporting documentation.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 488 at 4.

The Court agrees fully with Plaintiffs’ arguments on the

reasonableness of their proposed rates and their costs. However,

with respect to the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ documented

hours, the Court concludes that two small reductions must be

made to account for: (1) excessive billing in Plaintiffs’ hours

related to preparing the current fee petition and (2) hours

billed by both attorneys and professional staff for work that

was purely clerical in nature.

A. Fees

1. Reasonableness of Rates

Defendants challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’

rates and argue that “the Court should instead adopt the rates

set forth in the Fitzpatrick Matrix.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487

at 9-10. Turning to the three relevant factors of Plaintiffs’

billing practices; the skill, experience, and reputation of its

10 firm’s attorneys; and the prevailing market rates for similar

litigation in the Washington, D.C. area, see Eley, 793 F.3d at

100; the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the proposed rates

are reasonable.

As Plaintiffs note, an attorney’s “usual billing rate is

presumptively the reasonable rate,” if that rate is “in line

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Kattan, 995 F.2d at 278 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Defendants do not challenge the skill, experience, or

reputation of Plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.

487 at 10 (arguing that WilmerHale is “not a typical law firm”

but rather is “one of the largest firms in the world” that “can

command sky-high rates for its services when it has clients that

are willing to pay for them”). Rather, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs fail to “provide any evidence of the prevailing

market rates for ‘similar services’—i.e., average rates for

multi-plaintiff employment discrimination suits or even generic

complex litigation—in the Washington D.C. market.” Defs.’ Opp’n,

ECF No. 487 at 13. Within its argument, Defendants discredit

Plaintiffs’ declarations from two partners at similarly large

law firms, arguing that “neither attorney supports [their]

position with comparable examples, or any example[s] at all of

fees earned in similar litigation.” Id.; see also id. at 14

11 (“[N]either declaration provides any discussion of even a single

‘pro bono’ employment discrimination case or the rates actually

recovered from a civil rights client or approved by a court in

any case.”).

However, Defendants misapply the applicable standard for

establishing the “prevailing market rates in the relevant

community.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that “‘evidence

of the prevailing market rate can take many forms’” and “[n]o

particular type of evidence can be considered gospel.” DL, 924

F.3d at 589 (quoting Eley, 793 F.3d at 104 n.5). The declaration

from John A. Freedman (“Mr. Freedman”), a partner and Senior Pro

Bono Counsel at Arnold & Porter, concluded that Plaintiffs’

“hourly rates requested [in this litigation] are well below the

prevailing market rates in the District of Columbia for

experienced counsel who handle complex civil litigation.” Pls.’

Ex. 2 (“Freedman Decl.”), ECF No. 443-3 ¶¶ 3, 22. Mr. Freedman

based his opinion on his extensive experience with “pro bono

civil rights litigation, including in the area of employment

discrimination” and his “deep understanding of how large law

firms staff litigation matters and how they bill for such

matters using hourly rates.” Id. ¶¶ 3-4; see also id. ¶ 3

(noting his familiarity with Arnold & Porter’s “hourly rates for

the firm’s attorneys” in his capacity as a partner and Senior

12 Pro Bono Counsel for the firm). Similarly, the declaration from

Jeffrey T. Green (“Mr. Green”), a partner and Firmwide Chair of

the Pro Bono Committee at Sidley Austin, concluded that “the

rates requested by WilmerHale are well within reasonable

bounds.” Pls.’ Ex. 3 (“Green Decl.”), ECF No. 443-4 ¶¶ 3, 13. He

based his opinion on his “broad experience, spanning many years,

with the market rates charged by counsel in Washington, D.C.”

Id. ¶ 7; see also id. ¶¶ 7-8 (describing his experience as

including “review[ing] invoices from counsel” at large law firms

and “setting and charging clients [Sidley Austin’s] own hourly

rates”). These types of declarations, which are based on an

attorney’s extensive personal knowledge of the prevailing market

rates for legal services in the relevant community, have been

consistently accepted as evidence supporting a reasonable

billing rate. See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 691 F.2d

514, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (accepting “affidavit[] attesting to

the prevailing market rate” as long as the “affiant avow[ed]

that the quoted rate is based upon personal knowledge about

specific rates charged by other lawyers or rates for similar

litigation” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted));

Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 13 (D.D.C. 2008)

(according firm’s “established billing rates” “a presumption of

reasonableness” based on two attorney declarations from partners

at other “large, international law firm[s]” regarding “rates of

13 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation in the D.C. legal community”), amended and vacated in

part on other grounds sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Bill

Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011).

Cf. Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 170 (D.D.C. 2005)

(rejecting proposed rate where suggestion was not supported by

an “affidavit by an attorney or law firm knowledgeable in the

activities litigated by plaintiffs”).

Defendants attempt to discredit the declarations by

pointing out that “neither attorney supports [their] position

with comparable examples, or any example at all of fees earned

in similar litigation.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 13.

However, declarations about the prevailing market rate for

similar services do not require such detail. See Jordan, 691

F.2d at 521 (specifically noting that “[t]here is no requirement

that the affidavit be replete with names of other attorneys or

firms or otherwise filed with minute details” (internal

Defendants also fault the declarations for failing to

“undert[ake] any survey of prevailing rates for employment

discrimination work, or even complex civil litigation work, in

the D.C. metropolitan area,” and instead simply using

“identified points of reference” from “their own AmLaw 100

firms.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 13-14. The Court is

14 unpersuaded by this argument. First, fee applicants are not

required to provide surveys of prevailing market rates to

establish the reasonableness of their requested rates. Providing

surveys or matrices of prevailing rates for services in a

certain area is one way of establishing the prevailing market

rate, but as the D.C. Circuit has stated, “[n]o particular type

of evidence can be considered gospel.” DL, 924 F.3d at 589.

