[616]*616REEVES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER, J., joined. GIBBONS, J. (pp. 624-30), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
REEVES, District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant R.R. Denny Clunk, Judge of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division (“Judge Clunk”), appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on a claim of judicial immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Judge Clunk is entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Sean Brookings was born female, but completed a sex reassignment procedure to become “male.” On three occasions after the gender transition, Brookings applied for and received marriage licenses from the Stark County Probate Court. Brookings applied for the first license in 1988 and the second in 1990. The last application occurred December 20, 1994, when Brookings applied for a license to marry the late Lois Dimple McKinney Brookings (“McKinney”).
On May 4, 2001, Vincent Alfera, counsel for the decedent’s surviving son in a will contest action, wrote to Judge Clunk and the Stark County Prosecuting Attorney and provided documentation that Brook-ings had given false information to obtain a license to marry McKinney. Specifically, Alfera noted that Brookings had failed to truthfully attest to his legal sex (female), the number of his previous marriages (four), and his actual county of residence (Summit). This letter referenced Section 2921.13 of the Ohio Revised Code — the criminal statute which sets forth the penalty for making a false statement in a marriage application. Alfera also urged the recipients of the letter to bring charges against Sharon M. Perry/Sean Brookings.
On September 27, 2001, Judge Clunk filed a criminal complaint against Brook-ings for knowingly making false statements while applying for a marriage license in violation of O.R.C. §§ 2921.13 and 3101.05. Judge Clunk attested in the complaint that Brookings had purposefully made false statements to the probate court in connection with a proceeding within the court’s jurisdiction in order to mislead the court in performing its official duties. Brookings was later arrested and charged with committing a misdemeanor in the first degree through a continuing course of conduct.
Brookings responded by moving to dismiss the criminal charges based on the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Thereafter, the Canton Municipal Court dismissed the criminal complaint, concluding that the criminal charges had not been initiated within the limitations period. Brookings then initiated a § 1983 action against Judge Clunk, claiming that the judge had violated his civil rights by pressuring the prosecutor’s office to have him arrested and that Judge Clunk acted outside his jurisdiction in doing so.
On December 19, 2002, Judge Clunk filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against him based on absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied this motion, concluding that Judge Clunk’s actions were non-judicial and that he was not entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court’s jurisdiction to review this interlocutory appeal is based on the [617]*617principle that a district court’s denial of a claim of immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); see also Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir.1997). Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that “the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806.
The availability of absolute judicial immunity in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss presents a question of law. As such, the court’s review of the district court’s denial of the motion is de novo. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. Moreover, as the proponent of the claim of absolute judicial immunity, Judge Clunk bears the burden of establishing that such immunity is warranted. Id. (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 432, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993)).
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the performance of their judicial functions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 103 (6th Cir.1994) (A judge performing his judicial functions is entitled to immunity from a suit seeking monetary damages.). The Supreme Court has specifically held that state judges are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213.
In fact, judicial immunity applies to acts performed maliciously and corruptly as well as acts performed in bad faith or with malice as has been alleged in this case. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213; see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). However, judicial immunity does not apply if the judge’s activities were “non-judicial” in nature or if the judge’s actions are performed without any jurisdiction to do so. Id.; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Here, Judge Clunk contends that neither exception applies to his claim of absolute judicial immunity.
Although the applicability of judicial immunity on the facts presented here is a close question, for the reasons stated herein, we find that neither exception applies and that Judge Clunk is entitled to judicial immunity.
A. The Non-Judicial Acts Exception
In Stump, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test to determine whether an act is “judicial.” Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099. First, the court must consider whether the act in question is a function that is “normally performed by a judge.” Id. This court has previously referred to this inquiry as the functional approach. Under this inquiry, a court is required to examine the nature and function of the act, not the act itself. The Supreme Court reformulated this inquiry in Míreles by establishing that, even if a particular act is not a function normally performed by a judge, the court must look to the particular act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge. Id. at 13, 112 S.Ct. 286.
Second, in determining whether an act is “judicial,” the court must assess whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. [618]*618286. In examining the functions normally performed by a judge, this court has recognized that “paradigmatic judicial acts,” or acts that involve resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court, are the touchstone for application of judicial immunity. Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir.1997) (citing Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435-36, 113 S.Ct. 2167). Conversely, whenever an action taken by a judge is not an adjudication between the parties, it is less likely that it will be deemed judicial. Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir.1994).
In denying Judge Clunk’s motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that his actions were not paradigmatic judicial actions. Specifically, the court found that the swearing-out of a complaint against Brookings was not a function that is “normally performed by a judge” in that his actions neither “resolved disputes” nor “adjudicated private rights.” The court concluded that Judge Clunk’s actions were prosecutorial in nature and that, at the time he filled out the complaint against Brookings, he was acting as an ordinary citizen, not a judge.
