Scott v. Union Tank Car Co.

Indiana Court of Appeals

Scott v. Union Tank Car Co.

402 N.E.2d 992, 75 Ind. Dec. 150, 1980 Ind. App. LEXIS 1397

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 1, 1980

Docket3-877A203

StatusPublished

Cited by23 cases

This text of 402 N.E.2d 992 (Scott v. Union Tank Car Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992, 75 Ind. Dec. 150, 1980 Ind. App. LEXIS 1397 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinions

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Prentice Scott was an employee at will of Union Tank Car Company for a period of [993]*993approximately five years ending on August 26, 1974, the date of Scott’s dismissal. On October 6, 1976, over two years later, Scott filed suit against Union, alleging that he had been discharged in retaliation for filing á Workmen’s Compensation claim. However, Union’s motion to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Códe Ed.)) was granted by the court below.

Scott argues on appeal that his claim sounded in contract, not in tort, and that the six-year statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-1 (Burns Code Ed.)) was therefore applicable. He maintains that the court erred in concluding otherwise because his claim arose out of a contractual relationship, i. e., the relationship created by his unwritten contract of employment.

In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, the Supreme Court held that an employee who alleges that he or she was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act¹ or the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act² has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plainly, that decision recognized that an employee who files such a claim has an interest in continuing in his or her employment which is protected from invasion by the employer’s retaliatory actions. It follows that the act of an employer who discharges such an employee is one “which is intended to cause an invasion of an interest legally protected from intentional invasion,” and is, therefore, a tortious act. Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 6, Comment a. The fact that the right invaded is one which the law has created “in consequence of a relation which a contract has established between the parties” in no way undermines, but in fact supports, that con-elusion. See: Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind.App. 319, at 326, 95 N.E. 680, at 683.

Consequently, the trial court correctly denominated Scott’s claim as one sounding in tort and properly applied IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.) in dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the judgment below must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARRARD, P. J., concurs. STATON, J., dissents with opinion.

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HOFFMAN, Judge.

Prentice Scott was an employee at will of Union Tank Car Company for a period of [993]*993approximately five years ending on August 26, 1974, the date of Scott’s dismissal. On October 6, 1976, over two years later, Scott filed suit against Union, alleging that he had been discharged in retaliation for filing á Workmen’s Compensation claim. However, Union’s motion to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Códe Ed.)) was granted by the court below.

Scott argues on appeal that his claim sounded in contract, not in tort, and that the six-year statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-1 (Burns Code Ed.)) was therefore applicable. He maintains that the court erred in concluding otherwise because his claim arose out of a contractual relationship, i. e., the relationship created by his unwritten contract of employment.

In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, the Supreme Court held that an employee who alleges that he or she was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act¹ or the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act² has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plainly, that decision recognized that an employee who files such a claim has an interest in continuing in his or her employment which is protected from invasion by the employer’s retaliatory actions. It follows that the act of an employer who discharges such an employee is one “which is intended to cause an invasion of an interest legally protected from intentional invasion,” and is, therefore, a tortious act. Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 6, Comment a. The fact that the right invaded is one which the law has created “in consequence of a relation which a contract has established between the parties” in no way undermines, but in fact supports, that con-elusion. See: Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind.App. 319, at 326, 95 N.E. 680, at 683.

Consequently, the trial court correctly denominated Scott’s claim as one sounding in tort and properly applied IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.) in dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the judgment below must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARRARD, P. J., concurs. STATON, J., dissents with opinion.

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402 N.E.2d 992, 75 Ind. Dec. 150, 1980 Ind. App. LEXIS 1397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-union-tank-car-co-indctapp-1980.

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