Second, the prevailing market rate is based on the rates “in the

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at

100 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, given Plaintiffs’ firm’s status as an AmLaw 100

firm and the credentials and reputation of its lawyers as such,

see Pls.’ Ex. 4, ECF No. 443-5; the declarations from partners

familiar with services provided by lawyers of that caliber and

quality is especially relevant to establishing the reasonable

rates in this case. The Court therefore accepts the declarations

as “satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in

line with those prevailing in the community for similar services

by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation,” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100; and rejects Defendants’

argument that Plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide any evidence of

the prevailing market rates for ‘similar services,’” Defs.’

Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 13.

15 Plaintiffs frequently reference Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F.

Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 2008) in support of their claim that their

requested rates are reasonable, and in particular that their

evidence is sufficient to establish the prevailing market rate

for similar services. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 9-

11. In Miller, a district court in this circuit concluded that

WilmerHale’s “established billing scale” supplied “reasonable

hourly rates,” based in part on “affidavits from knowledgeable

local practitioners.” See Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 16-17.

Defendants argue that Miller is distinguishable on two grounds:

(1) that Miller involved a “qui tam action brought under the

False Claims Act” and (2) that WilmerHale, in the present case,

“has provided its services on a pro bono basis.” Defs.’ Opp’n,

ECF No. 487 at 12. As explained below, the Court concludes that

neither of Defendants’ arguments have merit.

First, on the qui tam nature of Miller, the court

specifically stated that “defendants ha[d] failed to demonstrate

that for purposes of calculating a reasonable hourly rate, qui

tam litigation differs in any meaningful way from other complex,

civil litigation that occurs in federal court.” See Miller, 575

F. Supp. 2d at 14-15. And courts have consistently considered

the litigation at issue in this case—Title VII litigation—

complex, civil litigation. See Craig v. District of Columbia,

197 F. Supp. 3d 268, 276-77 (D.D.C. 2016) (collecting cases).

16 Furthermore, Defendants do not argue that this case would not

fall under the umbrella of complex, civil litigation. Therefore,

the fact that Miller was a qui tam suit based on the False

Claims Act does not render it irrelevant to the fee petition at

issue in this case because both types of litigation—although

quite different in substance—have been classified as complex,

civil litigation for the purposes of determining appropriate

fees.

Furthermore, within its qui tam argument, Defendant states

that in Miller, the requested rates “were consistent with the

rates in the then-existing Laffey matrix,” whereas in the

present case, “WilmerHale’s rates far surpass those set forth in

market-based fee matrices.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 12.

However, in Miller, the Court specified that it was “merely

not[ing]” that the requested rates were in-line with the Laffey

matrix rates but that it “[did] not adopt this methodology.” See

Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 13 n. 21. In fact, the Court reasoned

that “[i]f non-conformity with updated USAO Laffey rates could

doom a petitioner’s request,” this would be inconsistent with

Supreme Court precedent requiring fee applicants to produce

satisfactory evidence of prevailing rates in the market. See id.

at 16. Therefore, a close reading of Miller reveals that not

only did the court not rely on the rates’ consistency with a fee

matrix for its holding, but also expressly disavowed using a

17 matrix to create a “ceiling on the rates courts can award

pursuant to fee-shifting statutes.” See id.

Second, Defendants attempt to distinguish Miller because

WilmerHale’s work in the current case was provided “on a pro

bono basis.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 12. Within this

argument, Defendants claim that “a principal reason the Court

blessed WilmerHale’s fees in [Miller’s] False Claims Act suit

was the commercial nature of its relationship with its client.”

Id. However, the court in Miller never made such a distinction.

On the pages cited by Defendants, the court in Miller rejected

the proposed presumption of creating a ceiling for rates based

on the Laffey matrix and went on to praise the “‘mega-law firm’-

quality representation” of WilmerHale’s lawyers. Miller, 575 F.

Supp. 2d at 16; see also id. (“By this Court’s assessment,

relator’s counsel—particularly the more junior trial team

members—acquitted themselves admirably.”). Nowhere within this

analysis does the court discuss the commercial nature of the

case or suggest that the rate should be different if the case

had been taken on a pro bono basis.

Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs’ evidence of the

firm’s billing practices. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs

failed to “demonstrate what rates are actually paid by clients

or realized by the firm,” and instead only derived rates by

“applying arbitrary discounts to its advertised billing rates

18 without citing any information or data on how often it realizes

its advertised rates or what discounts it frequently provides

clients on those high-dollar rates.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487

at 11. Turning to Plaintiffs’ evidence on the firm’s own billing

practices, WilmerHale Counsel Brian C. Smith (“Mr. Smith”)

submitted a declaration describing the practices. See Pls.’ Ex.

1 (“Smith Decl.”), ECF No. 443-2. He states that “WilmerHale’s

general practice is to charge clients on a monthly basis at its

standard hourly rates in effect at the time for work performed

in the preceding month,” although the clients in this case were

not so charged because of the “pro bono nature” of the

representation. Id. ¶ 13. Mr. Smith then explained how

WilmerHale “significantly reduced the requested hourly rates” in

this fee request “below the rates prevailing in the relevant

market in 2019.” Id. ¶ 18. He specified that Plaintiffs “are

requesting only $940 dollars per hour for partner time, a 30%

discount from WilmerHale’s current median partner rates” and

that for non-partners, “WilmerHale applied the lowest 2019

market hourly rate for each attorney in that category.” Id.

¶¶ 19-20. He explained that this practice deviates from

WilmerHale’s normal billing practice of charging based on an

associate’s seniority by year and that the discounts applied in

this case “resulted in significant reductions in some attorneys’

requested hourly rates, sometimes as much as $100 per hour.” Id.