The district court specifically rejected Judge Clunk’s assertion that he is entitled to judicial immunity because his actions were intended to protect the integrity of the judicial decision-making process. The court noted that, on September 27, 2001 (the time when Judge Clunk swore out the criminal complaint), Brookings was not a party before the court. As such, the district court concluded that Judge Clunk could not justify his actions by arguing that he performed prosecutorial functions as a result of a case “brought before [him] independently by the parties.”
(1) “Normally Performed By A Judge”
This court has previously held that the initiation of accusatory processes such as criminal prosecutions is not a function normally performed by a judicial officer. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.1984). However, in Barnes v. Winchell, the court explained that this exception to absolute immunity is a narrow one and that “even if a judge encroaches upon prosecutorial functions, the broad shield of absolute judicial immunity is not automatically overcome.” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1119.
In Barnes, this court conducted an extensive analysis regarding the distinctions between purely prosecutorial and judicial functions. In doing so, the court considered cases from this circuit as well as a number of other circuits. In particular, the court discussed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 916 (11th Cir.1986), which held that a judge did not lose immunity for directing the entry of charges against a witness who appeared before the judge in a pending case.
In Harris, Municipal Court Judge Clinton Deveaux presided over a preliminary hearing against Phillip Jones, who had been charged with rape and false imprisonment. During the hearing, evidence was presented indicating that Stephanie Harris, the victim, had robbed Jones. Although the prosecutors objected, Judge Deveaux insisted that Harris be charged with armed robbery. He also ordered a detective to arrest her. Judge Deveaux indicated to the prosecutor that he would release Harris on her own recognizance if he would agree to the same reduction for Jones. The prosecutor refused. However, when Harris later appeared before Judge Deveaux, he learned that she had been released on her own recognizance. At that time, Judge Deveaux reduced the charge against Jones and released him on his own recognizance. The Eleventh Cir[619]*619cuit concluded that Judge Deveaux’s actions, although unusual, were judicial.
After reviewing cases from the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, the Barnes court further noted that, in those instances where the judge initiates proceedings based on his private interests which are completely separate from the cases before him brought independently by the parties, the judge will likely not be protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1118. In support of this principle, the court relied on Harris, supra, and this circuit’s decision in Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1984).
In Sevier, Kenneth Turner, a county juvenile court judge, had the authority to collect delinquent child support payments. In an attempt to collect these payments, he instructed his staff to initiate criminal prosecutions against those fathers in arrears. He then used those impending criminal actions as leverage to obtain consent orders. Notably, Judge Turner received part of his salary from these payments. In distinguishing the two cases, the Barnes court noted that Judge Turner initiated charges, not as a result of a case brought before him by the parties, but as a result of events in his private, non-judicial life; that is, events in which he had a personal stake. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1118. As a result, Judge Turner was denied immunity from suit. Judge Deveaux, however, was afforded immunity for his actions which “arose out of judicial proceedings brought before him by independent parties.” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Harris, 780 F.2d at 915).
In making this distinction, the Barnes court also referred to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 601, 66 L.Ed.2d 491 (1980), in which Circuit Judge William Vanderwater was denied judicial immunity for acts that the court held to be prosecutorial in nature. In addition to his profession as a judge, Judge Vanderwater also managed an apartment building. When Lopez, a former evicted tenant, returned to the apartment complex, Judge Vanderwater went to the complex with a handgun and detained him until the police arrived. At Judge Vanderwater’s request, the officers arrested Lopez. Subsequently, Judge Vanderwater swore out a criminal complaint against Lopez for theft of a key and then proceeded to preside over his case. The court concluded that the judge was not entitled to immunity for “making the decision to prosecute, determining the offense to be charged, preparing the written charge ... and presenting the charge ... to himself.” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1117 (citing Lopez, 620 F.2d at 1235).
Ultimately, the Barnes court held that Judge Winchell was performing a judicial act when he assisted individuals who were before him as litigants in preparing their complaint against Barnes. The court noted that “Judge Winchell’s level of involvement in the prosecution of Ms. Barnes [was] far less substantial and of a significantly different nature than the purely prosecutorial action to which immunity did not extend in ... Sevier and Lopez.” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1119. Further, unlike the judges in those cases, Judge Winchell was not motivated by private interests, did not single-handedly initiate criminal charges against persons who did not have a case pending before him, and then subsequently pass judgment upon such charges. Id.
In Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997), this court again addressed the issue of whether the initiation of criminal proceedings against an individual constitutes a judicial act. Frank Barrett was the owner of a roofing business that was [620]*620“involved in an ongoing controversy with the Department of Codes Administration of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County regarding work permits for various projects.” Id. at 249. In September 1994, Barrett appeared before Nancy Harrington, a Metropolitan General Session Judge of Nashville and Davidson County, to answer two violations of the Environmental Codes. At the conclusion of the bench trial, Judge Harrington ruled against Barrett and he became enraged. Barrett then decided to investigate Judge Harrington and, in doing so, he discovered that she had previously dismissed parking tickets that had been issued to her and her husband. Barrett also made threatening remarks about Judge Harrington to court employees who advised Judge Harrington that she should be concerned for her safety.
In response, Judge Harrington wrote letters on her judicial letterhead to the state district attorney urging him to investigate Barrett because he was “attempting to obstruct justice by harassing [her] and [her] family.” Id. Judge Harrington was also concerned that Barrett was attempting to set up a situation in which she would have to recuse herself from future cases against him, which “were likely to arise due to his ongoing dispute with the Codes Department.” Id.
In concluding that absolute immunity shielded Judge Harrington from liability for her actions in writing letters to the prosecutors that prompted the investigation of Barrett, the court found that she was attempting “to protect the integrity of the judicial decision-making process.” Id. at 259. The court noted that, “just as a judge’s citation for contempt against a party who obstructs justice is a judicial act taken to preserve integrity of the judicial system, so too is the instigation of criminal proceedings against a disgruntled litigant whose conduct may amount to obstruction.” Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, the court noted that it made no difference whether Barrett’s alleged obstruction occurred inside or outside the courtroom. Rather, the fact that Judge Harrington believed Barrett’s actions amounted to obstruction of justice in relation to her role as a judge imposed the duty to report such actions to the proper authorities. See Barrett, 130 F.3d at 259.
In reaching this conclusion, the Barrett court relied upon the logic from Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1985) (vacated and remanded on other grounds in Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986) and reversed in part by Martinez v. Winner, 778 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.1985)). In that case, the Tenth Circuit addressed the scope of judicial immunity regarding actions taken by Fred Winner, (then) the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Judge Winner was the presiding judge over Francisco Martinez’s criminal case. The relevant issue in Martinez concerned whether Judge Winner was entitled to immunity for writing letters to the Justice Department and other law enforcement officials in which he accused Francisco Martinez of being a catalyst for bringing together terrorist groups and attempting to obstruct justice by collaborating with spectators to intimidate the jury. The court concluded that Judge Winner was entitled to immunity for writing these letters because he “had a duty to notify the proper authorities if he felt a crime was being committed in his courtroom.” Barrett, 130 F.3d at 258 (citing Martinez, 771 F.2d at 435).
In the present case, Judge Clunk had a similar duty. Upon learning that Brookings had falsified information on his application for a marriage license, Judge Clunk had an obligation to report to prose[621]*621cuting authorities that he felt a crime had been committed in his court. This was the third time Brookings had applied for and received a marriage license from the Stark County Probate Court since his gender reassignment. Presumably, Brookings also failed to truthfully attest to relevant information in his prior requests for a license. Brookings’ repeated attempts to fraudulently obtain marriage licenses provides further support for Judge Clunk’s efforts to protect the integrity of the judicial system.
In Barrett, this court concluded that Judge Harrington’s conduct in writing to prosecuting authorities was protected by judicial immunity. Specifically, the court noted that she was fearful that the harassment would cause her to have to recuse herself from future cases involving Barrett. Similarly, in the instant case, it is illogical to conclude that Judge Clunk, although aware that Brookings had committed fraud upon the court in applying for a marriage license, was required to sit silently and refrain from reporting such conduct to the proper authorities, particularly in light of Brookings’ continuing course of conduct in fraudulently applying for marriage licenses. Additionally, if litigants are able to perpetrate fraud on courts and subsequently threaten judges with personal liability for reporting such behavior, the integrity of the judicial system is jeopardized. Such actions and their attendant results would encourage litigants to act unlawfully and limit a judge’s ability to address such conduct through proper venues.1
As noted above, in determining whether this act is judicial, this court must examine the nature and function of the action, not the act itself. This circuit has held that even if the particular act is not a function normally performed by a judge, it may constitute a judicial act if it relates to a general function normally performed by a judge. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13, 112 S.Ct. 286). Admittedly, the swearing out of a criminal complaint is not a normal function of a judge. In fact, this type of conduct is typically undertaken by a citizen complainant or law enforcement personnel. And as previously noted, the instigation of criminal proceedings is not an adjudicatory [622]*622function in that it does not resolve disputes between two parties, but rather it initiates one. However, the general function of Judge Clunk’s conduct in initiating,criminal proceedings against Brookings was to “preserve the integrity of the judicial system.” Barrett, 130 F.3d at 259.
