Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 2, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-00822
StatusUnknown

This text of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Felton, (N.D. Tex. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ) COMMISSION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) VS. ) 3:20-CV-0822-G ) THOMAS J. FELTON, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is Thomas J. Felton (“Felton”)’s motion to dismiss. Motion to Strike Immaterial Content and Dismiss Complaint and Brief in Support (“motion to dismiss”) (docket entry 11). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. However, this dismissal is without prejudice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is granted leave to replead. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background This suit arises out of the alleged planning and execution of a scheme by Felton and other senior managers of Ironclad Performance Wear Corporation (“Ironclad”) to artificially inflate Ironclad’s revenues by engaging in deceptive accounting practices. Complaint (docket entry 1) ¶¶ 1, 11. Ironclad developed and manufactured “high-performance, task-specific gloves and apparel for use in the construction, manufacturing, oil and gas, and automotive industries.” Id. ¶ 10. On April 8, 2020, the SEC initiated this suit against three of Ironclad’s senior

managers (collectively “the defendants”) including Felton, Jeffrey D. Cordes (“Cordes”), and William M. Aisenberg (“Aisenberg”). Id. ¶¶ 7-9. During all relevant times, Cordes served as Ironclad’s Chief Executive Officer; Aisenberg as Chief Financial Officer; and Felton as Senior Vice President of Supply Chain. Id. In his role as Senior Vice President, Felton was responsible for Ironclad’s daily operations,

“including tracking and maintaining information regarding inventory and ensuring that sales transactions were completed.” Id. ¶ 9. Cordes and Aisenberg eventually consented to judgment against them, leaving Felton as the sole defendant in the case. Accordingly, some factual allegations that concern only Cordes and/or Aisenberg are

omitted from this opinion. In its complaint, the SEC alleges that between the fourth quarter of 2015 and June, 2017 (the “Relevant Period”) the defendants improperly recognized more than $3.3 million in revenue before it was actually earned and more than $3 million in

revenue that was never, in fact, earned. Id. ¶ 11. On this basis, the SEC brought eight claims against Felton. Specifically, the SEC alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (count I); aiding and abetting a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (count II); violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act (count III); aiding and abetting violations of the Securities Act (count

- 2 - IV); violations and aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (count VI); violations of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act (count VIII);

violations of Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2 (count IX); and violations of Section 13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1 of the Exchange Act (count XI). Id. ¶¶ 42-55, 60-63, 67- 73, 77-79. 1. Revenue Improperly Recognized Before it was Earned The SEC alleges that the defendants improperly recognized revenue during the

Relevant Period for products sold but before those products were actually shipped. Id. ¶ 17.1 The complaint alleges that Felton “actively participated” in this practice by frequently communicating with Ironclad’s third-party warehousing company about orders that were “‘closed in [the] system but [were] still at [the third-party

warehousing company],’ ‘post[ing] but not shipping,’ or ‘physically staying behind.’” Id. ¶ 20. Felton purportedly approved closing purchase orders for unshipped products and knew “that his approval would trigger Ironclad to recognize revenue for those products” and that such revenue “violated relevant accounting policies and

inflated Ironclad’s reported revenues.” Id. In addition to closing purchase orders for unshipped products, Felton allegedly

1 This type of behavior likely violates Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. As the complaint notes, “Section 605-10-25 of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, delivery of goods is a key factor in determining whether revenue has been realized and earned, and it is inappropriate, with limited exceptions . . ., to recognize revenue for products that have not yet shipped.” Id. ¶ 18. - 3 - “took affirmative steps to hide the unshipped orders from Ironclad’s auditor by instructing the third-party warehousing company” to exclude certain items from the

inventory count and move products to another warehouse. Id. ¶ 21. In the only example provided by the SEC, Felton allegedly sent an email to the third-party warehousing company in January, 2017 encouraging it to assist Ironclad in hiding unshipped products: “According to Bill [Aisenberg] there are three orders sitting at [the third-party warehousing company] that have to get moved today without

exception. . . . If they don’t get picked up they have to move across the street. They cannot be in our warehouse space when the auditors arrive!!!!” Id. 2. Improperly Recognized Revenue that Ironclad Never Earned. In addition to recognizing revenue before products shipped, the SEC avers that

Ironclad improperly booked at least $3 million in revenue that was never actually earned. Id. ¶ 23. The complaint outlines four instances in which Felton – or the defendants collectively – recognized or assisted in recognizing revenue that Ironclad never earned. As relevant to Felton, the SEC’s allegations range across four of

Ironclad’s customers: Customers A, B, D, and G. a. Customer A The SEC asserts that Cordes and Aisenberg asked Customer A to purchase gloves, remove a brand label, and affix a new one. Id. ¶ 28. Customer A would then resell the rebranded gloves to third parties. Id. The SEC avers that Ironclad sold the

- 4 - gloves to Customer A in the fourth quarter of 2016, but that “the work was never done, and Customer A never attempted to sell the gloves before Ironclad repurchased

them.” Id. Instead, the SEC alleges, the third-party warehousing company, “under Felton’s management, performed the relabeling work, not Customer A.” Id. Additionally, Customer A allegedly entered into this transaction on condition of a “backstop” agreement that “guaranteed that Ironclad would repurchase any gloves Customer A did not sell for the original price, plus the cost of

relabeling/repackaging, and a commission for Customer A.” Id. ¶ 29. The SEC avers that Felton “was aware of the backstop agreement” and “also aware that Customer A did not perform any value-added services to earn a commission.” Id. Sometime in February, 2016, Ironclad agreed to repurchase the products sold

to Customer A in the fourth quarter of 2015. Id. The SEC avers that “Felton instructed the third party warehouse to delay bringing the products back into Ironclad’s inventory until April 2016–after the close of the fiscal year.” Id. ¶ 31. b. Customer B

Ironclad entered into a distribution agreement with Customer B in 2015. Id. ¶ 32. The SEC alleges that at the end of the year, despite the fact that Customer B had not paid any invoices, Ironclad recognized $1,289,330 in revenue. Id. Ironclad repurchased the gloves from Customer B sometime in early 2016 as needed to sell to other customers. Id. According to the SEC, “Felton oversaw these

- 5 - transactions.” Id. c. Customer D

The complaint alleges that, in 2016, Cordes sent several emails to Customer D asking it to exchange $100,000 worth of old gloves with new models. Id. ¶ 34. Customer D agreed and sent Ironclad two spreadsheets – one labeled “EXCHANGE” and one labeled “GLOVES TO RETURN.” Id. The SEC posits that, at Cordes’ direction, Felton altered the spreadsheets to conceal the fact that the transactions

were exchanges as opposed to new sales. Id.

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