19 ¶ 21; see also Pls.’ Ex. 5, ECF No. 443-6 (showing reduction

rates as high as 24.7% and $180 an hour for some associates).

Defendants disregard this evidence, arguing that Plaintiffs

fail to “demonstrate what rates are actually paid by clients or

realized by the firm.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 11. In

particular, Defendants argue that firms often “discount their

standard rates” and “do not always collect 100 percent of the

fees they ultimately bill . . . [so] reported rates surely

overstate the actual fees the law firms are paid.” Id. at 12

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, within this

critique, Defendants fail to acknowledge that Plaintiffs seek

discounted rates and not the full “market rates for paying

clients” that it usually charges. See Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2

¶ 21; Freedman Decl., ECF No. 443-3 ¶ 21 (describing “the

decision to use the lowest hourly rate for each category of

attorney” as evidencing “very conservative billing judgment”).

Furthermore, as noted above, two practitioners with extensive

knowledge about fees for similar services in Washington, D.C.,

have claimed that the fees Plaintiffs are actually requesting

are more than reasonable and even on the lower end of the market

for such services. See Freedman Decl., ECF No. 443-3 ¶ 21

(concluding that “the fees WilmerHale has requested represent

heavily discounted rates, well below the prevailing market rate

in the Washington, D.C. legal market, and below the amount the

20 firm would otherwise command in the market for similar legal

services”); Green Decl., ECF No. 443-4 ¶ 14 (“The rates charged

by WilmerHale for all timekeepers covered by this petition are

comparable to—and in many instances significantly below—the

prevailing market rates for attorneys of similar credentials and

experience. Indeed, they are below even discounted rates that

Sidley charges my clients.” (emphasis added)). This evidence as

a whole assuages any concern about Plaintiffs’ advertised

billing rate providing it a windfall over its normally recovered

fees. See Wilcox v. Sisson, No. 2-1455, 2006 WL 1443981, at *5

(D.D.C. May 25, 2006) (refusing to further lower billing rate

when attorney voluntarily lowered “the effective rates charged

. . . by 22%”); J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d

11, 31 (D.D.C. 2023) (holding that plaintiffs met their initial

burden of substantiating their fee request with sufficient

evidence despite defendants’ criticism of plaintiffs’ evidence

as “improperly focused on fees charged rather than payments

received”). Overall, the Court’s role is to assess whether

Plaintiffs’ requested rates are reasonable, not to police “data

on how often [WilmerHale] realizes its advertised rates or what

discounts it frequently provides clients on those high-dollar

rates,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 12. Therefore, the Court

concludes that Plaintiffs’ voluntary reductions in their

advertised billing rates alongside the declarations from several

21 knowledgeable practitioners in the Washington, D.C. legal

community attesting to the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’

requested rates satisfies Plaintiffs’ burden of producing

sufficient evidence of their entitlement to the requested rate.

See Eley, 793 F.3d at 100; DL, 924 F.3d at 588.

Since Defendants argue that the Fitzpatrick Matrix’s rates

should be used instead of Plaintiffs’ claimed rates, the Court

must now determine whether Defendants have “present[ed] equally

specific countervailing evidence” supporting their proposed,

lower rate. DL, 924 F.3d at 589 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Court concludes that Defendants have failed to

meet this burden.

The Fitzpatrick Matrix is a fee matrix based on “rates that

lawyers charged clients for litigating complex cases in [the

D.C.] District Court as determined from publicly filed fee

petitions and resulting court orders.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487

at 15-16 (citing Decl. of Brian T. Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick

Decl.”), ECF No. 487-1 ¶ 5). The data used to compile the matrix

included 419 unique lawyers in 84 unique cases from 2013 to

2020. See Fitzpatrick Decl., ECF No. 487-1 ¶ 11. Defendants note

that in a recent case, the Fitzpatrick Matrix was determined to

be superior to another, previously used matrix. See Defs.’

Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 16. In that case, J.T. v. District of

Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2023), the district court

22 determined that the Fitzpatrick Matrix was superior to a

previously used matrix for several reasons that are inapplicable

in this case. For example, the Court in J.T. determined that the

Fitzpatrick Matrix’s “underlying dataset ha[d] the clear benefit

of being much more recent,” in comparison to the other matrix

which was “almost 34 years” old. Id. at 32-33. However, in this

case, Plaintiffs seek rates at the firm’s 2019 billing rates—a

much more recent and directly applicable data set. See Pls.’

Mot., ECF No. 485 at 7 (“Plaintiffs seek reimbursement at

WilmerHale’s standard 2019 hourly rates—but with substantial

discounts.”). Additionally, the J.T. Court praised the “large

sample size” of the Fitzpatrick Matrix in comparison to the

other matrix. See J.T., 652 F. Supp. 3d at 33. But in this case,

which involves lawyers from, as Defendants put it, “one of the

largest firms in the world” that “markets itself as one of the

most preeminent law firms in the wor[l]d,” see Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF

No. 487 at 10; that large sample size is not necessarily

indicative of a similar quality of work, skill, experience, or

reputation. The Fitzpatrick Matrix takes into account the

average rate of a number of lawyers with varying credentials and

at varying types of firms to create its matrix. See Fitzpatrick

Decl., ECF No. 487-1 at ¶¶ 5-11. In contrast, the declarations

Plaintiffs provided in support of its proposed fees focused on

the work of firms and lawyers of similar caliber and reputation.

23 See, e.g., Freedman Decl., ECF No. 443-3 ¶ 16 (“I have compared

the specific hourly rates requested by WilmerHale to my firm’s

hourly rates, because Arnold & Porter competes in the same

market with WilmerHale for complex civil litigation.”); Green

Decl., ECF No. 443-4 ¶ 14 (“The rates charged by WilmerHale

. . . covered by this petition are comparable to—and in many

instances significantly below—the prevailing market rates for

attorneys of similar credentials and experience.” (emphasis

added)). Defendants fail to justify why a matrix that

encompasses a large variety of lawyers over a longer time period

provides “equally specific countervailing evidence” as

declarations specific to lawyers of a similar caliber of

representation using 2019 rates. See DL, 924 F.3d at 589.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants fail to meet

their burden and accepts Plaintiffs’ requested rates as

reasonable.