The Appellee argues that Judge Clunk’s actions were not judicial because he acted with an evil motive in instigating criminal charges. Specifically, he asserts that Judge Clunk admitted that he “really twisted arms to get this [Brookings case] prosecuted.” However, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988), the Supreme Court noted that a judicial act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.” Id. at 227, 108 S.Ct. 538. For example, in Míreles, a judge ordered police officers to bring an attorney before him, with excessive force. In concluding that the judge was entitled to immunity, the court focused on the more general act of ordering counsel before the court, rather than the issue of the use of force. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. 286.
In the instant case, the focus is on the act of initiating criminal proceedings against Brookings by swearing out a criminal complaint against him. Judge Clunk is entitled to immunity for this action because it was taken in an effort to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. The fact that Judge Clunk may have twisted the arms of the prosecutor to get the case prosecuted does not transform the act into one that is not covered by immunity.
In summary, Judge Clunk was engaged in a judicial act in swearing out a criminal complaint against Brookings upon learning that he had committed a crime in his court. Because Judge Clunk had information indicating that Brookings had falsified his application for a marriage license and had attempted to obstruct justice in a case then pending before him, he had a duty to report Brookings’ conduct to the proper authorities. Therefore, we find that Judge Clunk’s actions constitute a judicial act taken to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. Barrett, 130 F.3d at 259.
(2) Judicial Capacity
Several cases are noteworthy with respect to the issue of actions taken under the rubric of “judicial capacity.” For example, in Barnes, this court discussed the Fifth and Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981) and Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 601, 66 L.Ed.2d 491 (1980), discussed supra, in which the courts refused to recognize judicial immunity.
Harper involved an individual (Jack Harper) who went to the chambers of County Judge Arden Merckle to drop off a support payment check for his former wife, a secretary employed by another county judge in an adjacent office. Judge Merckle asked Harper to be sworn in for questioning, but Harper refused. As a result, Judge Merckle then conducted a “contempt proceeding” after having Harper apprehended. Judge Merckle found Harper in contempt and incarcerated him for three days.
In determining whether Judge Clunk dealt with Brookings in his judicial capacity, the district court correctly noted that, at the time Judge Clunk swore out the complaint, Brookings was no longer a litigant in his court. However, the district court incorrectly concluded that this fact demonstrates that Judge Clunk initiated criminal proceedings against Brookings based on his private interests and not a [623]*623result of a case “brought before [him] independently by the parties.”
Judge Clunk filed a criminal complaint against Brookings based on his dealings with him in his role as a Probate Judge. Judge Clunk, unlike the judges in Harper and Lopez, did not initiate criminal charges based on his private, non-judicial life and then, in highly irregular proceedings, pass judgment upon such charges. Instead, the controversy between Judge Clunk and Brookings arose directly from a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 361, 98 S.Ct. 1099.
B. Absence Of All Jurisdiction Exception
The Supreme Court has held that the term “jurisdiction” is to be broadly construed to effectuate the purposes of judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099. As such, a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction “only when the matter upon which he acts is clearly outside the subject matter of the court over which he presides.” Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.1997). Acts done “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” for which no immunity is afforded, should be distinguished from those actions in “excess of jurisdiction” which fall within the ambit of immunity protection. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1122.
Here, even if Judge Clunk exceeded his authority in filing a criminal complaint against Brookings, he did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Assuming, as the Appellee suggests, that Judge Clunk committed a procedural error by initiating criminal proceedings against Brookings, this type of mistake will not render him liable for damages. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (holding that the commission of grave procedural errors, including those involving due process, does not constitute judicial action taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction).
As a Probate Judge, Judge Clunk had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying action. That is, he had the authority to issue a marriage license if he deemed it appropriate or to deny the license if he determined that there was a “legal impediment.” O.R.C. § 3101.05. Additionally, however, Judge Clunk had an obligation to report potentially obstructive conduct to the proper authorities if he felt such conduct had occurred in a case before him. As in Barrett and as conceded by the Appellee during oral argument, Judge Clunk could have satisfied this obligation by simply writing a letter to prosecutors outlining those matters that Brookings had falsified on his marriage license application. However, the issue in this case is whether Judge Clunk exceeded his authority when he went one step further and not only wrote a letter outlining Brookings alleged obstructive behavior but filed a criminal complaint against him.
In summary, the facts of this case support the conclusion that Judge Clunk’s actions should be held to be an integral part of the judicial process. His obligation to report to the proper authorities that a potential crime had been committed in a case then pending before him leads this court to conclude that, at most, Judge Clunk simply acted in excess of his jurisdictional authority. Because we conclude that Judge Clunk did not act in complete absence of all jurisdiction, his actions are protected by absolute judicial immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and REMAND with directions that the claims asserted against Judge Clunk be dismissed.