Seaman v. Brown

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00775
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION GUY J. SEAMAN, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-775-G-BN § JUDGE MARY BROWN, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Guy J. Seaman filed this pro se action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three state judges, a state district court administrator, and a state appellate clerk of court sued in their official and individual capacities, a private attorney representing his wife in a state court divorce proceeding, and various John and Jane Doe officials. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 11. Seaman has also filed various motions seeking relief, including a motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief barring the state court from, among other things, issuing orders or holding hearings, mediation, or trial “without explicit federal court authorization,” Dkt. No. 5 at 3, and a motion titled “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Notice of Federal Collapse Risk, and Demand for Expedited Intervention,” asking this Court to “[a]ssert control, freeze the timeline, and preserve federal adjudication,” Dkt. No. 12 at 8. Because Seaman is proceeding pro se, Senior United States District Judge A. Joe Fish referred this lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny the request for injunctive relief and dismiss this lawsuit.

Legal Standards A district court may “consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own initiative.” Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); accord Bell v. Valdez, 207 F.3d 657 (table), 2000 WL 122411, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2000) (per curiam) (“[I]t is well-established that the district court may dismiss a complaint on 12(b)(6) grounds sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). “The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the

procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). A magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide notice, and the period for filing objections to them affords the parties an opportunity

to respond. See, e.g., Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citations omitted), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual

matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels;

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)). And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899

(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). As to Seaman’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, such an injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be entitled to

a preliminary injunction, the applicant must show (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted) Analysis The complaint alleges claims against the district judge and associate judge handling his divorce proceedings, the court administrator, the administrative judge for the region, the attorney representing his wife in the divorce, and ten “unknown judicial assistances, clerks, coordinators, and court officers.” See Dkt. 1 at 7-9. Seaman asserts that the state court judges and staff violated due process, equal protection, and the right to petition through their handling of his divorce case, including more than 30 motions that he filed and the denial of motions to recuse. See

id. He also alleges that they implicitly conspired or colluded with his wife’s attorney. Id. Seaman then filed an amended complaint adding the clerk of court for the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals and incorporating the original complaint by reference. See Dkt. No. 11. He asserts that the clerk denied him access to the appellate court because of filing issues that Seaman asserts were “deliberate obstruction.” Id. at 3-5. As always, the Court must first consider its jurisdiction. See Louisiana v. U.S.

Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is always first.” (citation omitted)). “Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v. Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 374, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)).

That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented by statute, and § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014), then citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)). There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing

state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But this exception does not permit injunctions against state courts or their employees because “’an injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163). And Seaman alleges no facts that could overcome judicial immunity for the judicial defendants, including court staff. “[A] judge generally has absolute immunity

from suits for damages.” Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)). “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))). There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id. Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.” (citations omitted)).

So Seaman’s claims against the state court judges and state district and appellate court staff should be dismissed. And to the extent that Seaman points to various rulings of the Supreme Court overturning state court decisions, a district court generally does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions. See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court

judgments’ except when authorized by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004))); accord Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the doctrine prevents “thinly veiled attempt[s] to circumvent the state appellate process and to collaterally attack – in the guise of a federal civil rights action – the validity of a state court [judgment] and other related

orders”). Appellate jurisdiction for federal issues lies instead with the U.S. Supreme Court after an appeal has gone through all state appellate processes. With respect to the claims against Bybee, generally, in the absence of a properly pled conspiracy with a government actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, constitutional claims against a private party will fail. See, e.g., Hershner v. City of Dallas, No. 23-11214, 2024 WL 4471503, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (per curiam) (“Without the inclusion of a state official, there is no basis to lodge a claim of deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution.” (citing 42 U.S.C. 1983)). “Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead

the operative facts upon which their claim is based. Bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient.” Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir.1987) (footnote omitted); Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1985 and ... plaintiffs must plead the operative facts upon which their claim is based.” (cleaned up)). The claims of a conspiracy do not meet this standard. At best, Seaman alleges

collusion between his wife and her lawyer, but conclusory allegations that ruling or failing to rule on particular motions imply a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1985. For these reasons, Seaman’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before dismissal, but leave is not required when a plaintiff has already pled his “best

case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Seaman’s complaint fails to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given another opportunity, Seaman could allege viable legal claims. Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay. But the opportunity to file objections to these findings, conclusions, and recommendation (as further explained below) allows Seaman another opportunity to show that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should instead grant

leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)). Finally, for all these reasons, Seaman also has not shown a substantial

likelihood of success on his claims, so the Court should deny the motions for a preliminary injunction and for a temporary restraining order. See Bluefield Water Ass’n, 577 at 252-53. Recommendation The Court should deny the motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order [Dkt. Nos. 5 & 12] and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: April 14, 2025 : : DAVIDL.HORAN —s—SsS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-10-