2. Reasonableness of Hours

Defendants also challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’

claimed hours. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

documented hours should be reduced because of: (1) “vague”

billing entries; (2) “redundant, excessive, or unnecessary” time

expended on several projects in particular and the case as a

whole; (3) the prevalent use of block-billing throughout the

time entries; and (4) the billing of time for “purely clerical

24 work.” See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 17. Plaintiffs respond

that Defendants’ proposed reductions are not appropriate “in

light of the numerous reductions in hours plaintiffs made to

their fee request voluntarily,” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 488 at 19;

and that most, if not all, of Defendants’ arguments “are . . .

meritless,” id. at 21.

Beginning with the issue of block-billing, Defendants argue

that the lodestar should be reduced by 10 percent because

“Plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in systemic block-billing.”

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 24. As the D.C. Circuit has noted,

block-billing, or “time records lump[ing] together multiple

tasks,” can make “it impossible to evaluate their

reasonableness.” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971. However, as

several courts in this circuit have acknowledged, “a party can

recover for block-billed tasks if there is ‘sufficient detail’

to ‘evaluate what the lawyers were doing and the reasonableness

of the number of hours spent on those tasks.’” Pursuing Am.’s

Greatness v. FEC, 463 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting

Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D.D.C.

2006)). The problem of block-billing is not simply lumped time

entries, but lumped time entries that “make it difficult to

determine the accuracy and reasonableness of billing entries,”

often resulting from “inadequate description[s]” of time

expended. Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 158; see also id. (refusing

25 to reduce fee petition with block-billing because “sufficient

detail ha[d] been provided so that [the Court] can evaluate what

the lawyers were doing and the reasonableness of the number of

hours spent on those tasks”); Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971

(reducing fee award where block-billing entries also “lack[ed]

adequate detail”).

Turning to the fee petition here, the Court agrees that

many of Plaintiffs’ time entries present a problem not simply of

lumping tasks together, but lumping tasks together in such a way

that the Court cannot evaluate the reasonableness of the hours

spent on those tasks. See Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 158. For the

most egregious examples, lawyers spent entire days on a variety

of vague tasks with a single time entry. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 8

(“Full Time Entries”), ECF No. 443-9 at 6 (logging 11.61 hours

with the entry “EDIT MOTION AND DRAW UP TRO/PI PAPERS; COMPLETE

DRAFT TRO/PI PAPERS; MULTIPLE CONFS W/LAKE AND BUTLER RE

FILINGS; TELECON WITH AUSA NYLAND RE SAME; EXAMINE FAX FROM

NYLAND; SEND LETTER TO SAME RE FILING; COMPLETE PAPERS AND

ASSEMBLE EXHIBITS”); id. at 15 (logging 8.70 hours with the

entry “CONFS W/HOLMES RE BRIEF; EXAMINE DRAFT OF SAME; WORK ON

BRIEF; TCON W/HOLMES AND SISKIN RE SAME; DRAFT/EDIT PORTIONS OF

BRIEF.”).

Although the Court agrees that these examples of block-

billing are indicative of the impermissible billing practices

26 that make it impossible for courts to examine the reasonableness

of a fee request, the Court also concludes that Plaintiffs’

voluntary reductions have accounted for the issue. In an

exercise of billing judgment, Plaintiffs proactively combed

through over 480 pages of billing records and “reduced by ten

percent ‘block billed’ time entries.” See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No.

485 at 14; Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2 ¶ 25. This voluntary

reduction is identical in percentage to the reductions imposed

by courts that have reduced fees for systemic block-billing

concerns. See, e.g., Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (reducing

lodestar by 10 percent for block-billing). Accordingly, the

Court declines to impose additional reductions for Plaintiffs’

block billing. See Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 557

F. Supp. 3d 65, 90 (D.D.C. 2021) (declining “to impose a

further, across-the-board reduction” given that fee applicant

had previously “agreed to reduce its fee request”); Driscoll v.

George Washington Univ., 55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 116 (D.D.C. 2014)

(concluding that “any insufficient documentation has been

sufficiently accounted for by plaintiffs’ counsel’s voluntary

reduction of the final lodestar figure by 5%”).

Turning to Defendants’ related objection regarding “vague”

billing entries, Defendants appear to make a two-fold argument

about Plaintiffs’ billing practices. First, Defendants argue

that various entries “only vaguely describe meetings,

27 conferences, and other communications, but provide no

explanation whatsoever for their occurrence.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF

No. 487 at 19. Second, Defendants argue that entries regarding

“substantive work” are also insufficient because of their vague

descriptions. See id.

Beginning with Defendants’ argument regarding

communications, the Court agrees that many of the entries

Defendants identify in their attached Exhibit 1 are “entries

akin to those” criticized by the D.C. Circuit in Michigan v.

EPA, 254 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.

487 at 19; Michigan, 254 F.3d at 1093-94 (concluding that

billing “entries for conference calls with individuals” who were

named but “not further identified in the petition” were

insufficient because “the reasonableness of these calls . . .

cannot be determined”). These entries discuss meetings or calls

with individuals without noting the nature or purpose of those

communications, making it difficult for the Court to determine

whether those communications were reasonable in light of the

case overall. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 487-2 at 2 (“E-

MAIL W/GOLDSTEIN”); id. at 4 (“TELECONS WITH GILL AND GELFOND”).

