Securities & Exchange Commission v. Gabelli

653 F.3d 49, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15810
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 2011
DocketDocket 10-3581-cv(L), 10-3628-cv(XAP), 10-3760-cv(XAP)
StatusPublished
Cited by80 cases

This text of 653 F.3d 49 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Gabelli) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Securities & Exchange Commission v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15810 (2d Cir. 2011).

Opinion

RAKOFF, District Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) appeals from a judgment entered August 17, 2010, dismissing the SEC’s complaint against Marc J. Gabelli, the portfolio manager of the mutual fund Gabelli Global Growth Fund (“GGGF” or the “Fund”), and Bruce Alpert, the chief operating officer for the Fund’s adviser, Gabelli Funds, LLC (“Gabelli Funds” or the “Adviser”). For the following reasons, we REVERSE the District Court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the complaint and are presumed to be true. In essence, the SEC’s complaint charges defendants with failing to disclose favorable treatment accorded one GGGF investor in preference to other investors: specifically, the fact that Gabelli Funds, investor adviser to GGGF, while prohibiting most GGGF investors from engaging in a form of short-term trading called “market timing,” secretly permitted one investor to market time the Fund in exchange for an invest *53 ment in a hedge fund managed by Gabelli. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20-21, 17, 31, 35-38, 42, 44-45.

A. Market Timing

“Market timing” refers, inter alia, to buying and selling mutual fund shares in a manner designed to exploit short-term pricing inefficiencies. See Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent Chair Condition (Apr.2005) (“Staff Report”), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/studies/indchair.pdf. A mutual fund sells and redeems its shares based on the fund’s net asset value (“NAV”) for that day, which is usually calculated at the close of the U.S. markets at 4:00 P.M. Eastern Time. Prior to 4:00 P.M., market timers either buy or redeem a fund’s shares if they believe that the fund’s last NAV is “stale,” i.e., that it lags behind the current value of a fund’s portfolio of securities as priced earlier in the day. The market timers can then reverse the transaction at the start of the next day and make a quick profit with relatively little risk.

Mutual funds like GGGF that invest in overseas securities are especially vulnerable to a kind of market timing known as “time zone arbitrage,” whereby market timers take advantage of the fact that the foreign markets on which such funds’ portfolios of securities trade have already closed (thereby setting the closing prices for the underlying securities) before the close of U.S. markets. 2 Market timers profit from purchasing or redeeming fund shares based on events occurring after foreign market closing prices are established, but before the events have been reflected in the fund’s NAV. In order to turn a quick profit, market timers then reverse their positions by either redeeming or purchasing the fund’s shares the next day when the events are reflected in the NAV.

Although market timing is not itself illegal, market timing can harm long-term investors in the fund by “raising] transaction costs for a fund, disrupting] the fund’s stated portfolio management strategy, requiring] a fund to maintain an elevated cash position [to satisfy redemption requests], ... resulting] in lost opportunity costs and forced liquidations ... unwanted taxable capital gains for fund shareholders and [a reduction of] the fund’s long term performance.” Id. at 32-33. See also Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2300, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011) (“Although market timing is legal, it harms ’ other investors in the mutual fund.”).

B. The Parties

Gabelli Funds, an investment adviser within the meaning of Section 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Section 202(a)(ll) of the Investment Advis *54 ers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”), is the investment adviser to GGGF, an open end investment company, or mutual fund, registered under the Investment Company Act. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. Marc Gabelli was the portfolio manager for GGGF and its predecessor fund from 1997 to 2004 and also managed several Gabelli-affiliated hedge funds. Id. ¶ 10. From 1988 to 2003, Bruce Alpert was Gabelli Funds’ chief operating officer and the person who directed the Adviser’s “market timing police,” a group of GGGF employees, that monitored trading in the Adviser’s mutual funds in order to restrict market timing. Id. ¶¶ 1, 11, 31. Najy N. Nasser was the chief investment adviser to Folkes Asset Management, now called Headstart Advisers Ltd. (“Headstart”). Id. ¶¶ 1,10.

C. The Alleged Misconduct

The complaint alleges that from 1999 until 2002, Gabelli and Alpert permitted Headstart to engage in time zone arbitrage (which defendants referred to as “scalping”) that took advantage of stale pricing opportunities in GGGF. Id. ¶¶ 17, 36, 42. Initially the amount of such scalping was limited, but on April 7, 2000, Gabelli allegedly agreed to permit Headstart to increase its market timing capacity from $7 million to $20 million, in exchange for a $1 million investment by Headstart in a hedge fund that Gabelli managed. Id. ¶ 21. Headstart’s $1 million investment, which constituted approximately four percent of Gabelli’s hedge fund’s assets, was made the day after Headstart’s increase in market timing. Id. ¶ 23.

Between April 2000 and the Spring of 2002, Headstart’s increased market timing in GGGF’s shares regularly involved between four and fifteen percent of GGGF’s assets. Id. ¶ 24. Eventually, however, following instructions from the Fund’s parent company, Gabelli and Alpert caused Head-start to reduce its ownership in GGGF and, in August 2002, to cease its market timing activity, whereupon Headstart redeemed its remaining investment in Gabelli’s hedge fund. Id. ¶¶ 25-28.

Prior to the cessation, however, and during the same period that Gabelli and Alpert were approving Headstart’s market timing in GGGF shares, Alpert and Gabelli banned at least 48 other GGGF accounts from market timing and rejected market timing purchases totaling at least $23 million. Id. ¶35. As early as December 2000, Alpert drafted an internal memorandum that explained that since “Market Timers (scalpers) have been using the International and Global Funds in a way that is disruptive to the Fund and the management of the portfolio,” the Adviser was making efforts to “identify each account and restrict them for purchasing the funds.” Id. ¶ 31. For the next two years, “market timing police” — employees instructed by Alpert to monitor market timing activity within Gabelli Funds — reviewed purchases in global funds: if it appeared that the purchase was a market timing trade, the purchase was rejected and sometimes the account was banned from making future purchases. Id. Yet, during the very same period, Alpert instructed the market timing police to ignore Headstart’s market timing activity because “it was a Marc Gabelli client relationship,” and assured Nasser that Headstart’s accounts would not be blocked. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.

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653 F.3d 49, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15810, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-gabelli-ca2-2011.