Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley

798 F. Supp. 1473, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, 1992 WL 201322
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMay 28, 1992
DocketC92-479WD
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 798 F. Supp. 1473 (Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, 1992 WL 201322 (W.D. Wash. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO STRIKE, AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DWYER, District Judge.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 7, 1991, this court entered an order in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081, declaring unlawful a proposal of the United States Forest Service to sell logging rights in national forest habitat areas of the northern spotted owl without complying with the requirements of the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., and its implementing regulations. The owl is an “indicator species” under NFMA and a threatened species throughout its range under the Endangered Species Act *1476 (“ESA”). The NFMA regulations provide that

[f]ish and wildlife shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.

36 C.F.R. § 219.19. See also § 219.27(a)(6).

On May 23, 1991, a further order was entered in the Evans case directing the Forest Service to

have in effect by March 5, 1992, revised standards and guidelines to ensure the northern spotted owl’s viability, together with an environmental impact statement, as required by NFMA and its implementing regulations^]

and enjoining further sales of logging rights in spotted owl habitat areas until that was done. 771 F.Supp. at 1096.

Both orders were affirmed on appeal. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.1991). The court of appeals and district court opinions in Evans set out the history and background of the timber/spotted owl controversy, which will not be repeated here.

Pursuant to the May 23, 1991, order in Evans, the Forest Service has prepared and issued a new environmental impact statement (“EIS”). On March 3, 1992, defendant James R. Moseley, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) adopting the Forest Service’s preferred alternative from the EIS. The Forest Service then filed a notice of compliance with the May 23 order, and final judgment was entered in Evans for plaintiffs Seattle Audubon Society, et al. (SAS”), on the claims under NFMA, and for the Forest Service and Washington Contract Loggers Association, et al. (“WCLA”), on claims asserted under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.

In the present ease, filed March 25, 1992, SAS challenges the legality of the EIS and the ROD, alleging that (1) the EIS fails to assess the environmental consequences to the northern spotted owl of continued logging of its habitat, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; and (2) the management plan adopted does not assure the viability of the owl, does not prescribe measures to protect critical habitat, and does not assure the viability of other old-growth dependent species, all in violation of NFMA.

As in the Evans case, intervenors WCLA support the position of the Forest Service.

All parties have moved for summary judgment, and all agree that summary judgment may properly be entered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The briefs and other written materials submitted, and the arguments of counsel made at a hearing held on May 22, 1992, have been fully considered.

For the reasons stated in this order, the court finds that the Forest Service has not fully complied with NEPA and that it must take further action under that statute. Pending the agency’s further compliance with NEPA, no ruling is made on the legality of the proposed management plan.

II.

STANDING AND RIPENESS

The Forest Service argues that SAS lacks standing to challenge the ROD and EIS, and that no controversy is ripe for judicial review. Under existing law, however, standing is clearly established and the case is ripe for decision. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1513-19 (9th Cir.1992).

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court in reviewing a challenged administrative action determines whether the action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or was taken without observance of procedures required by law. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 980-81 (9th Cir.1985); 5 U.S.C. § 706. The standard is narrow and presumes the agency action is valid, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976), but does not shield agency action from a “thorough, nrobing, in-depth review,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

*1477 The focal point for judicial review is the administrative record in existence, not a new record made initially in the reviewing court. Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.1980). The court may, however, consider evidence outside the administrative record for certain limited purposes, e.g., to explain the agency’s action or to determine whether its course of inquiry was insufficient or inadequate. Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 403 (1989); Animal Defense Counsel v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir.1988).

IV.

MOTION TO STRIKE

In addition to citing the administrative record (“AR”), SAS and the Forest Service have filed witness declarations and have cited testimony given at an eight-day evidentiary hearing held in the Evans case a year ago. The Forest Service now moves to strike the declarations of Drs. Gordon Orians, Peter Kareiva, Daniel Doak, and Susan Harrison, filed by SAS. It argues that judicial review must be limited to the administrative record.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman
646 F.3d 1161 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Conservation Northwest v. Rey
674 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (W.D. Washington, 2009)
Western Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Management
552 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Nevada, 2008)
Mountaineers v. United States Forest Service
445 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Washington, 2006)
Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey
380 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (W.D. Washington, 2005)
Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn
296 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (W.D. Washington, 2003)
National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service
235 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (W.D. Washington, 2002)
Sierra Club v. Bosworth
199 F. Supp. 2d 971 (N.D. California, 2002)
Hanson v. United States Forest Service
138 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Washington, 2001)
Reservation Ranch v. United States
42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,286 (Federal Claims, 1997)
Palmer v. University Medical Group
973 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Oregon, 1997)
Ago
Washington Attorney General Reports, 1996
National Audubon Society v. Hoffman
917 F. Supp. 280 (D. Vermont, 1996)
Ecology Center, Inc. v. Gorman
902 F. Supp. 203 (D. Montana, 1995)
Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons
871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Washington, 1994)
Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. U.S. Forest Service
838 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Washington, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
798 F. Supp. 1473, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, 1992 WL 201322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seattle-audubon-society-v-moseley-wawd-1992.