However, these issues are not so prevalent as to warrant a

reduction of the lodestar for several reasons. First, most of

the entries identified have already been voluntarily discounted

by Plaintiffs for block-billing concerns or “time billed by

28 partners that could be characterized as supervising junior

attorneys,” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 14. See Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF

No. 487-2 at 2-5. Furthermore, when the Court aggregates the

hours identified in Exhibit 1, the total is slightly over 100

hours. See Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 487-2. 6 These hours therefore

represent less than half of 1 percent of the total hours

documented by Plaintiffs in this fee petition. See Full Time

Entries, ECF No. 443-9 at 482 (listing total hours as 24,446.50

hours). Since the Supreme Court has discouraged trial courts

from becoming “green-eyeshade accountants” in pursuit of

“auditing perfection,” see Fox, 563 U.S. at 838; the Court

concludes that even though Plaintiffs have, on occasion, failed

to adequately document the substance of their meetings, the

problem is not so rampant as to warrant a reduction of the

6 Although Defendants argue that Exhibit 1 provides a “non- exhaustive selection of representative examples pulled from Plaintiffs’ billing records,” Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 19; the Court notes that the entries in Exhibit 1 seem to cover the entire timespan of requested attorneys’ fees, with the latest entry from May 2019, see Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 487-2 at 5. Furthermore, a brief overview of Plaintiffs’ billing records reveals that most communications were documented with sufficient detail for the Court to determine what the subject of the communications were and therefore evaluate the reasonableness of the time spent. See, e.g., Full Time Entries, ECF No. 443-9 at 55 (“TELECONS WITH FENNER RE 6/14 MEETING WITH ADMINISTRATOR.”); id. at 202 (“TELECONFERENCE WITH JACOBS AND WATERS RE HEARING AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE.”); id. at 433 (“E-MAILS WITH TEAM MEMEBRS RE ASKING DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY NARATIVE OF THEIR LIVE WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY AT UPCOMING HEARING”). Thus, the Court concludes that Exhibit 1 provides a fair estimate of the full extent of the problem Defendants identify.

29 lodestar and has otherwise been adequately remedied by

Plaintiffs’ voluntary reductions.

Moving next to Defendants’ argument about inadequate

documentation of substantive work, the Court also concludes that

the issue does not warrant reduction of the lodestar.

Defendants, in their Exhibit 2, provide the Court with “examples

of inadequately detailed time-entries involving substantive

work.” See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 19. However, most of

Defendants’ chosen examples are not indicative of the kind of

time entries that “make[] it impossible for the court to verify

the reasonableness of the billings, either as to the necessity

of the particular service or the amount of time expended on a

given legal task.” In re Sealed Case, 890 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C.

Cir. 1989). In Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d

962 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the D.C. Circuit held that certain time

records “lack[ed] adequate detail” when attorneys “billed simply

for ‘research’ and ‘writing’ . . . the purposes of which [tasks

were] not provided.” Id. at 971; see also Cobell, 407 F. Supp.

2d at 158 (criticizing entries “such as: ‘research read cases;

searched Westlaw’ . . . ; ‘prepare for trial’ . . . ; ‘further

trial preparation and document review’ and ‘trial preparation’”

for providing “little or no reference to the substance of the

work claimed” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Craig, 197 F.

Supp. 3d at 280 (criticizing “billing entries only vaguely

30 describe[d as] ‘preparing for trial’” as “provid[ing] no detail

or specificity from which the Court could ascertain whether the

preparations were reasonably expended or, instead, were

unnecessarily duplicative”). In Exhibit 2, some entries clearly

fall into the category of deficient entries described in Role

Models. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 487-3 at 2 (“RESEARCH

REPLY BRIEF.”); id. at 4-5 (“TRIAL PREP.” and “PREPARE FOR

TRIAL”). However, many more meet the required level of detail to

allow the Court to assess the nature and reasonableness of the

work documented. For example, time entries like “RESEARCH RE

DISPARATE IMPACT,” “READING DEA REPORTS AND RESEARCHING EEOC

PROVISIONS,” and “REVIEW O’FLANAGAN’S REPLY RE MOTION FOR NON-

BINDING ARBITRATION; FIND STATUTE ON WESTLAW AND E-MAIL TO

O’FLANAGAN,” id. at 1-2; all describe, at the very least, the

general subject of the substantive work the attorneys engaged

in. See Nat’l Assoc. of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675

F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A] fee application need not

present the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise

activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific

attainments of each attorney.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Furthermore, similar to Defendants’ examples from

Exhibit 1, about half of the time entries have already been

voluntarily discounted by Plaintiffs for block-billing. See

Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 487-3 at 1-5. Therefore, when looking at

31 the entries the Court agrees do not provide sufficient detail

and also have not already been voluntarily discounted by

Plaintiffs, the Court calculates that these entries amount to,

at best, less than half of the hours identified in Exhibit 2—or

roughly 150 hours. These hours then amount to less than 1% of

the total hours sought by Plaintiffs. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No.

485 at 11. Since a brief review of the full billing records show

that this is not a systemic problem, the Court concludes that an

across the board reduction of the lodestar is not warranted. Cf.

Craig, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 278 (“A fixed, percentage reduction

may be warranted when a large number of billing entries suffer

from one or more deficiencies.”); Role Models, 353 F.3d at 973.

Rather, it appears that these isolated issues of insufficient

descriptions in the larger context of the full fee petition and

the fact that the Court does not find the overall award to be

excessive, have already been largely accounted for in

Plaintiffs’ voluntary reductions. Therefore, the Court will not

issue additional reductions in search of “auditing perfection.”

Fox, 563 U.S. at 838.

Defendants next challenge Plaintiffs’ hours for “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” time expended in general

and on several matters in particular. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.

