Securities & Exchange Commission v. Egan

994 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2014 WL 345215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13178
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 31, 2014
DocketNo. 13 Civ. 236 WHP
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 994 F. Supp. 2d 558 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Egan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Egan, 994 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2014 WL 345215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13178 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brings this accounting fraud action against Jack J. Egan, Jr., C.P.A., alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Exchange Act Rules. Egan moves under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b) to dismiss the claims sounding in fraud for failure to state a [562]*562claim and failure to plead scienter adequately. For the following reasons, Egan’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the Complaint are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. From January 1992 to August 2011, Egan was the senior vice president, chief financial officer (“CFO”), and principal financial officer of Volt Information Systems, Inc. (‘Volt”). (Compl. ¶ 16.) Volt’s subsidiary, Volt Delta Resources, LLC (‘VDR”), provides computer-based directory assistance. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Verizon1 was one of VDR’s most important customers. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 22)

In 2006, VDR learned that Verizon was considering switching to a competitor. (Compl. ¶ 26.) To keep Verizon’s business, VDR offered to develop and lease customized directory assistance software for Verizon, anticipating that the lease would begin in 2008. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.) VDR proposed two pricing models for a four-year lease, requiring either annual license and maintenance fees and a down payment of $4.5 million or per-usage fees and a down payment of $27 million. (Compl. ¶¶28, 30.) Under either model, VDR would recognize more than $70 million in revenue over the four-year period. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Egan reviewed and “edited” VDR’s proposal. (Compl. ¶¶ 31, 33.)

In early December 2006, Verizon informed VDR that it had an opportunity to secure $10 million in internal funding if it could purchase a capital asset2 before the end of the year. (Compl. ¶ 36.) VDR’s proposed annual license would not qualify as a capital asset, but a purchase or perpetual license of VDR software would. To help Verizon obtain the internal funding, VDR issued two price quotes for the sale or perpetual license of four software modules at the core of the new program. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39.) In reality, however, the purported sale was a sham; the two entities continued negotiating for a long-term lease of the same modules. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39.)

Verizon obtained the internal funding using VDR’s price quotes. (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 48.) VDR and Verizon created additional documentary support for the transaction, including a $10 million purchase order for the software modules and a pricing schedule allocating the total purchase price among four modules. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41.) VDR and Verizon characterized the $10 million as a deposit on their future licensing contract for the software. (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 49.) To assure Verizon that VDR would continue to negotiate a long-term lease in good faith after receiving the $10 million, Egan reviewed and edited a “commitment letter” to Verizon. (Compl. ¶ 45.) By mistake, Verizon transferred the $10 million to Volt rather than VDR. (Compl. ¶ 48.) When the error was discovered, Egan authorized transfer of the funds to VDR. (Compl. ¶ 48.)

In the spring of 2007, a final agreement eluded VDR and Verizon. (Compl. ¶ 51.) By a memorandum of understanding, VDR promised to refund the $10 million if no agreement was reached. (Compl. ¶¶ 51-52.) Egan participated in the ongoing negotiations. (Compl. ¶ 53.) In early October 2007, Egan asked Volt’s assistant controller for the memorandum of under[563]*563standing between VDR and Verizon. (Compl. ¶ 57.)

On October 25, 2007, Verizon accepted two of the software modules. (Compl. ¶¶ 54-55.) VDR drafted a formal acceptance letter, (Compl. ¶ 54), “releasing]” $7.55 million of the $10 million to VDR. (Decl. Paul H. Schoeman Ex. C at 2; Mem. Supp. Egan’s Mot. Dismiss 5, 14.) The letter continued the fagade that a sale had occurred by stating that VDR had transferred physical possession of the modules to Verizon. (Compl. ¶ 55.)

Two days later, VDR created a project recognition worksheet showing a sale of the two software modules. (Compl. ¶ 59.) The next day, the last day of Volt’s fiscal year, VDR’s CFO recognized the $7.55 million as revenue, recorded $2.1 million in development costs for the two modules, and created journal entries to reflect a sale, indicating that the modules had been sold or perpetually leased. (Compl. ¶¶ GO-61.) Egan learned of VDR’s revenue recognition after the fiscal year ended. (Compl. ¶ 62.) On November 14, 2007, expecting a “much bigger boost to earnings” from the initial transaction, Egan requested more information from VDR. (Compl. ¶ 63.) On November 16, 2007, VDR and Verizon executed a four year lease of the modules beginning January 1, 2008 at a cost of more than $70 million. (Compl. ¶ 65.)

In December 2007, Egan discussed VDR’s recognition of the $7.55 million as revenue with Volt’s external auditor. (Compl. ¶ 70.) VDR had provided only the purchase order, acceptance letter, and journal entries to the auditor. (Compl. ¶ 68.) Egan failed to correct the outside auditors’ erroneous understanding that the two modules had been “sold or perpetually leased.” (Compl. ¶ 72.) Nor did he offer any other documents or information regarding the $10 million December 2006 transaction. (Compl. ¶¶ 72-73.)

Under generally applicable accounting principles (“GAAP”), public companies may only recognize revenue if “[pjersuasive evidence of an arrangement exists.” (Compl. ¶ 6 (quoting Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, 68 FR 74,436, 74,436 (Dec. 23, 2003)).) An “arrangement” is “the final understanding between the parties as to the specific nature and terms of the agreed-upon transaction.” (Compl. ¶ 7 (quoting Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, 68 FR 74,436, 74,436 n. 3).)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “[Fjactual content that is ‘merely consistent with,’ rather than suggestive of, a finding of liability will not support a reasonable inference.” N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 121 (2d Cir.2013). “[T]he choice between two plausible inferences that may be drawn from factual allegations is not a choice to be made by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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994 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2014 WL 345215, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-egan-nysd-2014.