Fulks v. Knowles-Carter

207 F. Supp. 3d 274, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123150, 2016 WL 4735783
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 11, 2016
Docket16 Civ. 4278 (JSR)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 207 F. Supp. 3d 274 (Fulks v. Knowles-Carter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fulks v. Knowles-Carter, 207 F. Supp. 3d 274, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123150, 2016 WL 4735783 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

JED S. RAKOFF, United States District Judge.

By bottom-line Order dated August 31, 2016, this Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The pleadings allege that defendants’ distribution of a film trailer (the “Trailer”) and film itself (the “Film”) promoting the release of the musical album “Lemonade” infringe plaintiffs copyright in the short film “Palinoia.” This Opinion explains the reasons for its ruling and directs the entry of final judgment.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges copyright infringement, “the works themselves supersede and control contrary descriptions of them, including any contrary allegations, conclusions or descriptions of the works contained in the pleadings.” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The allegations of the SAC relevant to the motion to dismiss are as follows. Plain[278]*278tiff Matthew Fulks is an independent filmmaker and creative director at a popular television station. SAC ¶¶ 1-2, EOF No. 26. In July 2014, plaintiff completed a seven-minute short film entitled Palinoia, which depicts “the pain of a tumultuous relationship.” Id. ¶ 3. The short film consists of “seemingly unrelated visuals in rapid montage, with the recitation of a poem used as voiceover against a distinctive soundtrack.” Id. ¶ 4. The protagonist is a Caucasian male.1 An unseen individual speaks French in the background of several scenes, id ¶¶ 4, 57, and there are English subtitles.2

In April 2016, defendants aired the Trailer and Film in order to promote the release of defendant Beyoncé Knowles-Carter’s “Lemonade” album. Id ¶¶ 15, 25, 61. The 58-minute Film tells the story of an African-American woman’s journey from heartbreak to healing. Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss the SAC (“Defs.’ Br.”) at 5, ECF No. 32. It features 11 songs from Lemonade, connected by interludes of dialogue and poems. Id. The Film has thematic headings, which evoke the Kubler-Ross stages of grief,3 and reflect the content of each chapter: “Intuition,” “Denial,” “Anger,” “Apathy,” “Emptiness,” “Accountability,” “Reformation,” “Forgiveness,” “Resurrection,” “Hope,” and “Redemption.” Id. The Film closes with a title card reading “Lemonade.” Id. at 11.

The 65-second Trailer features a rapid succession of visuals excerpted from the Film, “with the recitation of a poem used as voiceover against a distinctive audio soundtrack.” SAC ¶ 16. The Trailer ends with a card titled “Lemonade,” id. ¶ 73(6), followed by a “screen shot promoting an HBO film, also called Lemonade,” id. ¶ 23.

On June 8, 2016, plaintiff filed his complaint, which he amended on June 20, 2016 and July 13, 2016. The SAC brings one count of copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976 against all defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the Trailer and the Film infringe his copyright in Palinoia because they contain: (1) nine examples of “visual” similarities; (2) “audio” similarities; and (3) similarities in “total concept and feel.” Id. ¶¶ 72-79.

In the absence of direct evidence of copying, copyright infringement requires showing “(a) that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and (b) the substantial similarity of protectible material in the two works.” Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 662 (2d Cir.1993). Defendants do not dispute access on this motion. Instead, they move for dismissal on the ground that the allegedly infringing works are not “substantially similar” to Palinoia as a matter of law.

“The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.” Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.1960). Works are substantially similar if an “ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same.” Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir.2001) (inter[279]*279nal quotation marks omitted). In applying the test, courts “comparte] the contested design’s total concept and overall feel with that -of the allegedly infringed work ... as instructed by our good eyes and common sense,” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts then ask whether “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work,” Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1001 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n the end, [the] inquiry necessarily focuses on whether the alleged infringer has misappropriated the original way in which the author has ‘selected, coordinated, and arranged’ the elements of his or her work.” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Though often a fact-intensive question, the Second Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that, in certain circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve [substantial similarity] as a matter of law, ‘either because the similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiffs work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.’ ” Id. at 63 (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.1983)). Indeed, “[w]hen a court is called upon to consider whether the works are substantially similar, no discovery or fact-finding is typically necessary, because what is required is only a visual comparison of the works.” Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Before embarking on the substantial similarity analysis, it is critical to bear in mind what does not amount to infringement under the Copyright Act.” Croak v. Saatchi & Saatchi, N. Am., Inc., No. 15 CIV. 7201 (JSR), 174 F.Supp.3d 829, 2016 WL 1274713, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016). As an initial matter, “the similarity between two works must concern the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 67. In addition, under the doctrine of scenes á faire, “elements of an image that flow naturally and necessarily from the choice of a given concept cannot be claimed as original.” Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F.Supp.2d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y.2005); see 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[B][4] (“Labeling certain stock elements as ‘scenes a faire’ does not imply that they are uncopy-rightable; it merely states that similarity between plaintiffs and defendant’s works that are limited to hackneyed elements cannot furnish the basis for finding substantial similarity” (footnote omitted)).

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207 F. Supp. 3d 274, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123150, 2016 WL 4735783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fulks-v-knowles-carter-nysd-2016.