487 at 21. Looking to Defendants’ general concern first,

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel “staffed the cases

32 inefficiently,” billing for “36 different attorneys, many of

whom had only limited roles.” Id. In the full context of the

case, the Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ fee request covers over

two decades of litigation. As another court in this district

noted, “one would expect some turnover in assigned personnel”

when cases are unusually long and a firm’s “ability to leverage

additional human resources as the case’s demands change[] may

actually have rendered its representation more efficient.”

Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 41. Furthermore, in this case,

Plaintiffs voluntarily excluded from the hours total, “any

attorney or staff member who worked fewer than 15 hours on the

matter” as well as time “for any summer associate,” which in

total accounted for over 800 hours of time. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No.

485 at 13; Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2 ¶¶ 23-24. Defendants in

particular point to two attorneys who only worked on the case

for a single month each in 2002 and 2010 respectively,

criticizing their hours as unnecessary because much of the time

was spent reviewing and writing summaries of the case. See

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 21. While the Court would not

ordinarily consider such time productive in an easier or shorter

case, the two-decades long litigation at issue here presents

different considerations. The Court expects that such

litigation, given its time and complexity with the ongoing

monitoring of the injunction, would require attorneys new to the

33 case to devote some time to reviewing and later summarizing for

other attorneys, the case’s history. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

have proactively accounted for any inefficient staffing by

eliminating over 800 hours of work and “exclude[ing] time spent

transitioning lawyers on and off the matter.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF

No. 485 at 13; Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2 ¶ 25. Therefore, the

Court does not agree that Plaintiffs’ staffing created

inefficiencies and lead to redundant or excessive work. See

Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (“[W]ithout evidence of

duplication, the Court will not speculatively second-guess

Wilmer Hale’s staffing decisions in the invited manner.”).

Next, Defendants argue that “[m]uch of the billing [was]

also excessive.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 21. However,

Defendants’ sole example of time spent responding to the Court’s

Minute Order from May 25, 2017, is poorly chosen. As Plaintiffs

point out, although the “Minute Order was only two sentences

long,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 22; this Court asked the

parties for a “joint status report informing the Court which

objections to the [Magistrate Judge’s most recent] Report and

Recommendation remain at issue for resolution” and “whether

supplementary briefing is necessary in view of the notices

filed.” See Minute Order (May 25, 2017). Furthermore, the final

joint status report revealed that the “parties ha[d] different

views as to which issues remain to be resolved” and so presented

34 their views separately, with Plaintiffs providing a

comprehensive list of remaining issues and brief, yet

informative context for several of the concerns. See Joint

Status Report, ECF No. 416 at 1-3. Given the level of

coordination required—both internally among Plaintiffs’ team and

externally with Defendants—to produce this information, the

Court does not agree that the time spent on the report was

“beyond what was reasonably necessary.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.

487 at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, although Defendants note that Plaintiffs had

“[s]ix attorneys” participate in a meeting to discuss the

report, Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 22; that level of

participation seems to be an isolated incident. Plaintiffs

specified that part of its discounting of hours included only

accounting for “two lawyers’ attendance at any meeting,

deposition, or hearing that more than two lawyers attended, even

though the additional lawyers’ attendance was, in counsel’s

view, often if not always necessary and reasonable.” See Pls.’

Mot., ECF No. 485 at 14; Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2 ¶ 25. It

appears that this single instance of billing for six attorneys

was an isolated incident that was overlooked by Plaintiffs in

their own pursuit of avoiding excessive or redundant billing in

the fee petition. As the billing entries of the attorneys were

small—varying from 0.7 to 1.3 hours—the Court does not conclude

35 that this oversight warrants reduction of the overall lodestar,

see Fox, 563 U.S. at 838; and Defendants do not point to any

other instances of potentially excessive staffing to suggest

that this example was indicative of a larger problem despite

Plaintiffs’ claims of combing through its billing records and

accounting for the issue. Therefore, the Court does not agree

that the lodestar should be reduced to account for Plaintiffs’

alleged excessive staffing.

Defendants next challenge Plaintiffs’ hours for

“nonproductive work,” specifically, the hours spent on the

current fee petition. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 22. The Court

agrees that the hours presented for work on the current fee

petition are excessive and will reduce the identified amount by

two-thirds.

Defendants’ Exhibit 4 presents a list of hours Plaintiffs’

counsel dedicated to the fee petition. See Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF No.

487-5. The entries begin in 2005 and conclude in 2016, totaling

520.1 hours and $307,537.10. See id. 7 Defendants note that this

total alone is excessive, citing cases where fee petitions that

took less than half the amount of time were deemed excessive and

7 In Exhibit 4, Defendants provide a total for only the hours and corresponding cost for time spent on the fee petition from December 9, 2014, until November 14, 2016. See Def.’s Ex. 4, ECF No. 487-5 at 11. The Court’s totals reflect the full time spent on the fee petition from April 14, 2005, to November 14, 2016.

36 reduced by 50%. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 23-24. As

Plaintiffs point out, neither of the cited cases involved

decades long litigation, and thus neither fee petition required

combing through decades of attorney hours. Although the Court

agrees that Plaintiffs’ petition would be expected to account

for some extra time combing through years of attorney billing

records, the over thirteen weeks of attorney time billed is

still excessive even in the context of the case as a whole.

Another troubling aspect of Plaintiffs’ hours is that a

substantial amount of the work in preparation for the current

fee petition is not documented. Plaintiffs state that they are

currently seeking fees for “litigation between June 1, 1996, and

June 25, 2019 (inclusive).” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 1.

However, the amended fee petition was filed in June of 2020. See

Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File an Am. Mot. for Award of Att’ys’

Fees and Costs, ECF No. 443. And the declarations supporting the

motion were executed in June of 2020 as well. See, e.g., Smith

Decl., ECF No. 443-2 at 10. Plaintiffs’ request to amend their

original fee petition explains that the updated petition

“provides additional documentation to support certain aspects of

their fee request” and “corrects a clerical error in the

original motion that led to the lodestar being calculated based

on WilmerHale’s 2016 rates instead of discounted rates based on

its 2019 rates.” See Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File an Am. Mot.

