Segal v. Paramount Pictures

841 F. Supp. 146, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, 1993 WL 546980
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 30, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 92-3808
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 841 F. Supp. 146 (Segal v. Paramount Pictures) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Segal v. Paramount Pictures, 841 F. Supp. 146, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, 1993 WL 546980 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ROBRENO, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendants for alleged copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, I will grant defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 1983, at age 22, plaintiff Samuel Segal (“Segal”) submitted a screenplay to an executive at Paramount Pictures Corporation (“Paramount”). Before sending the screenplay to Paramount, Segal had registered his screenplay with the United States Copyright Office. Segal’s screenplay, entitled Star Trek TV: Inside the Klingon Empire, was based on the popular television and motion picture series Star Trek that Paramount had produced since 1966, when the television series premiered. At the time of Segal’s submission, Paramount’s latest release in the series was the 1982 motion picture sequel, Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. Segal has never been an employee of Paramount; he has never had any contractual relationship with Paramount; and Paramount has never solicited any submissions from him. Segal, nonetheless, hoped that Paramount would read his screenplay and offer to produce a motion picture based on this script.

Instead, Paramount returned the screenplay to Segal in July 1983, explaining that the studio was in the process of developing its own Star Trek TV movie and that Paramount could not consider his screenplay. Paramount subsequently released the third installment of the motion picture series, Star Trek III: The Search for Spock, in 1984. In *148 1986, the studio released Star Trek TV: The Voyage Home, followed by Star Trek V: The Final Frontier in 1989 and Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country in 1991.

In 1992, Segal initiated this action, alleging that Paramount’s 1991 release of Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country (“The Undiscovered Country ”) infringed his copyright on the screenplay Star Trek IV: Inside the Klingon Empire ("Inside the Klingon Empire ”) which he had submitted to Paramount in 1983. Segal joined four individual defendants in the infringement suit: Leonard Nimoy, a lead actor, executive producer, and developer of The Undiscovered Country; Nicholas Meyer, the movie’s director and one of its writers and developers; Denny Martin Flinn, one of the movie’s writers; and Ralph Winter, a producer of the movie.

II. DISCUSSION

In Count I of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges copyright infringement; in Counts II and III he claims unfair competition and unjust enrichment, respectively; and in Count IV he alleges copyright infringement based on a theory of joint work. To prove copyright infringement, plaintiff must show that he owned a copyright on the screenplay of Inside the Klingon Empire and that defendants copied his screenplay in producing The Undiscovered Country. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877, 93 L.Ed.2d 831 (1987). A claimant may prove copying circumstantially by showing both that the two works at issue are substantially similar and that the allegedly infringing party had access to the allegedly infringed work. See id. at 1231-32.

Defendants contend that with respect to plaintiffs claim of copyright infringement, summary judgment against plaintiff is appropriate on two independent grounds. First, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to present specific facts showing a genuine issue as to whether Segal’s Inside the Klingon Empire and Paramount’s The Undiscovered County are substantially similar. Second, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to present specific facts showing a genuine issue as to whether the developers and producers of The Undiscovered Country had access to Inside the Klingon Empire. 1 After reviewing the standard for summary judgment, I shall consider both of defendants’ arguments, after which I shall discuss plaintiffs claim of joint work and his pendent state law claims.

A. Standard for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 366 (3d Cir.1990). The moving party bears the initial burden of pointing out the absence of genuine issues of material fact, but summary judgment should be granted against a party that fails to show “the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleadings, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

B. Substantial Similarity.

Substantial similarity is premised upon two findings. In particular, there must *149 be sufficient similarity between the two works at issue to conclude that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted work in producing the allegedly infringing work. See Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232. Second, there must be sufficient intrinsic similarity for an ordinary lay observer to conclude that there has been an unlawful appropriation. Id.

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841 F. Supp. 146, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1949, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18316, 1993 WL 546980, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/segal-v-paramount-pictures-paed-1993.