Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJune 10, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-00822
StatusUnknown

This text of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton, (N.D. Tex. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ) COMMISSION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) VS. ) 3:20-CV-0822-G ) THOMAS J. FELTON, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is Thomas J. Felton (“Felton”)’s motion to dismiss. Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint and Brief in Support (“motion to dismiss”) (docket entry 27). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background This suit arises out of Felton’s alleged participation in a fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate Ironclad Performance Wear Corporation (“Ironclad”)’s revenues by more than $3.3 million. First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) (docket entry 26) ¶ 1. Ironclad was a Nevada corporation headquartered in Farmers Branch, Texas, that developed and manufactured “high-performance, task-specific gloves and apparel for use in the construction, manufacturing, oil and gas, and automotive industries.” Id. ¶ 14. Ironclad’s common stock was traded on the OTCQB1 under the symbol

“ICPW.” Id. ¶ 10. Between the fourth quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2017 (“the Relevant Period”), “Ironclad also issued stock to its employees upon the exercise of employee stock options and publicly disclosed proceeds from the issuance of that stock.” Id. The plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alleges that

“[d]uring the second quarter of 2017, Ironclad received an anonymous report regarding potentially improper revenue recognition practices by the company.” Id. ¶ 15. On July 6, 2017, after an independent investigation into “accounting irregularities,” Ironclad filed a report with the SEC “announcing that investors should

no longer rely on the company’s financial statements” over the last several quarters. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Ironclad’s auditor resigned on September 22, 2017, noting specifically in a letter to the chairman of Ironclad’s audit committee that Ironclad leadership “influenced and instructed employees and third parties to inappropriately record

certain transactions as shipped when the goods were not shipped to a customer.” Id. ¶ 17. The SEC asserts that, in total, “Ironclad closed, invoiced, and recognized revenue for at least 53 orders that were processed on the last day or two of a quarter

1 OTCQB is an over-the-counter securities market in which investors purchase and sell stocks for registered companies, including penny stocks and shell companies. - 2 - but were not actually shipped until after the quarter ended.” Id. ¶ 18. The SEC avers that this practice – resulting in prematurely recognizing over $3.3 million in

revenue – violates Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) and Ironclad’s own revenue recognition policy. Id. ¶¶ 18-20. As a result of the discovery of its artificially inflated revenue, Ironclad entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 8, 2017. Id. ¶ 14. Ironclad liquidated substantially all of its assets on November 14, 2017.2

The SEC alleges that “Felton carried out this scheme along with former defendants Jeffrey D. Cordes (‘Cordes’) and William M. Aisenberg (‘Aisenberg’), who, including Felton, comprised Ironclad’s senior management team.” Id. ¶ 2. During all relevant times, Cordes served as Ironclad’s Chief Executive Officer;

Aisenberg as Chief Financial Officer; and Felton as Senior Vice President of Supply Chain. Complaint (“Original Complaint”) (docket entry 1) ¶¶ 7-9. In his role as Senior Vice President, Felton was responsible for Ironclad’s daily operations, including “tracking and maintaining information regarding Ironclad’s inventory,

managing Ironclad’s inventory, managing the shipment of orders, customer service, and ensuring that sales transactions were completed.” Amended Complaint ¶ 11.

2 Ironclad owned “100 percent of the stock of Ironclad Performance Wear Corp. California (“ICPW California”), the entity through which all Ironclad-related operations were conducted.” Id. The distinction between these two corporate entities is irrelevant to this opinion unless otherwise noted. - 3 - Cordes and Aisenberg consented to judgment against them, leaving Felton as the sole defendant in this case.

In its Amended Complaint, the SEC alleges that, during the Relevant Period, Felton engaged in the fraudulent scheme to artificially increase Ironclad’s revenue in three ways, which are set forth in greater detail below. Id. ¶ 2. First, “he marked as complete, or caused his subordinates to mark as complete, in Ironclad’s internal sales and inventory database $3.3 million in customer orders” despite “knowing that the

customer orders would not be shipped until the following quarter.” Id. Second, “Felton directed Ironclad’s third-party warehouse company to relocate [the completed but] unshipped orders to other locations and to incorrectly calculate Ironclad’s inventory, for the express purpose of concealing these goods from

Ironclad’s auditor, who Felton knew would question the presence of these goods in a warehouse Ironclad controlled.” Id. The SEC asserts that this functioned to conceal the completed but unshipped orders and the premature revenue recognized therefrom. Finally, the SEC alleges that “Felton falsified customer documents to

disguise product exchanges – which should not have counted as revenue-generating transactions – as new sales,” further inflating Ironclad’s revenue. Id. Aside from artificially inflating Ironclad’s revenue, the SEC also asserts that Felton’s actions contributed to materially misleading financial statements produced and disseminated by Ironclad.

- 4 - On these bases, the SEC brings eight claims against Felton. Specifically, the SEC alleges violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (count I); aiding and

abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (count II); violations of sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act (count III); aiding and abetting violations of sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act (count IV); violations and aiding and abetting violations of section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (count V); violations of the books and records provisions of the Exchange Act and

aiding and abetting violations of section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act (count VI); misrepresentations and misconduct regarding the preparation of required reports under the Exchange Act (count VII); and circumventing or failing to implement internal controls under section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act (count VIII). Id. ¶¶ 40-

68. 1. Revenue Improperly Recognized Before it was Earned The SEC alleges that Felton improperly closed fifty-three orders between the fourth quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2017, representing $3.3 million in

revenue. According to the SEC, “[e]ach of the [fifty-three] individual transactions comprising this scheme . . . are supported by specific evidence including invoices, which identify when Ironclad took credit for the revenue, and bills of lading, which document when Ironclad actually shipped the customer orders” and that comparing “these documents reveal[s] that Ironclad recognized revenue for transactions in the

- 5 - preceding quarter when the actual shipment of the order occurred after the close of that quarter.” Id. ¶ 26. Significantly, the SEC asserts that “the prematurely closed

orders always occurred only days before the end of a fiscal quarter.” Id. ¶ 25. The SEC contends that Felton furthered the fraudulent scheme by “improperly signal[ing] that proceeds from these transactions could be booked by Ironclad as revenue, and, in fact, Ironclad did book the transactions as revenue.” Id. ¶ 26. Although the SEC does not paint an exhaustive portrait of Felton’s activities in this

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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-and-exchange-commission-v-felton-txnd-2021.