37 for Award of Att’ys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. 443 at 1. These

changes seem to have required a significant amount of additional

work. See id. (explaining that the “amended motion attaches: (1)

declarations explaining that plaintiffs’ requested hourly rates

are reasonable; (2) an exhibit with additional detail about the

WilmerHale attorneys who have worked on this matter; and (3)

invoices with additional detail on expert costs that plaintiffs

incurred in seeking to enforce this Court’s orders”). In this

context, the request for more than 500 hours of work on the

petition is indeed excessive.

Nevertheless, the hours in Defendants’ Exhibit 4 show some

work that contributed to the preparation of the current fee

petition. For example, time was spent reviewing billing records

over several years and preparing exhibits for the petition. See,

e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF No. 487-5 at 4 (“Review[ing] 2015

billing records for fee petition”); id. at 6 (“Prepare exhibits

re requested costs and expenses; draft templates for exhibits re

fees”). Some time was also spent strategizing how to exercise

billing judgment—including deciding on the discounts that have

now eased the Court’s own process in assessing the fee petition.

See, e.g., id. at 8 (“Edit fee petition to reflect using the

lowest current billing rates and edit the spreadsheet for

clarity”). Therefore, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to recover

one-third of their requested hours in relation to the

38 preparation of the fee petition, which amounts to $102,512.37,

but will not otherwise reduce the lodestar. 8

Defendants’ last contention on the issue of reasonable

hours is the “billed time performing work that is purely

clerical in nature.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 27. Although

Plaintiffs claimed that they excluded “time spent on

administrative matters, such as coordinating calls and meetings”

and “time spent by project assistants on purely clerical matters

that did not require knowledge of the facts or law of the case,”

Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 13 (citing Smith Decl., ECF No. 443-2

¶ 25), Defendants argue that “the billing records still include

numerous instances of both attorneys and staff billing time for

non-compensable clerical tasks,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at

28. Defendants also compiled a list of “non-exhaustive . . .

representative examples of these entries” as its Exhibit 5. Id.

Defendants ask this Court to “reduce the lodestar of project

assistants and paralegals by 50% and reduce the lodestar for

attorneys by 5%” to account for the issue. Id. at 30. After

reviewing the billing records, the Court concludes that such a

high reduction is not warranted. Rather, the Court will reduce

the time identified in Exhibit 5 by 25%.

8 For computational clarity, the Court will simply reduce the total fees by two-thirds of the claimed amount from Exhibit 4—a reduction of $205,024.73.

39 Beginning with the extent of the issue, Defendants argue

that Exhibit 5 is a “non-exhaustive” list of examples of time

entries where support staff and attorneys billed for purely

clerical work. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 28. Upon a

comprehensive review of the timesheets, the Court disagrees. In

the vast majority of entries, the time billed by paralegals and

project assistants was more than merely clerical work, requiring

specialized knowledge of the case and making decisions based

upon that knowledge. See, e.g., Full Time Entries, ECF No. 443-9

at 5 (paralegal billing entry for “REVEW MATERIALS ON

PROMOTIONS; PREPARE SYNOPSIS AND STATUS CHART.”); id. at 99

(paralegal billing entry for “QUALITY CHECK MULTIPLE SETS OF

DEFENDANTS 4TH DOCUMENT PRODUCTION; CHRON AND DISTRIBUTE SAME TO

TEAM; UPDATE PLEADINGS FILE AND INDEX.”); id. at 223 (project

assistant billing entry for “UPDATE DISCOVERY AND FILINGS BINDER

WITH PROPOSED ORDERS FILED BY ORDER OF THE COURT AT 4/12

HEARING.”). Furthermore, Exhibit 5 provides examples up until

2016 and the Court’s independent review does not suggest that

the problem stems far beyond the examples provided. The Court

therefore concludes that Exhibit 5 provides a strong estimate of

the scope of the problem at issue.

Turning to the substance of Exhibit 5, the examples add up

to 706 hours and $260,710. See Defs.’ Ex. 5, ECF No. 487-6. This

amounts to about 3% of the total hours requested in the

40 petition. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 11 (“seek[ing]

reimbursement for just over 19,479 hours of attorney time and

4,966 hours of support-staff time”). However, not all of the

examples from Exhibit 5 indicate non-compensable hours spent on

purely clerical work. For example, many of the billing entries

are also blocked time entries, with clerical tasks amounting to

only some of the time billed. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 5, ECF No.

487-9 at 2 (associate billing entry for “DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR

PLAINTIFF CLASS; FAX SAME TO BEAVER”); id. at 4 (associate

billing entry for “REVIEW DOCUMENTS FOR DOCUMENT RELEVANT TO

UPCOMING DEPOSITIONS; ATTEND TO VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS;

COMMUNICATE WITH GIL RE: RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES.”); id.

(associate billing entry for “REVIEW DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANTS’

LATEST PRODUCTION; PREPARE WITNESS FILES; ATTEND TO CASE

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.”). Deficiencies in these entries have

already been reduced by Plaintiffs for block-billing.

However, some of the entries suffer from a lack of clarity,

such that the Court cannot determine whether the task was purely

administrative or not. For example, many of the support staff

entries involve organizing various documents, but the entries

are not clear as to whether that organization required

specialized knowledge of the case. See, e.g., id. at 5 (project

assistant billing entry for “ORGANZE PLEADINGS BINDER AND UPDATE

PLEADINGS INDEX.”); id. at 6 (paralegal billing entry for “COPY,

41 ORGANIZE AND PREPARE RYAN DEPOSITION EXHIBITS PER E. GREGORY.”).

Cf. Robinson v. District of Columbia, 61 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67

(D.D.C. 2014) (concluding that task which “required evaluation

of individual documents and separating useful documents from

non-useful documents” as “not . . . mere clerical work”). Even

if the work conducted was beyond clerical work, these entries

fall short of Plaintiffs’ obligation to provide the Court with

“well-documented claims.” Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 763,

767 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, as noted previously in this section’s discussion

about vague time entries, the majority of these entries have

already been discounted for block-billing or otherwise accounted

for in Plaintiffs’ voluntary reductions.

