Hanson v. United States Forest Service

138 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5050, 2001 WL 357103
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedApril 5, 2001
DocketC99-1050L
StatusPublished

This text of 138 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (Hanson v. United States Forest Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanson v. United States Forest Service, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5050, 2001 WL 357103 (W.D. Wash. 2001).

Opinion

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LASNIK, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702, for judicial review of federal administrative agency action. The plaintiffs, Chad Hanson, Native Forest Council, Earth Island Institute, and Friends of the Breitenbush Cascades (collectively “citizen groups”), seek injunctive relief against federal defendants United States Forest Service and *1298 Bureau of Land Management (collectively “the Forest Service”), until a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“SEIS”) on the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan (“Plan”) is prepared. The citizen groups assert that the Forest Service is required to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by submitting an SEIS before awarding any new timber sales or implementing existing timber sales. The Forest Service denies these claims. Defendant-intervenor American Forest Resource Council (“AFRC”) supports the Forest Service’s position.

The citizen groups contend that the Forest Service is required by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., to issue an SEIS because three pieces of significant new information have come to light since the Plan was adopted. The Forest Service asserts that the citizen groups’ claims are not ripe. It also contends that it considered the information cited by the citizen groups and did not find it to be new and significant. AFRC concurs, and contends that the citizen groups lack standing and bring no new and significant information to light that cannot be addressed under the existing Plan.

All three parties have moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The motions have been fully briefed and oral argument was heard in open court on February 7, 2001. All parties agree that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and that the case can be decided on motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court finds that the Forest Service has complied with NEPA and that it need not take further action under the statute. The citizen groups’ request for injunctive relief pending the completion of an SEIS is denied.

II. STANDING, RIPENESS, AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION

AFRC argues that the citizen groups lack standing to challenge the Forest Service’s approval of timber sales because the declarations from their members are too vague to constitute a personal and concrete injury. The citizen groups argue that standing has been established by submitting declarations from their members, professing a past, present, and future use of the forests.

The doctrine of standing has constitutional and prudential origins. To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, a causal connection between the injury and defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that the court can redress the injury by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “[Environmental and aesthetic injuries constitute injuries in fact for standing purposes.” Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 1172,1176 (9th Cir.2000).

Through their declarations, the citizen groups allege that their members utilize various forests within the Plan for hiking, climbing, backpacking, swimming, nature study, and other outdoor activities. (See Deck of Chad Hanson at ¶¶ 3, 7; Decl. of Heather Weinstein at ¶ 5; Deck of Tim Hermach at ¶¶ 5-6; Deck of Michael Donnelly at ¶¶ 4-5; Deck of Mark Ottendad at ¶ 4). They express concern that the logging of the old-growth forests, which provide shelter to the northern spotted owls (“NSOs”), harms the species and the beauty of the forests they frequent. The citizen groups have established that their environmental and aesthetic interests in the Plan’s forests will be harmed by future logging. If their request for an SEIS and injunctive relief were granted, the articulated injury would be redressed. *1299 The citizen groups have constitutional standing.

To establish prudential standing under the APA, the citizen groups must demonstrate that they are “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. They must also establish that they are within the “zone of interests” of the statute at issue, which is not intended to be a difficult standard. ONRC v. USFS, 59 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1089-90 (W.D.Wa.1999).

The citizen groups believe their enjoyment of the forests will be adversely affected if an SEIS is not conducted under NEPA to take into account new and significant information regarding the NSOs and logging. The zone of interests test is not burdensome, and it is satisfied. The citizen groups have prudential standing.

Standing exists but the issues of ripeness and final agency action must be considered before the Court can reach the merits of this case. The Forest Service argues that the citizen groups’ action is not ripe for judicial review because it does not challenge a final agency action at the project level and does not oppose site-specific timber sales. The citizen groups assert that a NEPA action is ripe, regardless of whether a final agency action has been authorized or implemented. Alternatively, they argue that the Forest Service’s failure to prepare an SEIS in light of new information is a final agency action. The citizen groups contend that they need not challenge a specific site-specific timber sale project because their grievance is with the overall Plan.

Under the APA, when general review is sought of an agency action, it must be a final agency action. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 882, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). However, the Supreme Court recently explained that a NEPA claim may be ripe before a final agency action because it “simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc, v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). The Court stated, “Hence a person with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper.” Id. Recently, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Ohio Forestry as creating an exception to the final agency action requirement for NEPA. See ONRC v. BLM, 150 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.1998); ONRC v. USFS, 59 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1090 (W.D.Wash.1999).

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Bluebook (online)
138 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5050, 2001 WL 357103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanson-v-united-states-forest-service-wawd-2001.