Finally, Exhibit 5 does list a few entries that are clearly

only clerical in nature. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 5, ECF No. 487-6

at 8 (senior associate billing entry for “FILL OUT PAPERWORK TO

GET ACCESS TO ECF”); id. (senior associate billing entry for

“CONDUCT FILING OF REPLY"). See also Michigan, 254 F.3d at 1095-

96 (concluding that tasks like filing documents at courthouse

“could be undertaken by clerical, not legal personnel” and thus

should be deducted from the fee award).

Thus, looking at Exhibit 5 as a whole, the Court concludes

that roughly a quarter of the time documented represents time

spent on purely clerical tasks that have not already been

42 discounted by Plaintiffs through their voluntary reductions. The

Court will therefore subtract one-quarter of Exhibit 5’s total

compensation amount—$65,177.50—from the lodestar. See Beckwith

v. District of Columbia, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017)

(choosing to reduce fee award for time billed by certain

personnel by a set percentage when parties did not “parse out

which tasks [billed were] clerical and which [were] not . . .

[r]ather than ‘nit-pick’ through every time entry or deny

reimbursement for every charge”).

B. Costs

Plaintiffs seek $770,750.91 in costs for the over two

decades of litigation at issue. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 485 at 15.

Defendants challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ claimed

costs only for “printing and photocopying,” which Defendants

argue were “billed at rates in excess of the customary rates

charged in the District” for years. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at

30. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs charged

“$1.10 per page between June 1996 and January 2003” for

printing, $0.20 per page between June 1996 and October 2004 for

copying, and $0.20 per page between January 2003 and November

2004 for printing. Id. at 31. Defendants also state that

Plaintiffs have “always charged $1.00 per page” for printing and

copying in color. Id. Defendants argue that such rates are

clearly excessive since courts in this circuit have determined

43 that $0.15 per page suffices for printing and copying expenses,

raising the rates to $0.25 for the same services in color. Id.;

see Salazar v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, 2014 WL

12695696, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (reducing

“copying/scanning/printing rates to .15/page” based on other

district courts in the circuit).

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument because their claims

about Plaintiffs’ charges are not supported by the evidence.

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 provides a detailed, over 650-page list

of charges that accrued to accumulate Plaintiffs’ total request

for over $770,000 in costs. See Pls.’ Ex. 10 (“Pls.’ Costs”),

ECF No. 443-11. As Defendants note, Plaintiffs do not charge

specifically for “printing” between 1996 and 2005, instead

charging for “Network Services/Word Processing.” See Defs.’

Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 31 n.5; Pls.’ Costs, ECF No. 443-11 at 514

(charge of “NETWORK SERVICES/WORD PROCESSING” changed to

“DOCUMENT PRINTING” in early May 2005). Defendants argue that

this charge amounted to between $0.20 to $1.10 per page of

printing services between June 1996 to November 2004. See Defs.’

Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 31. However, the details from Exhibit 10

show that the “Network Services/Word Processing” charge does not

come with a specific number of pages associated with each

charge. See, e.g., Pls.’ Costs, ECF No. 443-11 at 130

(describing services from 11/12/2002 as “NETWORK SERVICES/WORD

44 PROCESSING – WORD PROCESSING CHARGES FOR 11/12/2002”).

Furthermore, multiple charges of varying amounts accrued on the

same date, suggesting that each entry is not an entry for each

page printed. See, e.g., id. (charging between $1.10 and $3.30

for eight charges of “NETWORK SERVICES/WORD PROCESSING” on

11/12/2002). Similarly, although Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs charged $0.20 for standard copying services between

June 1996 and October 2004, see Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 487 at 31;

the charges for “DUPLICATING” during this time period both

varied and did not have a page number associated with each

charge. See Pls.’ Costs, ECF No. 443-11 at 130 (charging between

$0.80 to $67.80 for “DUPLICATING” services provided on

11/12/2002). The same is also true for color printing services.

The charges for color printing began in earnest in 2007, but

again, the charges do not specify a number of pages and the

amounts varied in each entry. See, e.g., id. at 559 (charging

between $25.00 and $153.00 for “DOCUMENT PRINTING COLOR”

services provided on 09/05/2007). Thus, the evidence from

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10 does not clearly support Defendants’

claim that Plaintiffs overcharged for copying and printing

services. And Plaintiffs, in their reply brief, specifically

assert that they charged “not . . . more than $0.20 per page for

standard printing and copying costs throughout the relevant

period.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 488 at 24. Finally, looking at the

45 ultimate question of reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ claimed

costs, the Court does not conclude that $205,451.16 in printing

expenses for over two decades of litigation is per se

unreasonable. See Holbrook, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (approving

costs claimed by plaintiff when “they appear[ed] modest and

reasonable on their face”). Therefore, the Court rejects

Defendants’ argument and will allow Plaintiffs the full amount

of their claimed costs.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the court GRANTS in part

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, see ECF No.

485. The Court slightly reduces Plaintiffs’ proposed amount of

$15,004,767.46 for excessive billing in preparing the fee

petition and instances of billing entries representing purely

clerical work. Those reductions are for $250,024.73 and

$65,177.50, respectively. The Court will allow Plaintiffs to

recover a total of $14,689,565.23. An appropriate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge September 27, 2024